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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the notion of authenticity and its existential, aesthetic and 
political determinations in the work of Marguerite Yourcenar. It aims to trace the 
desire for authenticity in Yourcenar’s fiction and criticism and to assess the strategies 
employed to preserve the possibility of authentic representation.
The investigation focuses on two aspects of the problematic of authenticity: 
subjectivity and politics. Both are discussed by Yourcenar in predominantly aesthetic 
terms. She argues that individual existence cannot be understood in its own 
uniqueness because it is entrapped within representational structures. The impasse of 
representation also affects the political self-constitution of nations and communities. 
Yourcenar’s response to this problem is developed through her meditation on art and 
time. She observes that authenticity is not a question of original creativity, but one of 
accepting the perishing of all representations in time. She also understands realism as 
a critically aware choice to accept the limits of narrative representation.
Yourcenar attempts to rescue the notion of authenticity for modernity by 
foregrounding difference and repetition. The thesis discusses this strategy in relation 
to de M an’s thought on irony and history, Benjamin’s writing on film and translation, 
and Heidegger’s analysis of spatio-temporality. The last part of the thesis focuses on 
poststructuralist interpretations of Heidegger by Lacoue-Labarthe and Lyotard. It is 
argued that the model of political self-realization which Yourcenar proposes for post­
war Europe can be associated with Heidegger’s vision of national identity in Nazi 
Germany. Yourcenar’s Memoires d ’Hadrien is used as a case study showing the 
ambivalence of her discourse on authenticity, a discourse which hovers 
uncomfortably between modem political aestheticism and the desire to overcome 
aestheticism at large. This conclusion helps to contextualize Yourcenar’s work in 
relation to political and philosophical modernity. It also highlights the vicissitudes of 
the search for authenticity in twentieth-century Europe.
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INTRODUCTION
In her fiction and criticism, Marguerite Yourcenar strongly suggests that it is possible 
for man to develop an authentic relationship with the world. Yet for all its positive 
connotations, this authentic relationship is seldom understood as the unproblematic 
coordination of the self and what lies beyond it. The difference between interiority 
and exteriority is itself so persistent, that authenticity never takes the form of 
reconciliation. Rather, for Yourcenar, authenticity designates a paradoxical 
achievement on man’s part, which consists in recognizing, accepting and preserving 
the separation of self and world.
This thesis proposes to investigate the notion of authenticity and its existential, 
aesthetic and political parameters in the work of Yourcenar. These three parameters, 
existence, aesthetics and politics, define key forms of involvement with the world 
and describe specific ways in which difference manifests itself.
Drawing from the existentialist tradition of the twentieth century, I shall use the 
term existence to designate the plain fact of being in the world. This definition of 
existence shall be further clarified (and tested) in my thesis. Nonetheless, it must be 
stated at the outset that ‘existence’ denotes an effort to think man in non-essentialist, 
non-objectivist and non-positivist terms, as an entity with no stable form or content. 
In her published interviews with Patrick de Rosbo, Yourcenar uses the adjective 
‘existentiel’ in a comparable way. She specifies that in her novel Memoires 
d ’Hadrien (1951),
9
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nous avons enfin un personnage dont je dirais que 1’ image que finalement nous 
obtenons de lui est existentielle et non essentielle, pour parler le jargon philosophique 
de notre temps (autant celui-la qu’un autre), c ’est-a-dire que nous avions un individu 
unique comme nous tous, fait comme nous tous d’elements fortuits assembles un peu 
au hasard, et qu’il s ’agit de retrouver dans leur complexite.
Similarly, in the case of Zenon, the main character of her novel L ’CEuvre au noir 
(1968), she writes that:
de nouveau j ’etais passee d’une realite poetique, archetypale et aussi, disons-le, 
conventionnelle, a une realite existentielle : la realite d’un individu donne a un 
moment donne.1
While Yourcenar is keen on distancing herself from the existentialists of her time, 
she employs the distinction between essence and existence to underline the 
contingency, facticity and spatio-temporal concreteness of two of her main narrative 
characters. In the sense that Yourcenar gives to the word, and which I also intend to 
follow in my analysis, existence is inherently differential, because it suffers an 
incessant change, and refers to the actual or imagined path towards subjectivity and 
selfhood.
If such concepts as existence, subjectivity and selfhood occupy a prominent 
place in Yourcenar’s oeuvre, the same cannot be said about politics. Strictly speaking, 
it is only in two of her novels, Denier du reve (1934, re-written in 1959) and 
Memoires d ’Hadrien that politics, in the everyday sense of the word, plays an 
important role. Even in these novels, the political as such is not discussed for its own 
sake, but always supplements the existential, and its meaning depends on the way it 
shapes, or is shaped by, the narrative characters. However, it is precisely the 
confluence of the existential and the political in Yourcenar that interests me. As an 
arrangement of the relationship between, on the one hand, individuals and 
communities, and on the other, space and time, politics forms an aspect of 
subjectivity. Whether in the guise of the politicized subject, of the subject of politics,
1 Patrick de Rosbo, Entretiens radiophoniques avec M arguerite Yourcenar (Paris: Mercure de France, 
1972), pp. 66-67.
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or of the subject as an agent of politics, the political frequently determines the 
existential parameters of the narrative. 2 It is certainly present in Yourcenar’s 
historical fiction and affects the development of her characters within the historical 
settings in which they act. Thus, even if Yourcenar is not consistently preoccupied 
with politics in her work, the political emerges as the productive relationship between 
man and world and as an important component of the subject’s personal trajectory 
and identity. As I shall endeavour to show, political subjectivity is also differential. 
The individual or the community do not simply impose their presence on the world in 
a linear and authoritative way, but are in a constant state of negotiation with space, 
tradition and history. Politics is understood, at least in principle, as the acceptance 
and management of the difference that separates man from the world.
However, it is in the realm of the aesthetic that difference manifests itself the 
most clearly and the most persistently in the work of Yourcenar. The principal way in 
which this happens is through the failure of the work of art fully to represent reality. 
Yourcenar’s rich and idiosyncratic art criticism, as well as her numerous references 
to art -  modem or ancient, western or oriental -  in her fiction, frequently revolve 
around the theme of the impossibility of adequately depicting nature or the human 
body in art. More generally, though, Yourcenar is concerned with art’s fundamental 
tendency to confer stable meanings to things, whereas, for her, meanings are 
ephemeral, fleeting and historically constituted. In this sense, semantic and semiotic 
difference does not affect only the visual arts, but every act of representation, 
whether artistic or literary. Art and literature fail in their programmatic goal to 
represent reality and experience, insofar as artistic and linguistic representations are 
motivated by the impulse to originate new stabilizing significations.
2 The politicized subject is represented in Yourcenar’s work by such radical figures as Marcella in 
Denier du reve, Remy in Souvenirs Pieux (1974), Mishima in Mishima ou la vision du vide (1980); 
the ‘subject o f politics’ includes Rome in M emoires d ’Hadrien  and Europe in Yourcenar’s essay 
‘Diagnostic de l ’Europe’ (1929); and the subject as an agent o f politics is best embodied by Hadrien as 
an emperor, in M emoires d ’Hadrien.
3 For example, Zenon persecuted by the authorities in L ’CEuvre au noir.
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The same is true with regard to other forms of writing, such as philosophy and 
historiography. While Yourcenar was an ardent student of history and a 
philosophically-minded writer, she also insisted on the abstract character of 
philosophical and historical interpretation. For her, philosophers and historians risk 
conceptualizing experience at least as much as artists, poets and novelists. As we 
shall see, Yourcenar considers that every act of representation, whether properly 
aesthetic or not, installs a conceptual distance between a signifier -  a work of art, a 
piece of writing -  and a set of factual referents which belong to reality or ‘life’. 
Precisely because representation is understood as a process of giving form and 
meaning to what is in itself amorphous and without permanent content, art is the 
privileged space where difference is the most acutely felt.
As I mentioned above, that which is primarily without stable form or content is 
human existence itself. If representation in all its guises fails to capture what is 
changeable and disorderly in the world, then a fortiori it fails to convey the unsettled 
reality of the self and the contingency of experience. This situation complicates all 
aspects of the effort to understand oneself, because, as I shall be discussing in 
Chapter 1, representation is the principal way of accessing the self as well as the 
world. It is the indispensable means of self-knowledge and of cognizance of the 
world, while at the same time it introduces difference and transforms both the world 
and the self into objects, concepts and symbols. This problem is central in Memoires 
d ’Hadrien, where the chief issue is to make sense of one’s life, and in L ’CEuvre au 
noir, where knowledge of the world is the main stake. In both these novels, the quest 
for authenticity is to be understood in terms of the struggle to transcend the impasse 
of representation. In my thesis I shall be using such categories as ‘the aestheticization 
of experience’, ‘the conceptualization of reality’ and the ‘rhetorical constitution of 
selfhood’ to refer to the problematic of representation.
The aesthetic or representational character of man’s relationship with the world 
is even more evident when it comes to politics. I just referred to politics in the
12
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Yourcenarian text as an ‘arrangement’ and a ‘management’ of space and time. Man 
structures and allocates meaning to the world in such a way that the polis is already 
an aesthetic-political representation. I shall discuss this point in more detail in 
Chapter 2, with reference to Memoires d ’Hadrien and to the cities that Hadrien 
founds during his reign.4 As we shall see, the political meets the aesthetic in a 
fundamental way in this novel. The model for the organization of the state and for the 
formation of political subjectivity is the work of art. The basic notions of 
representation, beauty, order and difference are at work in Yourcenar’s definition of 
both the state and the task of the statesman. It is in this context that I use the term 
‘the political aesthetic’ in the title of my thesis. I shall be arguing that, especially in 
Memoires d ’Hadrien, politics emerges as a form of aesthetics, while the political 
leader is an arch-artist who undertakes to negotiate the impasse of representation.
In this way, the existential and the political parameters constitute aspects of the 
problematic of aesthetic representation in the work of Marguerite Yourcenar. 
Existential authenticity and political authenticity are interrelated in as much as they 
depend on the possibility of authentic representation. If authentic representation were 
possible, if man’s artistic, literary, etc., creations could indeed convey the variability 
and multiformity of life, then man would be able to recognize himself existentially 
and politically in his works. However, following a line of reflection that brings 
Yourcenar close to Heidegger, as well as to some of his poststructural epigones, she 
insists that such a representation is beyond our capacity. How is it then that 
Yourcenar persists in the search for authenticity in her novels and criticism? Before 
attempting to answer this question in the chapters that follow, I propose to examine 
briefly here the ways in which Yourcenar employs the term authenticity, and the
4 M emoires d ’Hadrien is the imaginary memoirs o f Roman emperor Hadrian. In my thesis, I shall be 
using the name ‘Hadrien’, with an ‘e \  to refer to the main character o f this novel; in the few cases in 
which I shall be referring to the Roman emperor (117-138 CE), I shall be writing ‘Hadrian’, with an 
‘a’.
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various contexts in which it has been used in twentieth century literature and 
criticism in the West.
Readers of Yourcenar will notice that she does not use the term authenticite in 
the existential and political sense that I am attaching to it in my thesis. This word and 
its derivatives appear not infrequently in the Yourcenarian text to mean ‘genuine’, 
‘proper’ or ‘exact’. For example, in ‘Les Visages de l’Histoire dans l’« Histoire 
Auguste »’ (1962), Yourcenar distinguishes between the dubious authenticity of the 
Historia Augusta as a document (presumably written in the 4th Century CE) and the - 
equally uncertain - truthfulness and veracity of its content. She argues that modem 
historians suspect this text of being ‘une quasi totale imposture’, and then notes: 
‘L ’authenticite est une chose, la veracite en est une autre.’5 Authenticity is here 
understood in the sense of correct attribution to an author. The distinction between 
authenticite, as the truth of the object, and veracite, as the truth of its content, is, of 
course, fundamental to philology and to artistic connoisseurship. Both authenticity 
and veracity are understood in this context as forms of correspondence. Veracity 
clearly involves a correspondence between the actual facts, e.g. the historical facts 
mentioned in Historia Augusta, and their narrative exposition. But authenticity is 
also a form of correspondence. As Geoffrey Hartman notes, ‘the authenticity of the 
artist matters as a guarantee of a direct correspondence between the mind of the 
maker and the attributed work’.6 In this sense, authenticity denotes an undisputed 
correspondence and continuity between author and work, and it is opposed to 
artificiality and forgery.7
5 EM, p. 6. ‘Les Visages de l ’histoire dans l ’« Histoire Auguste »’, is included in Yourcenar’s 
collection o f essays Sous benefice d ’inventaire (Paris: Gallimard, 1962).
6 Geoffrey H. Hartmann, Scars o f  the Spirit: The Struggle against Inauthenticity (New York: 
Macmillan, 2002), p. 9.
7 In her essay ‘Le Chainon manquant de l ’ecriture’, May Chehab discusses the same passage from 
Yourcenar’s ‘Les Visages de l’histoire’ and hints at the idea o f authenticity as a form of 
correspondence. In May Chehab, ‘Le Chainon manquant de l’ecriture’, in (ed.), M arguerite Yourcenar 
entre litterature et science (Clermont-Ferrand: SIEY, 2007), pp. 157-174, (pp. 172-73).
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We find this understanding of authenticity in other parts of Yourcenar’s work. In 
the ‘Carnets de notes de Memoires d ’Hadrien (written in 1952), a series of 
fragmentary reflections on the composition of this novel, Yourcenar complains about 
the loss of authenticity suffered by the ruins of the Villa Adriana, emperor Hadrian’s 
final residence in Tivoli, as a result of bad restoration. ‘La moindre restauration 
imprudente infligee aux pierres, la moindre route macadamisee entamant un champ 
ou l’herbe croissait en paix depuis des siecles, creent a jamais 1’irreparable. La beaute 
s’eloigne ; l’authenticite aussi.’8 In this passage, authenticity has again the meaning 
of continuity between an original and its current form. Authenticity is also associated 
with beauty, implying that the correspondence between the original artefact and its 
ruins is what makes it beautiful for us today.
Nevertheless, continuity and correspondence between the authentic object and its 
origin are not linear and unproblematic. In her essay ‘Voyages dans l’espace et 
voyages dans le temps’ (1982), Yourcenar refers to the process of abstraction to 
which the contemporary visitor to ancient monuments has to take recourse in order to 
visualize them as they originally stood. For example, she argues that the protective 
rope surrounding Stonehenge ‘nous empeche efficacement de faire un saut de trente 
siecles’. Then she makes an extraordinary statement about the authenticity of the 
Parthenon in Athens:
Pour voir le Parthenon, comme l’ont vu non seulement Pericles, qui le connut 
surcharge d ’omements multicolores et de boucliers d ’or qui nous gateraient sans 
doute la purete de son architecture, ou Byron, qui le vit authentiquement en ruine, 
mais encore nous-memes il y a une trentaine d’annees, il faut eliminer en pensee la 
pollution d’Athenes.9
According to Yourcenar, it is not Pericles, its commissioner, but Byron who saw 
Parthenon in its authentic form, that is, ‘authentiquement en ruine’. For her,
8 OR, p. 540.
9 This and the previous quotation, EM, p. 699. ‘Voyages dans l’espace et voyages dans le temps’ was 
included in Yourcenar’s posthumous collection o f essays, Le Tour de la prison  (Paris: Gallimard, 
1991).
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authenticity is a quality pertaining to the ruin, in its purity, simplicity and 
suggestiveness. The authentic ruin is continuous with its origin, the ancient temple, 
in a paradoxical and troublesome fashion: not only is this continuity difficult to 
discern through the pollution of the modem city, but the origin to which the ruin 
corresponds is, we are told, inauthentic and impure. It follows that, for Yourcenar, 
authenticity and originality are two distinct concepts. Authenticity is a quality which 
remains hidden and which reveals itself to the observer once a process of almost 
random transformations occurs (e.g. transformations effected in time).
The word authenticite is used by Yourcenar in an analogous way with reference 
to concepts and ideas. In a footnote to her essay on the poet Constantin Cavafy, 
Yourcenar distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic Hellenism. ‘II importe 
pourtant de distinguer chez [Cavafy] entre les belles pieces d ’un hellenisme 
authentique, et celles ou il lui arrive de ceder a un gout [...] pour une Grece 
d’etagere’.10 Authenticity is again considered as a quality which remains hidden, 
although it is available to those -  artists or spectators, writers or readers -  who look 
for it. At a different point in this essay, Yourcenar is even more explicit as regards 
the hidden character of authenticity. Discussing Cavafy’s mysticism, she observes 
that it never transforms into linguistic and literary hermeticism; then she adds a 
footnote in which she remarks: ‘C ’est ce qui lui donne son etrange caractere 
d’esoterisme authentique, c ’est-a-dire bien cache.’11 Cavafy’s esotericism remains 
hidden behind the clarity of expression and the neatness of poetic form. This is what 
makes it authentic.
From this discussion, a pattern begins to emerge as to the way Yourcenar 
understands and uses the word authenticite and its derivatives. Authenticity is 
opposed to the artificial and the pastiche. It implies a continuity with an origin, but
10 EM, p. 138. From ‘Presentation critique de Constantin Cavafy’ (written 1939, revised 1953), an 
essay included in Sous benefice d ’inventaire.
11 EM, p. 158n.
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this continuity is not untroubled. The authentic tends to blend with the inauthentic or 
to remain concealed behind it. Thus, when we read in the work of Yourcenar that an 
object or an idea is ‘authentic’, we are not in the presence of something ‘original’. On 
the contrary, Yourcenar suggests that we are at a distance from the self-sufficiency of 
the original object or idea, while the ‘authentic’ is in fact an authentic representation. 
Even before its tasteless restoration, the Villa Adriana was not identical to the 
original Villa built by Hadrian, but a set of ‘authentic’ ruins. Similarly, in the realm 
of ideas, Cavafy cannot express his Hellenism and esotericism in an immediate 
manner; he has to re-iterate these original notions cautiously, to re-present them in 
such a way that their meaning does not figure autonomously or plainly in his poetry. 
His Hellenism is a poetical transformation of the original, plain idea of Hellenism. 
Finally, Yourcenar goes as far as to suggest that the origin with which authentic 
representations are associated may not actually exist. If, in antiquity, the Parthenon 
was burdened with needless embellishments, it is Byron who saw it ‘authentiquement 
en ruine’. The original to which Byron’s Parthenon corresponds exists only in our 
imagination.
The difference between originality and authenticity is crucial for Yourcenar, as it 
is for my study. If the terms authenticity and inauthenticity pertain principally to 
representations, then it is also true that they describe two forms of difference from an 
origin. Authentic difference is exemplified by the untouched ruins (such as 
Yourcenar saw them in Piranesi’s etchings, for instance), while inauthentic difference
1 9is exemplified by the artificial and the pastiche. It is therefore not an exaggeration 
to claim that Yourcenar’s artistic, literary and cultural criticism constitutes a tireless 
search for authentic representations. Her work in general can be considered as an 
effort to distinguish between the authentic and the artificial, and as an exploration of 
the obscure ways in which the authentic differs from a hypothetical origin.
12 I am referring here to Yourcenar’s essay ‘Le Cerveau noir de Piranese’ (1959-1961), in Sous 
benefice d ’inventaire.
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Following Yourcenar, in this thesis, I employ the term ‘authenticity’ principally 
as an aesthetic term which implies simultaneously a continuity with, and a difference 
from, an origin. Nonetheless, my interest is not primarily in artistic authenticity, but 
in the possibility of authentic existence and authentic politics as they emerge in 
Yourcenar’s writings. The criterion of authenticity applies both to existence and to 
politics: each is thoroughly affected by the problematic of representation.
Occasionally, Yourcenar comes close to associating explicitly the idea of 
authenticity with the question of existence. For example in Les Yeux ouverts, her 
book of interviews with Matthieu Galey, she expresses her opinion on the 
recreational use of drugs as follows: ‘Je suis contre tout ce qui est artificiel. Je trouve 
que l’esprit doit agir d ’apres soi-meme, d ’apres ses propres lois, sans bequilles et en
1 Ttout cas sans echasses.’ It is significant that Yourcenar locates the problem in the 
artificiality of the experience that drugs incite. She aestheticizes the issue of drugs, by 
suggesting that this experience is fake, inauthentic. More generally, though, it must 
be recognized that she did not use the term authenticite to define existential self- 
fulfilment and self-realization.
The reason for this may be that Yourcenar kept herself consciously at a distance 
from the existentialist tradition of the twentieth century. I discuss this topic in more 
detail in Chapter 4, with reference to Heidegger’s existentialism. However, the ideal 
of authentic selfhood has been central to philosophy long before European 
existentialism. Marshall Berman locates the beginning of the search for authenticity 
at the dawn of the Christian era, which, let us not forget, is also the historical setting 
of Memoires d ’Hadrien. Berman argues that it was after the disintegration of the 
Platonic polis, albeit after a gap of several centuries, that man looked for ways to 
affirm his individuality:
13 Marguerite Yourcenar, Les Yeux ouverts: Entretiens avec Matthieu Galey  (Paris: Le Centurion, 
1980), p. 112.
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It was only long after the disintegration o f this ancient polis  that the basis o f personal 
identity was questioned systematically and the search for authenticity was formally 
begun. The Stoics o f Nero’s age found themselves in a world governed by chance, 
contingency and arbitrary power [. ..].  Personal identity had to be fought for and 
wrested from such a world.14
The search for authenticity is associated by Berman with the beginnings of
individualism and the formation of individual political identity. Berman goes on to 
document the re-emergence of the quest of authenticity in Montesquieu and
Rousseau, while trying to put forth a new-Leftist agenda for the achievement of 
authentic morality and citizenship.
Both these aspects, the moral and the political, stress the interplay between the 
individual and the community which characterizes the concept of authenticity, as we 
still understand it today. In as much as the call for authenticity is also the call for self- 
realization, the individual finds herself opposed to social norms and moral demands. 
In his book The Ethics o f  Authenticity, Charles Taylor gives the individualistic 
interpretation of authenticity:
Being true to m yself means being true to my own originality, and that is something 
only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am also defining myself. I am 
realizing a potentiality that is properly my own. This is the background understanding
to the modem ideal o f  authenticity and to the goals o f self-fulfilment or self-
realization in which it is usually couched.15
Taylor recognizes the political and social dangers involved in this interpretation, and 
dismisses the resulting instrumentalism and ‘the culture of narcissism’ from which, 
he thinks, modernity and postmodemity suffer.16 However, he suggests that we can 
resist further fragmentation, both internal and societal, and understand authenticity in 
an intersubjective or ‘dialogicaf context.17 He proposes that we should rethink
14 Marshall Berman, The Politics o f  Authenticity: Radical Individualism and the Emergence o f  
Modern Society (New York: Atheneum, 1970), p. xx. In Chapter 2 o f my thesis, I shall investigate the 
ways in which Hadrien attempts to differentiate his approach to authenticity from that o f his 
contemporary Stoics.
15 Charles Taylor, The Ethics o f  Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 
29.
16 See Taylor, p. 55.
17 Taylor, p. 33.
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authenticity as a normative ideal involving ‘creation and construction as well as 
discovery’, ‘originality’, and ‘self-definition in dialogue’.18
The normative and intersubjective characteristics of authenticity have been 
emphasized more recently by Alessandro Ferrara in his 1998 book, Reflective 
Authenticity: Rethinking the Project o f Modernity. He claims that
the category o f authenticity, broadly understood as the congruity o f the self or o f a 
collective identity with itself -  a congruity not reducible to consistency -  [. ..] can 
help us to account even better than autonomy and difference for what it is that cultural 
rights, multiculturalism and the right to privacy are meant to protect, for what we 
understand today by human dignity.19
Ferrara’s argument is too refined to summarize here, but it may be read as an effort to 
re-institute a universal horizon of reference which is ‘appropriate to a 
postmetaphysical standpoint’.20 What I would like to stress at this point is that 
Ferrara’s definition of authenticity relies on a principle of congruity which is not 
reducible to consistency. This definition is close to Yourcenar’s perception of 
authenticity. As I discussed above, she understands authenticity in terms of a troubled 
continuity with an origin. Authenticity is, for her, a criterion for assessing 
representations on the basis of an aesthetic model. The same applies to Ferrara’s 
concept of authenticity.21
This aesthetic approach to authenticity is amply used by the existentialist 
philosophers, according to Jacob Golomb. In his book In Search o f Authenticity: 
From Kierkegaard to Camus, he examines the development of the notion of 
authenticity in five existentialist philosophers, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Sartre and Camus, and finds that at least the last four understand this notion in terms 
of ‘the authentic individual who individualizes and creates himself. In this act of
18 Taylor, p. 66.
19 Alessandro Ferrara, Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project o f  M odernity (London: 
Routledge, 1998), p. 52, my emphasis.
20 Ferrara, p. 10.
21 See, for instance, Ferrara, p. 10, where he writes o f ‘the well-formed work o f art’ as a model for 
authenticity.
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creation, creator and creation merge.’22 Man forms himself existentially as a work of 
art.
Golomb argues that ‘authenticity defines itself as lacking any definition’. All the 
same, a few paragraphs further down, Golomb offers a definition of authenticity as 
‘the authentic response of being true to the project of forming one’s own self, which 
entails reluctance to conform to any existential “is” or “ought” or to seek some 
transcendental “ought”’.23 This passage implies that authenticity is a possibility of the 
self that transcends ethics, conceptuality and difference. For Golomb, to be authentic 
means to produce a full and solid representation of oneself that leaves no part of 
oneself unaccounted for. Writing on Sartre’s aesthetic model of authenticity in La 
Nausee, Golomb remarks:
Sartre’s conclusion is that one is ‘saved’ by music, more generally, by art. In creating 
one’s self, one may become both a genuine artist and a work o f art. By becoming and 
living like a ‘saxophone note’, like a ‘melody’, one can achieve ‘justification of one’s 
existence’. The metaphor o f music and the aesthetic model o f authenticity transform 
this gloomy and nauseating novel into an optimistic literary manifesto o f the viability 
o f the search for authenticity within the anonymous crowd.
The idea of redemption through the stability, fullness and meaningfulness of a single 
note suggests that the existentialist model of authenticity, as Golomb perceives it, is 
linear, harmonious and self-sufficient. This model is very far indeed from 
Yourcenar’s understanding of authenticity as a troubled and differential continuity 
with an uncertain origin. While both Golomb and Yourcenar employ aesthetic 
models of authenticity, Golomb’s model stresses the hope of absolute self-creation, 
while Yourcenar’s model underlines the impossibility of total representation.
I cannot examine the different existentialist approaches to authenticity in further 
detail here, but I shall be comparing Heidegger’s analysis of authentic being with
22 Jacob Golomb, In Search o f  Authenticity: From Kierkegaard to Camus (London: Routledge, 1995), 
p. 71. The quotation refers specifically to Nietzsche’s concept o f authenticity in The Birth o f  Tragedy, 
but it describes succinctly the aesthetic approach to existential authenticity in general.
23 Golomb, p. 13.
24 Golomb, p. 145-146. The quotations within the quotation are from Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. 
by R. Baldick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982).
21
Introduction
Yourcenar’s perception of authenticity in Chapters 4 and 5. One of my arguments 
will be that, for both Yourcenar and Heidegger, the concepts of unity, identity and 
authenticity are equally complex and problematic. Not only does Yourcenar’s 
approach to authenticity have little in common with such one-dimensional aesthetic 
models as Taylor’s and Golomb’s, but it challenges the metaphysics underpinning the 
very concepts of ‘creating’ and ‘constructing’.
To give but one example here, in her introduction to her play Qui n ’a pas son 
Minotaure ?, Yourcenar explains that she re-wrote this work several times over a 
period of thirty years, experimenting with different operatic, comedic, grotesque and 
farcical representations of the central character, Thesee. Then she links the gradual 
and fragmentary creation of the figure of Thesee with that of her more famous 
character, Hadrien.
Quelques annees plus tard, j ’allais essayer de decrire dans Hadrien un homme qui peu 
a peu se construit a l ’aide de ses actes et du meme coup organise un monde. Je crois 
bien que je n’aurais pas reussi a en donner meme l’idee la plus inadequate, si je 
n’avais pas d’abord tente cette entreprise de comique disintegration.25
Yourcenar wants us to know that it was the disintegration of the character of Thesee 
which allowed for the narrative re-constitution of the character of Hadrien. Although 
an aesthetic model of existential and political self-authentication is followed in 
Memoires ( ‘un homme qui [...] se construit et [...] organise un monde’), this model 
is not spontaneous or undisturbed. It provides for the conscious deconstruction of the 
narrative subject, and for its subsequent reconstruction on the basis of individual 
fragments. At a narrative level, the figure of Hadrien is authenticated by virtue of its 
being explicitly a repetition of fragments rather than an original unified creation of 
the author’s mind. This point will be developed further in Chapter 3.
25 Introduction to Qui n ’a pas son M inotaure ?, in Marguerite Yourcenar, Theatre, 2 vols (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1971), II, p. 179. This play was first published in Marguerite Yourcenar, Le mystere 
d ’Alceste, suivi de: Qui n'a pas son M inotaure, (Paris: Plon, 1963).
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Can we therefore argue that Yourcenar was a step ahead of her time in terms of 
how she understood and attempted to ensure the authenticity of her novels and 
narrative characters? In one sense, this is not true, since novelists have always looked 
for innovative ways to ensure authenticity in their work. A prime example is Stendhal 
who, as Ann Jefferson argues, uses realism, repetition and, more scandalously, 
plagiarism, in a way that heightens the authenticity of the narrative. With reference to 
realism, Jefferson remarks that, for Stendhal, ‘the proper use of language requires the 
same “naturel” that is indispensable to authentic forms of passion’.26 The implication 
is that the expression of true passion requires conventional narrative means. ‘But if 
passion, where the demands of authenticity are just as great as they are in fiction, if 
passion can accommodate and even flourish on a repetition of the already written, 
then what about the novel?’27 Jefferson maintains that it is not originality or repetition 
as such that assert the authenticity of the novel. ‘The important thing is that [...] 
there is a deliberate sounding of more than one voice, and a careful positioning of the 
desired reader to enable her to hear all the voices at work in the texts.’28 While I agree 
with Jefferson that ‘repetition in itself is neither positive nor negative, neither vulgar 
nor sublime’, I shall be arguing that, by foregrounding the instance of repetition, 
Yourcenar attempts to revive the cause of authenticity, narrative or otherwise.29 I 
shall also re-examine the issue of realism and whether it precludes or, on the 
contrary, helps to affirm the possibility of authenticity in writing. In any case, it is 
safe to conclude that Yourcenar does not stand out among other writers specifically 
for problematizing the issue of narrative authenticity in her novels.
Rather, I believe that the singularity of Yourcenar’s approach becomes manifest 
when examined in the specific literary and cultural context in which it is inscribed. 
On the one hand, she attempts to narrate the struggle for authenticity, while avoiding
26 Ann Jefferson, Reading Realism in Stendhal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 93.
27 Jefferson, p. 217.
28 Jefferson, p. 217.
29 Jefferson, p. 217.
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the existentialist tendency of using fiction to illustrate a philosophical point. On the 
other hand, she thematizes the problematic of authenticity in narrative but, unlike her 
contemporary nouveau-romanciers, she sees the novel primarily as ‘the writing of 
adventure’, rather than ‘the adventure of writing’. I am borrowing these phrases from 
Fran^oise van Rossum-Guyon, who writes:
En s’affirmant comme aventure d’une ecriture au lieu de l’ecriture d’une aventure 
[. . .],  en passant de 1’autorepresentation a 1’antirepresentation, le Nouveau Roman 
[. . .] se constitue en theorie du roman puisqu’il met a nu sa condition de possibility 
selon laquelle c ’est la narration qui constitue la fiction et non 1’inverse.
For Yourcenar, focusing on ecriture as such does not teach us anything new about the 
representational character of either writing or experience. It is not necessarily the 
breaking of textual ‘continuity’, but the mise-en-scene and the practice itself of 
writing which show the ‘theoretical’ and therefore artful and artificial character of the 
novel. As Michel de Certeau has stressed with reference to Freud’s not 
unconventional ‘roman familial’ Moses and Monotheism, ‘La pratique productrice 
du texte est la theorie' The text contains and narrates the theory that makes it 
possible. In Chapter 1, I shall argue further that, for Yourcenar, it is through the 
rigorous use and inevitable failure of realism that the limits of representation become 
visible. Authenticity arises paradoxically on the limits of realist narrative as that 
obscure truth of the self that does not lend itself to representation.
In this sense, already with Memoires d ’Hadrien, Yourcenar enters into a 
dialogue with the critique of authenticity and representation which is a key aspect of 
the postmodern theory of writing (and) the self. In her Poetics o f  Postmodernism,
30 Frarujoise van Rossum-Guyon, ‘Le Nouveau Roman comme critique du roman’, in Jean Ricardou 
and F. Rossum-Guyon (eds), Nouveau roman : hier, au jourd’hui (Paris: Union Generale d ’Editions, 
1974), pp. 215-254, (p. 229).
31 Michel de Certeau, L ’Ecriture de I’histoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), p. 339. ‘Roman familial’ is 
how de Certeau describes Freud’s 1939 historico-psychoanalytical study M oses and Monotheism. De 
Certeau italicizes the phrases quoted here to stress that ideas and concepts can be articulated more 
convincingly through the rhetorical processes and semiotic structures which constitute the text, rather 
than through the analytical language o f science, historiography, criticism and so on. I am not using this 
argument against the nouveau rom an , but I believe it is even better illustrated by realist narrative such 
as Yourcenar’s.
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Linda Hutcheon sums up this critique in terms of the decentring of the subject in 
literature as in thought:
In postmodern psychoanalytic, philosophical and literary theory, the further 
decentering o f the subject and its pursuit o f individuality and authenticity has had 
significant repercussions on everything from our concepts o f rationality to our view of 
the possibilities o f genre.
[. . .] The move to rethink margins and borders is clearly a move away from 
centralization with its associated concerns o f origin, oneness and monumentality that 
work to link the concept o f the center to those o f the eternal and universal. The local, 
the regional, the non-totalizing are re-asserted as the center becomes a fiction -  
necessary, desired, but a fiction nonetheless.32
Following Hutcheon’s claim, emphasis on the periphery works to challenge the 
autonomy of the centre and therefore to delegitimize the struggle for existential, 
political and narrative authenticity. As we shall see, Yourcenar’s pre-emptive answer 
is that, even in the traditional context of literary realism, the subject has never been 
an autonomous entity preoccupied with consolidating its centrality, but has always 
constituted itself in dislocation, with no ‘place’ to call its own. Because the subject 
has no place, it has never been possible to focus on it, whatever the reservations with 
regard to the realist novel in postmodernist thought. On the contrary, as I shall 
discuss in Chapter 1, realism is seen by Yourcenar as a technique of focusing on the 
trivial, the phenomenal and the repetitive, with an aim of closing in on the shifting 
and obscure area of the subject, without even attempting to represent it centrally. 
Furthermore, while Yourcenar would readily agree that the systematic discourses of 
science and ideology often presume the presence of the subject, she would also add 
that the way to deconstruct these discourses is not necessarily by consciously 
dismantling the narrative and decentring the subject. One cannot decentre what is 
already decentred. My reading of Yourcenar will suggest that, for her at the very 
least, the purportedly solid and unitary context to which the realist novel is said to
32 Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics o f  Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction (London: Routledge, 1988), 
p. 58.
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appeal lends itself excellently to demonstrating the constitutive dislocation of the 
subject.
By explicitly recognizing this state of affairs Yourcenar’s characters claim their 
authenticity. Recognition does not restore the stability of the self, but situates it in the 
interplay between purity and impurity, between the desire for order and the certainty 
of disorder. In this sense, for Yourcenar, authenticity does not consist in a dialectical 
transcendence of irony, but in accepting what I shall designate, following Heidegger, 
as the facticity of the self, that is, the fact that the self always exists in a concrete and 
finite spatio-temporality that refuses synthesis and redemption. Authenticity emerges 
in Yourcenar’s fiction as the acceptance of the self’s constitutive inauthenticity or, 
better, as the swinging back and forth between revolt and acceptance, between the 
impulse to create something original and the knowledge that pure creativity is beyond 
our capacities. I believe that this dramatic oscillation between extreme existential 
states is described in Memoires d ’Hadrien more explicitly, intensely and 
convincingly than in any other work by Yourcenar. This is one of the reasons why I 
shall be reading this novel more closely than the rest of Yourcenar’s literature. My 
study will also engage, nonetheless, with the rest of Yourcenar’s fiction especially 
after the Second World War, as well as with her literary and artistic criticism. I shall 
not, with some exceptions, focus on Yourcenar’s autobiography and theatre, for 
reasons of space, and because this would require different critical and interpretative 
approaches.
Yourcenar is not alone in suggesting that authenticity is not a synonym of purity, 
but involves the ability to understand what is at stake in the opposition between 
purity and impurity. The purity/impurity dichotomy has been a central issue in 
twentieth-century art, as Mozaffar Qizilbash discusses in a 1998 essay with the title 
‘Impurity, Authenticity, Humanity’.33 Qizilbash asks: ‘Is it distinctively, even
33 Mozaffar Qizilbash, ‘Impurity, Authenticity, Humanity’, in Angelaki: Journal o f  Theoretical 
Humanities, Volume 3, No 1 (Oxford: Carfax, 1998), pp. 1-7.
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authentically, human to be, in some sense, impure?’.34 He compares the work of 
Mondrian with that of Pollock, and concludes that, with regard to ‘the pure/impure 
opposition, Mondrian was the foremost purist in abstract painting and Jackson 
Pollock’s work is exemplary of the impure’.35 Can we therefore claim that Pollock 
represents the ‘human’ more truthfully than Mondrian, asks Qizilbash. Or is the 
opposite also arguable, namely, that Mondrian expresses a very human desire for 
purity, while Pollock offers a demonic, almost inhuman, representation of impurity? 
Drawing from the work of another abstract painter, Barnett Newman, and reflecting 
on the ‘imprecisions’ and ‘imperfections’ of his paintings, Qizilbash concludes that 
‘the impure is not simply human, nor the pure inhuman. Rather, [...] it is in the 
opposition between the pure and the impure that the human shows itself.’ Further 
down, he stresses again that ‘it is [...] in the interplay between the pure and the 
impure that the human emerges’.36 In Newman’s paintings, as in Yourcenar’s 
narrative, authenticity is understood as the drama of impurity over the background of 
the quest for purity.
At this point, however, a risk emerges, and it is one which I think was not fully 
taken into account in Yourcenar’s thinking of authenticity. In inverting the meaning 
of authenticity, so as to reckon with the fundamental inauthenticity of the self, one 
might be tempted to imagine a new universal form of subjectivity whose 
characteristic is precisely its instability and decentredness. If impurity is a 
constitutive aspect of being human, then one might surmise that humanity can finally 
be defined on the basis of its infirmity and inauthenticity. In this sense, self- 
realization would lead to the creation of a new identity which, although based on the 
acknowledgement of fleetingness and contingency, would itself be ontologically self- 
sufficient and secure. It would be a new, negative essence. I believe that this
34 Qizilbash, p. 2.
35 Qizilbash, p. 3.
36 Qizilbash, p. 3.
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unacknowledged risk lurks in Qizilbash’s perception of what it means to be human. 
Humanity is depicted by him as a new universal referent. I also believe that this 
danger is present in Yourcenar’s writing, and especially in her determination of 
political authenticity.
Political authenticity constitutes one of the structural themes of Memoires 
d ’Hadrien -  and this is the other reason why I have chosen to focus mostly on this 
novel. As we shall see, the issue of political authenticity has a double reference. 
Firstly, it concerns the political identity of the community over which Hadrien rules, 
namely the Roman Empire. Secondly, it refers to the political identity of the 
community which Yourcenar addresses in principle, namely Europe in the wake of 
the Second World War. These two communities, with Hadrien as the exemplary 
leader and arch-artist, constitute two political subjects that are distinct in time, but 
which share the same space, history and, as I shall argue in Chapter 5, the same 
geopolitics and ‘geopoetics’.
In Memoires d ’Hadrien, both the individual and the political subjects follow the 
same aesthetic model of self-authentication. Just as Hadrien - the individual subject - 
constructs himself as an artefact made of pre-existing fragments, so the empire - the 
political subject -  is organized as a work of art, assimilating and promoting its own 
history. Yourcenar clearly hopes that the search for political authenticity in Memoires 
will resonate with her contemporary European readers. The novel’s phenomenal 
success in the 1950’s suggests that she was justified in that hope.
Yet the transition from the individual to the political and from the existential to 
the historical is not so smooth. While, to a certain extent, Memoires d ’Hadrien 
avoids reducing individual existence to a stable identity with immutable 
characteristics, the empire is ultimately defined as a entity with a fixed historical and 
political content. Put differently, while from an existential viewpoint, the figure of 
Hadrien maintains its idiosyncrasy and corresponds only to itself, from a political
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perspective, the empire and, by inference, ‘Europe’, acquire a universal meaning that 
exceeds their factical limits. They become pure identities.
The reason for this is, I believe, that the political subject (the ‘empire’, ‘Europe’) 
is given a concrete geopolitical space in the novel, despite Yourcenar’s insistence 
that the subject is fleeting, mysteriously drifting away from its expected course, and 
never inhabiting its ‘proper’ space. The political subject ceases to be a differential 
representation, and becomes a symbol with a concrete referent. Europe and Rome 
become signifiers of ‘humanity’, ‘beauty’ and ‘freedom’, ideals which draw their 
validity from Greece, and in the process exclude other forms of subjectivity which do 
not have the same character of universality. In the last chapter of my thesis, I shall be 
examining some of the strategies of exclusion deployed in Memoires by looking into 
Hadrien’s relationship with his silent lover, Antinoiis, and into Hadrien’s aggressive 
wars against the Jews. Overall, there is room to argue that politics in Memoires is 
anchored in the idea of the universality of Greece, and that Greek aesthetic thought 
constitutes the missing space of the subject. In this way, the political articulation of 
authenticity in Memoires will be shown to preserve those very traditional essentialist 
and metaphysical determinations which the individual subject of this novel struggles 
to shake off.
Although the last chapter of my thesis will be dedicated to the issue of political 
aestheticism and the exclusion of otherness in Memoires, my concern overall is not to 
be critical of Yourcenar. Nor do I seek, in the first four chapters, to ‘reclaim’ 
Yourcenar for postmodemity. In addition to studying the adventures of the notion of 
authenticity in general, I am interested in helping to establish the specifically modem 
character of Yourcenar’s fiction, criticism and thought. For that purpose, I will be 
reading her work in the light of the analyses of authenticity by Benjamin and 
Heidegger, two different, but in certain ways compatible, thinkers of modernity. In
29
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my investigation, I shall also be consulting selected studies on political and 
philosophical modernity by de Man, Lacoue-Labarthe and Lyotard.
Of these thinkers, it is with Martin Heidegger’s existentialism that Yourcenar’s 
thought on subjectivity, existence and authenticity can be compared the most 
fruitfully. This might come as a surprise, given these two writers’ manifestly 
different styles of writing, and also their seemingly diverging attitudes towards a 
number of individual themes. Yourcenar’s balanced, ‘readerly’ narrative contrasts 
sharply with Heidegger’s unruly poetical-philosophical prose. Moreover, 
Yourcenar’s fiction, however inclined to philosophical meditation, has little to offer 
by way of rigorous analysis and conclusive statements. From a different perspective, 
Yourcenar’s work bears the stamp of cosmopolitanism; it opens itself to a variety of 
traditions, cultures, languages, arts and literatures, old and new alike. Conversely, 
Heidegger’s life and philosophical attitude seem provincial, almost oblivious of 
anything that is not related to his Greco-Germanic references, and suggestively 
rooted in the land around Freiburg which he rarely left.37
Yet these differences are not so extreme as they initially appear. Yourcenar’s 
cosmopolitanism seems less assured when considered from the vantage point of 
‘Diagnostic de l’Europe’, one of her early and most conservative essays, as I shall 
discuss in Chapter 3. On the other hand, Heidegger is the philosopher who taught us 
about the homelessness of Being -  a notion close to the dislocated subject to which I 
referred above. There is an element of irony in calling ‘provincial’ a philosopher 
deeply concerned with the ideas of exile and wandering. As Derrida writes, 
‘comment accuser cette pensee [i.e. la pensee de Heidegger] de Terrance
37 See Adorno’s critique o f Heidegger’s provincialism, in Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon o f  
Authenticity, trans. by Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (London: Routledge, 1986), especially pp. 
53-57. Adorno stresses the ‘falsity o f rootedness’ in Heidegger (p. 57). With reference to a 1933 radio 
broadcast by Heidegger, entitled ‘Why Do W e Stay in the Provinces’, Adorno observes that ‘With 
wily strategy [Heidegger] disarms the charge that he is provincial; he uses the term “provincialism” in 
a positive sense’ (p. 53). See Martin Heidegger, ‘Creative Landscape: Why Do W e Stay in the 
Provinces’, in Anton Kaes et al. (eds), The Weimar Republic Sourcebook  (Berkeley: University o f  
California Press, 1994), pp. 426-428.
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interminable d ’etre un nouveau paganisme du Lieu, un culte complaisant du 
Sedentaire ? La requete du Lieu et de la Terre n ’a rien ici [...] du provincialisme ou 
du particularisme.’38 Furthermore, it may be argued that Yourcenar’s philosophically 
minded literature reflects, rather than resists, Heidegger’s literary-minded 
philosophy.
In my analysis, I shall attempt to trace the similarities between Yourcenar’s and 
Heidegger’s approaches to existence and subjectivity. I shall place especial emphasis 
on their respective accounts of the non-conceptual unity between man, space and 
time. I shall also argue that both Heidegger and Yourcenar encourage us to think 
unity in terms of difference rather than identity. For both thinkers, unity rests, 
paradoxically, on accepting the difference that separates man from the world, and 
refuses harmony and identification. Self-authentication will thus be distinguished 
from the simplistic view of the existentialist project of creating a ‘meaning’ for one’s 
life. Rather, authenticity will be associated with the constant repetition of previous 
fragments of meaning, and with the perpetual re-assertion of difference.
In a more critical spirit, I shall point out that Yourcenar’s and Heidegger’s 
respective accounts of subjectivity are equally affected by the risk of universality. As 
I discussed above, this is the risk involved in stabilizing the site of the subject by 
considering impurity and differentiality as the subject’s immutable and universal 
characteristics. I shall argue that, like Yourcenar, Heidegger also looked in Greek 
poetics and aesthetics to find a universal site for the subject, and suggested that it was 
possible to implement a Greek-inspired aesthetic model of authenticity in modernity. 
While for Yourcenar this model serves to create a new political identity for post-war 
Europe, in Heidegger’s political thought, this model is used to inspire a new political 
identity for pre-war Germany. This discussion will eventually refer to Heidegger’s 
involvement with the Nazi party in the 1930’s, and to the way this involvement is
38 • 'Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence et metaphysique’, L ’Ecriture et la difference (Seuil: Paris, 1967), pp. 
213-14.
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linked with his philosophy. I will suggest that the same perception of political 
authenticity underpins Yourcenar’s and Heidegger’s political thought, despite the fact 
that Yourcenar’s approach was much less radical as a result of the then recent war.
Yourcenar’s existential and political thought will thus be associated with 
political modernity, albeit with its darker side. Unlike some of Yourcenar’s most 
vociferous critics, I shall not be quick to decry her putative ‘collaborationist strategy’, 
nor shall I consider at length here charges of anti-Semitism which, I believe, do not 
do justice to the complexity of her thought.39 Still, I shall raise the issue of the 
representation of the Jews in Memoires, not to point out the presence of racial 
prejudice in Yourcenar’s writings - 1 do not think there is any - ,  but to show how her 
thought is allied to an understanding of subjectivity and authenticity which also 
makes racism and fascism possible. I will suggest that this is not a particularity of 
Yourcenar’s or Heidegger’s thought, but a sign of a specific strand in political 
modernity which of course both authors chose to follow. Especially with regard to 
Yourcenar, I wish to examine how the simultaneous quest for authenticity and 
exemplarity, for uniqueness and universality, expresses itself in her work as a 
particular feature of modernity. Yourcenar’s work will thus appear to be rooted in 
modernity not only in that it opens itself to a series of new and radical questions, 
including those of subjectivity and representation, but also in that it seems to exclude 
certain forms of alterity which modernity, in some of its guises, refuses to think.
Paradoxically, studies investigating the presence of modernity in Yourcenar’s 
work are scarce. This suggests that Yourcenar’s tactics of keeping equal distance
39 In his essay ‘Coup de Grace as Male Fantasy: On the Sexual Politics o f Fascism ’, Michael Rothberg 
writes suggestively o f ‘Yourcenar’s “collaborationist strategy’” (p. 141), but fails, in my opinion, to 
provide any evidence, literary or otherwise, supporting his claim. This essay is in J. H. Sarnecki and I. 
Majer O ’Sickey (eds), Subversive Subjects: Reading M arguerite Yourcenar (Madison, N.J.: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 2004), pp. 125-147. Elaine Marks castigates Yourcenar’s ‘antisemitism, 
racism, classism ’ (p. 86), in her chapter on Yourcenar, entitled “‘Getting Away with Murd(h)er”, 
Author’s Preface and Narrator’s Text: Reading Marguerite Yourcenar’s Coup de grace  “after 
Auschwitz’” , in Elaine Marks, M arrano as Metaphor: The Jewish Presence in French Writing (New  
York: Columbia UP, 1996), pp. 85-95.
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from most literary, philosophical and cultural movements of her time has so far been 
successful. As Margaret Elisabeth Colvin wrote not long ago,
while in recent years there has been a steady output o f excellent critical studies, 
recordings from numerous colloquiums, and so on, all attesting to the interest 
[Yourcenar’s] work continues to evoke, most o f these critics’ themes tend to reinforce 
her classicism: ethics, history, and universality, to cite only three. Yet strikingly few  
studies in recent years have extensively or deepW questioned cultural biases or probed 
other premises upon which her reputation rests.
Colvin’s assessment is especially valid with respect to the dearth of studies aiming to 
contextualize Yourcenar’s corpus in terms of the historical, political and cultural 
conjuncture at which it was produced.
To be sure, there have been sporadic efforts to assert Yourcenar’s literary 
modernism or even postmodernism. For instance, in a 1993 essay entitled ‘Yourcenar 
postmodeme ?’, Luc Rasson compares the lack of any sense of finality in 
Yourcenar’s novel Un homme obscur (1982) with what he perceives to be 
Tindifference “postmodeme”’.41 Catherine Golieth, on the other hand, identifies 
distinct features of literary and artistic modernity, including fragmentariness, self- 
referentiality, loss of meaning, lack of closure and the quest for being-in-itself, in the 
key metaphor of alchemy in L ’CEuvre au noir. Golieth argues that alchemy emerges 
in this novel as the absolutely modem art. She writes that Talchim ie aurait realise en 
acte ce que les poetes “modemes” n ’ont que pense’.42 Finally, Colvin also discusses 
Yourcenar’s modernism in an extremely perceptive fashion. She writes that 
‘Yourcenar was undeniably a modernist writer in some respects: for example, in 
certain earlier works’ use of avant-garde expressionism, of myth, and of a “classical”
40 Margaret Elisabeth Colvin, Baroque Fictions: Revisioning the Classical in M arguerite Yourcenar 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005), p. 13. Recent critical approaches to Yourcenar’s work and persona tend 
to come from the areas o f feminist criticism and psychoanalysis. Such works include Pascal Dore, 
Yourcenar ou le feminin insoutenable (Geneve: Droz, 1999); Carole Allamand, M arguerite Yourcenar 
ou I’ecriture en mal de mere (Paris: Imago 2004); and J. H. Sarnecki and I. Majer O ’Sickey (eds), 
Subversive Subjects, to which I referred in the previous note.
41 Luc Rasson, ‘Yourcenar postmodeme ?’, in Bulletin de la Societe Internationale d ’Etudes 
Yourcenariennes, No 12, Tours, December 1993, pp. 1-6, (p. 6).
42 Catherine Golieth, ‘Au sujet de la modernite de L ’CEuvre au n o ir’, in Bulletin de la Societe 
Internationale d ’Etudes Yourcenariennes, No 20, Tours, December 1999, pp. 123-141, (p. 136).
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style imitating the recit gidien\ 43 At the same time, Colvin stresses the ‘numerous 
contradictions’ in the work of Yourcenar who, despite her modernism, ‘appeared to 
follow an almost reactionary trend in literature’.44 These contradictions refer to the 
simultaneous instance of classical and modem themes in the work of Yourcenar, such 
as unity and plurality, mastery and chaos, authorial presence and absence 45 Colvin 
argues that ‘this instability obliges us to re-examine Yourcenar’s work in the light of 
the rules governing the reception and canonization of modem writers, and to study 
the way in which modem societies “manage” their cultural productions’.46
In line with this imperative, the present thesis proposes to highlight some of the 
specifically modem characteristics of Yourcenar’s thought and literature. While, in 
the examples given, Colvin, Rasson and Golieth are principally concerned with 
literary and artistic modernism, I shall be focusing on political, cultural and 
philosophical modernity in Yourcenar. Taking into account the current paradoxical 
situation in Yourcenarian criticism, whereby the modernity of a 20th-Century writer 
needs to be argued and confirmed, I shall pursue an immanent approach for the best 
part of my thesis. This means that, rather than identifying the ways in which 
Yourcenar’s work satisfies definitions of modernity that are external to it (as Golieth 
does), I shall try to follow its internal dynamic and logic, or lack thereof. Certainly, 
the critical terms which I shall be employing -  authenticity, subjectivity, 
representation, fragmentation, alterity, and so on -  carry an independent semantic 
charge, a fact which complicates the task of immanent criticism. However, I shall be 
adjusting these terms to Yourcenar’s thought and discourse, so that, for instance, 
authenticity will be confounded with its opposite (Chapter 2) and fragmentation will 
imply the possibility of totality (Chapter 3). Moreover, I shall single out and 
prioritize other terms which are peculiar to Yourcenar’s vocabulary and thought - for
43 Colvin, p. 17.
44 Colvin, p. 30 and p. 18, respectively, emphasis by the author.
45 Colvin, p. 13.
46 Colvin, p. 30.
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example, hiatus, disorder, revolt, freedom, acceptance, guardianship, life and eternity. 
Finally, my intention is to probe, rather than repress, the unexpected twists and 
contradictions of Yourcenar’s writings. By drawing principally from the resources of 
the Yourcenarian text, I hope to highlight the ways in which it articulates, and 
responds to, the call of modernity.
Nevertheless, external critique will also be necessary -  and I will come to this in 
the last chapter of my thesis - when the contradictions and ambiguities of Memoires 
d ’Hadrien will prove impossible to interrogate in their own terms. The issue in that 
final chapter will be the possibility of imagining a subject which is free from 
ontological determinations and which resists reduction to a stable identity with a 
solid home -  Greece, Germany or Europe -  and a projected future. Since my 
argument will be that Yourcenar’s text shrinks from imagining this subject -  a 
subject for which she nonetheless persistently searched - ,  I will take recourse to the 
poststructuralist critique of subjectivity and aesthetics and to what might be called a 
post-ontological thinking of alterity. The limits of the way authentic subjectivity is 
thought in Yourcenar will thus prove to overlap with the limits of philosophical and 
political modernity which she embraced as a writer.
Consequently, the present thesis can be broadly divided into two parts which 
supplement each other. Chapters 1 to 4 will underscore the intricate and 
uncompromising character of the concept of authenticity in Yourcenar’s existential 
and political thought. Chapter 5, on the other hand, will focus on the critique of 
authenticity in general and on the limits that the quest for authenticity imposes on 
Yourcenar’s perception of the subject.
More specifically, in Chapters 1 and 2, I shall look in Memoires d ’Hadrien, in 
Yourcenar’s monographs on Thomas Mann and Constantin Cavafy and, to a lesser 
extent, in L ’CEuvre au noir and Un homme obscur, to see how the quest for 
authenticity relates to the impasse of representation. I shall underline the implications 
of this impasse with regard to the notion of selfhood, the quest for freedom, and the
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scope of realism. Finally, I shall bring together her essay ‘Le Temps, ce grand 
sculpteur’ (1954) with Paul de M an’s ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’ (1969), to 
establish Yourcenar’s answer to the problem of authenticity and, more generally, to 
that of semiotic referentiality.
In Chapter 3, I shall open up the discussion to consider the wider cultural and 
aesthetic parameters of the quest for authenticity in modernity. Yourcenar will 
emerge as an uncommonly astute, if conservative by disposition, critic of modernity, 
through a reading of her essay ‘Diagnostic de l’Europe’ in dialogue with Walter 
Benjamin’s ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1936). 
Further, based on Benjamin’s insights on translation and the notion of totality, I shall 
argue that Yourcenar ensures the narrative authenticity of her works and fictional 
characters by treating them as literary fragments existing finitely in time.
Spatiality, temporality and subjectivity in Yourcenar and in Heidegger will 
constitute the main themes of Chapter 4 . 1 shall initiate a dialogue between Being and 
Time (1927) as well as other works by Heidegger, one the one hand, and various parts 
of Yourcenar’s corpus, from Pindare (1931) to Un homme obscur (1982) on the 
other. In the process, I hope to show that Yourcenar develops an unsystematic but 
pervasive existential-ontological perception of the subject which, like Dasein, exists 
in a state of constant tension between its own past and future and remains in a state of 
difference from the world it inhabits finitely. This is the definition of existential 
authenticity. However, at the end of this chapter, the aporias of Yourcenar’s and 
Heidegger’s existentialism will start becoming evident, when the issue of history is 
raised. This chapter will ask a series of questions which can be summarized as 
follows: How can the authentic hero of Yourcenar’s fiction, in his solitary union with 
his private world, understand and account for the infinite variety, concreteness and 
depth of collective history?
The modem subject’s confrontation with history will be discussed in the last 
chapter of my thesis. Reading Lacoue-Labarthe’s La Fiction du politique (1987) and
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Lyotard’s Heidegger et les « juifs » (with a lower case ‘j \  1988), I shall argue that 
politics in modernity has generally been perceived in terms of the self constitution of 
peoples and nations as works of art. Inspired by a Greek model of aesthetics, this 
political aestheticism culminated historically in national aestheticism in the form of 
Nazism. I shall claim that, especially in Memoires, Yourcenar embraces an analogous 
Greek-inspired perception of politics, and suggests that it is still appropriate for the 
purpose of Europe’s political reconstruction in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. Despite the unambiguous rejection of barbarism in Memoires, violence and 
exclusion as a result of the aestheticist perception of politics are dominant in this 
novel. I shall be tracing and examining instances of ‘otherness’ which do not 
conform to Hadrien’s Hellenocentric model. More particularly, I shall be focusing on 
the cases of Antinoiis and the Jews, who suffer directly or indirectly from Hadrien’s 
actions and remain voiceless or badly understood.
Yourcenar’s work will thus be shown to participate knowingly in various aspects 
of the debate on modernity. Her work incorporates, processes and reflects 
modernity’s concerns and contradictions, and attempts to provide literary, aesthetic 
and political solutions to them. In my opinion, it ‘fails’ precisely to the extent that 
modernity itself ‘failed’ to confront one of the issues that it so persistently 
thematized, namely, the issue of difference in representation. But this ‘failure’ can 
easily and legitimately be rephrased in terms of ‘success’. The work of Yourcenar 
illustrates exceptionally well the paradoxical state of writing in modernity: it points 
to the impasse of representation, but attempts to bypass it; it articulates the political 
and historical intertext to which it belongs, but hopes to transcend it; it makes us 
aware of the futility of the search for authenticity, but still strives to achieve it.
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CHAPTER ONE
S u b je c t iv it y , P o l itic s  
a n d  t h e  L im it s  o f  R e p r e s e n t a t io n
In Memoires d ’Hadrien, Yourcenar establishes a relationship between subjectivity 
and politics on the basis of the problematics of representation. Although the rest of 
her fiction often revolves around similar issues, it is in the figure of Hadrien that the 
personal and the political are entwined and explored more consistently. The main 
narrative device of the novel, the memoirs of emperor Hadrian, serves precisely that 
purpose, as does the idea that these memoirs are addressed as a letter to Hadrien’s 
future successor, Marc (Marcus Aurelius). As ‘memoirs’, the novel raises issues of 
selfhood, subjectivity and identity; as a long autobiographical ‘letter’ to the future 
emperor, it presents Hadrien’s political thought and describes his political vision and 
activity. Both subjectivity and politics are considered by Yourcenar as forms of 
representation of the self and the community which the novel sets out to articulate; 
and both are submitted to a constant critique as categories of conceptual abstraction. 
This critique is distinctly modem in character and can be thematically connected with 
the existential thought of the first half of the twentieth century, on the one hand, and 
with poststructuralist theories of representation, on the other. In this chapter, I shall 
attempt to identify the particular terms of Yourcenar’s critique of conceptuality as it 
emerges in Memoires d ’Hadrien, but also in her essays and other works of fiction. I 
shall first focus on questions of existence and subjectivity and then on Yourcenar’s
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perception of politics and freedom. This discussion will give rise to a parallel 
investigation of Yourcenar’s narrative realism which, more than a stylistic 
preference, constitutes a choice based on her implicit theories on subjectivity and 
representation.
The impossibility of the subject
The first chapter of Memoires, ‘Animula vagula blandula’, introduces the chief 
question of the novel, that of the subject and its relationship with the world. In a 
series of philosophical meditations, Hadrien explores the subject’s inability to define 
itself in relation to a reality which it tends to conceptualize. The issue here is to 
understand ‘human existence’ and Hadrien notes that there are three ways of doing 
so, T  etude du soi’, Tobservation des autres’ and ie s  livres’.1 None of these ways is 
found to be sufficiently effective, as none offers unmediated insight into the truth of 
being. I shall discuss briefly this part of the novel as it forms its theoretical backbone 
and defines the conditions of the quest for authentic subjectivity.
The overdetermination of reality through conceptual and artistic manipulation is 
succinctly confirmed in Hadrien’s commentary on ‘les livres’: ‘La lettre ecrite m ’a 
enseigne a ecouter la voix humaine, tout comme les grandes attitudes immobiles des 
statues m ’ont appris a apprecier les gestes. Par contre, et dans la suite, la vie m ’a 
eclairci les livres.’ In retrospect, this assertion seems to anticipate the 
poststructuralist claim that experience is always already mediated by language and 
that the simplicity and ‘naturalness’ of life are in fact constructs of the mind. 
However, as the second part of the above passage also implies ( ‘la vie m ’a eclairci
1 OR, p. 302. Marguerite Yourcenar, M emoires d ’Hadrien (Paris: Plon, 1951), for the first edition.
2 OR, p. 302.
39
Chapter 1 -  Subjectivity, Politics
and the Limits o f  Representation
les livres’), the possibility of immediacy is not excluded by Yourcenar. On the 
contrary, it constitutes the existential goal of her main narrative characters who 
struggle to penetrate different layers of interpretation towards the indecipherable core 
of ‘life’. As we shall see later, these layers of interpretation, as they accumulate over 
time, constitute nothing less than history. Already at the time of Hadrien, such 
interpretations, necessary as they are, are perceived as obstacles to man’s quest for 
immediate contact with himself and with nature:
Les poetes nous transportent dans un monde plus vaste ou plus beau, plus ardent ou 
plus doux que celui qui nous est donne, different par la meme, et en pratique presque 
inhabitable. Les philosophes font subir a la realite, pour pouvoir l’etudier pure, a peu 
pres les memes transformations que le feu ou le pilon font subir au corps : rien d’un 
etre ou d’un fait, tels que nous les avons connus, ne parait subsister dans ces cristaux 
ou dans cette cendre. Les historiens nous proposent du passe des systemes trop 
complets, des series de causes et d’effets trop exacts et trop clairs pour avoir jamais 
ete entierement vrais ; ils rearrangent cette docile matiere morte, et je sais que meme a 
Plutarque echappera toujours Alexandre.3
Yourcenar discerns three techniques of appropriation, namely, idealisation (poetry), 
purification (philosophy) and oversystematization (historiography). Strictly speaking, 
there is nothing particularly original in this critique; but it leaves Hadrien, as much as 
Yourcenar’s reader, at a loss before the necessity and the impossibility of 
representation. There is undoubtedly an element of oversimplification in Yourcenar’s 
cursory assessment of these three disciplines, especially if we think that she refers to 
the perceived intellectual decline of her time as much as of that of Hadrien. In an 
interview with Patrick de Rosbo, Yourcenar would make the following statement:
Toutes les ideologies durcissent le passe, l ’epurent, le systematisent a faux. Cela est 
vrai des notres : on peut aligner les faits historiques sur une ideologic marxiste, 
structuraliste, ou toute autre ; on peut reorganiser toute l ’histoire dans le sens des 
progres du capitalisme ou de la technologie. [...] Mais ce durcissement, ce 
dessechement du vecu au profit d’ideologies regnantes n’est pas particulier a notre 
epoque. L ’Histoire universelle de Bossuet represente une meme tentative pour faire 
entrer bon gre mal gre le vecu dans le cadre du dogmatisme chretien du XVIF siecle.4
3 OR, pp. 302-3.
4 Patrick de Rosbo, Entretiens radiophoniques avec M arguerite Yourcenar (Paris: Mercure de France, 
1972), p. 56.
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To the techniques of appropriation mentioned above, Yourcenar adds another one, 
namely ideological reduction. This quotation echoes the previous one in terms of the 
rejection of systematic thought as a means of capturing life in its mobility and 
malleability. While one admires Yourcenar for being instinctively sceptical vis-a-vis 
ideology and dogma, one is also surprised to find addressed pell-mell under these 
rubrics such different methods of analysis and approaches to existence as Marxism, 
structuralism, capitalism, technocracy and Christianity. Clearly, Yourcenar is not 
immune to her own critique of the different techniques of reduction and 
appropriation. At this point, however, I should place emphasis on what she 
understands as the incompatibility between the self and ie  monde tel qu’il nous est 
donne’, ‘la realite’, T e tre ’, i e  corps’, i e  passe’, i e  vecu’. These terms refer to a 
fleeting and chaotic reality with which the subject must establish a stable relationship 
in order to understand itself.
While the world is given to us as fact, our inauthentic relationship with it 
extends to our dealings with other people. With reference to T  observation des 
hommes’, the second way of understanding existence mentioned in ‘Animula vagula 
blandula’, Hadrien points out that ‘presque tout ce que nous savons d ’autrui est de 
seconde main’.5 In addition to the lack of immediacy, the inadequacy of available 
methods of interpretation means that our relationship with others is inconclusive. 
Hadrien notes that he used to read police reports on his subjects in an effort to 
understand their acts, and then adds: ‘Mais ces rapports si nai'vement circonstancies 
s ’ajoutent a la pile de mes dossiers sans m ’aider le moins du monde a rendre le 
verdict final.’6 The inability to make judgements reflects the absence of any valid 
frame of reference which would authenticate the relationship between human beings.
This comment may also be read as a defence of Yourcenar’s choice to approach 
her narrative subject using intuition as much as scholarship. This is confirmed in the
5 OR , p. 303.
6 OR , p. 303.
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‘Carnets de notes de Memoires d 'H adrien\ Yourcenar’s 1952 appendix to this novel, 
where she notes that, in search of the figure of Hadrien, she had ‘un pied dans 
F erudition, l’autre dans la magie’.7 In ‘Ton et langage dans le roman historique’, an 
essay to which I shall return, Yourcenar explains her way of transcending the barriers 
of interpretation that separated her from her chief narrative characters, and more 
specifically from their ‘voice’.8 Every step of her critique of representation in 
‘Animula vagula blandula’ can be related to her perception of subjectivity and 
implicit narrative theory.
This also applies to the third way of evaluating human existence, ‘l’etude de soi’. 
Yourcenar shows how the non-representability of the world affects the subject by 
bringing about a schism at its core, pre-empting its autonomy, and forcing it to 
internalize alienation.
Quant a Fobservation de moi-meme, je  m ’y oblige, ne fut-ce que pour entrer en 
composition avec cet individu aupres de qui je serai jusqu’au bout force de vivre, 
mais une familiarite de pres de soixante ans comporte encore bien des chances 
d’erreur. Au plus profond, ma connaissance de moi-meme est obscure, interieure, 
informulee, secrete comme une complicite. Au plus impersonnel, elle est aussi glacee 
que les theories que je  puis elaborer sur les nombres : j ’emploie ce que j ’ai 
d’intelligence a voir de loin et de plus haut ma vie qui devient alors la vie d’un autre.
Mais ces deux procedes de connaissance sont difficiles, et demandent, Fun, une
descente en soi, F autre, une sortie hors de soi-meme.9
The subject’s aporetic relationship with reality is reflected in the way it attempts to 
understand itself. The aspect of the self which is recognizably as chaotic and mobile 
as nature escapes the intellect’s capacity for figuration and leaves it frustrated. 
Consequently, at stake here is nothing less than the unity and self-sufficiency of the 
subject. This will be the constitutive question of the novel, both for Hadrien, as the 
suffering hero, and for Yourcenar, as the writer who tries to portray him. She is 
aware that this attempt at self-identification, which she calls in the above passage 
composition, and which is in essence the projected reconciliation between the self
7 OR, p. 526. In Chapter 3 , 1 shall discuss further this comment by Yourcenar.
8 ‘Ton et langage dans le roman historique’, EM, pp. 289-311.
9 OR, p. 304.
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and the world, has the opposite from the desired effect. Rather than eliminating the 
distance between the subject and itself, it establishes this distance. On the one hand, 
as Hadrien points out, the theoretical attitude displaces the subject further from itself. 
Theory as the possibility of vision entails the element of objectification, which 
restores the opposition in terms of the gap between the observer and the thing 
observed. On the other hand, if unsystematic, non-speculative approaches are 
employed, then, according to the above passage, we come face to face with obscurity, 
interiority and formlessness. Both the rational and the mystical methods fail to efface 
the subject’s difference from itself. They are, as Hadrien notes, ‘outils plus ou moins 
emousses : mais je n ’en ai pas d ’autres.’10
Trapped between the necessity of form and the inadequacy of the techniques of 
representation, Hadrien is overwhelmed with fear: ‘Quand je considere ma vie, je 
suis epouvante de la trouver informe’.11 It is not the obscurity as such of the self that 
Hadrien fears (on the contrary, he feels ‘complied’ in it), but the disorder and 
diversity of existence which render it unsuitable for aesthetic manipulation. Hadrien 
describes how his effort to delineate his own profile and thus delimit his identity 
perpetuates the difference from his true self, as it were, and ends in a blurred 
reflection of it: ‘Je persois bien dans cette diversite, dans ce desordre, la presence 
d’une personne, mais sa forme semble presque toujours tracee par la pression des 
circonstances ; ses traits se brouillent comme une image refletee sur l’eau.’12 The 
theme of the gap between form and chaos, order and disorder, is here re-iterated in 
terms of the opposition between stable presence and contingency.
At the same time, this passage can also be read as a reference to Yourcenar’s 
effort to stabilize the elusive image of Hadrien. She perceives well his ‘presence’, but 
his various dissonant traits and acts, as they have survived in historical and artistic
10 OR, p. 304.
11 OR, p. 304.
12 OR, p. 305.
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sources, do not form a continuum. Thus, the difference within the subject is 
reproduced at the level of the relationship between author and narrative character. 
This is especially true in the case of the historical novel, understood as a literary form 
that attempts to lend meaning and represent the segmented and intrinsically 
unrepresentable material of the past. In the ‘Carnets de notes’, Yourcenar writes:
Tout nous echappe, et tous, et nous-memes. La vie de mon pere m’est plus inconnue 
que celle d’Hadrien. Ma propre existence, si j ’avais a l ’ecrire, serait reconstitute par 
moi du dehors, peniblement, comme celle d’un autre ; j ’aurais a m’adresser a des 
lettres, aux souvenirs d’autrui, pour fixer ces flottantes memoires. Ce ne sont jamais 
que murs ecroules, pans d’ombre. S ’arranger pour que les lacunes de nos textes, en ce 
qui conceme la vie d’Hadrien, coincident avec ce qu’eussent ete ses propres oublis.13
Yourcenar perceives simultaneously within herself, within Hadrien, and between 
herself and her narrative character the indefinable difference that costs the subject its 
history and identity. In this context, the last sentence of the above passage should not 
only refer to the way Yourcenar left a margin for pragmatic omissions in Memoires, 
but also to a subtler arrangement. Along with these omissions of what she did not 
know about Hadrien, Yourcenar implies that she arranged for the non-representation 
of what Hadrien did not know, or no longer knew, about himself. Non-representation 
means here the refusal to aestheticize and speculate on what she calls ‘murs ecroules, 
pans d’ombres’. Rather than interpreting or illuminating -  literarily, critically, 
philosophically - these obscure areas and ruins, which form a separate thematics in 
her fiction and criticism, Yourcenar leaves them untouched. This essentially negative 
narrative attitude is a result of her acceptance that these areas of the self can never be 
represented, yet representation is the only available means for approaching them. 
Yourcenar uses conventional methods of narration, such as realism, in order to 
demonstrate not the ‘unrepresentable’ itself, but its outer limits. As she remarks again 
in the ‘Carnets de notes des Memoires d'Hadrien , ‘ces notes ne cement qu’une 
lacune’.14 More than the contour of Hadrien’s ‘face’, the novel sets out to trace the
13 OR, p. 527-28.
14 OR, p. 523.
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outer limits of what is described in ‘Animula vagula blandula’ as an ‘hiatus 
indefinissable’ within the self. 15 I shall now argue that the recording of the distance 
between the thinking self and its internalized lacunae is one of the key significations 
of Yourcenar’s realism.
The perspective of realism
As a technique of representation, Yourcenar’s realism operates in a negative mode. 
Its purpose is to emphasize the insufficiency of the subject as well as the 
insufficiency of the act of representation. In so far as the intention of the narrative is 
to demonstrate a lack, an originary schism that gives birth to a ‘subject’, realism 
fulfils this intention through its very inappropriateness to deal with that lack. One of 
realism’s purposes in Memoires is to describe the exterior aspect of things, to provide 
an inventory of the life and the thoughts of Hadrien, without reducing the gap within 
the self into a theory or an aesthetics. So much is suggested at the beginning of the 
book, where, in a direct address to Marc, his future successor, Hadrien remarks: ‘Je 
t ’offre ici comme correctif un recit depourvu d’idees preconc^ues et de principes 
abstraits, tire de l’experience d’un seul homme qui est moi-meme.’16
Yourcenar compared realism to an inventory of the sensible in a footnote to her 
interviews with Patrick de Rosbo which refers to Sainte-Beuve’s suggestion that the 
description of the exterior aspect of things ‘goes without saying’ (‘va de soi’).
[Les] maitres du roman realiste [...] ne trouvaient pas necessairement que l ’aspect 
exterieur de la vie ‘allait de so i’. La description du repas de noces d’Emma Bovary et 
des vehicules qui y ont amene les convives n’est ni moins minutieuse ni moins 
exhaustive que celle des appartements de Salammbo ; elle est seulement, il faut bien
15 OR, p. 305.
16 OR, p. 302.
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le dire, plus authentique. L ’enumeration et la peinture des objets dont s ’encombre une 
civilisation peut devenir un inventaire, ou une satire de celle-ci.17
The reason why Flaubert’s realism in Madame Bovary is more authentic than that in 
Salammbo is evidently that in the first case he had actually witnessed a similar event 
or spectacle to the one he described. But if realism in general is more authentic than 
other forms of fictional representation, it is because it only aspires to inventory the 
representable aspects of reality. Paradoxically, its immediate referent is not the entire 
realm of the real, which is too fleeting a notion to lend itself to representation, but 
only the sensible and the intelligible. In her interviews with Matthieu Galey, 
Yourcenar explains:
Je sais que je tombe dans 1’inexplicable, quand j ’affirme que la realite -  cette notion 
si flottante -, la connaissance la plus exacte possible des etres est notre point de 
contact, et notre voie d ’acces aux choses qui depassent la realite. Le jour ou nous
sortons de certaines realites tres simples, nous fabulons, nous tombons dans la
1 8rhetorique ou dans l’intellectualisme mort.
As Yourcenar distinguishes between ‘simple reality’ and things that lie beyond it, so 
she imagines a meticulous and exhaustive realism which brings the narrative to the 
outer limits of what exceeds the phenomenal. The dark area that remains untouched 
by realist depiction constitutes the negative focus of reference. That we should only 
have access to the hidden truth of our being through the literary or artistic 
manipulation of its phenomenal aspects is a situation which Yourcenar calls ‘presque 
un scandale pour l’esprit’.19 She explains it further in her monograph on Thomas 
Mann, when she attempts to interpret his ‘meticulous’ and ‘obsessive’ realism:
Le meticuleux realisme de Mann, ce realisme obsede qui caracterise si souvent la 
vision allemande, sert d’eau mere aux structures cristallines de l ’allegorie ; il sert 
aussi de lit a la coulee quasi souterraine du mythe et du songe. La Mort a Venise, qui 
s ’ouvre par le recit realiste d’une promenade dans la banlieue de Munich, ne nous 
epargne rien des horaires de trains et de paquebots, des bavardages d’un barbier et des 
tons voyants d’une cravate, organise les deboires et les contretemps d’un voyage en 
une allegorique danse des morts ; tout en dessous coule, inepuisable et brulante,
17 Rosbo, pp. 48-49.
18 Marguerite Yourcenar, Les Yeux ouverts: Entretiens avec Matthieu Galey  (Paris: Le Centurion, 
1980), p. 60.
19 Les Yeux ouverts, p. 59.
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secretement issue d’un symbolisme plus antique, la grande reverie d’un homme en 
proie a sa propre fin, tirant de son fonds la mort et 1’amour.20
This passage says as much about the way Yourcenar understands realism in her own 
writings as it does about Mann’s narrative technique. Realism remains this side of the 
prosaic, and indeed records obsessively and meticulously the phenomenal aspect of 
reality, but its true referent lies beyond its own supposedly self-contained structure. 
As Yourcenar suggests, realism needs to be supplemented by such erratic and 
differential narrative techniques as allegory and myth, so as to approach its final 
referent, which is again confirmed in this essay as ‘le gouffre interieur’. ‘Realite, 
allegorie et mythe se fondent les uns dans les autres.’21
In the following chapter, I will return to the notion of allegory and the way it 
authenticates the narrative. In the present context, I would argue that Yourcenar 
interprets realism in a manner which acknowledges and builds upon its failures as a 
technique of representation, for example, in conventional historical narrative. 
Historiographic realism, as Barthes has shown, is tautological; it signifies nothing but 
itself: ‘c ’est la categorie du “reel” (et non ses contenus contingents) qui est alors 
signifiee ; autrement dit, la carence meme du signifie au profit du seul referant 
devient le signifiant meme du realisme.’22 Barthes claims convincingly that realist 
narrative purports to ignore the linguistic constitution of man’s relationship with the 
world by confusing the signified with the semiotic referent. Realism’s narrative and 
normative agency depends on creating the illusion that the representational sign 
refers to reality, where in fact it refers only to itself. This is a situation which 
Yourcenar accepts, while attempting to turn it to the profit of the truth of the 
narrative.
20 EM, p. 166-67. From ‘Humanisme et hermetisme chez Thomas Mann’, in Sous benefice 
d ’inventaire.
21 EM, p. 167.
22 Roland Barthes, ‘L ’effet de reel’, in R. Barthes et al., Litterature et realite (Paris: Seuil, 1982), pp. 
81-90, (p. 89).
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The difference between realist representation and that to which it ‘refers’ is the 
very difference that Yourcenar discerns within the subject. The impossibility of self- 
contained subjectivity is reflected by the ineffectiveness of the narrative. If realism 
always fails to refer to the reality it targets, then it should be the privileged method to 
employ in search of a reality which is always fleeting and deferred. Thus, 
paradoxically, the final referent of Yourcenar’s (and Thomas Mann’s) realism is not a 
‘believable’ fictional space-time, nor is it the ‘category of the real’, as Barthes writes. 
It is the reality that realism fails to represent. In contrast to modernist methods of 
fictional representation which frequently disrupt the narrative thus tending to 
schematize what does not lend itself to figuration and interpretation, realism closes in 
on a gap without attempting to verbalize it. When it does verbalize it, the result is 
poor, ‘grotesque’, thus proving further the insufficiency of the act of representation. 
In her essay on Thomas Mann, Yourcenar wonders whether Naphta and Settembrini, 
the two philosophers of The Magic Mountain, ‘sont d’enormes porte-voix par 
lesquels s’enonce grotesquement, puisqu’il passe par les mots, un probleme trop 
vaste pour qui les mots ne sont pas faits’. Whether it stays within the limits of the 
phenomenology of the real or it becomes self-consciously grotesque, Yourcenar’s 
realism has little to do with positivism or the belief that entities exist independently 
of language or consciousness. On the contrary, Yourcenar’s realism seeks to 
demonstrate the limits of representation and thus to map negatively the ‘indefinable 
hiatus’ inside the self and between the self and the world.24
23 EM, p. 167.
24 May Chehab argues that Yourcenar used a similar strategy o f closing in on the absent subject 
(T absence du m oi’) in her autobiography Le Labyrinthe du monde (in EM), in which Yourcenar 
herself is hardly present. Chehab asks:
‘Alors, en quoi consiste exactement le « moi » de Yourcenar ?
Sa caracteristique majeur est qu’il est construit du dehors. En effet, lorsque les contours de la personne 
ne peuvent plus etre definis a partir de son activite ou de son affectivite propres [ .. .] ,  il ne reste que 
l’observation indirecte spatiale ou temporelle, qui a dicte au X X e siecle un grand nombre de quetes 
ontologiques detournees. C ’est pourquoi Andre Breton cherche son visage dans ceux qu’il hante, et 
Saint-John Perse adopte la deambulation circulaire de la Strophe plotinienne dans Amers comme voie 
d’approche d ’un Etre insaisissable. C ’est pourquoi Yourcenar, elle, choisit la quete genealogique.’
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In my analysis, I will pursue further the question of realism in fiction, and 
whether, in spite of the structuralist critique, it actively explores the limits of 
narrative and points to what lies beyond its competence. My intention and method 
will be to identify and follow in good faith Yourcenar’s claims with respect to artistic 
and narrative representation and to test these claims not against a specific theory, but 
against the Yourcenarian text itself. I shall discuss the theoretical consistency of these 
claims, for instance with regard to the question of referentiality, and shall confirm 
their relevance to their immediate cultural and historical context, that of modernity. 
Ultimately, the strength of Yourcenar’s interpretation of realism will be proportional 
to the validity of her theory of representation, a theory which itself originates in the 
problematics of existence, subjectivity and politics. Understanding Yourcenar’s 
realism is therefore part of the process of examining her perception of the subject, its 
existential and political identity (or lack thereof) and the nature of the 
unrepresentable hiatus that Yourcenar discerns within this subject.
From this introductory discussion of Yourcenar’s realism and from the analysis 
of ‘Animula vagula blandula’, two themes emerge with clarity. The first concerns the 
link that Yourcenar establishes between existential identity and the act of 
representation. The failure of the subject fully to schematize its relationship with the 
world leads to a permanent state of internalized difference. The existential is 
transferred from the start to the level of the aesthetic. It is the formlessness and 
disorder of reality which begets self-alienation. The second theme has to do with 
Yourcenar’s conviction that authentic subjectivity is still possible, despite the 
debilitating pressure of the aesthetic on the existential. We know this because, after 
all, Hadrien goes on to write his memoirs. The book will be a realist representation of 
Hadrien’s life through which we expect him to emerge as the authentic subject.
May Chehab, ‘La Deduction du « moi » et 1’impossible autobiologie’, in Remy Poignault et al. (eds), 
L ’Ecriture du moi dans Vceuvre de M arguerite Yourcenar (Clermont-Ferrand: SIEY, 2004), pp. 75- 
88, (p. 76, emphasis by the author).
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Authentic, because through the narrative Hadrien will restore a meaningful continuity 
between himself and the world, without attempting to effect a transcendental, 
mystical or ideological reconciliation of the two. The promise of the novel is that 
authenticity is still possible within the impasse of referentiality and within the 
context of nihilism. This is also the promise of other works by Yourcenar, including 
L'CEuvre au noir and Un homme obscur, as I will point out on various occasions. 
Having these two themes in mind, I shall now shift the focus of the investigation to 
Yourcenar’s perception of politics and freedom.
Freedom as a form of accepting
Even though the subject understands itself inadequately by means of the conceptual 
manipulation of reality, freedom, in Yourcenar, can never be freedom from 
representation. As I mentioned above, she frequently thinks of history as a series of 
interpretations of reality, superimposed on each other and never quite reaching their 
mark. In her novella of 1982 Un homme obscur, she returned to this question. One of 
the emblematic figures of the book, the philosopher Leo Belmonte, explains to 
Nathanael, the main character, who has come to visit him on his death bed, that the 
ongoing difference between ideas and things reveals our incessant desire for order:
Oui, il en est des choses et des idees comme d’un corps qui se dechame [...] mais 
leurs rapports demeurent neanmoins inchanges. D ’autres chairs et d’autres notions 
prennent la place de celles qui pourrissent... Ces myriades de lignes, ces milliers, ces 
millions de courbes par lesquelles, depuis qu’il y a des hommes, l ’esprit a passe, pour 
donner au chaos au moins l ’apparence d’un ordre...25
25 OR, p. 1009. Un homme obscur was first published as part o f a trilogy, Comme I’eau qui coule, 
which included two novellas, Anna Soror... and Un homme obscur, and a short story, Une belle 
matinee. Marguerite Yourcenar, Comme I’eau qui coule (Paris: Gallimard, 1982).
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Belmonte perceives history as a sequence of more and more sophisticated attempts to 
re-write chaos in terms of order. Sick and cynical, he himself is the embodiment and 
the result of man’s constitutive imprisonment within ideational structures. His entire 
work has been an effort to define freedom and identity in terms of order and beauty. 
At the end of his life, he realizes that this philosophical attitude (by which 
Yourcenar, more often than not, understands a purist attitude) leads nowhere: ‘Les 
passerelles des theoremes et les ponts-levis des syllogismes ne menent nulle part, et 
ce qu’ils rejoignent est peut-etre Rien. Mais c’est beau.’26 Beauty of the mind 
contrasts sharply in these pages of Un homme obscur with Belmonte’s decomposing 
body, but it is in the latter that he will seek a definition of God.
[...] trouver un trou par lequel descendre vers je ne sais quels antipodes divins... 
Encore faudrait-il que [...] ce trou fut au centre, fut un centre... Mais du moment que 
le monde ( aut D e u s ) est une sphere dont le centre est partout [...], il suffirait de 
creuser n’importe ou pour amener Dieu, comme au bord de la mer on amene l ’eau 
quand on creuse le sable... Creuser des doigts, des dents et du groin, dans cette 
profondeur qui est Dieu... ( Aut Nihil, aut forte  Ego. ) Car le secret, c ’est que je creuse 
en moi, puisqu’en ce moment je suis au centre.27
Belmonte has to accept that there is no universal order of things, only a pattern in the 
way disorder manifests itself as the difference between things and ideas. Through a 
complex reasoning, he locates within the self the divine element, the ‘nothingness’ 
which escapes representation. He concludes that there is no unique truth in the centre 
of the universe; rather, the diffusion of truth is revealed every time that the desire for 
identity is frustrated. Everyone and everything is a centre to their world, and in every 
case the primordial difference between representation and what lies beyond it is 
attested.
While Belmonte never frees himself from the longing for beauty and identity, he 
points to a direction that other characters in Yourcenar’s work have followed in their 
pursuit of freedom. This direction involves accepting the failure or representation and
26 OR, p. 1011.
27 OR, p. 1011-12.
51
Chapter 1 -  Subjectivity, Politics
and the Limits o f  Representation
integrating this failure in a new definition of authenticity. Even at this moment of 
intellectual honesty, Belmonte remains above all a philosopher, and his account can 
at best be grotesque, as I have already suggested. On the contrary, Hadrien is above 
all a statesman and must translate this theory into a pragmatic political project.
In Les Yeux ouverts, Yourcenar stresses Hadrien’s pragmatism: ‘Dans le cas
■JQ
d’Hadrien, je  pense que le pragmatisme l’a emporte’ . In her interviews with Rosbo, 
she also discusses Hadrien’s pragmatism in conjunction with the political and 
existential imperative to act. She explains that Hadrien’s sagesse consists in his 
ability to move beyond the chaos of existence towards a constructive relation with 
the material world. ‘Cette sagesse humaniste est aussi eminemment pragmatique, une 
fa9 on d ’accepter les faits et de partir d ’eux pour construire.’ Like Belmonte’s 
philosophy, Hadrien’s pragmatism involves accepting the disorder of the world and 
the concomitant deficiency of the subject. Pragmatism’s particular meaning, 
however, lies in Hadrien’s resolution to find a practical way to salvage humanism 
and the possibility of existential and political freedom.
Thus, an opposition develops in Memoires between Hadrien’s pragmatism and 
accepting attitude, on the one hand, and the predominant philosophy of his time, late 
Stoicism, on the other. Epictetus was the most famous proponent of Stoicism at that 
time, and he advocated the renouncement of bodily feelings and earthly attachments. 
Hadrien stresses that this old philosopher, who lived a pure life in voluntary poverty, 
had seemed to him ‘en possession d ’une liberte quasi divine’. He then specifies that 
this divine freedom is not the kind of freedom that he himself is after.
Mais Epictete renon9ait a trop de choses, et je m’etais vite rendu compte que rien, 
pour moi, n’etait plus dangereusement facile que de renoncer. [. . .] Ces sages 
s’effo^aient de retrouver leur dieu par-dela 1’ocean des formes, de le reduire a cette 
qualite d’unique, d’intangible, d’incorporel, a laquelle il a renonce le jour ou il s ’est 
voulu univers.30
28 Les Yeux ouverts, p. 156.
29 Rosbo, p. 100.
30 OR, p. 398.
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Philosophy is again put to the test for not taking into account the facticity of the 
world and for attempting to reduce contingent forms into ideas. The difficult freedom 
which comes from accepting is thus opposed to the philosophical freedom which 
comes from renouncing. This message is specifically targeted at Marcus Aurelius, the 
addressee of the novel, who was of course himself an important Stoic philosopher.
Pour moi, j ’ai cherche la liberte plus que la puissance, et la puissance seulement parce 
que, en partie, elle favorisait la liberte. Ce qui m’interessait n’etait pas une 
philosophic de l ’homme libre (tous ceux qui s’y essayent m’ennuyerent) mais une 
technique ; je voulais trouver la chamiere ou notre volonte s ’articule au destin, ou la 
discipline seconde, au lieu de la freiner, la nature. Comprends bien qu’il ne s ’agit pas 
ici de la dure volonte du stoique, dont tu t’exageres le pouvoir, ni de je ne sais quel 
choix ou quel refus abstrait, qui insulte aux conditions de notre monde plein, continu, 
forme d’objets et de corps.31
If there are some anti-Sartrean undertones in this passage, especially in the phrase ‘je 
ne sais quel choix ou quel refus abstrait’, they can be attributed to Yourcenar’s 
sceptical attitude towards existentialism as a philosophy which dominated the post­
war cultural scene in France and which she found too abstract.32 Indeed the interest 
of this passage lies in the key oppositions between philosophie and technique, and 
between volonte and destin. These two oppositions are intimately linked to each other 
and form the semantic axis along which Yourcenar’s perception of freedom and her 
political and aesthetic thought as expressed in Memoires are structured. The 
metaphor of la chamiere transfers the problem of the existential discrepancy between 
desire -  ‘volonte’ - and its frustration -  ‘destin’ - onto a practical-technical level. 
With this metaphor Yourcenar intimates her conviction that the transition from 
thought to action, as far as both existence and politics are concerned, entails a shift in 
one’s mode of thinking for which philosophy cannot prepare the subject. Inasmuch as
31 OR, p. 318.
32 In a 1987 interview for RAI, the Italian state television channel, Yourcenar was asked by Francesca 
Sanvitale whether she were in contact with the French existentialists, for example Sartre, Camus, 
Blanchot. She answered: ‘Pas enormement, parce que je trouve toute cette litterature beaucoup trop 
intellectualiste, beaucoup trop dialectique ; et dans un moment ou il serait si important de voir de pres 
et de s ’interesser a la realite des choses, elle tourne le dos aux choses.’ Maurice Delcroix (ed.), 
M arguerite Yourcenar: Portrait d ’une voix (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), p. 366.
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philosophy constitutes a closed, self-referential systematization of reality, it resists 
translation into action. In the work of Yourcenar, the example of Leo Belmonte, the 
extreme philosopher who cannot provide a legitimate account for what remains 
incommunicable to thinking, illustrates the theme of the failures of conceptual 
thought even when it tries to radicalize itself. At the same time, Hadrien’s quest for a 
‘technique’ constitutes a call for a post-philosophical and at the same time more 
original understanding of the relationship between the self and the world. ‘La 
chamiere’ is the emblematic metaphor for this new relationship, for it implies that 
this relationship must be articulated -  in art, literature, politics, and so on - on a 
pragmatic, that is, non-conceptual basis.
Yourcenar also juxtaposes discipline with nature, which helps us understand the 
opposition between ‘volonte’ and ‘destin’ with reference to the problematics of 
representation. ‘Volonte’ expresses the desire for the production of meaning through 
the ‘disciplined’ effort to discover order in nature, or to impose order on it, 
depending on one’s critical and political stance. Therefore, ‘volonte’ is the will for 
signification through art, language, as well as politics; it is the artistic intention 
which, as Yourcenar implies in the above passage, usually manifests itself in the 
effort to immobilize nature. On the other hand, ‘destin’ is a more puzzling term, but 
it should not be construed as connoting a teleological design of existence.33 It rather 
signifies the natural necessity which frustrates desire, refuses artistic intention and 
confirms the distance between the work of man and the inaccessibility of nature. 
Claude Foucart has interpreted in analogous terms the notion of ‘destinee d ’homme’, 
which is mentioned in ‘Animula vagula blandula’.34 Foucart points out that by 
‘destinee’ we may understand the inevitable ‘hiatus’ within the subject, which
33 Elsewhere, Yourcenar explains that she does not favour the idea o f predetermination and fate. 
During her interviews with Matthieu Galey, she remarks: ‘Je dirais que la vie ne me semble pas avoir 
de dessin (de dessein) defini. (Ou, si elle en a un, c ’est a des profondeurs que nous ne pouvons pas 
atteindre.) [...] Je ne crois pas a un destin irrevocablement present.’ Les Yeux ouverts, p. 315.
34 OR, p. 304.
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precludes the possibility of identity. ‘Cet “hiatus” trouve son reflet immediat dans 
l’aspect “informe” de la vie. [...] La est un element capital dans ce jaugeage de la 
distance consideree comme image de la “destinee d’homme.”’ Thus ‘destin’ refers 
to the formlessness of life and to the suspension of every project of representation. In 
this context, ‘trouver la chamiere’ announces Hadrien’s project to coordinate the will 
for immediacy that drives creativity and the destiny of difference that awaits the work 
of art as well as political action.
These ideas and their impact on Yourcenar’s existential and political thought 
will be discussed further in this and the following chapter. With regard to the 
question of freedom, it is clear that its existential and political dimensions largely 
coincide and are envisioned by Yourcenar from an aesthetic perspective. From my 
discussion so far it follows that the definition of freedom must involve awareness of 
man’s entanglement within representational structures and must also account for the 
necessary frustration of any claim to original creativity. So, exactly how does 
Yourcenar understand the concept of ‘technique de liberte’ and how does it 
authenticate man’s actions? In the pages that follow the passage quoted above (pp. 
318-19), Hadrien gives a number of examples of the ways he implemented this 
technique with an aim to mould his personality. These examples function mostly as 
practical advice to his addressee, Marc, yet also lead gradually to the blurring of the 
boundary between freedom and its opposite: ‘J ’ai reve d ’un plus secret
acquiescement ou d’une plus souple volonte’; and further on, ‘je m ’effor^ais 
d ’atteindre par degre cet etat de liberte, ou de soumission, presque pur’. Finally, 
Hadrien offers the paradoxical idea of ‘liberte d’acquiescement’: ‘Mais c ’est encore a 
la liberte d’acquiescement, la plus ardue de toutes, que je me suis le plus 
rigoureusement applique. Je voulais l’etat ou j ’etais’.36 The perception of a form of
35 Claude Foucart, ‘Marguerite Yourcenar, L ’Exil et la distance’, in Berengere Deprez and Ana de 
Medeiros (eds), M arguerite Yourcenar: Ecritures de I’exil (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 
1998), pp. 267-276, (p. 269).
36 All quotations from OR, pp. 318-319.
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freedom which consists in acquiescing to the state in which one happens to be merits 
further elaboration, not only because of its apparent absurdity, but also because it 
constitutes one of the key ideas that infiltrate Yourcenar’s critical thought.
There is no doubt that the ‘liberte d ’acquiescement’ is at odds with mainstream 
Western perceptions of freedom. A comparison of i a  liberte d ’acquiescement’ with 
the forms of freedom examined by Isaiah Berlin in his seminal essay ‘Two Concepts 
of Freedom’ is telling. Berlin accepts that there are ‘more that two hundred senses of 
[the] protean word’ freedom, but examines ‘no more than two of these senses -  but
37those central ones, with a great deal of human history behind them’. He first 
discusses ‘negative freedom’, that is, the liberal conception of freedom from  
constraint (physical, social, moral and so on). Then, he makes a separate case for 
‘positive freedom’, the radical freedom to rule oneself and realize one’s potential. He 
takes his discussion far enough to suggest that these two concepts of freedom are 
based on two historically distinct ideals of authentic selfhood. A negative one, which 
is pursued through ‘self-abnegation in order to attain independence’; and a positive 
one which aims at ‘self-realization, or total self-identification with a specific 
principle or ideal in order to attain the selfsame end’.39 It is not difficult to trace 
evidence, in Memoires d ’Hadrien, of Yourcenar’s scepticism with regard to the 
actual possibility of achieving either of these two types of liberty.
As far as negative freedom is concerned, Yourcenar’s critique of abnegation as a 
method of self-liberation is at its strongest in the passages where Hadrien argues 
against the ascetics and the Stoics, of whom Berlin also makes frequent mention. 
Berlin associates the search for independence, that is, negative liberty, with ‘a 
strategic retreat into an inner citadel -  my reason, my soul, my “noumenal” se lf and
37 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts o f Liberty’, in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), pp. 118-172, (p. 121).
38 T h is is liberty as it has been conceived by liberals in the modern world from the days o f Erasmus 
[...] to our ow n’, Berlin, pp. 127-28.
39 Berlin, p. 134.
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adds that ‘this is the traditional self-emancipation of ascetics and quietists, of stoics 
or Buddhist sages’.40 In Memoires, criticism of asceticism takes the form of a 
Brahman whom Hadrien met on the bank of the Euphrates and whom he described in 
similar terms as the Stoics: ‘Ce brahmane etait arrive a l’etat ou rien, sauf son corps, 
ne le separait plus du dieu intangible, sans substance et sans forme.’41 Both Epictetus 
and the Brahman are judged by Hadrien as ‘ces purs fanatiques.’42
Yourcenar’s scepticism extends also to freedom of the positive kind, that is, the 
possibility of self-identification with specific principles. While existential 
identification between the self and the world remains Hadrien’s goal, he 
acknowledges that the principles which are supposed to provide the base for 
achieving it are transitory and reductive. The chapter ‘Animula vagula blandula’ can 
indeed be read as a treatise on the relativity of principles and ideals -  philosophical, 
ethical, aesthetic. Hadrien is convinced that principles have only conceptual value 
and, therefore, do not reflect reality as it appears to the observer and as it is lived by 
the self. Principles per se are useless to the seeker of truth. As I will discuss in 
Chapter 2, for Yourcenar, the political leader ought to manipulate principles and 
ideals, rather than abide by them, as they only belong to ephemeral historical 
realities.
The difference between these historically recognizable types of freedom and 
Yourcenar’s ‘liberte d’acquiescement’ will be further underscored, if we consider the 
forms of relationship between man and the world that these types of freedom entail. 
Despite their differences, both the radical and the liberal approaches promote the idea 
of mastery over the self and the environment, whether in an aggressive, or in a 
defensive way. Berlin identifies positive liberty as a form of mastery: ‘The ‘positive’ 
sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be
40 Berlin, p. 135.
41 OR, p. 397.
42 OR, p. 398.
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his own master’.43 But negative freedom is a form of mastery as well. With reference 
to Berlin’s distinction, Leslie Paul Thiele makes the following statement:
Negative liberty signals the individual’s control of his or her immediate environment, 
of his or her ‘private’ space and time. [...] Negative liberty [...] pertains to sovereign 
control of a personal realm. This is the realm of private property, which includes, 
following John Locke’s formulation, the property of one’s self. [...] Positive 
libertarians advocate a transcendent, socially defined self that achieves mastery over 
itself and its world by way of self-given law. Negative libertarians advocate an 
empirical, atomic self that achieves mastery over a private domain through the 
expression of will.44
The typically Western qualification of freedom as mastery contrasts with the form of 
freedom that Hadrien pursues. Yourcenar’s commentary on Hadrien’s imperial title 
of ‘Maitre de tout’, bestowed on him by the Athenians, is characteristic in this 
respect. The reader is asked to understand this title not as a confirmation of Hadrien’s 
authority but as a reward for his ‘collaboration’ with the people and, more 
metaphorically, with the spirit of his time. ‘J ’avais collabore avec les ages, avec la 
vie grecque elle-meme ; l’autorite que j ’exer9 ais etait moins un pouvoir qu’une 
mysterieuse puissance, superieure a l’homme, mais qui n ’agit efficacement qu’a 
travers l’intermediaire d ’une personne humaine.’45 This is a richly ambiguous 
statement, to which I shall return in Chapter 5. But as far as the notion of mastery is 
concerned, it suggests that Hadrien has found the ‘chamiere’ that coordinates 
‘volonte’ and ‘destin’. The implication here is that, if Hadrien is a ‘maitre’, it is 
because, in his quality as the head of state, he has submitted the will for 
representation and creativity to a higher truth, which could be construed as man’s 
true being, God, or nature. Paradoxically, in this context, liberte is a synonym of 
soumission, and maitrise is a synonym of collaboration. These are two of a series of 
semantic inversions that Yourcenar effects in Memoires and elsewhere, and which I 
propose to identify and interpret in the course of my thesis.
43 Berlin, p. 131.
44 Leslie Paul Thiele, Timely Meditations: Martin H eidegger and Postmodern Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 68-69.
45 OR, p. 4 2 2 .
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During her interviews with Matthieu Galey, Yourcenar argued that man’s 
freedom to master and mould his existence is, in reality, only a half-freedom: she 
referred to Thom me maitre, ordinateur et sculpteur de soi-meme, libre de choisir 
entre le mal et le bien, entre la folie et la sagesse, don et liberte que 1’animal n ’a pas. 
Mais precisement cette quasi-liberte (car qui la dira complete ?) nous rend 
responsables’.46 Freedom of choice, mastery of the world and the self - the common 
targets of both the liberal and radical approaches - are not authentic forms of liberty. 
A dedicated ecologist and animal lover, Yourcenar believes that animals are in a 
position to enjoy true freedom: ‘II y a cette immense liberte de 1’animal, enferme 
certes dans les limites de son espece, mais vivant sans plus sa realite d'etre, sans tout 
le faux que nous ajoutons a la sensation d ’exister’.47 The freedom of animals is at the 
antipodes of human liberty as mastery and freedom of choice. Because for animals 
there is no defining divide between ‘will’ and ‘destiny’, they experience no 
difference with themselves. They offer humans the spectacle of unquestioning 
acceptance of time and space.
This primordial state of being is also hinted at by Yourcenar in her essay ‘Qui 
sait si 1’ame des betes va en bas’. In this essay, she challenges the common 
interpretation of the biblical injunction for man to be ‘maitre et seigneur [du] peuple 
des animaux’. Yourcenar refers to the Jewish-Christian myth of creation to suggest 
that Adam could have understood freedom differently:
Cet Adam, encore intouche par la chute, aurait aussi bien pu se sentir promu au rang 
de protecteur, d’arbitre, de moderateur de la creation tout entiere, utilisant les dons 
qui lui avaient ete faits en surplus, ou differemment, de ceux octroyes aux animaux, 
pour parachever et maintenir le bel equilibre du monde, dont Dieu l’avait fait non le 
tyran, mais l’intendant.48
46 Les Yeux ouverts, p. 319.
47 Les Yeux ouverts, p. 318, Yourcenar’s emphasis.
48 All quotations from EM, p. 374. ‘Qui sait si l ’ame des betes va en bas’ (written in 1981) is included 
in the collection o f essays Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur (Paris: Gallimard, 1983).
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Here, the meaning of mastery and freedom is subverted and understood, 
paradoxically, in terms of mediation and administration. Yourcenar imagines a 
prelapsarian functional relationship between man and nature, which has been lost 
because of misuse of man’s ‘gifts’ ( ‘dons’). These gifts, which distinguish man from 
animals, are precisely that to which Yourcenar referred as ‘volonte’, the desire for 
representation or the possibility of art and politics in the broad sense, through which, 
when used appropriately, the world’s ‘beautiful balance’ is manifested. This state of 
authenticity is contrasted with freedom as mastery and tyranny, which corresponds to 
conventional socio-political approaches to liberty in the West, and is based on a 
misconception of man’s creative impulse and power. The ecological definition of 
freedom as a form of acquiescement presupposes the recognition that the ‘gift’ of art 
is a ‘surplus’, a supplement to nature, and it installs a permanent difference between 
man and nature which man has to accept. Accepting and acquiescing are therefore 
key words in Yourcenar’s thinking on politics and existence because they imply that 
freedom and authentic selfhood should come as a result of an art (a language, a 
representation) which consciously preserves, rather than effaces the difference 
between man and the world.
To understand the concept of liberte d ’acquiescement, it is important to raise the 
question as to what or whom one ‘acquiesces’. There is undoubtedly an apparent 
paradox in Yourcenar’s political position on freedom. If i a  liberte d ’acquiescement’ 
differs fundamentally from common revolutionary or libertarian conceptions of 
freedom, then it must eventually lead to the subject’s renunciation of any claim to 
mastery over not only other people’s ‘destin’, but also its own. Is there not a risk, 
then, to understand the formula ‘Je voulais l’etat ou j ’etais’ as a gratuitous defence of 
the status quo? In her essay ‘Presentation critique de Constantin Cavafy’, Yourcenar 
explains herself: ‘il importe toujours de savoir si, en demiere analyse, l’oeuvre d’un
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poete s’inscrit en faveur de la re volte ou de 1’acceptation’.49 In the context of her 
assessment of Cavafy’s poetry, she puts forward an interpretation of ‘acquiescement’ 
as a condition that contains revolt: ‘On peut dire sans paradoxe que la revolte ici se 
place a l’interieur de 1’acquiescement, fait inevitablement partie de la condition 
humaine que le poete reconnait pour sienne.’ What is more, she traces the presence of 
revolt in the origin of every act of true acceptance.
Les tres beaux vers inspires par un passage de Dante, Che fece... il grand rifiuto, 
poeme du raidissement et du refus, demeurent neanmoins situes au plus profond de 
1’acceptation, formulent le cas extreme et personnel ou il y aurait re volte a ne pas se 
revolter. C’est qu’une vue completement acceptante ne peut guere se baser que sur le 
sentiment tres fort de ce qu’il y a d’unique, d’irreductible, et finalement de valable, 
dans chaque temperament et dans chaque destin.50
Yourcenar conflates the meanings of ‘revolte’ and ‘acceptation’, in the same way that 
she blurs the border between ‘liberte’ and ‘soummission’. The poem by Cavafy, 
which she quotes in French in her own and C. Dimaras’s translation, is about saying 
‘le grand OUI ou le grand N O N ’, and assuming the responsibility for this choice. 
Cavafy is equally vague as Yourcenar with regard to what it is that one accepts of 
refuses. His poem, however, finishes by identifying refusing as an unambiguous and 
conscious choice by the individual: ‘Celui qui a refuse ne regrette rien : si on 
l’interrogeait de nouveau, il repeterait NON -  et cependant ce NON, ce juste NON, 
l’accable pendant toute sa vie.’51 Yourcenar interprets this ‘non’ as part of a greater 
‘oui’ that does justice to the uniqueness of the individual. In her assessment, she does 
not side with the person who has to choose, but with the poet, whose function is to 
express what is at stake in that choice. The poet’s a priori accepting attitude allows 
him to see that existential, ideological, ethical or other choices are always about 
historically specific ways of systematizing and conceptualizing reality, which one 
may embrace or reject. Such choices, however right (justes) or devastating
49 EM, p. 156.
50 EM, p. 156.
51 EM, p. 157, emphasis in the original.
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(iaccablants), are always between concepts and systems of interpretation. It is only 
the poet who, by recognizing and accepting this state of affairs, places himself 
beyond such choices and demonstrates the gap that defines man’s relationship with 
nature and with himself. By doing so, the poet refuses to reduce individuals into 
types or identities defined by the systems of interpretation which they accept or 
reject. Thus, according to Yourcenar (though, I suspect, not necessarily according to 
this specific poem by Cavafy), the poet’s ‘acquiescement’ contains ‘revolte’ in the 
sense that he resists the temptation to standardize individuality and does so by 
accepting the impossibility of self-identity. The poet’s privileged vantage point 
ensures his ‘liberte d ’acquiescement’, through which the uniqueness of every 
individual and their irreducibility to a prescribed ‘identity’ is attested.
Acceptance and revolt remain central in Yourcenar’s thought, as the frequency 
with which she returns to these themes attests. For example, writing about Thomas 
Mann’s The Magic Mountain in 1956, she notes: ‘A partir de cette vision de l’horreur 
intrinseque, toutes les avenues de l ’esprit pourraient s’ouvrir pour Hans, celle de la 
saintete ou celle du crime, celle de la revolte ou celle de 1’acceptation.’52 Yourcenar’s 
1972 essay on Andre Gide also contains a reference to ‘revolte et acceptation’, in the 
context of i e  drame du choix perpetuel entre le refus du soi et l’abandon a soi’.53 In a 
more political vein, in a footnote to her published interviews with Rosbo, she 
specified that accepting is ‘a noble act’ when it concerns the self, but not when it 
concerns the suffering of others: ‘trop de chretiens [...] ont accepte sans difficulte les 
malheurs d ’autrui, attribues a la volonte de Dieu.’54 Thus, for Yourcenar, the terms 
acceptance and revolt resonate with both political and existential significance. In her 
essay on Cavafy, Yourcenar brought together all these elements in such a way that 
the opposition between ‘revolte’ and ‘acceptation’ was transcended.
52 EM, p. 173.
53 Marguerite Yourcenar, ‘Andre Gide revisited’, in Cahiers Andre Gide, 3, Le Centenaire (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1972), pp. 21-44, (p. 32).
54 Rosbo, p. 137.
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The paradoxical understanding of revolt as part of acceptance is further 
supported by Yourcenar’s rejection of the conventional idea of revolt in politics, 
ideology or even art and literature -  a rejection repeated on different occasions. With 
regard to historical revolutions, she pointed out to Matthieu Galey: ‘Je n ’idolatre pas 
les revolutions. Elies produisent finalement leurs reactions, plus virulentes encore, et 
presque inevitablement elles s’enlisent aussi dans des societes fonctionnarisees, 
hierarchisees, et pour finir dans des “goulags”’.55 Yourcenar clearly believes that 
revolt against a system of ideas or a mechanism of production of meaning inevitably 
reproduces new systems of representation which are based on analogous structures 
and hierarchies. This idea tallies with her perception of history as a series of 
(mis)representations of reality. What remains stable is the impulse and the ability for 
representation, which Yourcenar suggests that we should accept as a constitutive 
attribute of our being, rather than renounce in the search for identity.
Yourcenar’s idiosyncratic reading of Cavafy’s poem Che fece... il grand rifiuto 
may not be sufficiently backed by evidence in that particular poem, but does convey 
well Cavafy’s general poetic and intellectual stance. Like E.M. Forster, who once 
described Cavafy as a gentleman standing ‘motionless at a slight angle to the 
universe’, Yourcenar looks at the Greek poet as being partly outside the world and its 
representations and partly absorbed by them.56 With reference to the presence of 
religion in Cavafy’s poetry, she remarks:
La meme absence de revolte permet a Cavafy de se mouvoir avec aisance au sein de 
son heredite orthodoxe, et fait de lui, en definitive, un chretien. Chretien aussi eloigne 
que possible du tourment, de 1’effusion de cceur, ou de la rigueur ascetique, mais 
chretien pourtant, puisque religio, au sens antique du terme, aussi bien que mystica, se 
trouve faire partie de 1’uni vers du christianisme.57
55 Les Yeux ouverts, p. 309-10.
56 Mentioned in Judith Scherer Herz, ‘The Remaking o f the Past in Forster's Non-Fiction’, Twentieth 
Century Literature, Vol. 31, No. 2/3, E. M. Forster Issue (Summer 1985), pp. 287-296, (p. 291).
57 EM, p. 157.
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The absence of revolt leads to what Yourcenar specified above as ‘le cas extreme et 
personnel ou il y aurait revolte a ne pas se revolter’. This is because through a poetic 
negotiation with Christianity, Cavafy replaces dogma and emotional sublimation with 
the mystical element of religio ‘au sense antique du terme’. Yourcenar made a 
similar comment in Les Yeux ouverts, referring to the Shinto religion:
C’est justement la splendeur des ceremonies, le rite, le sentiment du sacre qui est 
important, parce qu’il [...] montre dans toute leur beaute les gestes de la vie. [...] Je 
crois que [fuir cette beaute] c’est meconnaitre le sens des religions, c’est-a-dire ‘ce 
qui relie’, comme nous l’avons deja dit. II s’agit de relier l’homme a tout ce qui est, a 
ete, et sera.58
Yourcenar suggests here that access to ourselves and the world is possible through 
the ceremony and the rite, that is, through acts of representation. While art evidently 
does not ensure unmediated unity between the subject and the world, it establishes a 
relationship ( ‘relier’) between them, which, as I have argued, is differential in 
character. To refuse representation ( ‘fuir cette beaute’) would constitute an act of 
revolt against aesthetic mediation. This, Yourcenar stresses in the above passage, 
would be a misapprehension of our relationship with being ( ‘tout ce qui est, a ete, et 
sera’) -  a relationship which is not to be understood in terms of absolute identity, but 
in terms of a difference, a link ( ‘relier’, religio).
Cavafy’s poetry and Shinto ceremonies share a common understanding of 
representation and the mission of art. Art fails in its main objective to structure and 
systematize the world (which is also the objective of philosophy, historiography and 
politics, as we saw). Through this failure, art reveals the limits of the subject, the 
fleetingness of the world and the perpetual difference that separates the two. If the 
world manifests itself through this failure and this difference, then the artist must 
accept this state of affairs and use art in order to delineate better the nature of this 
difference. In this sense, Cavafy’s poetry is, for Yourcenar, both an act of liberation
58 Les Yeux ouverts, pp. 38-39.
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and ‘une maniere de soumission a la nature de choses.’59 The main benefit from 
adopting the attitude of accepting is the recovery of an original relationship between 
man and world, confirmed by the return to the original signification of words 
{religio, mystica). This does not involve returning to a paradisiacal state of 
immediacy; quite to the contrary, it involves recognizing the permanent displacement 
of the subject in relation to the world and itself.
The restorative function of accepting is illustrated by Yourcenar in her short 
essay ‘Sur un reve de Diirer’. This essay is about a watercolour by Diirer called T he 
Vision’ which depicts an apocalyptic dream he had during a night of June 1525, with 
terrible columns of water falling ponderously from the heavens and flooding the 
earth. Diirer accompanied his watercolour with an explanatory text, which intrigues 
Yourcenar’s imagination. The point that interests me here is Yourcenar’s 
commentary on the final sentence of Diirer’s text -  a sentence which is not 
semantically connected with the rest of the writing: ‘Dieu toume pour le mieux toutes 
choses.’60 Yourcenar stresses Diirer’s religiousness and then meditates on this 
‘formule pieuse’:
Elle peut au choix s’interpreter comme une formule propitiatoire quasi machinale, 
assertion plus ou moins sincere d’un optimisme fonde sur la bienveillance divine, 
aussi peu concluante qu’un distrait signe de croix, ou, au contraire, comme un acte de 
soumission tres reflechi a l’ordre des choses, partout caracteristique de tout grand 
esprit authentiquement religieux, Marc Aurele acceptant ce que veut 1’uni vers, Lao- 
tseu d’accord avec le vide et Confucius avec le Ciel. 1
Yourcenar wonders whether Diirer’s declaration of faith originates in his candid, 
ingenuous affirmation of religion or, ‘au contraire’, in his thoughtful, philosophical 
acceptance of it. Authentic religiosity, Yourcenar notes, consists in the ability to 
submit oneself to the order of things. However, if, for Yourcenar, religio means 
above all ‘relation’, as I just suggested, then to be ‘authentiquement religieux’ is to
59 EM, p. 157.
60 EM, p. 318. ‘Sur un reve de Diirer’ (written in 1977) is included in Marguerite Yourcenar, Le 
Temps, ce grand sculpteur.
61 EM, p. 320.
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have an authentic relationship with the world. Therefore, their ability to submit to the 
order of things makes it possible for Marcus Aurelius, Lao-Tzu and Confucius to 
enjoy an authentic relationship with them. In this context, Yourcenar concedes that 
there is in fact no contrast between sophisticated and candid acceptance:
Mais cet ‘au contraire’ est de trop. Nous devinons que la confiance ingenue et 
1’adhesion impersonnelle se rejoignent quelque part, a des profondeurs de la nature 
humaine ou le principe de la contradiction ne penetre pas. Telle quelle, cette mantra 
chretienne a sans doute aide Diirer a emerger indemne de son terrible songe.
Diirer was saved from his terrible dream thanks to his accepting attitude, whose
nature is not exclusively Christian, as the expression ‘mantra chretienne’ intimates.
Yourcenar claims that Diirer’s authentic acceptance is more deeply-seated and
original than the contradictions which cost him a night terror. These contradictions
are not reconciled by him, but continue to torment him. Yet, to the extent that he
accepts these contradictions, he manages to place himself beyond them and emerge
undamaged from this adventure. As in the case of Cavafy, to accept means to reclaim
62a position of authenticity which does not cancel contradiction and conflict.
Significantly, Yourcenar stresses the realism of Diirer’s sketch and textual 
annotation to it. ‘Ce reve frappa par une absence totale de symboles.’ ‘Le visionnaire 
est un realiste [...]. Sa precision est d ’un physicien. Des le choc de la premiere 
trombe d’eau, il a essaye de mesurer a quelle distance il se trouvait du point de 
frappe.’ Indeed, Diirer mentions in his text that he was at a distance of four leagues 
from the point of the first downpour, and this is also how he painted it. Yourcenar 
considers this as a sign of an exquisite humanism: ie  meilleur de la notion 
d’humanisme [est] inclu dans cette capacite, meme en reve et au sein d’une sorte
62 Writing on Yourcenar’s ‘Sur un reve de Diirer’, Nigel Saint proposes to look at this image and text 
by Diirer as one work. The torrent o f water threatens to dissolve not only the land on which it falls, but 
also Diirer’s watercolour itself, as well as Diirer’s writing, placed right underneath the image. Saint 
observes: ‘Water and colour pigment in the watercolour are the substances now undergoing 
dissolution. [ ...]  The writing stands in an ambiguous spatial relationship to the wash [ ...] ;  [it] is about 
to receive the impact o f the water.’ In this sense, Durer’s accepting attitude does not only save the 
artist himself from terror; it also protects his work from dissolution. Nigel Saint, M arguerite 
Yourcenar, Reading the Visual (Oxford: Legenda, 2000), p. 40.
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d’angoisse ontologique, de continuer de jauger.’63 Now this gauging of the distance 
between Diirer and the downpour is precisely what Yourcenar describes as the 
pragmatism and realism at the heart of the existential experience. Diirer stands in fear 
and anxiety in front of a world which remains incomprehensible and with which he 
cannot identify. His task as an artist is not to repress or interpret this spectacle, but to 
accept it and ‘measure the distance’ that separates him from it. Measuring the 
distance is similar to Yourcenar’s narrative technique of closing in on the gap 
(‘cemer la lacune’) which separates man from the world and from his own being.64 In 
both painting and writing, realism aims at gauging the distance between the self and 
the world. It confirms the alienating gap within the self and resists the temptation of 
conceptual reduction and rationalization. According to Yourcenar, this is what 
Cavafy does by embracing Christianity (but also other, ostensibly contradictory, 
schematizations of reality, such as Greek hedonism and even nihilism).65 This is also 
what Thomas Mann and Flaubert do, when they describe, the first, the Munich station 
timetables, and the second, Madame Bovary’s wedding dinner. According to 
Yourcenar, Piranesi and Mishima also share a similar perception of the function of 
realism.66 These writers and artists do not understand themselves as original creators 
or thinkers but as craftsmen:
La position du poete reste celle d’un artisan exquis ; sa fonction se limite a donner a 
la plus brulante et a la plus chaotique des matieres la plus nette et la plus lisse des 
formes. Nulle part l’art n’est considere comme plus reel ou plus noble que la realite. 
[...] Art et vie s’entraident l’un l’autre.67
63 These passages from EM, p. 319-20.
64 Claude Foucart makes a similar point with reference to Yourcenar’s essay on Diirer: ‘Saisir 
I’authenticite [...], c ’est d ’abord apprecier tres precisement cette distance qui separe les etres.’ Foucart 
focuses on the distance that separates the writer from her fictional characters, whereas I am interested 
in the existential-ontological distance between the self and the world. Foucart, p. 267.
65 Cf. EM, p. 157.
66 I am referring here to Yourcenar’s monographs ‘Le Cerveau noir de Piranese’ (written in 1959-61, 
in Sous benefice d ’inventaire) and Mishima ou la Vision du vide (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), also 
included in EM.
67 EM, p. 158
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The mission of art, as this passage from Yourcenar’s essay on Cavafy suggests, is to 
set up a context in and through which reality in its chaotic consistency may manifest 
itself. It is clear that the artist as craftsman is better placed than the philosopher to 
achieve this goal -  although we should always bear in mind Yourcenar’s own 
preconceptions against philosophy and critical thought. It is further suggested that 
pure artistic originality, whether as sublimation or as suppression of the disorder or 
things, is beyond the scope of art and has nothing true to say about reality.
While Cavafy, along with Piranesi, Diirer and Thomas Mann are characteristic 
cases of the artist as craftsman, perhaps the most graphic portrait of the artist as 
original creator in Yourcenar’s work is that of a fictional character, Wang-Fo, in her 
short story ‘Comment Wang-Fo fut sauve’. This is the story of a painter who ‘aimait 
l’image des choses, et non les choses elles-memes’.68 The emperor of the land of 
Han, who grew up surrounded only by Wang-Fo’s paintings, believing that his 
empire would be as beautiful as them, arrests him one day and accuses him of lying: 
‘Tu m ’as menti, Wang-Fo, vieux imposteur : le monde n ’est qu’un amas de taches 
confuses, jetees sur le vide par un peintre insense, sans cesse effacees par nos 
larmes.’69 Wang-Fo may have been arrested, but he is the one who holds the emperor 
hostage in his representations: ‘[Tes] sortileges’, says the emperor, ‘m ’ont degoute de 
ce que je possede, et donne le desir de ce que je ne possederai pas.’70 Wang-Fo’s 
punishment is to have his eyes burnt and his hands cut off, so as not to deceive 
through his art any longer. Yourcenar implies that there is an element of justice in 
this punishment, although she saves Wang-Fo at the end. He escapes in his imaginary 
world, inside one of his paintings. This enigmatic tale is as much about the power of 
art to generate its own space and create the illusion of redemption, as it is about the
68 OR, p. 1171. Written in 1936, ‘Comment Wang-Fo fut sauve’ opens Yourcenar’s Nouvelles 
Orientates (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), a collection o f short stories.
69 OR, p. 1177.
70 OR, p. 1178.
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failure of pure creativity to demonstrate the ways in which man is related to the 
world.
Imprisoned within the confines of a sublimated reality, the emperor of the land 
of Han contrasts sharply with Hadrien, the emperor of Memoires, whose freedom is 
summed up in the phrase ‘je voulais l’etat ou j ’etais’. The ‘liberte d’acquiescement’ 
is above all the existential freedom which comes from acknowledging that our access 
to reality passes necessarily through art in the broad sense of representation and that 
this art is doomed to fail in its constitutive goal to depict the world. The art of 
realism, a humbler art, as it were, whose aspiration is not to reflect reality, but to 
reproduce its distortions in the artistic or literary work, is one of Hadrien’s tools in 
the search for self-authentication, a technique de liberte.
It is significant that this is a technique and not a philosophy or a system of 
analysis. Like Diirer and Cavafy, Hadrien is depicted by Yourcenar as a consummate 
craftsman, a ‘physicien’, gauging the distance between what he writes and what he 
experiences, sees or imagines. As Yourcenar writes with regard to narrative in the 
first person, ‘une telle forme litteraire [...] oblige [le lecteur] a redresser les 
evenements et les etres vus a travers le personnage qui dit je  comme des objets vus a 
travers l’eau’.71 This passage explains among other things that there is no pretension 
of immediacy in the realist text. On the contrary, by deflecting ie s  etres et les 
evenements’, the realist narrative points to its failure and, at the same time, to the 
presence of an obscure area (a gap, a distance) that can only be depicted in terms of 
distortion or refraction. Yourcenar hopes that this process authenticates both the 
realist work of art and the artist. It authenticates Memoires as a novel by Yourcenar, 
but also as a text supposedly narrated by Hadrien. At the same time, as a technique de
71 Preface o f Le Coup de grace, OR, p. 81, Yourcenar’s emphasis. The preface was written in 1962. 
Marguerite Yourcenar, Le Coup de grace (Paris: Gallimard, 1939), for the first edition in a separate 
volume.
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liberte, realist narrative authenticates the narrator himself, who closes in on the gap 
within the self, thus confirming this gap and acknowledging its unrepresentability.
Politics as a technique of authentication
If individual existence is freed and authenticated through realist art, then freedom and 
authenticity should also be possible to achieve at the level of politics. This is 
Hadrien’s assumption in his political and cultural work, to which I will refer in more 
detail in the next chapter. Yourcenar’s understanding of freedom and the aesthetic 
character of our personal relationship with the world already allows some preliminary 
thoughts with regard to her perception of politics. Politics is a form of representation 
par excellence, because it organizes our relationship with reality according to 
concrete structures, plans and visions. Inasmuch as this relationship is always 
mediated by concepts, it is also mediated by politics as the art of managing and 
manipulating these concepts. Like any form of mediation, politics not only 
establishes, but also distorts the relationship between the subject or the community 
and the world. Yourcenar’s critique of oversystematization, ideology, dogma and so 
forth extends to those political systems which are based on extreme interpretations of 
reality. As she points out in Les Yeux ouverts:
Aucun reve de perfection n’est a jamais realise sans entrainer aussi la violence et 
l’erreur. [...] Un communiste ideal serait divin. Mais un monarque eclaire, comme le 
souhaite Voltaire, serait egalement divin. Seulement ou sont-ils ? [... Les monarchistes 
fran^ais] ne voient pas que leur roi ferait aussitot appel a 1’equivalent de M. Giscard 
d’Estaing ou de M. Mitterrand a la tete de son ministere, et que le bureau de poste 
serait tenu par le meme employe, ou son sosie. Le capitaliste technocrate qui pretend 
etablir le bonheur sur la terre par ses moyens d’apprenti sorcier me parait d’ailleurs du 
meme ordre.72
72 Les Yeux ouverts, p. 120.
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This criticism reproduces at the level of politics many elements of Yourcenar’s 
perception of art. She claims that, in principle, she would not object to an ideal form 
of political representation, only such a form is not possible. Every political mediation 
between man and the world inevitably leaves behind a trail of error and violence. 
This is particularly true of systems intending to establish a relationship of total 
equivalence between man and the world, namely, totalitarian systems, such as 
communism and monarchy. Interestingly, Yourcenar asserts that technocratic 
capitalism is also such a system: its ‘sorcery’ is ‘of the same order’. All these systems 
miscalculate the constitutive non-ideality of the subject, symbolized in the above 
passage -  rightly or wrongly -  by Mitterrand and the post office employee. These 
systems attempt to impose an identity between man and the world, which is always 
proved fictional and wrong. Memoires d ’Hadrien provides Yourcenar’s answer to 
the question of leadership and politics. She imagines a poetic-political re­
arrangement of reality which takes into account the unavoidable distortions brought 
about by political representation. Hadrien’s goal is not to create a new and original 
political system, but to accept and maintain the existing political order and pacify the 
empire, without imposing speculative interpretations of political or existential 
subjectivity. As we saw, Hadrien’s idea of liberty is based not on a philosophy, but 
on a technique. His politics is one way of implementing this technique. It aspires to 
be a ‘pragmatic’ and ‘realist’ politics of accepting the differential and incomplete 
relationship between the subject and the world.
Hadrien’s ‘technique de l’homme libre’ invites various types of interpretation, 
several of which will be attempted in my thesis. Apart from questions of internal 
theoretical consistency, this aesthetic determination of freedom will be interrogated
73 The same views are expressed in Mishima ou la Vision du vide, where Yourcenar writes: ‘L’erreur 
grave du Mishima de quarante-trois ans [ ...]  est de n’avoir pas vu que, meme si le visage de Sa 
Majeste resplendissait de nouveau dans le soleil levant, le monde des « ventres pleins », du plaisir « 
6vente » et de l ’innocence « vendue » resterait le meme ou se reformerait, et que meme Zaibatsu, sans 
lequel un Etat moderne ne saurait subsister, y reprendrait sa place preponderate, sous le meme nom, 
ou d ’autres noms.’ EM, pp. 257-58.
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in relation to the context of its enunciation, to wit, the immediate post-war period. 
The possibility of freedom is indeed historicized by Yourcenar, but in relation to the 
context of its reference, the Roman Empire. Early in the ‘Carnets de notes de 
Memoires d ’Hadrien , she notes:
Retrouve dans un volume de la correspondance de Flaubert, fort lu et fort souligne par 
moi vers 1927, la phrase inoubliable : ‘Les dieux n’etant plus, et le Christ n’etant pas 
encore, il y a eu, de Ciceron a Marc Aurele, un moment unique oil 1’homme seul a 
ete.’74
Man’s solitude is also man’s freedom. The quotation from Flaubert has a strongly 
negative and a strongly positive connotation. It suggests that there was a period of 
nihilism in antiquity, where man was unaided by the divine element and therefore 
had no point of reference or standard of validity. But this period is also one of 
freedom, in the sense of the development of a humanist conscience which allowed 
man to question his representations and, as I argued, to manipulate them towards the 
goal of self-authentication. Thus, the choice of the narrative subject of Memoires has 
to do with this unique historical conjuncture where, as Yourcenar’s readers have 
noticed, the divine and the human elements coincide.75 What is at stake in the novel 
is precisely man’s ability to resist the temptation to play god, to reject the idea of 
filling the historical-ontological gap with new representations and to use this 
occasion to assert humanity in terms of difference and incompleteness. Further, there 
is no doubt that Yourcenar establishes a link between, on the one hand, nihilism and 
the possibility of freedom which Flaubert discerned in the period of the Pax Romana, 
and on the other, the historical and cultural conditions that prevailed in Europe after 
the Second World War.
The choice of historical time has yet another implication. As I pointed out 
already, Yourcenar understands history as a palimpsest of interpretations and
74 OR, p. 519.
75 See, for instance, C. Frederick Farrell, Jr and Edith R. Farrell, ‘Un lien entre l ’humain et le sacre : 
Le nom de dieu’, in Remy Poignault (ed.), Le Sacre dans Voeuvre de M arguerite Yourcenar (Tours: 
SIEY, 1993), pp. 163-173, (especially pp. 171-72).
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conceptualizations of ‘le vecu’. On this topic and with reference to the historical 
setting of Denier du reve, Yourcenar’s novel on fascist Italy, Nadia Harris makes the 
following remark: ‘Nous sommes dans un univers ou les mediations symboliques 
sont devenues le relais incontoumable du sens et d ’ou l’immediatete, l’intuition ont 
disparu, balayees par une culture millenaire qui ne contjoit de relation au monde que 
fondee sur l’intelligibilite et la raison [...].76 Harris posits an original state of 
immediacy that precedes temporally the ‘millenary’ process of rationalization and 
rhetorization of experience. I do not think that this assumption is fully justified, 
since, for Yourcenar, art has always mediated and intellectualized man’s relationship 
with the world. This aside, Harris’s comment successfully highlights Yourcenar’s 
conviction that the quest for freedom is more and more encumbered by imaginary 
representations, as history builds upon itself. This means that existential and political 
freedom is a possibility for Hadrien more than it is for modem man. If we take into 
account Flaubert’s comment above, it becomes clear that Hadrien represents a 
narrative subject which is ideally placed before an exceptional historical situation: he 
has a unique chance of uncovering the layers of interpretation which conceal his true 
relationship with the world. The novel suggests strongly that Hadrien insisted on the 
instability and inconclusiveness of this relationship and thus managed to reclaim his 
personal liberty and authenticity.
In this chapter I argued that Yourcenar associates the problematics of existence 
and that of politics with the question of aesthetics and representation. Beginning with 
a reading of the first chapter of Memoires d ’Hadrien, and drawing evidence from 
other fictional and critical works by Yourcenar, I attempted to show how the 
representational character of the subject’s relationship with the world affects its sense
76 Nadia Harris, ‘Representations de l’Autre dans l ’oeuvre de Marguerite Yourcenar’, in Jean-Philippe 
Beaulieu, et al. (eds), M arguerite Yourcenar, Ecritures de Vautre (Quebec: XYZ, 1997), pp. 45-52, 
(p. 46).
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of selfhood and denies its autonomy. I proposed that Yourcenar considers the 
subject’s entrapment within conceptual structures as both an impasse which frustrates 
the search for identity and an opening through which to reclaim freedom and 
authenticity on the basis of difference. While the subject cannot, and should not 
attempt to, rid itself from art and representation, Yourcenar suggests that it can 
arrange these representations in such a way as to acknowledge and accept its 
permanent lack of identity with the world and itself. Realism in narrative and 
pragmatism in politics are the two forms this arrangement assumes. Whatever 
Yourcenar’s reservations vis-a-vis philosophy in general, this is undoubtedly a 
complex philosophical task. It is also one which brings her close to 20th-Century 
existentialism and poststructuralism, as I will discuss in the chapters that follow.
The human and the political subjects which we expect to emerge from Memoires 
d ’Hadrien challenge the conventional perception of subjectivity as full and unfailing 
presence to oneself. We expect Hadrien as an individual and as a political subject to 
emerge free from the quest for identity, and accepting his constitutive insufficiency 
as part of his authenticity. The same should be true of the novel, Memoires 
d ’Hadrien, whose narrative authenticity depends on whether it indeed acknowledges 
the limits of the realism it employs. In the following chapters, I shall examine the 
ways in which Yourcenar determines this fragmented, differential subjectivity and 
whether she succeeds in the existential as well as the political arena.
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CHAPTER TWO
T e m p o r a l it y , Ir o n y  
a n d  t h e  In v e r s io n  o f  A u t h e n t ic it y
In the 1990 conference Roman, histoire et mythe dans Voeuvre de Marguerite 
Yourcenar, Antoine Wyss underlined succinctly the relationship between Hadden’s 
guiding rule of acquiescement (Wyss writes: ‘accueil’) and his technique of 
manipulation of symbols and other mechanisms of representation:
La lucidite d’Hadrien [...] est une lucidite d’accueil, qui accepte toutes les paroles, 
toutes les pensees, tous les symboles, qui leur reconnait un sens ou une valeur, mais 
en meme temps regarde au-dela, leur refusant la qualite d’absolu [...]. Hadrien 
apparait ainsi comme un grand manipulateur de symboles, au sens large de tout ce 
qui, dans la culture humaine, engendre des significations et sert de support aux 
valeurs, de reference aux pensees. II peut s’agir de mots, de concepts, de systemes, 
d’entites sumaturelles, de mythes et de dieux, il peut s’agir aussi de lois, d’usages, 
d’institutions ou de batiments, en tant qu’ils representent quelque chose de plus 
qu’eux-memes. Toutes ces puissances [...] a partir desquelles la plupart des hommes 
pensent, et auxquelles leur pensee s’arrete ou retoume, Hadrien les considere pour 
elles-memes et les unes par rapport aux autres, il pense a elles et a travers elles.1
This comment is valid as far as both Hadrien’s politics and his perception of 
subjectivity are concerned. It points to the nihilism that permeates Memoires, in the 
sense of the absence of a point of reference for the systems of values and ideas 
employed by Hadrien in his role as emperor and cultural reformer. It also supports
1 Antoine Wyss, ‘Auteur, narrateur, personnage : Quelle historiographie pour M emoires d ’H adrien T , 
in Simone et Maurice Delcroix (eds), Roman, histoire et mythe dans Voeuvre de M arguerite Yourcenar 
(Tours: SIEY, 1995), pp. 483-491, (p. 488).
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the idea that, for Yourcenar, the subject’s relationship with the world is always 
overdetermined by various systems of signification. Wyss groups all these systems 
under the term ‘symbols’, thus implying that the mediation between the self and the 
world is rhetorical in character. This idea will be further pursued in this chapter.
Manipulation of symbols, as a political and existential technique, implies the 
possibility of authenticity. As I have already suggested, authenticity in Memoires 
should not be construed as the return to an original state of unity before any rhetorical 
mediation; it should rather be understood as a form of engagement with the world in 
which the impossibility of identity is taken into account. Man and the world may 
belong factically together, but from the point of view of the self, which is that of 
Memoires d'Hadrien, the gap separating them cannot be bridged. As I will argue in 
this and the following chapters, Yourcenar subverts the semantics of authenticity, 
purity and, to an extend, humanism, in such a way that these terms assume the 
opposite to their conventional meaning. The ideas of ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ are to be 
understood in terms of man’s particularity among other entities to exist in a 
differential relationship with the world. To be sure, the way Yourcenar subverts the 
semantic content of metaphysically charged words must be investigated and the 
philosophical meaning and consequences of this semantic subversion must be 
questioned. I propose to begin this investigation in the present chapter by examining 
first how Hadrien’s technique of manipulation of rhetoric is implemented, how it is 
associated with his cultural work and in what sense it can be said that it authenticates 
his politics.
Constructing and reconstructing
It was Yourcenar herself who defined politics as an art of manipulation in Les Yeux 
ouverts. During her interviews with Galey, she stressed that a good statesman-leader
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is a ‘manipulateur de genie’. She also called Hadrien un ‘grand metteur en scene’ 
and, metaphorically, ‘un joueur de poker’.2 As these analogies intimate, Yourcenar 
understands statesmanship as the re-casting of pre-existing values and symbols in an 
effort to form new and more functional representations. Strictly speaking, there is no 
element of pure creativity in this process; rather, there is the determination to remain 
consciously under the sign of representation. This is evident in Hadrien’s work as a 
founder and co-designer of temples and cities. These are conceived as artefacts 
through which man’s relationship with nature is both confirmed and mediated. Thus, 
on the one hand, Hadrien considers these cities as an intentional reproduction of 
natural order:
Plotinopolis, Adrinople, Antinoe, Hadrianotheres... J’ai multiplie le plus possible ces 
ruches de l’abeille humaine.
And further down:
La ville : le cadre, la construction humaine, monotone si Ton veut, mais comme sont 
monotones les cellules de cire bourrees de miel, le lieu des contacts et des echanges, 
l’endroit ou les pay sans viennent pour vendre leurs produits et s’attardent pour 
regarder bouche bee les peintures d’un portique...3
The analogy with the beehive suggests that Hadrien’s cities are modelled on nature. 
They constitute organic extensions of it, and in this sense they conform to the novel’s 
programmatic injunction, as it were, that discipline should assist nature in its work. 
The image of the peasant who comes to the city and is impressed by urban art and 
architecture illustrates the historical movement from nature to the representation of 
nature. The city is the scene on which the meaning of nature is revealed to man. 
Hadrien, as the founder of cities is the ‘metteur en scene’.
Yet on the other hand, in the same paragraph, Yourcenar writes that the city is 
aesthetically opposed to nature:
2
Les Yeux ouverts, pp. 158, 162 and 155 respectively.
3 OR, p. 386.
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Dans un monde encore plus qu’a demi domine par les bois, le desert, la plaine en 
friche, c’est un beau spectacle qu’une rue dallee, un temple a n’importe quel dieu, des 
bains et des latrines publiques, la boutique ou le barbier discute avec ses clients les 
nouvelles de Rome.4
While this statement does not contradict the previous argument about the city as an 
image of nature, it shows that there is no identity between the human and the natural. 
The city mediates and therefore establishes the connection between the two, but at 
the same time, as an image and a construction, it refuses it. The aesthetic 
representation -  whether it is a painting on a portico, a temple or the city itself - 
confirms the link and determines the distance between man and nature.
Importantly, this link is characterized by Yourcenar as beautiful, ‘un beau 
spectacle’. ‘Beauty’ is never without concrete meaning in Yourcenar and it is worth 
tracing its presence in her text as a direct reference to the fundamentally aesthetic, 
and therefore ‘un-natural’, relationship between man and world. In the above passage 
Yourcenar asserts that beauty defines the difference between the human and the 
natural. This is a conclusion that also Leo Belmonte draws in Un homme obscur, 
when he notes that man has exhausted himself in the effort to represent conceptually 
the world. As we saw in Chapter 1, he concludes by saying, ‘Mais c ’est beau’. In 
Belmonte’s philosophical world, the encounter with beauty has no practical value. 
On the contrary, for Hadrien, beauty is a way of implementing a politics that 
recognizes difference. One of his emblematic statements in the novel reads as 
follows: ‘Je me sentais responsable de la beaute du monde’. 5 More than a simple 
declaration of love for beauty, this phrase summarizes the way Hadrien understands 
politics and indeed subjectivity. The pursuit of beauty, harmony and order, reveals 
the mutual belonging of man and nature not in terms of identity but in terms of 
difference. Further, to be responsible for beauty means to be a master artist who re­
4 OR, p. 386.
5 OR, p. 390.
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arranges and manipulates symbolic and aesthetic values with an aim to demonstrate 
this incommensurability.
The most important way in which difference becomes apparent to Hadrien is 
through the gradual undoing of the work of art in time and in history. The work of art 
has to be understood in the broadest possible sense of ‘la construction humaine’, 
which includes the aesthetic object, but also cities and the Roman Empire itself. As 
the work of art changes or perishes with time, it transforms into a new representation, 
an image of difference produced by both man and nature. For example, the city of 
Rome is not considered in the novel as an objective aesthetic reflection of a stable 
historical and political reality, but as the representation of historical change: ‘Rome : 
[...] la preuve visible des changements et des recommencements de l’histoire’.6 In 
this sense, the city slowly becomes the work of time, rather than that of poetic fiction. 
It slips into a different temporality from that which it was initially meant to embody, 
and transforms into a complete presentation of reality.
Hadrien’s goal as a manipulator of symbols and representations is to include in 
the production of art the thought of time which is the agent of disintegration. Thus, 
with reference to building materials, he notes:
A Rome, j ’utilisais de preference la brique etemelle, qui ne retoume que tres 
lentement a la terre dont elle est nee, et dont le tassement, ou l’effritement 
imperceptible, se fait de telle maniere que l’edifice reste montagne alors meme qu’il a 
cesse d’etre visiblement une forteresse, un cirque, ou une tombe. En Grece, en Asie, 
j ’employais le marbre natal, la belle substance qui une fois taillee demeure fidele a la 
mesure humaine, si bien que le plan du temple tout entier reste contenu dans chaque 
fragment de tambour brise.7
This is an example of Hadrien’s technique of manipulation through which desire for 
order co-exists with the certainty of natural decay. The choice of building materials is 
ultimately based on the prospect of the destruction of art. Evidently, this contradicts 
the logic of the symbol and that of representation. This does not mean that the
6 OR, p. 418.
7 OR, p. 385.
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symbolic function of the edifices that Hadrien builds - for example, their reference to 
divine or institutional authority - is refused or subverted. As I stressed above, 
Hadrien is not a rebel, but a statesman who accepts symbols and conventional 
significations. This is why he becomes founder, patron and designer of temples and 
cities. However, after being delivered to time, as it were, these symbols serve to 
reveal a broader ironic context, in which their insufficiency as representations is 
made evident. Symbolic value and ironic awareness of difference share the same 
space and time. By combining the two, Hadrien remains constant to his programme 
to coordinate ‘volonte’ and ‘destin’, representation and its undoing.
In Memoires d ’Hadrien there are many references to Hadrien’s activity as a 
manipulator of the symbolic value of artworks and institutions, several of which will 
be discussed in my thesis. In the present context, I shall discuss one more example, 
that of the erection of the Olympeion in Athens. In the novel, this temple is 
considered an architectural success, and it is charged with religious and cultural 
meaning. In addition to its function as a place of worship of Zeus, for Hadrien, it 
symbolizes ‘le mariage de Rome et d ’Athenes’ and the rebirth of Greece after a long 
period of decline. Soon after its dedication, however, Hadrien recontextualizes this 
temple by seeing it from the perspective of its future decline: ‘Ce fut alors qu’une 
melancolie d’un instant me serra le cceur : je songeais que les mots d’achevement, de 
perfection, contiennent en eux le mot de fin : peut-etre n ’avais-je fait qu’offrir une
Q
proie de plus au Temps devorateur’. The ironic effect of time is here contemplated 
with sadness, as Hadrien remembers that pure creativity and the establishment of 
stable symbolic values are not possible. In fact, in Memoires, Hadrien is neither a 
pure manipulator nor a pure creator of art and symbols, but oscillates often violently 
between the two. His ‘impurity’ is part of Yourcenar’s definition of what it is to be 
human. In the passage quoted above, he suggests that the relationship between the
8 OR, pp. 422-23.
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two stages through which the artefact passes, that of its making and that of its 
unmaking, is not dialectical. The first stage is that of creation, stabilization, and the 
quest for identity, while the second stage is that of fragmentation, contingency and 
the affirmation of difference. The final authentication of the work of art is not a 
synthesis of the two stages, but the manifestation of difference in the spectacle of 
ruins. If the fragmented work of art represents authentically the relationship between 
man and nature, it nevertheless does not ensure a place for the subject, which will 
always remain deficient. At a different part of the novel, but in a similar mood, 
Yourcenar makes the following remark:
La ou un tisserand rapiecerait sa toile, ou un calculateur habile corrigerait ses erreurs, 
ou 1’artiste retoucherait son chef-d’oeuvre encore imparfait ou endommage a peine, la 
nature prefere repartir a meme l’argile, a meme le chaos, et ce gaspillage est ce qu’on 
nomme l’ordre des choses.9
According to Yourcenar, to the extent that artistic intention is intention for beauty 
and meaning, it will always be frustrated. What is at stake in the novel is the 
discovery of a form of order that contains disorder and even of a form of (non- 
)identity which contains conflict. Through his work as a cultural and political 
reformer, Hadrien investigates the possibility of this new post-metaphysical form of 
‘identity’ for a permanently dislocated subject - whether this is the individual subject 
or, as we shall see, the political subject, to wit, the Roman Empire.
Now while the primary goal of this chapter is to highlight the sophistication of 
Yourcenar’s unorthodox idea of authentic subjectivity, the risks involved in its 
definition are not underestimated. Yourcenar attempts to wrest such key terms as 
beauty, order, humanity and eternity out of their metaphysical context, but the risk of 
falling back into essentialism, or indeed of never emerging from it, is certainly high. 
Yourcenar’s love for classical beauty and her profound confidence in the possibility 
of order can only with difficulty be reconciled with what she sees with equal clarity
9 OR, pp. 475-76.
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as man’s shapeless facticity in a chaotic world. On the other hand, her fascination 
with ruins and the idea of decline over time implies an inverted essentialism, that of 
the decadent, the fleeting and the impure. Of course, there is no reason to question 
Yourcenar’s frankness as she sets out to reach the outer limits of the ‘unutterable’ 
(Tinform ule’). However, as this thesis will be unravelling the characteristically 
modem complexity of the notion of authentic subjectivity in Yourcenar, the stakes 
inevitably will become higher. Particular ideas, such as the inversion of the meaning 
of concepts, Hadrien’s ‘technique of accepting’ and his ‘manipulation of symbols’ 
will have to prove to be operative in the context of the narrative but also in that of 
modernity in general. The form of subjectivity which Yourcenar puts forward, and 
which is supposed to transcend the conventional categories of type and identity will 
also have to be described with some precision. Finally, this new subject, whose very 
insufficiency becomes apparent with time and authenticates it, must avoid the 
character of universality -  another of Yourcenar’s favourite terms. As we shall see in 
the last chapter of the thesis, it is the political subject, as Yourcenar imagines it 
especially in Memoires d'Hadrien, and as she projects it upon post-war Europe, that 
resists almost entirely the ‘manipulation’ that she proposes. Whatever its degree of 
failure or success, Yourcenar’s paradoxical existential and political thought, which 
combines conservatism and radicalism, acceptation and revolte, merits detailed 
analysis and historical contextualization, which is what I shall be doing in the rest of 
this chapter and the subsequent ones.
Yourcenar defines positively man’s relationship with the world as a 
collaboration expressed in two forms of action: construire and reconstruire. Her 
definitions of these two essentially poetic tasks, well-known among her readers and 
critics, read as follows:
Construire, c’est collaborer avec la terre : c’est mettre une marque humaine sur un 
pay sage qui en sera modifie a jamais ; c’est contribuer aussi a ce lent changement qui 
est la vie des villes.
8 2
Chapter 2 -  Temporality, Irony
and the Inversion o f Authenticity
J’ai beaucoup reconstruit: c’est collaborer avec le temps sous son aspect du passe, en 
saisir ou en modifier l’esprit, lui servir de relais vers un plus long avenir ; c’est 
retrouver sous les pierres le secret des sources.10
Hadrien situates the task of politics and that of aesthetics within the framework of 
accepting. Constructing and reconstructing are determined as forms of collaboration 
with what is already given to man, namely, ‘la terre’ and ‘le temps’, understood sensu 
lato as the inherited natural and historical space-time. Nevertheless, different 
aesthetic assumptions and aspirations underlie each of these two forms of action.
The definition of ‘construire’ implies the ideas of originality and permanence, 
which are nonetheless constantly challenged in this novel and elsewhere in 
Yourcenar’s work. Especially the phrase ‘mettre une marque humaine sur un paysage 
qui en sera modifie a jam ais’ situates man in opposition to ‘earth’, in a way which 
questions the possibility of ‘collaboration’. Yourcenar sexualizes the notion of 
‘construire’, by writing in the same paragraph: ‘Creuser des ports, c ’etait feconder la 
beaute des golfes’. Thus, the idea of ‘construire’ can be linked with a phallocentric 
perception of nature, whereby man leaves a permanent mark on the virgin body of the 
earth. By the same token, ‘construire’ can also be linked with a logocentric 
understanding of artistic intention, as the desire to defy and objectify what is 
perceived as nature’s transience and changeability. In a different context in 
Memoires, Yourcenar suggests that ‘construire’ is indeed an act of opposition to time 
as the agent of difference. In an imaginary but richly nuanced anecdote, she writes 
that, during a visit to the Egyptian city of Thebes, Hadrien scratched his name on the 
feet of the Colossus of Memnon. He then realized the frivolousness of this act, and 
remarked:
L’empereur [...] egratigna dans cette pierre dure quelques lettres grecques, une forme 
abregee et familiere de son nom : AAPIANO. C’etait encore s’opposer au temps : un 
nom, une somme de vie dont personne ne computerait les elements innombrables, une 
marque laissee par un homme egare dans cette succession de siecles.11
10 Both quotations in OR, p. 384.
11 OR, p. 445, my emphasis.
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‘Construire’ as ‘laisser une marque’ constitutes an act of opposition to time or, to use 
another of Yourcenar’s terms, an act of revolt. As such, the notion of constructing is 
related to a violent aesthetic act through which man claims a proper identity for 
himself. By writing a proper name, ‘A A PIA N O ’, Hadrien expresses symbolically his 
desire for absolute coincidence between a unique sign, his name, and a unique 
referent, his self. Soon, however, this propemess is proved to be illusory and the 
desire for identity is replaced by the certainty of displacement: Hadrien recognizes 
his situation as that of ‘un homme egare’. In the strict aesthetic sense of creating, the 
notion of constructing is thus impossible. Indeed, Hadrien admits elsewhere that 
‘meme la ou j ’innovais, j ’aimais a me sentir avant tout un continuateur’.12 As a form 
of collaboration, constructing signifies merely an intention, rather than an aesthetic or 
political act of pure creativity. Through the disintegration of the artwork, the artist 
becomes aware of the inauthenticity of this intention and enters the space of irony.
On the other hand, ‘reconstruire’ is free from metaphysical intention and consists 
in asserting the repetitive movement of irony. Unlike ‘construire’, it does not refer to 
an initial ‘mark’, a point of origin, but to the endless succession of mystification and 
demystification. To reconstruct signifies to acknowledge impermanence and change. 
As Yourcenar implies, ‘reconstruire’ is authentically temporal in the sense that it 
prolongs the future and uncovers the past. While in the course of the novel Hadrien 
struggles between the two roles of ‘constructeur’ and ‘reconstructed’, it is the latter 
role which is always depicted as most fitting to his task as emperor and cultural 
reformer. It would be useful at this point to re-quote Hadrien’s statement after the 
reconstruction of the Temple of Olympian Zeus in Athens: ‘J ’avais collabore avec les 
ages, avec la vie grecque elle-meme ; [...] le passe retrouvait un visage d ’avenir’. 
Reconstructing is here confirmed again as a form of collaboration with time. Through 
this collaboration, Hadrien discovers the unity of time in the constancy of difference.
12 OR, p. 4 1 5 .
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As the celebratory tone of this passage suggests, Yourcenar considers that political 
and existential identity can be successfully re-defined on the basis of this constancy.
According to this analysis, ‘reconstruire’ is not the antithesis of ‘construire’, 
even if these two terms refer to completely different attitudes towards the world and 
the self. It is clear that Yourcenar does not see any contradiction between them. As 
the intention of pure ex nihilo creativity, ‘construire’ pertains to the first stage of the 
history of the work of art, that of a necessary illusion. This stage involves a degree of 
mystification and belief in the possibility of re-unification with nature. It is a moment 
of inauthentic consciousness, which Yourcenar has associated with the notion of 
‘volonte’, the will for identity. This moment is followed by the second stage, the 
inevitable return of ‘destin’, which is confirmed in the ironic spectacle of ruins. 
While the context of irony cannot be transcended, it is possible for man to emerge 
from it as ‘reconstructeur’. This is not the role of the meta-ironist who resigns to the 
inevitability of decay, or who attempts to prevent it from happening again. The 
‘reconstructeur’ remains within the confines of inauthenticity. Only, as I have 
suggested, Yourcenar inverts the meaning of authenticity in order to redeem art and 
politics from within the context of irony. ‘Reconstructing’ is understood not as the 
creation, but as the ‘manipulation of symbols’; not as an original representation, but 
as the ‘mise en scene’ of established values. The succession of ‘construire’ and 
‘reconstruire’ defines the aesthetic and political task and engenders a specific 
temporality on which I now propose to focus more closely.
Irony and authenticity
Paul de Man’s influential essay ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’ provides a useful 
frame for understanding better the ‘the artistic or philosophical’ man’s transition 
from a ‘mistaken, mystified assumption’ of unity with nature to a ‘wiser’ stage,
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where a ‘distance’ between the self and ‘what is not a se lf , is established. He calls 
this transition a ‘fall’, a word whose theological undertones he recognizes, and which 
he links to the moment of absolute irony.
The element of falling introduces the specifically comical and ultimately ironical 
ingredient. [...] The Fall, in the literal as well as the theological sense, reminds [man] 
of the purely instrumental, reified character of his relationship to nature. Nature can at 
all times treat him as if he were a thing and remind him of his factitiousness, whereas 
he is quite powerless to convert even the smallest particle of nature into something 
human.13
De Man states with clarity what in Memoires d ’Hadrien is hidden behind the 
ambivalent definition of ‘construire’: namely, that it is impossible to leave an 
inaugural ‘marque humaine’ on the earth. In de Man’s essay, the poet-philosopher is 
not in a state of ambivalence. On the contrary, he is constantly the victim of his own 
‘false feeling of pride’.14 Not unlike Yourcenar, de Man defines this feeling as man’s 
inauthentic reaction to the irreversible effect of time, in a postlapsarian framework, 
where the distance between the self and the world constitutes the source of the 
subject’s lack of self-identity. In the context of his argument on the prevalence of 
allegory in early romantic literature, de Man associates the figure of the symbol with 
the inauthentic sense of time, as a result of the desire for spatial coincidence between 
the individual symbol and its referent. Further, allegory is linked with ‘the unveiling 
of an authentically temporal destiny’, since it confirms the arbitrariness and 
illegitimacy of the symbol. The distinct temporalities defined by these two figurative 
modes correspond to the temporalities pertaining to the acts of ‘construire’ and 
‘reconstruire’. Evidence supporting this point comes from several key passages from 
de Man’s essay:
The unveiling of an authentically temporal destiny [...] takes place in a subject that 
has sought refuge against the impact of time in a natural world, to which, in truth, it 
bears no resemblance. The secularized thought of the pre-romantic period no longer 
allows the transcendence of the antinomies between the created world and the act of
13 ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, in Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric o f  
Contemporary Criticism  (London: Methuen, 1983). All quotations from pp. 213-14.
14 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 214.
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creation by means of a positive recourse to the notion of divine will; the failure of the 
attempt to conceive of a language that would be symbolical as well as allegorical, the 
suppression in the allegory of the anagogical and the analogical levels is one of the 
ways in which this impossibility becomes manifest.15
De Man points out that the possibility of transcending ‘the antinomies between the 
created world and the act of creation’ depends on accepting an origin of positive 
reference. Indeed, the possibility of making an original and permanent ‘marque 
humaine’ would depend on some form of divine authorization. Were God’s 
authorization granted to the poet, every individual creation - every ‘construction’ or 
symbol - would coincide with its meaning through a process of reduction (anagoge) 
or correspondence (analogia). However, both de Man, with regard to romanticism, 
and Yourcenar, with regard to Rome at the time of Hadrian, assert that the divine will 
has lost its effectiveness. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, at the beginning of 
the ‘Carnets de notes’, Yourcenar quotes a passage by Flaubert which emphasizes 
man’s existential solitude in Hadrian’s time. Further evidence of man’s abandonment 
by God comes from a powerful and ironic remark by Hadrien apropos of a criticism 
by his architect, Apollodore. The latter had remarked that the colossal statues of 
seated gods which Hadrien liked to place inside temples would not be able to stand 
up, if they so wanted, without breaking the vault. Hadrien had his architect killed: 
‘sotte critique [...] Mais les dieux ne se levent pas ; ils ne se levent ni pour nous 
avertir, ni pour nous proteger, ni pour nous recompense^ ni pour nous punir. Ils ne se 
leverent pas cette nuit-la pour sauver Apollodore.’16
Thus abandoned by the gods, man -  according to de Man -  has to resort to a 
secular process of naming, based on the negative agency of allegory, the rhetorical 
figure by which time is introduced in consciousness:
In the world of the symbol [the] relationship [between the image and the substance] is 
one of simultaneity, which, in truth, is spatial in kind, and in which the intervention of 
time is merely a matter of contingency, whereas, in the world of allegory, time is the 
originary constitutive category. The relationship between the allegorical sign and its
15 De Man, T h e Rhetoric o f Temporality’, pp. 206-7.
16 OR, p. 490-1 .
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meaning (signifie) is not decreed by dogma. [...] We have instead a relationship 
between signs [which] necessarily contains a constitutive temporal element; it 
remains necessary, if there is to be allegory, that the allegorical sign refer to another 
sign that precedes it. The meaning constituted by the allegorical sign can then consist 
only in the repetition (in the Kierkegaardian sense of the term) of a previous sign with 
which it can never coincide, since it is of the essence of this previous sign to be pure 
anteriority. The secularized allegory of the early romantics thus necessarily contains 
[a] negative moment.17
For de Man, allegorical meaning is produced as the authentically temporal difference 
between consecutive signs that no longer perform any symbolic function per se. In 
this difference lies the negativity of allegorical language. In the secularized world of 
Memoires d ’Hadrien, the ‘negative moment’ is that of reconstruction, since it 
presupposes the destruction of the symbol which is about to be re-built, and therefore 
the renouncement of the hope to unite the symbolic image with the substance that it 
is supposed to represent. For Hadrien, the repetitive movement of reconstruction does 
not apply only in the literal sense of re-erecting older edifices and reforming 
institutions. As we have seen in the examples mentioned thus far, the new temples 
that he builds and the cities that he founds contain a negative moment too. They 
belong to time as much as they belong to particular locations. These cities and 
institutions draw their meaning from previous and future constructions of a similar 
kind. As Antoine Wyss underlines, all of Hadrien’s initiatives in the areas of 
architecture, city planning, state institutions and cultural values remain ‘puissances 
[... qu’Hadrien] considere pour elles-memes et les unes par rapport aux autres’. 
Although temples are dedicated to gods, and cities bear the names of their patrons, 
these symbolical significations prove to be temporary, as the constructions 
themselves collapse in time, literally or metaphorically. For this reason, Hadrien 
considers these values syntagmatically, ‘les unes par rapport aux autres’, thus 
allowing for their allegorical meaning to appear.
Yourcenar also presents the Roman Empire in terms of repetition in a large 
historical scale. As an institution, the Empire is not the absolute embodiment of
17 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 207.
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temporally fixed abstract values, but the differential representation of these values as 
they change over time. More specifically, for Yourcenar, Rome is a historical 
formation which draws its signification from a previous historical formation, namely, 
Greece. In the last chapter of my thesis, I shall discuss the way this complicates the 
concepts of accepting and reconstructing and makes it necessary to re-evaluate the 
notion of the authentic. In the present context, I wish to underline Rome’s 
heteronomy, as it is understood in Memoires d ’Hadrien. Its signification as historical 
formation and political ‘subject’ lies in the fact that it re-iterates a representation 
which is prior to it, a sign which precedes it.
Arguably, then, Hadrien’s authority to attribute political and cultural 
significations in a language that has lost its symbolic power relies on the allegorical 
(in de Man’s sense) management of values. This is a way to understand Yourcenar’s 
characterization of Hadrien as a ‘manipulateur de genie’. He does not seek to 
discredit individual values and institutions, despite the loss of their legitimacy. If 
acceptance contains revolt and reconstructing contains constructing, then it is also 
true that allegory contains the symbol. This is not a fact the de Man emphasizes 
sufficiently. However, his argument entails the idea of the fall of symbolic 
representations, which means that allegory contains, albeit in inverted or demystified 
form, the metaphysics of identity in the symbol. In the following passage, de Man 
draws a fundamental distinction between symbol and allegory:
Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, allegory 
designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and, renouncing the 
nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this 
temporal difference. In so doing, it prevents the self from an illusory identification 
with the non-self, which is now fully, though painfully, recognized as a non-self.18
De Man is keen to translate the rhetorical difference between symbol and allegory 
into the existential difference between illusory conceptualization and demystified 
recognition of the self. Hence, perhaps, his reluctance to discuss extensively the role
18 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 207.
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of the desire for unity during the production of allegorical meaning. Still, his analysis 
of allegory is clearly based on a negotiation between the positive act of creation and 
the negative work of repetition. By designating allegory as a movement of distancing 
and renunciation, he acknowledges indirectly that the fall of the symbols, and, 
consequently, the nostalgia for identity, are the conditions for the production of 
allegorical meaning. It follows that existential self-definition is the result of a 
repetitive process that begins with the desire for coincidence with the world and 
passes through the secular experience of frustration. Now, this is a process that 
Hadrien experiences frequently in Memoires. On the basis of it, he pursues existential 
freedom by accepting, rather than revolting against, the mechanisms of representation 
that hinder the work of self-definition. In the previous chapter I stressed that the 
notion of acceptation is inherently paradoxical. This is evident in the present context, 
where the recognition and acceptance of symbolic values are the conditions for the 
advent of the negative moment of renunciation, and the establishment of the 
demystifying language of allegory. Yourcenar’s paradoxical dialectic, according to 
which ‘reconstruire’ contains the illusion of the possibility of ‘construire’, coincides 
with the dialectic between allegory and symbol. It is through the blindness of 
accepting that Cavafy and Hadrien acquire the insight of authentic revolt.
A new definition of authenticity, beyond ‘the nostalgia and the desire to
coincide’, arises from de Man’s theory of allegory and irony. In the following
paragraphs, I shall compare the metaphysical definitions of authenticity and purity 
with their ironic re-determination in de Man’s and Yourcenar’s texts. While de Man 
does not discuss the idea of authenticity in a straightforward manner, its importance 
for his thesis is demonstrated by the frequency with which he uses this word and its 
derivatives and synonyms. He writes that ‘the prevalence of allegory [in early 
romantic literature] always corresponds to the unveiling of an authentically temporal 
destiny’. A few pages further down, he draws a similar conclusion with regard to
irony: ‘Both [allegory and irony] are determined by an authentic experience of
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temporality’.19 These arguments are based on de Man’s remark that time is 
constitutive of allegory and irony, as opposed to ‘the world of the symbol’, where 
time is not ‘the originary constitutive category’. In the symbol, temporality intervenes 
merely contingently, in a way that -  one is tempted to say -  does not harass the self- 
sufficient mechanism of the production of symbolic meaning. However, when 
temporality is introduced as a constitutive factor in the representation, then the 
symbol is destabilized and loses its autonomy. It becomes a sign among past and 
future signs. As de Man suggests: ‘it is of the essence of the previous sign to be pure 
anteriority’. By being purely anterior, the sign itself loses its identity and ceases to 
exist purely as itself: the temporal sign becomes impure. To conclude, when the 
temporality of the representation is only contingent, then the sign is stable and pure; 
but when there is pure temporality, as in the cases of allegory and irony, the sign 
loses its purity.
Yourcenar referred to a similar paradox when she noted that the Historia 
Augusta, one of her historical sources for Memoires, brings the contemporary reader 
into almost unmediated contact with the fleeting, unofficial ‘jugements [du Romain] 
de la rue [...] sur l’histoire qui passe’. ‘Nous avons ici’, she added, Topinion a l’etat 
pur, c ’est-a-dire impur’.20 An analogous moment occurs in the last part of 
Yourcenar’s autobiography, Quoi? L ’etemite. She imagines her father talking to 
Egon, the real person on whom the main character of Alexis was modelled, on the 
subject of homosexuality: ‘Et je ne te dirai pas non plus qu’il y a la je ne sais quelle 
voie rapide pour atteindre a la realite chamelle pure et simple, ou impure et simple. ’21 
These examples may not refer to temporality as such, but they describe states of 
facticity and fleetingness which cannot be idealized and conceptualized: the ‘hearsay 
on the street’, the instability of the flesh. As in the case of rhetorical figures, we are
19 De Man, T h e Rhetoric o f Temporality’, pp. 206 and 226.
20 Yourcenar, ‘Les Visages de l ’histoire dans l ’« Histoire auguste »’, in EM, p. 12.
21 EM, p. 1283, my emphasis. Marguerite Yourcenar, Quoi ? L ’etem ite  (Paris: Gallimard, 1988). Quoi 
? L ’etem ite  is the last part o f Yourcenar’s autobiographical trilogy Le Labyrinthe du monde.
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dealing with two different forms of purity: the purity of the existential and the purity 
of the conceptual. The pure facticity of existence fouls, as it were, the concept of 
being. In Yourcenar’s thought, purity and impurity interchange positions.
In de Man’s essay, temporality is the element that contaminates conceptual 
thought with the result that concepts cease to be pure. This paradox affects the notion 
of authenticity as well. There are two contradictory definitions of authenticity, 
depending on whether time is seen as simultaneity or anteriority.
- In the domain of the symbol, authenticity designates a state of identity between 
essence and appearance, upon which the autonomy of the individual sign rests. From 
a theological point of view, the authenticity of the name is guaranteed by dogma, 
which decrees the a priori presence of God in his creations, and therefore the unity 
between the self and the ‘non-self’. In this state of primordial authenticity -  evidently 
a prelapsarian world -  time is reduced to eternity, or, as de Man notes, to 
simultaneity and spatiality.
- In the domains of allegory and irony, this metaphysical interpretation of authenticity 
is profoundly challenged by the introduction -  de Man writes: the discovery - of time 
in the process of representation.22 Using persistently negative terms and expressions, 
de Man describes the temporalities that structure each of these rhetorical figures:
Allegory exists entirely within an ideal time that is never here and now, but always a 
past or an endless future.23
The act of irony [...] reveals the existence of a temporality that is definitely not
organic, in that it relates to its source only in terms of distance and difference and
allows for no end, for no totality. Irony divides the flow of temporal experience into a 
past that is pure mystification and a future that remains harassed for ever by a relapse 
within the inauthentic.24
For the purposes of my analysis, these temporalities coincide and complicate the 
meaning of authenticity in the same way. What is considered to be authentic in a
22 De Man writes that ‘allegory and irony are linked in their common discovery o f a truly temporal 
predicament’, de Man, p. 222.
23 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 226.
24 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 222.
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constitutively temporal environment is essentially inauthentic from the point of view 
of the timeless tautological sign. The temporality of allegory and irony can be 
considered inauthentic, inasmuch as neither allows for the establishment of a present 
in which signifier and signified constitute an organic whole; yet the same temporality 
is authentic, since it allows time to appear not as static presence, but as dynamic 
absence in the sense of the past and the future. Similarly, in theological terms, 
allegorical and ironic time is inauthentic, for it does not emanate immediately from a 
divine authority; still, considering that the divine will has lost its effectiveness, this 
time is authentic, because in its context this loss is recognized and accepted.
Therefore any argument on authenticity depends on whether one perseveres in 
the faith in the metaphysical unity between surface and depth, or perceives a break 
( ‘distance and difference’) at the heart of the semi otic representation. De Man, who 
certainly belongs to the second category, inverts the meaning of authenticity and uses 
it to qualify such concepts as temporality, experience and being, that no longer refer 
to a transcendental origin, but which describe the current secular state of affairs in 
terms of loss.25 In the context of de M an’s essay, to be authentic means to affirm the 
discontinuity or troubled continuity between being and the source of signification, 
and to accept that meaning dwells negatively in the language of irony.
It is worth adding that, according to Frank Lentricchia, de Man receives his 
concept of authenticity from Sartre. In his After the New Criticism, Lentricchia 
explains:
Sartre’s attempt to evade his intellectual progenitor [i.e. Heidegger] lies in his 
insistence that what Heidegger thought primally integrated was, in actuality, primally 
divorced; hence the antithesis of the for-itself and the in-itself. In his revision of 
romantic poetic de Man follows Sartre.
And elsewhere in the same chapter he adds:
25 In ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, apart from the expressions ‘authentically temporal’, ‘truly 
temporal’ and ‘authentic experience’, for which references have already been given, de Man uses the 
expressions ‘authentic being’ (p. 216), ‘actual s e lf  (p. 219) and ‘good poetic conscience’ (p. 208).
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From Being and Nothingness de Man picks up and accommodates to romantic literary 
contexts pour soi and en soi, the key terms of Sartre’s phenomenological ontology, 
and the relations of these terms to both good and bad faith, authentic and inauthentic 
existence.26
Lentricchia is not entirely convincing in his evaluation of identity and difference in 
Heidegger. In Chapters 4 and 5 ,1 shall be discussing the Heideggerian theme of unity 
that includes difference without cancelling it, and its relationship with Yourcenar’s 
perception of order and disorder. Still, Lentricchia’s comments are helpful in that 
they emphasize the irreducible gap that de Man perceives between the self and the 
world. Further, the connection which Lentricchia establishes between Sartre and de 
Man emphasizes the existential implications of de Man’s analysis of the temporality 
of rhetoric.
Indeed, de Man pays particular attention to the existential implications of 
authenticity, especially in the framework of his discussion of the temporality of irony. 
Drawing principally from Baudelaire’s idea of le comique absolu in his essay ‘De 
l’essence du rire’, de Man suggests that irony brings about ‘the division of the subject 
into a multiple consciousness’.27 In his essay, Baudelaire defines this subject as ‘un 
philosophe, un homme qui ait acquis, par habitude, la force de se dedoubler 
rapidement et d’assister comme spectateur desinteresse aux phenomenes de son 
moi . This dedoublement is the beginning of a permanent split within the subject. 
After the fall into irony, illusory identification with nature gives way to the 
realization of the rhetorical constitution of the self. At the moment of irony, de Man 
writes, ‘the innocence or authenticity of our sense of being in the world is put into
29question’. De Man explains that inasmuch as ironic language places the subject at a 
distance from which it can reflect on itself, it transforms it into a sign. ‘Language
26 Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism  (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 
287 and 285.
27 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 213.
28 Charles Baudelaire, ‘De l ’essence du rire’, in Curiosites esthetiques: L ’art romantique et autres 
oeuvres critiques, ed. by H. Lemaitre (Paris: Gamier, 1962), pp. 241-263, (p. 251), emphasis in the 
original.
29 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 215.
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divides the subject into an empirical self, immersed in the world, and a self that 
becomes like a sign in its attempt at differentiation and self-definition.’ This 
semiotic make-up of the subject has devastating effects on human existence. On the 
one hand, there is an inaccessible self which remains part of an undifferentiated 
empirical world. On the other hand, there is a phantasmatic, rhetorical self who can at 
best ruminate lucidly or mournfully upon this internal gap. In de Man’s words, ‘the 
ironic language splits the subject into an empirical self that exists in a state of 
inauthenticity and a self that exists only in the form of a language that asserts the 
knowledge of this inauthenticity.’31 The ironic fall of the philosopher-poet leads to 
the realization that what the self perceives as a natural or unselfconscious state of 
being is in fact an inauthentic one. After the fall into irony, which Baudelaire also 
associates with the separation between man and god, man exists in a consciously 
unnatural and permanently insecure state, in an unstable relationship with a world 
that no one masters.32
This is the same problematic that informs Yourcenar’s major novels and her 
autobiographical trilogy. Despite their particularities, Alexis, Eric von Lhomond, 
Hadrien, Zenon, Nathanael, as well as some of the central characters of Le 
Labyrinthe du monde, Yourcenar’s autobiographical trilogy, share a common interest 
in locating authentic subjectivity beyond the level of socio-political, cultural or 
ideological identity, in a solitary, mysterious self that is negated by both the rhetorical 
I and the empirical world. Among Yourcenar’s characters -  fictional or otherwise -  it 
is possible to distinguish those who are overwhelmed by this sad existential 
predicament (Leo Belmonte and Nathanael in Un homme obscur, Octave in 
Souvenirs pieux)', those who continue the effort towards self-determination by
30 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 213.
31 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 214.
32 In ‘De l’essence du rire’, Baudelaire describes the moment o f irony in terms o f fall: ‘le spectacle
d’un homme qui trebuche au bout du trottoir’, (p. 248). He establishes a clear link between laughing
and falling, in the theological sense o f the word: ‘II est certain [ ...]  que le rire humain est intimement 
lie a l ’accident d ’une chute ancienne, d ’une degradation physique et morale’, (p. 245).
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acknowledging, and investing in, the ironic split within the self (most notably Zenon, 
but also Alexis in Alexis ou le traite du vain combat, Eric in Le Coup de grace, 
Michel in Archives du nord)\ and those who suffer the consequences of this split, but 
cannot help rationalizing and ideologizing it, with the result that they resort to 
political violence in the hope of reversing it (Marcella in Denier du reve, Sophie in 
Le Coup de grace, Remy in Souvenirs pieux, but also Electre in Yourcenar’s play 
Electre ou la chute des masques). Unsurprisingly, none of these characters achieve 
their objectives, unless of course we take their defeat -  almost invariably sublimated 
into the desire for death, and typically underscored by its advent -  as a proof of the 
authenticity of their attitude. The longed-for demise of these anti-heroes, brought 
about by abandonment to sorrow, ironic manipulation of fate or, a fortiori, 
ideologization and violence, signifies the recognition of the subject’s original 
alienation from itself and corroborates its constitutive inability to establish its 
identity.
Notably, Hadrien is the only one among these characters who does not belong 
exclusively to any of these categories. He is certainly not a rebel, but his violent 
suppression of the revolt of the Jews testifies to gross ideological prejudice to which 
both he and -  to some extent at least -  Yourcenar are blind, as I will discuss 
subsequently. He is not wrecked by pessimism, but his initial hysteria at the idea of 
his imminent death contrasts unfavourably with the dignity with which Nathanael, 
the main character of Un homme obscur, lets himself die in sadness. He is a great 
ironist in that he has no faith in the symbols that he institutes, but he is not marked by 
Zenon’s fundamental atheism and, at a crucial turn of the plot, he sees himself as the 
god and creator ex nihilo of Antinoiis, his lover and ‘perfect’ work of art. Through 
his failures, which are largely due to the force and allure of the promise of identity, 
Hadrien appears as one of the most authentic of the novelistic characters that 
Yourcenar has proposed as figures of authenticity. In Memoires d ’Hadrien, the path 
towards recognition of the fragmented ontological status of the self does not involve
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asceticism and does not finish with the implementation of Hadrien’s technique of 
liberation through manipulation of ironic fate: it also entails falling into impurity. 
Hadrien looks at his fallen self and realizes that both his political and his existential 
projects are undermined by his repeated failure truly to anticipate the moment of 
irony. Yourcenar strongly suggests that he is saved -  authenticated -  by dint of being 
aware of his inauthenticity.
De Man understands the meaning and the necessity of individual falling in a 
different way:
The mere falling of others does not suffice; he [i.e. the language-determined man] has 
to go down himself. The ironic, twofold self that the writer or philosopher constitutes 
by his language seems able to come into being only at the expense of his empirical 
self, falling (or rising) from a stage of mystified adjustment into the knowledge of his 
mystification.33
Here is where de Man’s and Yourcenar’s perceptions of irony differ most strongly. 
De Man stresses that falling is by no means the preamble of a return to unity between 
the rhetorical self and the world. For him, irony and the consciousness of irony do not 
have any redemptive effect. He criticizes Starobinski for claiming that irony in 
Hoffmann’s Prinzessin Brambilla is a means of ‘reconciliation of the spirit and the 
world’.34 De Man comments that ‘true irony [states] the continued impossibility of 
reconciling the world of fiction with the actual world’.35 In the same vein, he is 
sceptical of Peter Szondi’s utopian projection of a new positivity that comes as a 
result of the negative knowledge of irony. According to Szondi, irony, or the 
conscious establishment of a distance between ‘finite achievement’ and ‘infinite 
longing’, allows for a ‘prefiguration of a future unity’. De Man considers this view
33 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 214.
34 Jean Starobinski, ‘Ironie et melancolie: Gozzi, Hoffmann, Kierkegaard’, in Estratto da Sensibilita e 
Razionalita nel Settecento (Florence: Sansoni, 1967), p. 459, quoted in English by de Man, ‘The 
Rhetoric of Temporality’, p. 217.
35 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 218.
36 Peter Szondi, ‘Friedrich Schlegel und die Romantische Ironie’, Satz und Gegensatz: Sechs Essays 
(Frankfurt: Insel-Verlag, 1964), pp 5-24, (p. 17); quoted in English by de Man, ‘The Rhetoric of 
Temporality’, p. 219.
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as ‘wrong from the point of view of the ironist’, who is aware that conceptual 
manipulation of experience precludes any hope for reconciliation. In a remark that 
amounts to a critique of traditional Hegelianism, de Man adds: ‘The dialectic of self- 
destruction and self-invention which [...] characterizes the ironic mind is an endless 
process that leads to no synthesis.’37 It follows that there is no possibility of 
permanent self-definition and, rather than synthesis and restoration, the best one can 
expect is a constantly renewed confirmation of one’s inauthenticity. But, as de Man 
puts it, ‘to know inauthenticity is not the same as to be authentic’.38
In view of this argument, Yourcenar’s position with regard to Hadrien’s 
authenticity and the significance of individual falling has to be re-examined. It is 
important to know whether she is drawn into the epistemological error or even the 
state of existential bad faith for which de Man essentially reprimands Szondi and 
Starobinski. As I have suggested already, for Yourcenar, irony is not the catalyst for 
the dialectical development of the self. Nowhere in her work does it lead to a new 
synthesis of experience and the intellect. As regards the temporality of irony, we may 
safely assume that she would endorse de Man’s assertion that ‘irony is not temporary
5 39[...] but repetitive, the recurrence of a self-escalating act of consciousness’. 
Otherwise, irony would be a mere intellectual stage in her narrative characters’ 
progress towards self-definition, followed by the invention of an authentic language 
that would be capable of articulating pragmatic expectations of redemption. But the 
closest these characters get to such a state of post-ironic bliss is the moment of their 
death, a moment shrouded in silence (Hadrien, Zenon, Belmonte, Nathanael) and 
completely devoid of hope. In Memoires, where the imminent death of the emperor 
constitutes an instance of irony which envelops the entire novel, the impossibility of 
establishing a sense of self-identity becomes more and more evident as he approaches
37 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 220.
38 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 214.
39 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 220.
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the end. A short phrase near the end of the book, when Hadrien is struggling with the 
idea of dying, echoes de M an’s assertion that ‘to know inauthenticity is not the same 
as to be authentic’. Hadrien says, ‘La meditation de la mort n ’apprend pas a mourir’, 
thus intimating that, till the very end, the knowledge of the ironic fall does not 
prepare one for the reality of falling. 40 Consequently, the question arises as to how 
one is to understand Hadrien’s authenticity. In what way can one be authentic, when, 
as both Yourcenar and de Man acknowledge, this would imply the impossible 
reconciliation between language and experience?
To understand the discrepancy between these two writers who, otherwise, start 
from similar assumptions and follow similar lines of thought, I propose to look 
further back at de Man’s idea of the a-historicity of the subject. It is necessary to do 
so, since, unlike Yourcenar, de Man associates the nostalgia for authenticity with the 
arbitrary expectation of redemption through the consummation of history. He defies 
conventionally understood Hegelian historiography by suggesting that history does 
not unfold according to a plan of fulfilment, and that our knowledge of this fact does 
not compensate for the inconsequence of history. Inasmuch as we understand 
authenticity as the telos and the overcoming of history, the subject can never be 
authentic, because it is fundamentally incapable of being historical. This means that 
the subject and history are articulated along such an ‘un-natural’, a-historical and 
eccentric structure as language. Arguably, the central point made in ‘The Rhetoric of 
Temporality’ is that temporality in its subjective and historical dimensions is a 
rhetorical scheme, precisely because what is felt as time is nothing more than the 
experience of the repetition of a failure to signify. In the following passage from this 
essay, de Man stresses that a-historicity is the result of a shortcoming, a lack which is 
constitutive of the subject.
40 OR, p. 510.
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It is a historical fact that irony becomes increasingly conscious of itself in the course 
of demonstrating the impossibility of our being historical. In speaking of irony we are 
dealing not with the history of an error but with a problem that exists within the self.41
At the heart of the matter lies de M an’s conviction that history is not a serial, 
organic, or dialectical progress that intends a prescribed end. History ‘is not natural’, 
‘it is not phenomenal’ and ‘it is not really temporal’, insists de Man in his essay on 
Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Task of the Translator’, in an effort to challenge the 
organicist, the hermeneutical, but also the Marxist interpretations of history. In that 
essay, he famously refers to history as the ‘errancy of language’, a ‘permanent 
disjunction’, a ‘linguistic complication’.42 De Man is not claiming that history is an 
accident of immaterial consequence. His point is rather that the dominant 
historiographies of the 19th and the 20th centuries are characterized by a 
programmatic perception of history and fail to distinguish between the political and 
the apocalyptic. Thus, the romantic and more generally the modem subject continues 
to imagine itself as the agent of a history that contains its transcendence. De Man’s 
thesis calls for a complete dissociation of the philosophy of history from theology 
and for a sustained discrimination between politics and the extra-linguistic or 
‘sacred’ categories of totality and identity. In ‘Conclusions: Walter Benjamin’s “The 
Task of the Translator’” , Paul de Man cites approvingly Benjamin’s thesis that the 
messianic dissolution of history cannot come from within history. Benjamin writes:
Only the messiah himself puts an end to history, in the sense that it frees, completely 
fulfils the relationship of history to the messianic. [...] Therefore the kingdom of God 
is not the telos of the dynamics of history, it cannot be posited as its aim; [...] seen 
historically it is not its aim, but its end, its termination.43
41 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 211.
42 All quotations from Paul de Man, ‘Conclusions: Walter Benjamin’s “The Task o f the Translator’” , 
in The Resistance to Theory, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), pp. 73-93, (p. 92).
43 Quoted and translated by de Man in ‘Conclusions’, p. 93. An English translation o f Benjamin’s 
‘Theologico-Political Fragment’ is in Peter Demetz (ed.), Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), pp. 312- 
313.
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In Benjamin’s comment de Man sees a confirmation of his claim that history cannot 
be properly historical, in the sense that it is not an intentional process and has no 
teleological design. The self, according to de Man, is a-historical, because it can 
never hope to coincide with nature: such a coincidence could never be the result of a 
historical process, but only of an extra-historical agency, that of God. If history is not 
possible, then there cannot be any politics either, at least not in the sense of a 
collective project which aims at creating a communal identity. On the contrary, 
politics as it is applied in a secular age can only be a form of poetics. Politics 
confirms, rather than challenges, the linguistic constitution of history, and does not 
contain the promise of authentication. De Man concludes this essay by arguing contra 
Gadamer that, properly speaking, there is no modernity, if modernity is understood as 
a dialectical achievement, ‘an essentially theological notion’.44 Critical negation and 
ironic distance, even if they are considered as particular features of modernity -  a 
claim with which de Man disagrees anyway - ,  do not trigger off the political process 
of historical fulfilment and do not signal the end of the schism between empirical and 
linguistic self. Authenticity is not possible, de Man would claim, because the self is 
not ‘designed’ to be part of a historical plan of redemption.
The relationship between authenticity and modernity will be further discussed in 
the next chapter of my thesis. At this point, however, I would like to question de 
Man’s claim that poetics and history have ‘no room for certain historical notions such 
as the notion of modernity’.45 With this statement, de Man equates the promise of 
authenticity with the putative dialectical accomplishment of the work of history in 
modernity. However, is the equation between modernity as a ‘theological notion’ and 
authenticity as exclusive and necessary as de Man suggests? Despite de Man’s 
assertions, we have witnessed instances of authenticity -  however ephemeral and 
isolated - in modem art and in political thought, as a reaction to the concept of the
44 De Man, ‘Conclusions’, p. 93.
45 De Man, ‘Conclusions’, p. 93
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unified self. Presumably, one of de Man’s goals is to discredit such violent 
metaphysical visions of modernity as Nazism and Stalinism, where authenticity is 
measured in terms of the subject’s adaptability to total and teleological perceptions of 
history. Nevertheless, de M an’s unconditional identification of authenticity with 
totality does not do justice to those typically modem and essentially political 
approaches to representation where emphasis is laid on the impure and the profane. 
In terms of artistic modernism, it would be useful to mention here Peter Burger’s 
distinction between a ‘work-centered modernism’ which is characterized by a 
‘peculiar pathos of purity’ (he names particularly ‘functionalist architecture, abstract 
painting and the nouveau roman’), and the radical avant-garde (for example ‘ecriture 
automatique’, ‘Magritte’s painting’ and the Dadaists). According to Burger, the 
avant-garde breaks the boundary with the external world ‘through audacious 
borrowings and provocative vulgarizations’.46 Given this distinction, it can be argued 
that the avant-garde paves the way for an understanding of selfhood and politics 
beyond the longing for identity, and therefore announces a new form of authenticity 
that is characteristically modem. Tellingly, in ‘Conclusions’, de Man quotes 
Benjamin’s praise of Bloch’s The Spirit o f Utopia to support his argum ent47 By 
taking recourse to Benjamin and Bloch, he implicitly accepts that distinct 
configurations of modem political thought which take into account the linguistic 
constitution of subjectivity are possible. Thus we may legitimately understand 
modernity as the context in which no illusions about the limits of politics and 
representation can be sustained any longer. It is by no means self-evident that this 
approach to modernity will lead to the error of historical immanentism, for which de 
Man reproves Gadamer, but also, implicitly, Starobinski and Szondi.
46 Peter Burger, ‘The Disappearance o f Meaning: Essay at a Postmodern Reading o f Michel Tournier, 
Botho Strauss and Peter Handke’, in Scott Lash and Jonathan Friedman (eds), M odernity and Identity 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 94-111. See especially pp. 97-98.
47 De Man, ‘Conclusions’, p. 93.
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The similarities and differences between Yourcenar and de Man as regards the 
elusive path of authenticity and the dead end of irony can now be summarized. De 
Man’s distinction between the actual and the fictional self helps us understand 
Yourcenar’s emphasis on the split between the self and the world. Moreover, 
Yourcenar is aware, at least as much as de Man, of the fact that sophistication and the 
consciousness of irony do not suffice to reconcile the semiotically determined man 
with himself and realise the vision of transcendence. However, while these 
conclusions allow de Man to pronounce the end of the hope for authenticity, 
Yourcenar maintains that not everything is lost, because authenticity does not have to 
be understood in the strict sense of redemption and reconciliation through the 
fulfilment of history. Modernity reveals the aesthetic/poetic character of our 
relationship with nature, thus presenting us with a unique opportunity to claim a new 
form of authenticity. The theme of man’s solitude in a secular era, which Yourcenar 
borrows from Flaubert, resonates again at this point. Free from the injunction to 
author his own history, man has the option to recognize himself negatively in the 
constancy of difference that is installed within the self. This negative recognition, 
which modernity makes possible, is what Yourcenar proposes to understand as a new 
form of purity and authenticity. As we have seen already, in Yourcenar’s work, the 
constancy of difference manifests itself predominantly as the experience of time. One 
of the central theses of her oeuvre is that time narrates man through the demise of his 
works, while man fails to narrate himself by means of poetic language (in de Man’s 
sense). Nowhere is this thesis expressed more succinctly than in Yourcenar’s short 
essay ‘Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur’.48
48 ‘Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur’ is the title essay o f Yourcenar’s collection o f essays Le Temps, ce 
grand sculpteur (Paris: Gallimard, 1983); included in EM.
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Time and difference
One of the most striking characteristics of ‘Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur’ is the 
unapologetic fashion in which Yourcenar informs us that true authorship and the 
fulfilment of artistic intention reside in time, rather than in man. Time authenticates 
the works of art, by leaving the marks of wear and those of lived history on them. 
Yourcenar begins this essay with a simple statement: ‘Le jour ou une statue est 
terminee, sa vie, en un sens, commence’.49 This almost prosaic hypothesis, upon 
which Yourcenar intends to meditate rather than reason, challenges the conventional 
perception of the work of art as a static and finished representation. She goes on to 
explore various forms of change ( ‘modifications’) suffered by statues: some of these 
changes are due to natural wear, some have been occasioned by human violence and 
some are the effect of different trends in conservation and restoration. Her summary 
examination ends with an ironic remark. Yourcenar points out that the most striking 
transformations occur to statues lost in the sea. After centuries of ongoing 
‘decomposition sans agonie’, ‘[ces statues] ne nous appartiennent plus’:
Elies ont subi un changement oceanique, aussi riche qu’etrange. Le Neptune [...] 
destine a omer le quai d’une petite ville [...] est descendu au royaume de Neptune. La 
Venus celeste est de venue 1’ Aphrodite des mers.50
There is a twofold reconciliation at play here, but it is, in both cases, ironic. Firstly, 
there is an ironic reconciliation with the sacred. Neptune, the god of the sea, and 
Venus, who, as Aphrodite, was bom from the foam of the sea, re-assume their 
original state, they finally return to the sea where they belong. However, this happens 
at the expense of their symbolic value. The union with the divine element is achieved 
precisely when god abandons man (‘ces statues ne nous appartiennent plus’).
49 EM, p. 312.
50 EM, p. 316.
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Secondly, there is an ironic reconciliation of the signified with the artistic signifier: 
these statues become authentic only after they escape the various historically specific 
processes of signification. Neptune returns to his ‘kingdom’, Venus becomes 
Aphrodite, when they are free from the intention of the artist-creator. These are 
extreme and controversial instances of reconciliation. They introduce, as I mentioned 
above, a new concept of authenticity, that has more to do with the perception of a 
world that fulfils itself through the temporal process of waste, than with man’s 
potential for authorship and creativity.
In ‘Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur’ Yourcenar remains descriptive and suggestive 
rather than overtly argumentative. Nonetheless, her contemplative, self-assured style 
is at odds with the violent theme of the essay, namely, destruction and waste in and 
of art. The suspicion that Yourcenar is pushing forward a specific theoretical agenda 
becomes stronger when we take into account the timing of the essay, originally 
drafted in 1954, a few years after the Second World War. Indeed, the essay’s full 
power and meaning emerges when it is read under the light of a specifically modem 
and politically urgent discussion of representation. Rather than a random collection 
of images and thoughts relating to the bizarre effect of the passage of time on 
sculpture, ‘Le Temps’ is an essay on violence in aesthetics, and on the aesthetics of 
violence in history. It is based on the assumption that the work of man (art, war, 
destruction and restoration) is animated by the ambition to refer to some original 
ideal. As far as this ambition is concerned, Yourcenar does not discriminate between 
the artist, whose work is supposed to represent truth, the rebel, who decapitates 
statues of false idols, and the restorer, who re-assembles fragments of ancient marble 
according to the prevailing taste of his or her time. These three categories of artistic 
agency are united in the common goal to reclaim a state of lost authenticity in the 
conventional sense of the word, by forcing a static correspondence between the work 
of art and what it is supposed to represent. While Yourcenar accepts that the 
aspiration for authenticity is legitimate and indeed proper to man, she shows that the
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methods used to fulfil it, creation and destruction, are fruitless and wrong. They are 
based -  and it is here that Paul de Man’s analysis is most useful -  on the misleading 
idea that progress in knowledge and the subversion of aesthetic, political or religious 
traditions can lead to the recovery of truth. Creation and destruction rely on the 
hypothesis that the creative subject is the author of history and that this history will 
eventually come to its fulfilment. Simply by pointing to the ruined statues of the past, 
Yourcenar leads us to a similar conclusion to that which de Man would also draw a 
few years later: namely, that the ironic effect of time is a sign of the impossibility of 
self-identity.
However, despite de M an’s reservations, in Yourcenar’s case, the knowledge of 
irony does not bring about the renewal of the aspiration to authenticity in its 
metaphysical guise. Nothing in ‘Le Temps’ indicates that manipulation of ironic time 
may yield better results than the centuries-long fight against it. On the contrary, she 
considers violence and the desire for identity in art as constitutive elements of life 
and nature -  elements which are as indisputable as the natural forces that transform 
slowly the statues of ancient divinities. For Yourcenar, the metaphysics of the 
symbol, ineffective as it is per se, remains deeply engraved in the human psyche. If 
her essay belongs to a new era, it is because she decides to search for beauty and truth 
not in the symbol and its subversion, but in the symbol’s ironic fall over a long 
period of time. From the statues’ exposure to the hazards of nature and history, a 
higher form of beauty is begotten that incorporates ambition and frustration:
A la beaute telle que l’a voulue un cerveau humain, une epoque, une forme 
particuliere de societe, [les modifications des statues] ajoutent une beaute 
involontaire, associee aux hasards de l’histoire, due aux effets des causes naturelles et 
du temps. Statues si bien brisees que de ce debris nait une ceuvre nouvelle, parfaite 
par sa segmentation meme.51
In this passage, the criterion of perfection follows the same rules as the criterion of 
authenticity in the two essays of de Man that I discussed above: what is considered as
51 EM, p. 313.
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perfect from the point of view of ironic time is considered as imperfect from the 
point of view of the artist and vice versa. Ultimately, the work of art is authenticated 
by ‘[sa] decomposition sans agonie, [sa] perte sans mort, [sa] survie sans 
resurrection’52. This amounts to saying that the bridging of the gap between intention 
and meaning, between the empirical and the linguistic self, is not conditional upon 
death and resurrection, over which the artist, the a-historical subject, has no power. 
The hope for the messianic solution, which gives rise to the aesthetics of the symbol, 
is but a necessary first step. The passage of time transforms works of art into 
authentic representations. The observer of ruins may then realise that there is no need 
to persist in this initial desire for identity as a coincidence between artistic intention 
and the work of art.
In ‘Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur’, as in Memoires, the reconstructeur can 
estimate better than the artist the significance of the transformations suffered by 
ancient statues. Yourcenar writes that their fragmented members convey better than 
the original work of art such notions as grace, love, movement and the awe of death, 
and that some of these statues are so ruined that they are indiscernible from pebbles 
found in the seashores of the Aegean Sea. She then continues as follows:
L’expert pourtant n’hesite pas : cette ligne effacee, cette courbe ici perdue et la 
retrouvee ne peut provenir que d’une main humaine, et d’une main grecque, ayant 
travaille en tel endroit au cours de tel siecle. Tout l’homme est la, sa collaboration 
intelligente avec l’univers, sa lutte contre lui, et cette defaite finale ou l’esprit et la 
matiere qui lui sert de support perissent a peu pres ensemble. Son intention s’affirme 
jusqu’au bout dans la ruine des choses.53
This passage encapsulates Yourcenar’s theory of authentic representation. Unlike de 
Man, but also unlike the structuralists who associate the dead end of representation 
with the death of meaning, she sees the failure of western aesthetics as the triumph of 
artistic intention. To be sure, she does not argue for the rehabilitation of the author. 
She rather points out that authorial intention is ultimately fulfilled in spite o f the
52 EM, p. 316.
53 EM, p. 313.
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author. This sounds like a paradox; but, in ‘Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur’, 
Yourcenar shows that the identification of intention and meaning is achieved 
( ‘s’affirme’) in ways that the artist could never imagine. It follows that, in principle, 
artistic intention is not wholly present in the artist’s consciousness. The western artist 
entertains an immodest concept of authenticity. He attempts to materialize this 
concept by mastering both matter and spirit, an act which is little short of hybris. As 
de Man shows, not even the Baudelairean ‘philosophe’, for all his awareness of 
irony, can escape mystification, the illusion that the empirical self and the semiotic 
self are unified in the artefact. However, once the work of art is delivered over to 
nature and history, the artist’s conscious intention fades away. As Yourcenar 
suggests, an old work of art no longer belongs to man. Fragmented, unrecognizable, 
it serves the overall intention of the act of representing, which is to state the true 
differential relationship between man and nature, between the concept and the thing, 
between language and experience.
These ideas have been present in less refined form in earlier works by 
Yourcenar. ‘Sixtine’, a series of short imagined monologues spoken by Michelangelo 
and other people related to him, written in 1931, is a prime example. In the following 
passage, the ‘Master’ meditates about nature, the limits of creativity and the 
inevitable perishing of the work of art. Time is described as Tetem elle mobilite de 
1’uni vers’:
Vouloir immobiliser la vie, c’est la damnation du sculpteur. C’est en quoi, peut-etre, 
toute mon oeuvre est contre nature. Le marbre, ou nous croyons fixer une forme de la 
vie perissable, reprend a tout instant sa place dans la nature, par 1’erosion, la patine, et 
les jeux de la lumiere et de 1’ ombre sur des plans qui se crurent abstraits, mais ne sont 
cependant que la surface d’une pierre. Ainsi, l’etemelle mobilite de l’univers fait sans 
doute l’etonnement du Createur.54
It is worth noticing that ‘Createur’ stands for the artist as much as for God: they both 
witness the instance of irony. Time is the great sculptor, for it hands back to nature
54 EM, p. 286; ‘Sixtine’ belongs to Yourcenar’s collection o f essays Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur.
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and to history what is due to them, and thus restores an original state of affairs that 
involves no salvation. The demise and belated authentication of art -  and, by 
extension, of all human constructions exposed to time -  corroborate the primordial 
difference that exists between man and nature. However, in so far as Yourcenar sees 
beauty in ruins in an affirmative, rather than a romantic way, she points to a new 
aesthetics, based on a modest perception of authenticity. When, in the sight of a 
fragment, Yourcenar exclaims ‘Tout l’homme est la’, she intimates her conviction 
that man is there identical to himself: an entity split between materiality and ideality, 
yet an inextricable part of nature and history. This is not an achievement on man’s 
part, for he never consciously intends his works to end in ruins. Nevertheless, this is 
the ‘beautiful’ conclusion of his efforts, a disillusionment that serves as an answer to 
the question of referentiality. Yourcenar suggests simultaneously that authentic 
representation is beyond man’s possibilities and that it is always already an 
accomplished fact. For all his inauthenticity, man is fundamentally authentic, in that 
he exists temporally.
A few years after the publication of ‘Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur’, Yourcenar 
returned, with a twist, to the theme of the slow disintegration and re-authentication of 
the work of art. In ‘Le Cerveau noir de Piranese’, a long essay written between 1959 
and 1961, she wrote about the characteristically modem attitude of Piranesi who took 
ancient ruins as his artistic subject matter and, not unlike Yourcenar, offered a 
representation (his etchings) of the failures of representation (the ruins). Piranesi acts 
as a ‘reconstructeur’, whose task is to remind us of the pragmatic (that is, non- 
essential, non-metaphysical) character of things, disclosed to us in and by time. 
Yourcenar writes:
1’image de la ruine ne declenche pas chez Piranese une amplification sur la grandeur 
et la decadence des empires et l’instabilite des affaires humaines, mais une meditation 
sur la duree des choses ou leur lente usure, sur 1’opaque identite du bloc continuant a 
l’interieur du monument sa longue existence de pierre.55
55 EM, p. 84.
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It is worth noting Yourcenar’s insistence that the work of art has no symbolic power: 
there is no ‘amplification’, no analogical or anagogical relationship between the 
monument depicted and what it was supposed to stand for, or between Piranesi’s 
engravings and any abstract ideas. Instead, there is the affirmation of the self-identity 
of matter. Yourcenar goes on to re-instate the relationship between the linguistically 
determined self (artistic intention, ‘volonte’) and nature (‘la pierre’), by introducing 
the parameter of time: ‘L ’edifice se suffit ; il est a la fois le drame et le decor du 
drame, le lieu d’un dialogue entre la volonte humaine encore inscrite dans ces 
ma9 onneries enormes, l’inerte energie minerale, et l’irrevocable Temps’.56 As in ‘Le 
Temps, ce grand sculpteur’, the intention of the artist (in this case the Roman 
architect whose construction Piranesi depicts) is affirmed in the temporal process of 
the undoing of the artefact. It is only during and because of this process that the work 
of art, as the negative representation of what the artist wishes to repress 
(disintegration in time), becomes authentic, that is, identical to itself. As Yourcenar 
puts it: ‘L ’edifice se suffit’.
The ideas which I propose to read in these essays relate closely to the familiar 
theme of ‘acceptation’. In ‘Le Temps’, Yourcenar invites indirectly the reader to 
acknowledge that there is no need to take resort to the hope of return to a state of 
authentic union with nature or the divine element. The failure of the symbol to 
advance history towards a putative messianic solution confirms man’s inability to 
manipulate his destiny, let alone prepare himself for redemption. The examples of 
wrecked statues that Yourcenar offers in ‘Le Temps’, stretching from classical 
antiquity to the modem times, indicate that she perceives western aesthetics as a long 
epic battle, a revolt against temporality. This battle culminates in, and concludes 
historically with, the Second World War -  a focal point of reference for Yourcenar’s 
aesthetics and politics, as I will discuss in the last chapter of my thesis. For her, the
56 EM, pp. 84-85.
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early post-war period, when both Memoires and ‘Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur’ were 
written, is the time when man has finally the chance to develop a different aesthetics 
that involves seeing, rather than conceptualizing, and accepting, rather than revolting: 
seeing the ironic effects of time on human constructions and developing a form of 
realism that is free from the pretension of totality in the aesthetic representation; 
accepting that authenticity neither precedes nor follows the difference between the 
‘natural’ and the ‘linguistic’ self, but designates the state of temporality and non­
identity in which man finds himself historically. The possibility of an aesthetics of 
accepting, as Yourcenar figures it, is meant as a chance for man to reclaim his 
position in nature and in history - not as auteur, but as collabora tes  and 
reconstructed.
The possibility of accepting constitutes the basic difference between Yourcenar’s 
theory of representation and de Man’s poststructuralism. These two thinkers follow 
similar tracks in their analyses of the metaphysics of the symbol and its existential 
import on the fragmented subject. Neither of them considers that the knowledge of 
irony is the catalyst for re-directing history to its ‘telos’, as it were. They also agree 
that history as a political/poetical process has nothing to do with the projected union 
with the sacred, which is why man is doomed to exist in permanent inauthenticity. 
However, while Yourcenar moves on from this point to discover a new form of 
authenticity that does not restitute man to his former authority, de Man stops short of 
exploring an alternative place for man in the world. While ‘The Rhetoric of 
Temporality’ focuses on man’s ironic fall and destitution, one might still detect a 
reverse anthropocentrism in this essay. De Man is content with inventing an aporetic, 
yet intensely dramatic world which revolves around the gap that was left by the fallen 
subject. However chaotic, this world still draws its metaphysical signification from 
man, who lies shattered in a conscious state of a-historicity. To a certain extent, these 
exclusively negative valorisations intimate de Man’s reluctance to free himself from 
the conceptual framework of the quest for authenticity. One suspects de Man for
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being too negative, in that he takes the absence of content in history as a proof of the 
a-historicity of the self.
This hard-line approach contrasts with Yourcenar’s more pragmatic spirit. 
Although both writers agree that we should dismiss the idea that we partake in a 
historical process, Yourcenar’s thought and writing are motivated by the experience 
of being historical. For her, the adventure of metaphysics, in which western man has 
found himself entangled, does not change the reality that we live in history. The 
conclusion that historical necessity does not possess a form conceivable by man 
(history is not organic, it is not dialectical, and so on) does not discredit the 
experience of this necessity. Thus it is not surprising that Yourcenar’s understanding 
of historicity, as inferred from her literature, is akin to that of the post-Marxist critic 
Fredric Jameson, who writes in The Political Unconscious that ‘[o]ne does not have 
to argue the reality of history: necessity, like Dr. Johnson’s stone, does that for us’.57 
He defines history as ‘the experience of Necessity’ and explains:
Necessity is not [...] a type of content, but rather the inexorable form of events; it is 
therefore [...] a retextualisation of history which does not propose the latter as some 
new representation or ‘vision’, some new content, but as the formal effects of what 
Althusser, following Spinoza, calls an ‘absent cause’. History is what hurts, it is what 
refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis, 
which its ‘ruses’ turn into grisly and ironic reversals of their overt intention.58
To be sure, the comparison between Yourcenar, the ‘liberal’ realist, and Jameson, the 
critic of the revisionist left, should not be taken too far, lest we lose from view the 
difference in their respective intellectual origins, vocabularies and goals. I am 
quoting Fredric Jameson as an example of a writer who wishes to distance himself 
from both the textualizing and the totalizing versions of historiography, by which I 
mean the structuralist interpretation of history as a self-reflective narrative and 
certain Marxist analyses which are heavily based on historical determinism. Like 
Yourcenar, he is aware of the ideological parameters involved in such conceptual
57 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 82.
58 Jameson, p. 102.
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representations of reality, and reminds us that history is something to be endured, 
rather than comprehended. The subject is historically situated, because it is always a 
human being experiencing history, regardless of her (in)ability to articulate its 
content and to recognize herself in it. De Man is certainly right to criticize traditional 
Marxist and theological accounts which claim that history is a process culminating in 
the consummation of human praxis or divine will. However, the conclusion that 
humans are hostages of their representations is only half of the story. This awareness 
can help us re-organise our relationship with reality, seen as a newly identified 
elusive referent.
In so far as there is an analogy between Jameson’s and Yourcenar’s respective 
understandings of history, there is also a parallel between their ideas on artistic 
intention. As I discussed above, Yourcenar suggests that the intention of the artist 
does not find its fulfilment in the autonomous work of art, but, paradoxically, in the 
process of waste to which it is exposed. The reconciliation intended by the artist 
between nature and the semiotically structured self is achieved only through the 
destructive agency of time. While, strictly speaking, no one really ‘intends’ the 
destruction of the work of art, when it loses its symbolic value it slowly recovers its 
‘authentic temporality’. It is then a realistic depiction of the truth that the artist 
intends to convey; an authentic representation that does not involve the moment of 
transcendence of the self. Now, from a certain point of view, what Yourcenar 
contends with regard to artistic intention, Jameson also implies with regard to 
historical agency. Indeed, in the above passage Jameson argues that history affects us 
by ironically reversing the overt intentions of individual and collective action. 
However, this reversal does not possess a coherent meaning in itself. The ‘ruses’ of 
history are not part of an underlying narrative (a la Hegel), and the undoing of human 
labour is an unmediated process on which man has no authority. It is during and 
because of these reversals that the historicity of human action becomes manifest. Our 
failure to act as agents of history discloses the latter as something that we necessarily
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experience but can never appropriate. A further thesis is now possible. If the ‘true’ 
face of history is revealed to us through the reversal of our intentions, then we 
depend on this repetitive process of mystification and disillusionment, desire and 
frustration, oblivion and memory, to become aware of our historicity. Unlike 
Yourcenar, Jameson does not take this argument so far as to suggest that the intention 
of the acting subject is affirmed ‘dans la ruine des choses’. Nonetheless, he performs 
a similar technique of inversion of significations. He condemns the conventional 
perception of history as the product of inauthentic historical conscience; conversely, 
he perceives, and affirms, history as the effect of an enigmatic and unrepresentable 
force, which has been traditionally assigned to the domain of the unreal. If, for 
Marguerite Yourcenar, authenticity is identified as the state of impurity in which we 
always already dwell, for Jameson, historicity is affirmed through recourse to a state 
of un-reality that penetrates and determines our actions.
So far in my thesis, I have tried to articulate in critical terms Yourcenar’s 
perception of the stakes involved in the modem crisis of representation. Her 
preoccupation with questions of authenticity both in life and in art is not of 
epistemological - and even less of ethical -  order; it rather has to do with the need to 
understand the self from an existential perspective, in a way that takes into account 
the aesthetic and semiotic constitution of subjectivity. To this effect, Yourcenar 
proposes - at least after the Second World War -  to employ a technique of observing 
and accepting reality in its phenomenological aspect, which is that of disorder and 
difference. She further proposes to redefine existential identity in terms of the 
constancy of this difference, and to rethink politics according to the aesthetic 
principle of reconstructing rather than that of creating. These ideas permeate the 
thoughts and actions of her principal narrative characters and are further analysed in 
Yourcenar’s critical writings. At the level of narrative representation, these ideas are 
also illustrated by the choice of historical fiction and that of realism as the main 
genre and the main narrative style of her novels.
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Reading Memoires d ’Hadrien, I have come close to identifying political man as 
a post-humanist who no longer intends to act as the agent of history, but assumes the 
role of the guardian of cultural achievement and that of the manipulator of symbols 
and meanings. He is described as a ‘reconstructeur’, rather than a creator ex nihilo, 
and his task is to maintain and record the difference between conceptuality and 
experience, measurability and fluidity, and ultimately representability and what lies 
beyond it. Although Memoires remains the principal reference when it comes to 
locating the instance of the political in the work of Marguerite Yourcenar, the rest of 
her fiction is rich in characters who function as pragmatists and mediators between 
such oppositions, without intending to reconcile them. One thinks especially of the 
figure of the medecin, a mediator between the body and the intellect, which, though 
important as a metaphor in Memoires, constitutes one of the central devices of 
L ’GEuvre au noir. I shall finish this chapter with a reference to the idea of medicine in 
these two novels and I shall discuss briefly its political and existential implications.
Medicine and madness
Zenon, the principal character of L ’CEuvre au noir, is a 16th-Century physician, 
philosopher and alchemist, entirely dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge, at the 
expense of his freedom and, finally, his life. As his three qualities suggest, 
knowledge is equally understood in this novel in terms of concrete science, abstract 
thinking and magic. Each of these elements contributes to the definition of a 
philosophical and aesthetic realism which is even more rigorous than that of 
Memoires. As a philosopher and an alchemist, Zenon realizes that truth as such is not 
available directly to the intellect, but must be understood non-rationally and non- 
speculatively. In one of the key moments in the novel, where he is asked whether he 
finds taking care or patients tiring, he answers:
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Chaque nuit passee au chevet d’un quidam malade me replasait en face de questions 
laissees sans reponse : la douleur et ses fins, la benignite de la nature ou son 
indifference, et si l ’ame survit au naufrage du corps. Les explications analogiques qui 
m’avaient jadis paru elucider les secrets de 1’uni vers me semblaient pulluler a leur 
tour de nouvelles possibilites d’erreur en ce qu’elles tendent a preter a cette obscure 
Nature ce plan preetabli que d’autres pretent a Dieu. Je ne dis pas que je  doutais : 
douter c ’est different ; je poursuivais 1’investigation jusqu’au point ou chaque notion 
ployait dans mes mains comme un ressort qu’on fausse ; des que je  grimpais a 
l’echelle d’une hypothese, je sentais se casser sous mon poids 1’indispensable s i.. .59
Unlike Hadrien, Zenon does not fall into irony in a dramatic manner. His repetitive 
fall from the ‘ladder’ (T echelle’) refers to his scholarly investigations, rather to 
accidents of his life.60 However, the result is the same. In the error of ‘les 
explications analogiques’ - which Paul de Man associates with the metaphysical logic 
of the symbol, as we saw above - Zenon sees a confirmation of the fact that man is 
not part of a preestablished natural or divine plan. Nonetheless, defying de Man’s 
logic, Zenon does not conclude that the self is essentially un-natural, just because it 
does not knowingly partake in any natural project of redemption. As a physician, 
Zenon is well-placed to know the inexorable corporeality of the self, even at the 
moment of fall, where nature seems ‘obscure’, and the split between the self and the 
world seems most assured. The meaning of medicine in L ’CEuvre au noir is that it 
offers a vantage point from which neither the inscrutability of nature nor the facticity 
of the subject can be mistaken.
In Michel Breulet’s words: ‘Parce qu’ils sont indissociables, Zenon passe ainsi 
de l’anxiete metaphysique a l’angoisse du corps’.61 The body, which triggers Zenon’s 
metaphysical anxiety and gives rise to questions about the intentionality of nature, is 
also the object on which he implements his medical technique. This technique is part 
of his attempt to approach truth scientifically, by measuring the distance that
59 OR, p. 646; Marguerite Yourcenar, L ’CEuvre au noir (Paris: Gallimard, 1968).
60 Cf. Marguerite Yourcenar in Les Yeux ouverts: ‘II y a des chutes verticales dans la vie d ’Hadrien. II 
n’y en a pas chez Zenon ; on le sent indestructible’, p. 190.
61 Michel Breulet and M. Delcroix, ‘La figure du medecin dans l’oeuvre de Marguerite Yourcenar’, in 
Bulletin de la Societe Internationale d'Etudes Yourcenariennes, No 21 (decembre 2000), (Tours: 
SIEY, 2000), pp. 161-82, (p. 180). This essay consists o f two distinct parts each o f which is written by 
one o f the two authors.
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separates him from it, just as Diirer measures the distance that separates him from the 
source of his anxiety, as we saw in the previous chapter. In the following passage, 
Zenon describes the relationship between the inquiring self and the world, and 
stresses the abilities and the failures of the ‘human spirit’:
J’en sais les limites [i.e. de Fesprit], et que le temps lui manquera pour aller plus loin, 
et la force, si par hasard lui etait accorde le temps. Mais il est, et, en ce moment, il est 
Celui qui Est. Je sais qu’il se trompe, erre, interprete souvent a tort les legons que lui 
dispense le monde, mais je  sais aussi qu’il a en lui de quoi connaitre et parfois 
rectifier ses propres erreurs. [...] J’ai observe les astres et examine l’interieur des 
corps. [...] Je sais que je ne sais pas ce que je ne sais pas ; j ’envie ceux qui sauront 
davantage, mais je sais qu’ils auront tout comme moi a mesurer, peser, deduire et se 
mefier des deductions produites.62
What may sound like Zenon’s positivist attitude towards knowledge is in reality an 
expression of his modesty with regard to the limits of scientific mind. As a humanist, 
Zenon is confident in the power of the human mind and in future progress; at the 
same moment, however, he knows that a great deal of error is always mixed in 
scientific truth, and that the latter deals only with the accessible, the representable 
part of a greater truth which remains elusive. As he remarks a few lines further down: 
‘Je me suis garde de faire de la verite une idole, preferant lui laisser son nom plus
fCXhumble d’exactitude’. This line sums up marvellously the negative humanism of 
L ’CEuvre au noir, as well as Yourcenar’s appreciation of realism as the negative 
representation of truth. Zenon’s reluctance to idolize truth mirrors Yourcenar’s 
refusal to ideologize those aspects of reality which do not lend themselves to 
semiotic interpretation. Further, Zenon’s almost obsessive interest in scientific 
accuracy is due to his decision to remain within the limits of representation and apply 
its rules rigorously. Like the realist writer, Zenon is above all an artisan. This is most 
evident when we think that medicine is for him a technique for bringing the self to 
the outer limits of the unreal and the unrepresentable, without ever transcending 
them. Writing about Zenon as a physician, Michel Breulet made a similar point:
62 OR, p. 653.
63 OR, p. 654.
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S ’abimant en son corps, Zenon resorbe ainsi 1’abTme ou l’angoisse le precipite ; etre 
en corps, c ’est encore etre ; c ’est s ’inscrire dans l ’espace et la duree. Done l ’homme 
est a la fois machine et machiniste. Voila, sans doute, comment, chez Zenon, se revele 
la vocation medicale. II s ’agit pour lui de decouvrir le machinisme du vivant, afin de 
le maitriser. Passionnement, mais sans apparente passion, son desir est bien de 
pouvoir enfin conduire la machine, la faire ralentir ou accelerer, jusqu’a l ’ultime 
immobilite.64
Breulet, who comes from the area of neuroscience rather than that of literature, 
stresses the reflexivity of the experience of being a medical doctor. Zenon studies his 
own body, and verifies its facticity, its ‘being-there’ spatially and temporally: ‘etre en 
corps, c’est encore etre’. From this point of view, the body can be thought of as a 
machine, and the physician as a machinist, someone who employs a technique. 
Clearly, neither Yourcenar nor Breulet argue that the body is a machine before 
anything else. But in so far as it exists factically, the body is measurable. In this 
sense, the physician is an artisan whose task is to master a technique, as the above 
passage also confirms. The knowledge that comes from measuring the body allows 
the physician to manipulate it ‘jusqu’a l’ultime immobilite’, which in L ’CEuvre au 
noir has the concrete meaning of Zenon’s suicide. In the context of the problematic 
of representation, Zenon’s suicide thus marks the end of measuring and the 
borderline between the sensible and what lies beyond it. By the same token, Zenon’s 
suicide marks the end of realism. This point is made with dry precision in the final 
phrase of the novel, where Zenon lies dying in his prison cell, losing his senses one 
by one. Yourcenar then concludes by writing, ‘Et c ’est aussi loin qu’on peut aller 
dans la fin de Zenon.’65 Just like medicine, writing explores the limits of the 
representable but refuses to go any further.
In a sense, what Zenon does in relation to the human body Hadrien does in 
relationship to the empire. To be sure, Hadrien’s method is not scientific, but his 
decision to remain within the representational context and to work on a technique 
rather than a philosophy is based on the same principles as those of medicine.
64 Breulet, p. 181.
65 OR, p. 833.
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Hadrien reserves the highest praise for the Athenian physician Leothicyde, who is 
described in the novel as an ‘homme universel’: ‘Esprit sec, il m ’appris a preferer les 
choses aux mots, a me mefier des formules, a observer plutot qu’a juger. Ce Grec 
amer m ’a enseigne la methode.’66 It is therefore in medicine, and specifically through 
this Greek physician, who is described by Maurice Delcroix as ‘un Zenon avant la 
lettre’, that Hadrien first identified some of the basic notions which he then used in 
politics.67 As in L ’CEuvre au noir, these notions include the facticity of things (‘les 
choses’), as an expansion of the medical idea of the facticity of the body; the 
relativity of words and abstractions ( ‘les mots’, ‘les formules’); and finally the notion 
of the method which, in so far as it is opposed to the concepts of interpretation and 
judgement (‘juger’), is a synonym for ‘technique’. The relationship between medicine 
and politics is openly recognized by Hadrien:
La profession de medecin m’aurait plu : son esprit ne differe pas essentiellement de 
celui dans lequel j ’ai essaye de prendre mon metier d’empereur. Je me passionnai 
pour cette science trop proche de nous pour n’etre pas incertaine, sujette a 
l’engouement et a l’erreur, mais rectifiee sans cesse par le contact de l ’immediat et du 
nu.
Metaphorically speaking, in Memoires d ’Hadrien, politics is understood as a form of 
medicine applied to each subject and to the empire as a whole. Like medicine, 
politics is neither pure science nor an expression of pure creativity, but a negotiation, 
without reconciliation, between man and nature. Both disciplines are therapeutic, as 
it were, because, unlike other forms of representation, they only operate within 
concrete spatio-temporal contexts. The political leader plays a rectifying role, 
because he understands the difference between facticity and representation. He can 
recognize the impulse and the error of representation (Tengouement et l’erreur’), 
although he cannot prevent errors from occurring. He becomes an arch-ironist and, to 
that extent, he also becomes a therapist.
66 OR, p. 313.
67 Breulet, p. 168.
68 OR, p. 313.
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As we saw, in ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’, Paul de Man is sceptical of the 
idea of the therapeutic agency of irony. Still, before he rejects this idea, he discusses 
it in a way which is relevant to my present argument. With reference to Baudelaire’s 
essay ‘De l’essence du rire’, he establishes a relationship between irony and madness, 
and more specifically between laughing at one’s fall and being possessed by a ‘folie 
lucide’ after falling. He quotes Baudelaire’s statement, ‘Le rire est generalement 
1’apanage des fous’, and explains that ‘irony is unrelieved vertige, dizziness to the 
point of madness’.69 Irony is madness because it originates in the internalized schism 
between the self and its representation. The dizziness of irony seizes everyone: 
‘Qu’est-ce que le vertige ? C ’est le comique absolu ; il s’est empare de chaque etre’, 
writes Baudelaire.70 We may therefore argue, with Paul de Man, that madness is a 
constitutive characteristic of the self, in so far as the latter possesses (or is possessed 
by) a language. In this scheme of things, the arch-ironist can play the role of the 
therapist. Baudelaire wonders whether Hoffmann, whom he sees as a master of the 
‘comique absolu’ and an arch-ironist, is indeed a ‘medecin de fous’:
C’est a croire qu’on a affaire a un physiologiste ou a un medecin de fous des plus 
profonds, et qui s’amuserait a revetir cette profonde science de formes poetiques, 
comme un savant qui parlerait par apologues et paraboles.71
The ironist invests the ‘profonde science’ of medicine with ‘formes poetiques’. This 
means that he cures madness with language; he does not simply explain what is 
wrong with representation, but uses ‘apologues et paraboles’, narration and 
fabulation, to demonstrate the difference that is installed within the subject. 
Consequently, irony is no cure in the sense of the re-authentication of the subject and 
the restoration of lost identity, as de Man surmises. Rather, the ironic tale could 
function as a repetitive confirmation of difference, a poetic and constantly deferred
69 De Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 214 and 215. The quotation from Baudelaire is from ‘De  
l’essence du rire’, p. 245.
70 Baudelaire, p. 260.
71 Baudelaire, p. 261. This phrase is also partly quoted in de Man, ‘The Rhetoric o f Temporality’, p. 
216.
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exposition of what Baudelaire and de Man call the ‘dedoublement’ of the self. By the 
same token, politics, itself a form of poetics, could also be a form of therapy.
Hadrien’s politics of ‘reconstruction’ is analogous to the ironic tale which 
reproduces the difference that causes madness. A political leader and ironist par 
excellence, Hadrien is a ‘medecin de fous’. In Memoires, he is indeed presented as 
the empereur-medecin who implements a politics of difference to cure a ‘mad’ 
population and a ‘mad’ empire. We saw how, in the last passage from Memoires 
quoted above, Hadrien pointed out the broad analogies between his ‘metier’ and that 
of the physician. With reference to his extensive tours in the empire, he remarks: ‘je 
pensais au medecin ambulant guerissant les gens de porte en porte’.72 We are invited 
to think of the empire as a suffering subject with Hadrien as the emperor-healer.
As we saw, de Man stresses that irony can be considered as a ‘folie lucide’. On 
at least two occasions, Yourcenar uses similar expressions to describe Hadrien’s 
mental state. She describes Hadrien’s experience of a quasi-mystical night which he 
spent alone in the desert as an ‘extase lucide’.73 Further down, she writes that, after 
Antinoiis’s death, Hadrien designed and founded a new city, Antinopolis, ‘soutenu 
d’une ivresse lucide’.74 At the beginning of this chapter, I quoted W yss’s comment 
that ‘la lucidite d’Hadrien est une luddite d’accueil’. We now see that Hadrien’s 
lucidity consists in his extremely sharp sense of irony, his understanding of the error 
and inevitability of representations, and the paradoxical possibilities of authenticity 
and freedom that are thus offered to man. Hadrien explains this almost unique 
lucidity among his contemporaries as follows: ‘II n ’y a qu’un seul point sur lequel je 
me sens superieur au commun des hommes : je suis tout ensemble plus libre et plus 
soumis qu’ils n’osent l’etre. Presque tous meconnaissent egalement leur juste liberte 
et leur vraie servitude.’75 Hadrien is presented as one of the few people of his time
72 OR, p. 382.
73 OR, p. 4 0 2 .1 shall return to this point in Chapter 4.
74 OR, p. 441.
75 OR, pp. 317-18.
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who did not misconstrue ( ‘meconnaitre’) the meaning of freedom and submission. As 
empereur-medecin, he rectifies the erroneous perception of freedom as freedom from 
inauthenticity, and offers his subjects a new understanding of authenticity as the 
knowing acceptance of difference.
As I stressed earlier, the conclusions that I am exposing here remain provisional 
until Hadrien’s political vision is examined in more detail in the last chapter of my 
thesis. Paul de Man’s caution that ‘to know inauthenticity is not the same as to be 
authentic’ will prove to be useful in that context. However, I feel that the theoretical 
possibilities opened up by Yourcenar’s re-examination of such ideas as purity, 
acceptance and freedom remain largely valid, whatever the way they are implemented 
in Memoires d ’Hadrien and other works by her. In addition to highlighting the 
significance of these ideas in Yourcenar’s work, I would emphasize the relevance of 
Yourcenar’s preoccupation with existence, aesthetics and politics in the context of 
modernity. My aim, in the next chapter, shall be to demonstrate that Yourcenar’s 
thought and writing are profoundly embedded in philosophical, cultural and literary 
modernity and that they frequently manage to shed unexpected light on it.
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C u l t u r a l  M o d e r n it y  a n d  N a r r a t iv e  
A u t h e n t ic it y : 
Y o u r c e n a r  a n d  B e n ja m in
In 2000, an international conference was organized by the University of Thessaloniki 
and the Societe Internationale d’Etudes Yourcenariennes to discuss the question: 
Marguerite Yourcenar: Ecrivain du XIXe siecle ? That this question was asked about 
an author who was bom and died in the twentieth century shows how Yourcenar’s 
effort to dissociate herself from most literary and philosophical movements of her 
time left her susceptible to the criticism of being out of touch with the century in 
which she lived. By way of example, May Chehab, one of the participants in the 
conference, referred to various philosophies which are present in Yourcenar’s work, 
including ‘les philosophies presocratiques, [...] les religions orientales, [...] le 
neoplatonisme et Plotin en particulier’, before asking: ‘L ’oeuvre de Marguerite 
Yourcenar portant l’empreinte plus ou moins profonde de toutes ces philosophies, il 
est legitime de se demander si son eclectisme a premiere vue passeiste ne desservirait 
pas, lui aussi, les options de la modemite.’1 Chehab went on to suggest that the 
renewal of interest in these philosophies at the end of the 19th Century reflected a
1 May Chehab, ‘Cerner l ’etre, une figure de la modemite ?’, in Georges Freris and R. Poignault (eds), 
M arguerite Yourcenar: Ecrivain du XIXe siecle ? (Clermont-Ferrand: SIEY, 2004), pp. 75-83, (p. 76).
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specifically modem tendency to delegitimize the subject of classicism. This tendency, 
argued Chehab, found a forceful expression in Nietzsche, whom Yourcenar had read 
well. Yourcenar was also an assiduous reader of pre-Socratic and oriental 
philosophies. Like many of her contemporaries, she looked in these philosophies for 
ways of interrogating essentialist approaches to subjectivity which, according to 
Chehab, were more persistent in France than in the rest of Europe in the first half of 
the twentieth century.2 Yourcenar’s effort to understand the self non-essentially led to 
the development by her of a technique of ‘closing in on being’ ( ‘cemer l’etre’), as 
opposed to representing it directly. Chehab sees this technique as a sign of 
Yourcenar’s modernity and gives her paper the title ‘Cemer l’etre, une figure de la 
modemite ?’. She claims that Yourcenar’s autobiographical trilogy Le Labyrinthe du 
monde, whose subject is in fact Yourcenar’s family rather than herself, can be 
understood in terms of the particularly modem consciousness of the 
unrepresentability of the T : ‘Dans Le Labyrithe du monde, l’impossible adequation 
entre l’observe et l’observant sous-tend l’impossible reflexivite du discours du « moi 
».’3 Chehab’s interpretation is not far from my understanding of the fleetingness and 
unrepresentability of the self in Memoires and other novels by Yourcenar. But it has 
the merit of emphasizing the modernity of Yourcenar’s approach.
I shall now begin to explore aspects of Yourcenar’s specifically modem 
approach to the poetics of subjectivity and the problematic of representation. I shall 
be looking in her political thought and cultural criticism to see how they were 
informed by the new realities with which the West was faced, especially in the 
interwar years. I shall suggest that it was the specific cultural and philosophical 
context of modernity, as understood by Yourcenar, which enabled her to raise the 
interrelated issues of existential and narrative authenticity. Furthermore I shall argue 
that her answer to this problem, analysed in abstract terms in the previous chapters,
2 Chehab, ‘Cerner l’etre’, p. 81.
3 Chehab, ‘Cemer l’etre’, p. 81.
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can be directly associated with specific aspects of early 20th-century aesthetic and 
literary theory. Modernity will thus appear simultaneously as the problematic 
landscape of inauthenticity and as a privileged topos where the question of 
authenticity could be addressed and new approaches to politics, art and existence 
could be initiated. One of the thinkers that have studied modernity in similar terms is 
Walter Benjamin. In what follows, two of his essays will serve as pointers of a 
specifically modem sensitivity in relation to which Yourcenar’s poetics and 
aesthetics will be appreciated.
Yourcenar and cultural modernity
In her 1929 essay ‘Diagnostic de l’Europe’, Yourcenar used the metaphor of sickness 
to expose the wounds of ‘un monde pret a mourir’.4 Based on an organic perception 
of history, this short essay re-iterates the rhetoric of decline which was typical of the 
interwar period. Europe is represented as a chronic patient threatened by imminent 
death. While Yourcenar writes in the name of Europe rather than that of a specific 
nation, her judgement is characterized by provincialism and inwardness. This 
exclusively European ‘cosmopolitanism’, which is in mortal danger of losing its 
virility and which resorts, desperate for help, to a semi-unconscious state of 
‘mystique’ and ‘hyperesthesie’, is at the antipodes of the universalism that is 
assumed by many critics to infiltrate her work. She emphasizes the antithesis 
between classical European values - ‘L ’ intelligence a l’etat pur [...] entre la Baltique 
et la mer Egee’ - and what she sees as the degeneration of these values in Europe 
from the Romantics onwards. On the one hand there is Tintelligence objective’, i a
4 Marguerite Yourcenar, ‘Diagnostic de l ’Europe’, EM , pp. 1649-1655 (p. 1651). The 1991 Pleiade 
edition contains an annotation o f 1982 by Yourcenar. First published in Bibliotheque universelle et 
revue de Geneve, No 18, juin 1929, pp. 745-52.
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pensee logique’, ‘la raison europeenne’, i a  connaissance’; on the other hand there is 
‘[le] moi souffrant’, and the predominance of ‘le sentiment’, i a  morale’, i a  
sensation’ and i a  femme’.5 The crescendo of Europe’s agony of death is conveyed 
by the sweeping vocabulary of the ‘Diagnostic’: ‘aboulie’, ‘ataxie’, ‘individualisme’, 
‘simplisme’, ‘vulgarisation’, ‘barbarisme’, ‘desespoir’, ‘passivite’, ‘flechissement’, 
‘deformation’, ‘fatigue’, ‘maladie’, ‘mort’. The metaphor of Europe’s pathology is 
the product of a conservative and traditionalist mind in the metaphysical sense of 
these terms: it surmises the existence of a state of originality from which Europe has 
fallen, and reduces post-Enlightenment European history to a slow and fatal process 
of decomposition. Yourcenar’s critique reaches a climax in the following passage, 
where an interesting allusion is made to the failure of industrialization and 
technology to fulfil their promises:
L ’economie traditionnelle n’a pas disparu seule dans le desastre financier; la 
civilisation toute entiere s ’est apergu qu’elle cessait d’etre. Etrange spectacle que 
celui d’une machine dont les rouages fausses par la catastrophe s’arretent ou toument 
a vide. L’expression populaire est la plus juste : « toument fou ».6
This feeling of insanity, this fear of the new, and the unease that technology 
engenders in the young Yourcenar cannot be easily reconciled with her contemplative 
admiration, twenty years on, for Hadrien, the innovator and cosmopolitan. Without 
wishing to place disproportionate emphasis on these early conclusions over 
Yourcenar’s more sophisticated criticism in later life, one cannot help but wonder 
how the traumatic experience of modernity shaped her perception of politics and 
aesthetics.
‘Diagnostic de l’Europe’ conveys a strong sense of loss of authenticity which 
infiltrates Yourcenar’s entire work. In this essay, authenticity is threatened by 
fragmentation and decay. As I discussed in the previous chapter, these are the very 
concepts which, because of the introduction of the parameter of time, make possible
5 All quotations from ‘Diagnostic de l ’Europe’, pp. 1649-50.
6 EM, p. 1651.
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authentic representation and the paradoxical fulfilment of artistic intention, as 
Yourcenar suggests in her 1954 essay ‘Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur’. In 1929, by 
contrast, the spectre of fragmentation as a specific aesthetic feature of modernity 
engenders panic. In the following passage, it is worth noticing the intricate parallel 
that Yourcenar draws between technology and fragmentation in art and literature.
La dissociation croissante du style n’est qu’un aspect de la dissociation des pensees, 
l ’incapacite du cerveau a retablir la suite logique des images. Elies sautent et 
s’echappent par saccades, comme les etincelles du moteur detraque qui va cesser sa 
marche. Ce qui disparait de l ’art, c ’est surtout la composition. Le style de Proust, 
subdivise a l’extreme, confus a force d’abondance, deborde sans cesse par les pensees 
subies et non dirigees, le style de Breton, spasmodique et sec, tout en detentes et en 
tensions, altement comme la prostration et l’excitation nerveuses.7
The convulsive body, the paroxysmal text and the dysfunctional machine combine to 
produce the monstrous image of modernity. The technological age has lost all 
dynamic for synthetic thinking and -  at least in the case of Western Europe -  has 
even abandoned the ambition for totalising narratives. The form of aesthetic 
representation that sets the tone and the rhythm of the new era is film. Yourcenar 
writes:
On toume. Le cinematographe a enseigne la decomposition du mouvement : les 
romanciers l’im itent; la vie tournee par l ’un au ralenti, s ’accelere dans les mains d’un 
autre operateur. [...] L ’esprit regie son rythme sur celui d’une vie de plus en plus 
agitee ; il travaille au millieme de seconde. L’art, jadis lent elaborateur, se specialise 
dans l’instantane. On peut dire que l ’esprit europeen acquit, dans les demieres annees 
du XIXe siecle, la sensibilite d’une pellicule photographique.8
Film and photography as the forms of art par excellence that befit a mechanical 
and fragmented age are the themes of the celebrated 1936 essay by Walter Benjamin 
‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’.9 In this essay, Benjamin 
notices that technical reproducibility has cost the aesthetic artefact its aura, and 
therefore its authenticity, within the cultural context to which it belongs. He writes:
7 EM, p. 1653.
8 EM, p. 1654.
9 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art in the Age o f Mechanical Reproduction’, in Walter Benjamin, 
Illuminations, ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zorn (London: Fontana Press, 1992), pp. 211-44.
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‘the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of 
tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a 
unique existence’.10 The loss of authenticity, the assumption by art and culture of the 
formal characteristics of the machine, and the centrality of film in the cultural 
analysis of modernity constitute some of the startling similarities between 
Yourcenar’s and Benjamin’s essays.
These similarities go further and touch the sensitive issue of the political 
meaning of the loss of the aura / authenticity of the work of art. This is the part of the 
analysis where one would expect these two thinkers to differ mostly -  as indeed they 
do in many ways. Nonetheless, implicit in both essays is the need to account for the 
blurring of the distinction between high and low art as a result of social emancipation 
and the expansion of mass culture. For Benjamin, the ‘transitoriness and 
reproducibility’ of aesthetic artefacts testify to an extremely heightened ‘sense of the 
universal equality of things’ among the masses. ‘The adjustment of reality to the 
masses and of the masses to reality is a process of unlimited scope’, he notes.11
Further down, he contrasts the traditional ‘cult value’ of works of art to their 
specifically modem ‘exhibition value’. He points out that there is a ‘quantitative 
shift’ from the former to the latter ‘polar type’, whereby emphasis is now placed not 
on the works’ ‘existence’ but on their ‘being on view’. Not only has this situation 
affected the standards of aesthetic evaluation, it has also effected ‘a qualitative 
transformation of [the work’s] nature’.12 The aesthetic object is changing to 
accommodate the new social norms of public accessibility - a movement that 
demonstrates modem art’s diminished power to signify. In a similar vein, Benjamin 
stresses the involvement of the masses in the process of weakening of writerly 
authority.
10 Walter Benjamin, T h e Work o f  Art’, p. 219.
11 Walter Benjamin, T h e Work o f  Art’, p. 217.
12 Walter Benjamin, T h e Work o f Art’, p. 218-19.
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With the increasing extension of the press which kept placing new political, religious, 
scientific, professional, and local organs before the readers, an increasing number of 
readers became writers. [. . .] Thus the distinction between author and public is about 
to lose its basic character. [...] Literary licence [. . .] thus becomes common 
property.13
Just as artistic originality is undermined by artistic plurality so literary authorship 
suffers from the common man’s rise to the level of writer. In a more didactic manner, 
Yourcenar makes a very similar point. She remarks that in the (classical) past, a few 
venerated texts were all that was required for good education.14 On the contrary, 
‘Aujourd’hui, le prodigieux effort vulgarisateur du livre et du journal, hatif toujours, 
maladroit souvent, permet a 1’inexperience du plus grand nombre 1’illusion de 
l’universel savoir.’15 As in ‘The Work of Art’, we learn that quantitative parameters 
have affected the type and quality of cultural production. Returning to the metaphor 
of the machine, Yourcenar compares modem culture to a workshop that is open for 
anyone to use and abuse. She refers to Ta masse, ruee dans ce laboratoire ouvert’, 
and this idea of openness is strongly reminiscent of Benjamin’s reference to ‘the 
desire of contemporary masses to bring things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly.’16
Yourcenar attempts to specify the historical period when the masses gained free 
access to this workshop for the first time. She writes that after the relative 
equilibrium of the 17th Century ‘se produisit l’admirable poussee de libre 
intellectualisme qui preceda et amena la Revolution. C ’est vers ce moment que 
l’esprit humain, trop charge, flechit.’17 This statement is based on an unmistakably 
deterministic view of history. It maintains that when the historical moment was ripe, 
as it were, for the masses to be allowed into the sphere of the intellect, guarded till 
then by the select few, the first working-class revolution in history took place. If the
13 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art’, p. 225.
14 Yourcenar’s precise expression is ‘des textes peu nombreux, veneres’, EM , p. 1651. These 
adjectives encapsulate two main characteristics o f the pre-modern artefact according to Benjamin, 
namely uniqueness and aura; both these characteristics, we are told, have vanished in modernity.
15 EM, p. 1651.
16 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work o f  Art’, p. 216-17.
17 EM, p. 1650.
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French Revolution was the early political expression of modernity, the first cultural 
expression of modernity was sickness of the mind due to intellectual congestion. The 
human spirit snaps, like the overburdened branch of a tree.18
At the point when Yourcenar’s deterministic view of history enters into play, the 
differences between her essay and Benjamin’s become palpable. As the metaphor of 
the overburdened branch already intimates, modernity is not an accident, nor is it a 
radical turning away from tradition. On the contrary, for Yourcenar, tradition is 
contained in the modem, and its tremendous duration and weight are the reasons 
behind contemporary neurosis. She writes:
la seule maladie dont une civilisation finisse par mourir, c ’est sa duree. La notre est 
vieillie. Des vieilles civilisations elle a les aspects disparates et comme rapieces 
d’histoire, le materialisme lourd du plus grand nombre oppose au fol idealisme du 
plus petit [ . . . ] .19
Conversely, for Benjamin modernity represents the potential for ‘a tremendous 
shattering of tradition which is the obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of 
mankind.’20 Mechanical reproducibility initiates a radical departure from the tradition 
of the auratic object. Thus the social significance of film -  the prototypically modem 
artefact -  ‘is inconceivable without its destructive, cathartic aspect, that is the 
liquidation of the traditional value of the cultural heritage.’21 The advent of the new 
brings about the elimination of the traditional. ‘Destruction’, ‘catharsis’, ‘liquidation’
18 Yourcenar’s vision o f the end o f  European civilization is also reminiscent o f Oswald Spengler’s 
polemical 1918 study Decline o f  the West', Oswald Spengler, The Decline o f  the West, trans. by 
Charles Francis Atkinson (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1926). As Bruno Tritsmans notes: 
‘L ’apparentement du regard historique a celui du visionnaire semble faire echo aux theses d ’Oswald 
Spengler du Declin de I’Occident en 1918. [. . .] Tout se passe comme si Yourcenar s’en souvenait [.. .] 
quand elle stigmatise dans TEurope des annees 20 une “decheance”, une “maladie” -  la metaphore 
spenglerienne par excellence -  dont elle se veut “temoin’V Bruno Tritsmans, ‘Opposition et esquive 
dans Alexis et la Nouvelle Eurydice' , Bulletin de la Societe Internationale d'Etudes Yourcenariennes, 
No 5, septembre 1989, pp. 1-14, (p. 2).
<http://www.yourcenariana.org/pdf/bull05/02Tritsmans.pdf>, [accessed on 29/08/2007].
19 EM, p. 1654.
20 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art’, p. 215.
21 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art’, p. 215.
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leave no doubt that the new is not a degeneration of the traditional and is not even 
generated from it. It contains nothing of it.
While an analysis of Benjamin’s long-debated relation to tradition lies beneath 
the scope of my thesis, it is worth pursuing the search for affinities and differences 
between ‘The Work of Art’ and ‘Diagnostic de l’Europe’ a little further. Comparative 
examination of these two essays will help elucidate Yourcenar’s perception of the 
aesthetic and philosophical stakes of modernity. The question arises as to whether 
Benjamin in the ‘Work of Art’ is implicitly critical of the idea of tradition’s 
obliteration, the abolition of the aura, and the rise of the masses as Yourcenar clearly 
is in her essay. Benjamin is certainly ironic about the pseudo-expertise of the movie­
goer and the newspaper reader.22 In a more serious vein, he clarifies that he does not 
think of cinema as an inherently revolutionary medium. More specifically, Benjamin 
writes: ‘So long as the movie makers’ capital sets the fashion, as a rule no other 
revolutionary merit can be accredited to today’s film than the promotion of a 
revolutionary criticism of traditional concepts of art.’ 23 While by its very structure 
film challenges traditional aesthetic theory and practice, it does not necessarily 
harbour a socially subversive potential.24 Furthermore, Benjamin places particular 
emphasis on ‘that oppression, that new anxiety which, according to Pirandello, grips 
the actor before the camera’.25
Interestingly, Yourcenar also mentions Pirandello in ‘Diagnostic’, although, for 
her, he is, together with Rilke and Gide, a good representative of the end of an era:
1f\‘[ils] represented assez bien ce point d ’aboutissement’. But there is another, even
22 The relevant point is made in Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art’, p. 225.
23 Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art’, p. 224.
24 On this point, see Susan Buck-M orss’s comment: ‘Clearly, in a world where mass media was being 
used for anything but critical enlightenment, Benjamin’s affirmation o f film and other forms of 
mechanical reproduction was addressed to the cognitive potential o f such media, not their present 
practice.’ In Susan Buck-Morss, ‘Benjamin’s Passagen-Werk: Redeeming Mass Culture for the 
Revolution’, New German Critique, No 29 (Spring Semester, 1983), pp. 211-240, (p. 214, note 8).
25 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art’, p. 224.
26 EM, p. 1655.
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more intriguing link between Yourcenar and Benjamin, with regard to Pirandello’s 
comment on the anxiety felt by the film actor. There is an episode in Yourcenar’s 
1934 novel Denier du reve, in which the fictional screen actress Angiola Fides 
watches one of her films in a Roman movie theatre and experiences a feeling of 
alienation before her own image. Incapable of identifying with her phantom-double 
on screen, which is both more real and less real than herself, Angiola feels ‘comme 
devant un miroir’27. Benjamin uses the same analogy, albeit with reference not to the 
movie screen but to the movie camera, as part of the process of film production: ‘The 
feeling of strangeness that overcomes the actor before the camera, as Pirandello 
describes it, is basically of the same kind as the estrangement felt before one’s image 
in the mirror.’28
To a certain extent at least, Benjamin and Yourcenar share the same reservations 
with regard to the loss of aura and its historical and existential implications. 
Nonetheless, at various points in the Artwork essay Benjamin is markedly more 
radical than Yourcenar. As we saw already, he suggests that the ‘contemporary crisis’ 
promises ‘the renewal of mankind’. He writes: ‘in permitting the reproduction to 
meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, [the technique of 
reproduction] reactivates the object reproduced’.29 This can be taken as a criticism of 
the traditional distance, that is, the aura surrounding the aesthetic artefact; by 
implication, the aura de-activates the work of art, neutralizes its dynamic for 
interaction, transforms it into an object of cult. Commenting on this point, Howard 
Caygill notes: ‘the object is reactivated when the qualities of distance and uniqueness 
are removed from it; it becomes something different, something which need no
27 OR, p. 240. Denier du reve was originally published in 1934: Denier du reve (Paris: Grasset, 1934). 
It was thoroughly reworked by Yourcenar in 1958-59: Denier du reve (Paris: Plon, 1959). This more 
recent edition is included in OR. The movie theatre scene has been analyzed in similar terms to those 
of the present dissertation in Erin G. Carlston, Thinking Fascism: Sapphic Modernism and Fascist 
M odernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 103-107.
28 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art’, p. 224.
29 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art’, p. 215.
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longer be experienced in terms of presence and absence.’ For Caygill, in ‘The Work 
of Art’, Benjamin is unequivocally critical of the cult value of the traditional artefact 
and celebrates the destruction of tradition and the attendant loss of authenticity in art.
Caygill writes: ‘This ability to distance its viewer marks the authenticity of the work
*2 1
of art, and is what Benjamin described critically as its “cult value’” . Therefore, 
despite his reservations, Benjamin placed emphasis on the emancipatory potential of 
the modem work of art, while Yourcenar ‘diagnosed’ in modernity an irreversible 
process of decay. This is why the central concept of the ‘Work of Art’ is 
reproducibility, while that of ‘Diagnostic’ is its flip side, namely, fragmentation.
In the Artwork essay, Benjamin contrasts painting and film, and points out that 
‘there is a tremendous difference between the pictures they obtain. That of the painter 
is a total one, that of the cameraman consists of multiple fragments which are 
assembled under a new law’.32 The specifically modem possibility of a new 
assemblage, governed by a law whose relevance I will discuss further down, is 
altogether lacking from ‘Diagnostic’. What we see instead in Yourcenar’s essay is a 
lament for the contemporary impossibility of the total work of art, compounded by 
the apocalyptic intuition of the telos of aesthetics. Indeed, in the last sentence of 
‘Diagnostic de l’Europe’, Yourcenar summarizes her diagnosis of the aesthetics of 
her time and her prognosis of the non-aesthetics of the future as follows: ‘resignes
d’avance aux tenebres qui vont suivre, assistons [...] au bouquet final du feu
•2-2
d’artifice d’un monde’. The final sparks of a luminous era, that of the 
Enlightenment, will be followed by darkness. As I discussed above, the death of 
European culture and art is a deterministic and organicist notion; it implies that art 
and culture as products of reason contain the seeds of their undoing.
30 Howard Caygill, ‘Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction o f Tradition’, in Andrew Benjamin and 
Peter Osborne (eds), Walter Benjam in’s Philosophy, Destruction and Experience (Manchester: 
Clinamen Press, 2000), 1-30, (p. 24).
31 Caygill p. 24, emphasis added by the author.
32 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art’, p. 227, my emphasis.
33 EM, p. 1655.
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It is of especial significance that Yourcenar sees the end of culture as brought 
about by cultural diversity, and the demise of tradition as a consequence of an excess 
of traditions. She writes: ‘Les cervaux mal prepares ploient sur la diversite des 
connaissances ; les cadres de la culture, a force de s’elargir, se sont brises’.34 It is 
difficult to resist the criticism of provinciality and narrowness of perspective, even as 
Yourcenar explains the process by which the legacy of the past lost its functionality 
and became a burden on man:
Toute conception philosophique de la vie est un legs lentement accru par l’histoire. 
[. ..] De nos jours, ces legs d’epoques differentes, objets d’interminables controverses, 
accablent par leur multiplicity. Dans cette Europe qui s ’organise peniblement en Etat 
unique, le passe est un immense heritage en litige.35
In principle, this summary statement on tradition and history is in agreement with 
Yourcenar’s perception of history, later in life, as an interminable process of 
representations by philosophical, political or artistic means. However, in Memoires, 
Hadrien, who is keenly aware of this state of affairs, considers the historical 
predicament of his time as a unique opportunity to redefine authentic subjectivity. To 
this effect, he attempts to develop a technique de liberte which, as I discussed in 
Chapter 1, consists in ‘acquiescing’ to this mode of creation and attribution of 
meaning, in order to point out its lacunae. In terms of my analysis, this means that 
between ‘Diagnostic’ and Memoires, Yourcenar’s perception of modem aesthetics 
and politics underwent an important transformation. In 1949, modernity was no 
longer understood by her as the quasi-Nietzschean, quasi-nihilistic moment of 
intellectual aphasia, but as a moment of metaphysical solitude and potential freedom.
Already in ‘Diagnostic’ there are signs of this subsequent development. In a final 
twist in this essay, when Yourcenar announces the agonising consummation of the 
drama of representation, she also celebrates the beauty of the time she lives in. ‘Je 
n’ai tant dit que notre epoque est malade que pour me reserver de dire a la fin qu’elle
M EM, p. 1651.
35 EM, p. 1652.
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est belle.’36 To be sure, she refers to the ironic phantasmagoria of the firework 
display, not to the ironic beauty of the ruins, as in ‘Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur’. 
The fact remains that already at the time of ‘Diagnostic’ she is in search of a new 
aesthetics that originates from within the end of all aesthetics. She writes: ‘Mais le 
prix dument acquitte nous donne le droit de jouir d ’un spectacle si divers. N ’assiste 
pas qui veut a celui d’un achievement. Acheve : fini -  le mot contient a la fois le sens 
de la perfection et celui de 1’arret.’ The beauty of decay that follows classical 
perfection is, of course, a central theme in Yourcenar’s work. But in 1929, this theme 
is still too closely tied to the concept of ongoing fragmentation that prefigures the end 
of all culture. At that time she still fails to see how ‘multiple fragments can be 
assembled under a new law’, as Benjamin would claim a few years later. By 1954, in 
‘Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur’, Yourcenar has found a way out of the symbolics of 
the fragment as a prefiguration of death. In the latter essay she discusses a new ‘law’ 
according to which time re-authenticates the work of art by submitting it to an 
irrevocable process of destruction. As I discussed in the previous chapter, this 
process deconstructs the symbolic content of the work of art and restores its 
representational value in an unexpected way. The decaying work of art represents 
reality authentically, while the freshly made work of art conceals its inauthenticity - 
the arbitrariness of the codes of signification which made its ‘creation’ possible. 
During this process, the traditional meaning of authenticity is reversed; what was 
previously considered as original and authentic is now proved to be a copy, while 
authenticity is found in the scattered ruins and is designated as a state of 
fragmentation. I would now submit that already in 1936, in ‘The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, Benjamin alluded to the same process of reversal 
of significations as a characteristic of modernity.
36 EM, p. 1655
37 EM, p. 1655.
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Authenticity and illusion
Part XI of ‘The Work of Art’, where Benjamin compares the staging of plays to the 
shooting of films, is one of the most widely debated of this essay. His analysis of the 
illusory character of the cinematic medium has been variously criticized as 
theoretically inconsistent and hailed as a refined moment of synthesis of his politics 
and his messianic preoccupation. As in my previous comments on Benjamin, my aim 
here is not so much to contribute to that discussion as to identify elements in his 
theory that help locate Yourcenar’s work squarely in the context of aesthetic 
modernity. More specifically, in Benjamin’s analysis of modernity I expect to discern 
novel determinations of authenticity which may also be central to Yourcenar’s 
writing and implicit theory of representation.
Benjamin observes that while theatre involves some effort on the part of the 
viewer to produce the illusion of reality, cinema as a medium presents a view of 
reality that is completely free from apparatus; as such, it requires a lower level of 
concentration and delivers a spectacle of higher verisimilitude. Benjamin brings into 
sharp focus this paradox which he takes to be a major development in aesthetics: 
‘The equipment-free aspect of reality here has become the height of artifice; the sight 
of immediate reality has become an orchid in the land of technology.’38 This amounts 
to saying that the technological age creates new ways of re-instating authenticity in 
representation. It does so, not by avoiding, or avoiding to acknowledge, the processes 
of mediation employed in aesthetic production, but by making the most of these 
processes. Immediacy is here the result of the inevitable excess of mediation ( ‘the 
height of the artifice’) in very much the same way that authenticity, in Yourcenar’s 
work, is the paradoxical outcome of the irrevocable fall into inauthenticity.
38 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art’, p. 226.
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Notably, the ‘sight of immediate reality’ achieved in film possesses the principal 
attribute of the canonically authentic object: namely, aura. In her essay ‘Benjamin, 
Cinema and Experience: “The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology’” , Miriam 
Hansen points out that the ‘orchid’ of the quotation above translates in an 
unconvincing way ‘the proverbial “blue flower” of German Romanticism, Novalis’ 
“blaue Blume’” . She continues by asking: ‘Why did Benjamin choose, albeit with a 
shade of irony, the highly auratic metaphor of the Blue Flower -  the unattainable 
object of the romantic quest, the incarnation of desire?’39 This question continues to 
puzzle critics, some of whom have taken Benjamin’s statement at face value -  
perhaps rightfully so -  and have thus accused him of intellectual shortsightedness: 
‘He does not see that, independent of the genesis of cinematic images -  in which 
artifice, tricks and manipulation play an important role -  the completed film presents 
a more convincing illusion of reality than does any other art form.’40 This is the 
conclusion which Rainer Rochlitz thinks that Benjamin should have drawn from the 
‘blaue Blume’ passage. However, as we saw above, Benjamin does criticize the 
technically empowered process of emotional and ideological manipulation that has 
characterized film production in the West from the start. At a different part of the 
Artwork essay, he writes: ‘In Western Europe the capitalistic exploitation of the film 
denies consideration to modem man’s legitimate claim to being reproduced. Under 
these circumstances the film industry is trying hard to spur the interest of the masses 
through illusion-promoting spectacles and dubious speculations.’ 41 Beyond the 
context of film theory, some critics have tried to understand the metaphor of the 
blaue Blume in the broader terms of the relation between illusion and reality under 
modernity. Far from a belated call for the return of the auratic element, Susan Buck-
39 Both quotations from Miriam Hansen, ‘Benjamin, Cinema and Experience: The Blue Flower in the 
Land o f Technology’, in New German Critique, No 40, Special Issue on Weimar Film Theory 
(Winter, 1987), pp. 179-224, (p. 204).
40 Rainer Rochlitz, The Disenchantment o f  Art: The Philosophy o f  Walter Benjamin, trans. by Jane 
Marie Todd (London: The Guildford Press, 1996), p. 177.
41 Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art’, p. 226.
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Morss reads T he  Work of Art’ as an attempt at setting the tone for a modem analysis 
of the social function of mechanically reproduced illusion. In her essay ‘Benjamin’s 
Passagen-Werk: Redeeming Mass Culture for the Revolution’, she suggests that 
Benjamin’s ‘artwork essay argues theoretically for the transformation of art from 
illusory representation into an analysis of illusions’. As a politicized art form, film’s 
function is ‘not to duplicate illusion as real, but to interpret reality as itself illusion.’42 
In other words, the evocation of the blue flower does not signify Benjamin’s putative 
attachment to a primordial state of authenticity but illustrates the idea that such a 
state is an imaginary construct. Furthermore, the image of the blue flower ‘in the land 
of technology’ implies that modernity is a privileged framework for examining the 
social and aesthetic forces at work in the configuration of this construct. Modernity is 
not a context within which illusion replaces reality; it rather is the condition under 
which all reality can see itself historically as illusion.
It is this specifically modem awareness of the swapping of roles between reality 
and illusion that I find sufficiently close to the reversal of meanings between 
authenticity and its opposite in the work of Marguerite Yourcenar. In the same way 
that the fragments of old statues are eloquent testimony to the inauthenticity of the 
‘original’ sculpture, the fragmentary character of film can reveal the illusory 
character of reality. Conversely, for Yourcenar, modernity allows us to redefine 
authenticity as a series of cracks and scars left on the aesthetic body which at the 
moment of its coming into being was considered pure; in the same vein, for 
Benjamin, modernity allows us to understand reality as a process of mediations, 
distortions and falsifications which had hitherto been assigned to a supposedly 
separate domain, that of ‘illusion’ or ‘representation’.
42 All quotations from Susan Buck-Morss, p. 214. Buck-Morss’s argument, which I summarize here, 
refers primarily to Benjamin’s Passagen-W erk; however she clarifies that it applies equally to ‘The 
Work of Art’.
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Discussing Benjamin’s remark that the movie scene’s ‘illusionary nature is that 
of the second degree’43, Hansen suggests that film reclaims a truthful representation 
of reality by further distorting reality’s already distorted image. The redeeming 
agency of film is based on ‘a logic of double negation’.44 In Part XI of T he  Work of 
Art’, and more specifically in the reference to the ‘blue flower’, Hansen perceives
an echo of the ‘distortion o f distortion’ that Benjamin traces in the work of Proust 
[. ..] Accordingly, ‘the equipment-free aspect o f reality’ [. . .] seems to me linked in 
whatever alienated and refracted manner, to that ‘homesickness for the world 
distorted in the state o f resemblance’ which Proust’s writing pursued to the point of 
asphyxiation. Such film practice, however, would have to [. . .] lend its mimetic 
capability to a ‘world in which the true surrealist face o f existence breaks through’.45
This is a legitimate hypothesis about the way certain forms of art and writing in 
modernity manipulate established mechanisms of representation in order to produce 
newly valid images of reality: images which are authentic insofar as they are products 
of a ‘second degree’ of artistic mediation and distortion.
The convoluted technique of re-authentication of image/narrative to which 
Hansen refers here is by no means alien to the Yourcenarian idea of the technique de 
liberte. Hadrien’s way of dealing with such mechanisms of conceptualization of 
experience as religion, philosophy and poetry ( ‘Animula vagula blandula’) is to adopt 
and counter-manipulate these mechanisms with the aim of demonstrating their 
estranging effect at both an existential and a political level. With reference to 
Yourcenar’s literary criticism, the same applies to Cavafy’s (but also Thomas Mann’s 
and Andre Gide’s) choice of acceptation over revolted  Acceptation signifies 
appropriation of institutionalized forms of abstraction and schematization of le vecu 
-  e.g. in the case of Cavafy, Christian Orthodoxy -  in order to produce versions of 
reality that do justice to the uniqueness of the individual. It is because of the
43 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art’, p. 226.
44 Miriam Hansen, p. 203.
45 Miriam Hansen, pp. 204-205. Hansen quotes here from Benjamin’s essay on Proust: ‘The Image of 
Proust’, in Illuminations, pp. 197-210, (p. 200).
46 I am referring here to Yourcenar’s essays on Constantin Cavafy, Thomas Mann and Andre Gide, 
which I have discussed previously in the present thesis.
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emancipatory effect achieved by means of the acceptance and twisting of canonical 
concepts, symbols and norms that Yourcenar can write in her monograph on Cavafy 
that i a  revolte se pose ici a l’interieur de 1’acquiescement’.47
Finally, Yourcenar’s narrative technique can also be considered as an alternative 
application of the modernist device of ‘distortion of distortion’. As has already been 
noted, Yourcenar is aware of the way linguistic representation tends to standardise 
meaning and superimpose metaphysical and ideological interpretations to experience. 
At a time when literature responds to this by revolutionising narrative, e.g. in the 
nouveau roman, Yourcenar insists on realism as the properly and fundamentally 
distortive fictionalising mechanism. She strives for extreme control over the 
linguistic medium and dissimulates authorial presence in the same way that the 
camera operates as an instrument of extreme censorship banning all apparatus out of 
the image. As I wrote previously, Yourcenar’s realism does not, in principle, aim at 
the interpretation of the sensible and le vecu, but at its phenomenological recording; 
one critic has pointed out that the camera in Benjamin’s Artwork essay plays 
essentially the same role: ‘The “web of circumstances” into which the camera
48penetrates [...] salvages phenomenological immediacy as the telos of artifice.’ 
Thus, the effect of double mediation is the loss of the metaphysical identity, the aura, 
of the object, which lends itself to the senses as a mere signifier. In Yourcenar’s 
narrative as well as in cinematic representation according to Benjamin, realism loses 
its ontological implications. Nothing in the artefact denotes the autonomous 
existence of the depicted image, while numerous elements indicate its strictly 
phenomenological nature.
47 See note 50, Chapter 1.
48 Gertrud Koch, ‘Cosmos in Film: On the Concept o f Space in Walter Benjamin’s “Work of Art” 
Essay’, trans. by Nancy Rotero, in Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne (eds), Walter Benjam in’s 
Philosophy, Destruction and Experience (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000), pp. 202-11, (p. 209).
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Collecting fragments
In the context of my parallel discussion of Benjamin’s and Yourcenar’s aesthetics 
and poetics it is important to ask what world the process of controlled distortion 
makes it possible to see. Contrary to Benjamin’s expectation, it is not ‘the true 
surrealist face of existence’ that Yourcenar’s narrative ultimately unveils -  at least 
not in the strict sense understood by the surrealists themselves, of whose work she 
did not think very highly. By way of example, in her essay on Roger Caillois, whom 
she succeeded in the Academie Frangaise, she identifies surrealism with the literature 
of fantasy, which, for her, is artificial and ficticious. ‘[Le] surrealisme l’a 
profondement marque [i.e. Caillois] [...]. Mais la rigueur obstinee qui le distingua 
toujours lui a vite fait sentir la difference entre le fantastique d ’ordre litteraire, 
toujours si proche du factice et du fabrique, et l’etrange ou l ’inexplique veritables’.49 
For Yourcenar, fragmentation is not a device employed impressionistically to ensure 
narrative authenticity, but a necessary existential state to which language can only 
refer in a negative way. Yourcenar’s narrative constructions may have the elegance of 
neoclassical architecture, but they are consciously made of what she perceives to be 
the ruins of classicism. Her realist narratives refer directly to these ruins as the 
apparent signifieds which operate as allegories (in de Man’s sense) of the fragmented 
relationship between man and the world. Therefore the world that Yourcenar’s 
realism makes it possible to see resists semiotic representation: it cannot be reduced 
to the narrative fragments which make it up and which cannot be synthesized into a
49 EM, p. 538, emphasis in the original. Yourcenar’s essay on Caillois, ‘L ’homme qui aimait les 
pierres’, is included in her posthumous collection o f essays En pelerin et en etranger (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989). On Yourcenar and surrealism, see also her letter to Nicolas Calas (18 February 
1962), in which Yourcenar writes, ‘[je] n’ai jamais ete entramee dans l ’orbite du surrealisme, et [je] 
tends a le considerer comme un mouvement etrangement fausse des son origine’. Marguerite 
Yourcenar: Lettres a ses amis et quelques autres, ed. by Michele Sarde et al (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 
pp. 200-204, (p. 202). In another letter o f the same collection she refers to Breton as a ‘magicien pris 
au piege’; (Letter to Gisele Freund, 30 August 1977, pp. 728-729, p. 728).
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total image. A fundamental similarity can be established between this world and the 
one captured by the cameraman in ‘The Work of Art’. To examine it, I will now turn 
to Benjamin’s suggestion that the image obtained by ‘the cameraman consists of 
multiple fragments which are assembled under a new law’.50
As it is made clear from Benjamin’s comparison between painting and shooting, 
this new law contrasts with that of traditional pictorial representation in that it 
imposes no distance between the work of art and the artist or the viewer, and 
therefore refuses to deliver the totality of the object. This law governs a 
‘representation of reality’ which ‘offers, precisely because of the thoroughgoing 
permeation of reality with mechanical equipment, an aspect of reality which is free of 
all equipment. And that’, writes Benjamin, ‘is what one is entitled to ask from a work 
of art.’51 Here, we are invited to ask what this law might be that makes possible a 
non-total assemblage of fragments, but does not fail to satisfy the modem viewer’s 
desire for authenticity in the image.
Another celebrated essay by Benjamin, already mentioned in Chapter 2, ‘The 
Task of the Translator’, can help us furnish a preliminary answer to that question by 
opening a new perspective. In this essay, written in 1923, Benjamin discusses 
translation as a type of philosophical work whose aim is to let the primordial 
relationship between the language of the original and that of the translation appear as 
a ‘kinship’ that encompasses all languages and is therefore situated beyond history. 
He writes:
All suprahistorical kinship o f languages rests in the intention underlying each 
language as a whole -  an intention, however, which no single language can attain by 
itself but which is realized only by the totality o f their intentions supplementing each 
other: pure language. W hile all individual elements o f foreign languages -  words, 
sentences, structure - are mutually exclusive, these languages supplement one another 
in their intentions. Without distinguishing the intended object from the mode of 
intention, no firm grasp o f this basic law o f a philosophy o f language can be 
achieved.52
50 See n. 32, this chapter.
51 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art’, p. 227.
52 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Task o f the Translator’, in Illuminations, pp. 70-82, (p. 74-75).
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‘The law of a philosophy of language’ is relevant to the law under which multiple 
fragments are assembled by the cameraman in the ‘Work of Art’ essay. To be sure, 
translation as an intralinguistic, or even metalinguistic, activity is essentially different 
from the act of literary or artistic representation. Nonetheless, Benjamin considers 
translation as a special form of reproduction, during which a new fragment, the 
translation, is created alongside, and owing to, another fragment, namely, the original 
piece of literature. It follows from the passage quoted above that these fragments can 
be assembled into a new entity, the ‘greater’ or ‘pure’ language, die reine Sprache, 
which is now described as the ‘totality of the intentions’ of all languages. Benjamin 
explains what this process of assembling consists of, using the well-known analogy 
of the vessel:
Fragments o f a vessel which are to be articulated together must follow one another in 
the smallest details, although they need not be like one another. In the same way a 
translation, instead o f making itself similar to the meaning o f the original, must 
lovingly and in detail, in its own language, form itself according to the manner of 
meaning o f the original, to make both recognisable as the broken parts o f the greater 
language, just as fragments are the broken parts o f a vessel.53
A number of issues may be raised with regard to this aspect of Benjamin’s theory of 
language, not least of all the question of its theological provenance and undertones. 
In his essay on Benjamin’s ‘Task of the Translator’, Paul de Man, drawing from an 
book by Gershom Scholem and an article by Carl Jacobs, points out that the image of 
the broken vessel originates from the Lurianic Kabbalah.54 The theological question 
and its specific Judaic parameters will inevitably permeate my discussion about the 
law that governs the assemblage of fragments into a new primordial entity, but they 
will have to remain outside my immediate context of reference. Besides, the 
importance of de Man’s commentary on the analogy of the vessel can be
53 I am using here Andrew Benjamin’s translation -  slightly amended to maintain syntactical 
consistency - for reasons that will become clear immediately. Andrew Benjamin, Translation and the 
Nature o f  Philosophy (Routledge: London, 1989), p. 100.
54 De Man, ‘Conclusions’, p. 90. De Man refers to: Gershom Scholem, The M essianic Idea in Judaism  
(New York: Shocken Books, 1971); and Carol Jacobs, ‘The Monstrosity o f Translation’, Modern 
Language Notes, Vol. 90, No 6, (Dec., 1975), pp. 755-766, (p. 763).
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demonstrated in philosophical terms alone. De Man sees through the totalistic 
impulse which led to errors in the English translation of Benjamin’s essay, a 
translation which suggests that the vessel is fully re-constructible and thus affirms the 
concept of pre-lapsarian unity of language (the Babel myth). He points out some of 
translator Harry Zohn’s slips and then argues that the analogy of the vessel serves the 
idea of an original and perpetual dislocation of language:
What we have here is an initial fragmentation; any work is totally fragmented in 
relation to this reine Sprache, with which it has nothing in common, and every 
translation is a fragment, is breaking the fragment -  so the vessel keeps breaking, 
constantly -  and never reconstitutes it; there was no vessel in the first place, or we 
have no knowledge o f the vessel, or no awareness, no access to it, so for all intents 
and purposes there has never been one.55
De Man’s attempt to inscribe Benjamin’s philosophy of language into the context of 
poststructuralist linguistic theory is convincing. He explains that ‘The Task of the 
Translator’ by no means establishes the existence of a (natural, rational or dialectic) 
relationship between the linguistic fragment and ‘pure language’. On the contrary,
despite what he calls ‘tropological errors’ in Benjamin’s essay (by which he means
figures of speech implying a closure of meaning - including the simile of the vessel 
itself), the German original text explains beyond any doubt the discrepancy between 
‘Gemeinte’ and ‘Art des Meinens’.56 This means that language as such is essentially 
different from its topical instantiations in actual writing and cannot be reduced to 
them. Writing is a process of reproduction of fragments whose assemblage does not 
amount to any totality.
This conclusion answers to some extent my question regarding the nature of the 
law that governs a non-total assemblage of fragments. This law is specific to the 
work of the translator, whose task is ‘lovingly and in detail’ to maintain the 
differential relationship that exists between linguistic fragments and language in its 
pure, formal state. Benjamin suggests that the translator processes the original text in
55 De Man, ‘Conclusions’, p. 91.
56 De Man, ‘Conclusions’, p. 87.
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57such a way that it retains its quality as logos, but loses its capacity to mean. He 
gives the example of Holderlin’s translations of Sophocles which, de Man writes, 
‘are absolutely literal, word by word, and which are therefore totally unintelligible;
5 58what comes out is completely incomprehensible, completely undoes the sentence’. 
Literal translation is therefore a form of distortion of the original, which is already 
distorted in relation to pure language, since it is contaminated with intentionality. 
Following the logic of this argument, it is plausible to say that translation is a 
corrective distortion, for it calls our attention to language per se -  a movement which 
is missing from the original text with its disproportionate emphasis on meaning. In 
that respect, translation resembles camera work which, as we saw, effects an illusion 
of second degree: by distorting an already distorted representation it produces an 
image of pure reality which, like the always broken vessel, is itself an illusion. Just as 
pure reality depends on the cinematic image so that it may ‘exist’ only as its missing 
signified, so pure language needs translation so that it may be posited as the illusion 
of the unity of languages.
The world that this double distortion makes it possible to see is one where the 
aporia between the specific contaminated fragment and totality in its pure state 
becomes evident. Paul de Man describes this world and its existential and historical 
dimensions in poignant terms: ‘Now it is this motion, this errancy of language that 
never reaches the mark, which is always displaced in relation to what it meant to 
reach, it is this errancy of language, this illusion of life that is only an afterlife, that 
Benjamin calls history.’59 I have already referred to this controversial passage, in the 
context of my discussion on authenticity and history, in the previous chapter. I then 
expressed reservations with respect to de Man’s concept of the a-historicity of the
57 Benjamin writes: ‘In the realm o f translation, too, the words ev apxr] rjv o Xoyoq (in the beginning 
was the word) apply.’ The logos corresponds to language proper which Benjamin sharply distinguishes 
here from the expressive / communicative function o f language. Benjamin, ‘The Task o f the 
Translator’, p. 79.
58 De Man, ‘Conclusions’, p. 88.
59 De Man, ‘Conclusions’, p. 92.
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subject and I explained why I thought there was a discrepancy between his and 
Yourcenar’s perceptions of authenticity. This important point aside, it is now 
possible to understand better the affinity between Benjamin’s analogy of the vessel, 
de Man’s interpretation of it, and Yourcenar’s realism. Yourcenar’s narrative 
conforms to the same ‘law of assembling fragments’ to which Benjamin first referred 
in relation to the cinematic technique and of which de Man also was aware in his 
reading of Benjamin’s translation essay. In the case of Yourcenar, this law applies 
both at the level of writerly technique and at the level of the topics she chose to 
explore, insofar as her narrative can be metaphorized as a process of collection of 
ruins. Whether they may be the ruins of personal or historical past or the ruins of 
realism itself, they constitute fragments whose assemblage does not amount to any 
form of reality or authenticity in the traditional sense.
Following the simile of the fragmented vessel, we may choose to read 
Yourcenar’s fiction negatively, as an inventory of ruins, that is, of idle, nonfunctional 
signs pointing to a putatively original state that has existed only in people’s 
imagination. The harmonious proportions of this inventory -  namely, the classical 
structure of Yourcenar’s narratives, for which she has been many times praised and 
sometimes derided -  simply convey the idea that, in modernity, there is still only one 
way to write or make art: representation cannot rid itself from the mimetic principle 
and can at best refer to what cannot be represented in a negative way. However, it is 
also possible to read Yourcenar’s fiction positively, following the paradigm of the 
movie camera. Like the invisible cameraman, she strives to achieve the effect of 
absolute realism and thus to rectify the reader’s vision by demonstrating reality’s 
illusory character. Devoid of nostalgia or hope of re-instating the putative 
authenticity of the real, she contends herself with describing the traces of a past 
which can only be hypothesized or posited. In that, her work is comparable to 
Cavafy’s poetic transformation of the ruins of Hellenistic Alexandria and Piranesi’s 
depiction of the ruins of Rome. She also shares with them the ambition of
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pinpointing the existence of the original work of art in the ruin and that of the ruin in 
the original work of art. Thus, as I explained in the previous chapter, she establishes a 
new, authentically referential relationship, not between the work of art and what it is 
supposed to symbolize, but between the ruins and the forces (‘time’, the ‘absent 
cause’, ‘initial fragmentation’...) that produce these ruins.
The paradigm of translation
It is no coincidence that both Yourcenar and Benjamin use the imagery of Greek and 
Roman antiquities to evoke a difference of ontological nature. It is the difference 
between, on the one hand, fragments, which are available to us as promises of a 
totality that they never deliver, and on the other, the totality itself that exceeds the 
sum of these fragments. Benjamin’s broken vessel certainly constitutes the 
paradigmatic image illustrating this difference, especially in the context of the theory 
of translation and its philosophical expansions. But Yourcenar as a writer of 
historical fiction has enacted this difference, by working with fragments of the past 
(e.g. in a literal sense, the little that remains from emperor Hadrian’s writings) and 
producing new works that are themselves fragments. The originarily fragmentary 
character of Yourcenar’s fiction is especially pronounced in the case of Memoires, a 
novel that never aspires to the unifying narrative of history and which owes part of its 
‘authenticity’ to additional narrative elements and references that cannot be proven 
scientifically to be authentic. It could be argued that in writing historical fiction, 
Yourcenar acts not as an original writer - for such a role would not be consistent with 
the primacy of reconstruire over construire, as I have discussed, -  but as a translator, 
in Benjamin’s sense; rather than interpreting the remains of the past in such a way as 
to create a new historical narrative (which would be the equivalent of creative 
translation, the translation of meanings and authorial intentions, rejected by
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Benjamin), she offers new fragmented narratives alongside the older ones. She thus 
manages to make visible the difference that exists between these individual stories 
and the grand narratives that serve as the basis of historical interpretation.
In T he  Task of the Translator’, Benjamin specifies that translators enact, rather 
than produce, the differential relationship between linguistic fragment and language 
proper: ‘[Translation] cannot possibly reveal or establish this hidden relationship 
itself; but it can represent it by realizing it in embryonic or intensive form.’60 
Yourcenar, on the other hand, describes clearly the process of writing Memoires 
d ’Hadrien as an exercise in a form of translation that is very close to Benjamin’s 
definition. In ‘Ton et langage dans le roman historique’, an essay in which she 
examined questions of authenticity in the reproduction of the ‘voice’ of a historical 
period, she asked:
Mais en quelle langue avais-je suppose qu’Hadrien, bilingue, me dictait ses 
Memoires ? Tantot en latin, sans doute, et tantot en grec, ce qui m ’offrait un certain 
jeu. II y a pourtant des moments oii, par inadvertance, je lui ai fait parler le fran^ais de 
mon temps.61
To write that Hadrien was dictating his memoirs to Yourcenar, and in Latin too, is 
perhaps for her to exaggerate the idea of empathetic identification between writer and 
main fictional character, so subtly explored in the ‘Carnets de notes de Memoires 
d ’Hadrien . Nevertheless, this is still a metaphor of considerable theoretical interest. 
Yourcenar implies that her novel can be seen as a translation from Greek and Latin 
into French, with only sporadic bits of what we would conventionally recognize as 
original literature. As a device to promote the idea of the genuineness of Memoires, 
this would be too obvious and naive. Besides, Yourcenar clarifies in just the 
paragraph that follows the above quotation that she would not object to the 
description of her novel as ''memoires imaginaires’ ,62 The point of presenting
60 Benjamin, ‘The Task o f the Translator’, p. 73.
61 EM, p. 296. ‘Ton et langage dans le roman historique’ (written 1972), is included in Le Temps, ce 
grand sculpteur.
62 EM, p. 297.
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Memoires as a translation and indeed as a play with languages ( ‘un certain jeu ’), is to 
recognize it as a supplement to the literary and scholarly bibliography which 
Yourcenar meticulously appended at the end of the book -  a rare and significant 
move for a work of fiction. The novel thus stands self-consciously as a fragment 
among other linguistic fragments, as the outcome of a metalinguistic play whose 
essence is not located only in its meaning but also in its structure and process.
As if to prove the fundamentally unoriginal and essentially linguistic character of 
her text as translation, Yourcenar puts it to the ultimate translation test, namely back 
translation. She writes:
J’eus l’occasion de verifier comme a l ’aide d’une pierre de touche l ’authenticite d’un 
autre passage. Un professeur demanda a ses eleves de traduire en grec (j’aimerais 
pouvoir dire retraduire) la page de l ’empereur qui decrit l’etat d’atonie qui suivit chez 
lui la mort d’Antinoiis. Je m ’obligeais a faire de meme. Immediatement, des addenda 
d’un ton plus modeme devinrent aussi visibles que le platre qui rejointoie deux 
fragments de statue.63
The similarity between the images that Yourcenar and Benjamin use to illustrate the 
work of translation, namely, the fragments of a statue and the fragments of a vessel, 
is indeed striking. As a writer, Yourcenar pieces together fragments of the source 
languages and fragments of the target language, in a manner which is very similar to 
that of what Benjamin calls a ‘genuine translator’.64 The experiment of back 
translation serves to make visible the difference between languages, as the metaphor 
of the platre clearly shows. Just like the plaster used by the archaeologist helps 
identify broken pieces of a statue as parts of a larger whole, so the French addenda 
used by Yourcenar in the process of translation are essential in making all linguistic 
fragments recognizable as parts of language as such. The metaphor of the platre 
brings Yourcenar as a translator very close to Benjamin’s injunction that both the
63 EM, p. 296, emphasis in the original.
64 This expression is in Benjamin, ‘The Task o f the Translator’, p. 76.
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original and the translation must be made ‘recognisable as the broken parts of the 
greater language.’65
In line with my argument so far, Andrew Benjamin has attached especial 
importance to the recognizability as such of the fragments of the vessel in Walter 
Benjamin’s analogy. In his essay ‘Walter Benjamin and the Translator’s Task’, he 
argued that the totality to which the different linguistic fragments (including the 
translation itself) refer in order to make themselves recognizable as parts of it is not 
one that precedes them, but one that is posited by them and which is futural in its 
essence.66 The translator’s task consists in showing that present in both the source 
and the target texts is ‘the greater language’, the possibility of a totality which 
contains difference and the promise of ‘a harmony which is the belonging together of 
differences.’67
The ‘pure language’ [. ..] is not a language. It is language. It marks the sameness of 
languages while allowing for their differences. What comes to be released by the 
translator is the language inhering in a language. However it is a language that itself 
cannot be translated, that cannot be put into words. It is the ‘expressionless and 
creative Word’, that was in the beginning.68
The messianic underpinning of this idea is unmistakable, but its significance for 
contemporary critical thought is also made clear by Andrew Benjamin. For my 
current discussion, this idea would mean that the ‘statue’ which Yourcenar attempts 
to assemble with fragments of the past and supplementary parts of the present (le 
platre, les addenda) will not necessarily resemble anything that has existed in the 
past; it will not represent emperor Hadrian or his time, but it will show how that time 
and Yourcenar’s are equally parts and manifestations of a deeper, more permanent
65 See note 53, this chapter, my emphasis here.
66 Andrew Benjamin draws this conclusion after examining the totality o f the ‘greater language’ in 
relation to the kabbalistic doctrine o f Tikkum, the projected harmony o f the world (Andrew Benjamin, 
pp. 99-100). With reference to the totality to which linguistic fragments refer, he concludes that ‘The 
posited reality does not refer back to an archaic reality’ (Andrew Benjamin, p. 101). Further down, he 
refers to ‘the postulated and hence futural vessel’ (Andrew Benjamin, p. 101).
67 Andrew Benjamin, p. 102.
68 Andrew Benjamin, p. 103, emphasis in the original.
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reality which, as I have discussed, is rhetorical and linguistic in nature. Further down, 
I will argue that it is this particular vantage point, which Yourcenar has reached by 
acting as a ‘translator’ rather than a ‘creative writer’, that allowed her to (re)claim the 
authenticity of the voice of Hadrien. Prior to that, I shall attempt a comparison 
between Yourcenar’s concept of time and Walter Benjamin’s concept of the afterlife 
of the literary work. My purpose is to find out whether it is true for Benjamin, as it is 
for Yourcenar, that time, which undoes the literary or aesthetic object, also 
paradoxically creates the possibility of its authentication.
‘L ife’ and ‘afterlife’
A step further than Paul de Man, who showed that the temporality disclosed by 
translation has nothing to do with the one-dimensional myth of Babel, Andrew 
Benjamin distinguishes between two concepts of time operative within Walter 
Benjamin’s theory of translation. One of them corresponds to natural languages while 
the other pertains to the pure or ‘primordial’ language. For his discussion he draws 
from Walter Benjamin’s distinction between the life and the afterlife (leben and 
Uberleben IFortleben lAufleberi) of the literary work in the ‘Task of the Translator’, 
and from a parallel distinction between information and story in the latter’s essay 
‘The Storyteller’. Here is how Andrew Benjamin describes these two temporal 
schemes:
The first is the temporality o f the instant. Information, Benjamin states, ‘lives only at 
the moment’. Information comes into being and passes away. It does not survive. It 
has no after-life. The story however is not closed. It has an after-life because there is 
never a final and fixed interpretation [...] It survives.69
69 Andrew Benjamin, p. 106. The quotation within the quotation is from ‘The Storyteller’, in Walter 
Benjamin, Illuminations, pp. 83-107.
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While in ‘The Task of the Translator’ ‘genuine’ translation has already been 
explicitly linked with the afterlife of the literary work, Andrew Benjamin specifies 
that the concept of afterlife pertains to a utopian reality in which, as we saw, 
difference survives within sameness and totality is possible beyond essentialism. This 
reality presupposes that there is no original language, no original moment of creation 
and identity. Thus, it cannot be reduced to the domain of meaning, of artistic 
intention and of the autonomy of the text, which correspond, in Andrew Benjamin’s 
distinction, to the linear temporality of the instant. This utopian reality, which is not 
about the triumph of reconciliation over conflict, in effect depends on fragmentation 
and contains it. This is the reason why the translator is charged with the task of 
making visible both the similarities and the discrepancies between languages. 
Bringing together the interrelated issues of the recognizability of the fragment and the 
ontology and temporality of language, Andrew Benjamin concludes with the 
following statement:
The belonging together o f languages, the fragments o f the vessel, posit that which 
makes them recognizable as ‘broken parts o f the same language’. A recognition which 
itself depends upon the impossibility o f reducing, either temporally or ontologically, 
the primordial to the simple instant. In other words it depends upon maintaining the 
distinction between the pragmatic use o f language -  language instantiated -  and the 
‘greater language’.70
Expanding on the concept of the afterlife of the literary work, Andrew Benjamin is 
concerned here with the delineation of a new area and a new possibility of 
interpretation, which he calls ‘the primordial’. By stressing that the primordial is not 
reducible to the instant, he marks the difference between the object of interpretation 
and the domain of reference. In the context of Western metaphysics, the object of 
interpretation has been approached tautologically with reference to an original 
moment of identity. This is the world of fixed meanings and fulfilled intentions, 
which, as we know, has proved to be devoid of authenticity. Nevertheless, Andrew
70 Andrew Benjamin, p. 107.
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Benjamin implies, the object of interpretation can also be approached differentially, 
with reference to a linguistic totality that allows for the object’s fragmentariness. 
This possibility of interpretation is revealed through the process of translation, which 
can now be thought either literally, as it is by Walter Benjamin, or metaphorically, in 
the context of poststructural criticism.
The philosophical strength of Andrew Benjamin’s argument lies not so much in 
questioning essentialism (this is rather the premise of his theory) as in trying to think 
an alternative platform for valid interpretation, based on the temporality of the story 
and the afterlife of the literary work. This is a bold effort and Andrew Benjamin is 
keen to emphasize its significance for European philosophy. He goes as far as to 
claim that Walter Benjamin’s work ‘opens up the possibility of thinking philosophy 
and translation [...] in terms, on the one hand of the overcoming of Platonism and on 
the other within the wake of the critique of the Enlightenment project.’71 The quest 
for a valid frame of reference and its implications for contemporary criticism is of 
course central to my thesis. I will now turn to Yourcenar’s concept of time to 
examine whether she, acting as a translator, has attempted to think the temporality of 
the literary or artistic work in terms analogous to those of Walter Benjamin and 
Andrew Benjamin.
Yourcenar comes close to the notion of the afterlife in ‘Le Temps, ce grand 
sculpteur’. Let me quote here the opening paragraph of this essay:
Le jour ou une statue est terminee, sa vie, en un sens, commence. La premiere etape 
est franchie, qui, par les soins du sculpteur, l’a menee du bloc a la forme humaine ; 
une seconde etape, au cours des siecles, a travers des alternatives d’adoration, 
d’admiration, d’amour, de mepris ou d’indifference, par degres successifs d’erosion et 
d’usure, le ramenera peu a peu a l ’etat de mineral informe auquel l ’avait soustrait son 
sculpteur.72
The first thing to note is that Yourcenar refers to the aesthetic object, not to the 
literary work. But there is no reason why the notion of afterlife should not apply to
71 Andrew Benjamin, p. 107.
72 EM, p. 312.
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any form of cultural production. If every form of artistic representation has its 
grammar and syntax, then all artefacts have an afterlife during which, just like
9 73literary works, they become more and more expressive of a ‘greater language’.
More importantly, Yourcenar does not refer to the afterlife but, simply, to the life 
of the statue. Does this discrepancy involve a different form of temporality from that 
of the afterlife of the literary work? Walter Benjamin’s text implies that it does not. 
In ‘The Task of the Translator’, he uses the terms ‘continued life’ and ‘afterlife’ of 
works of art to describe a very similar idea to what Yourcenar in her essay has termed 
‘life’ - la vie. ‘The history of the great works of art tells us about their antecedents, 
their realization in the age of the artist, their potentially eternal afterlife in succeeding 
generations. Where this last manifests itself, it is called fame.’74 It may be still 
objected that, while for Yourcenar the life of a statue begins at the moment of its 
completion, for Benjamin the afterlife of a work of art is only experienced by future 
generations of viewers. In fact, Benjamin insists that only when a literary work has
nc
reached the age of its fame is its translation possible. However, it follows from 
Yourcenar’s formulation above ( ‘au cours des siecles’) that her concept of the life of 
a work of art also extends over a long time perspective. It also becomes abundantly 
clear in the course of her essay that she is interested in the slow or abrupt 
transformations through which works of art go after they have reached their age of 
‘fame’ - to use Benjamin’s term. The question therefore remains to what extent 
Yourcenar’s concept of life coincides with Benjamin’s concept of afterlife.
If Walter Benjamin distinguishes between the life and the afterlife of the work of 
art, Yourcenar distinguishes between the creation of the artefact and its life. There is 
a parallel between the two earlier stages and between the two later stages, although it
73 In ‘The Task o f the Translator’, Walter Benjamin concedes that non-linguistic modes of 
representation also convey a hidden significance relevant to the expression o f the nature o f life itself. 
He writes that non-linguistic life, ‘in its analogies and symbols, can draw on other ways o f suggesting
meaning than intensive -  that is, anticipative, intimating -  realization’, (p. 73).
74 Benjamin, ‘The Task o f the Translator’, p. 72.
75 Benjamin, ‘The Task o f the Translator’, p. 72.
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is not exact, as we just saw. To avoid a confusion of terms, especially since ‘life’ 
means a different thing for Benjamin and for Yourcenar, I shall approach this issue 
schematically.
a) The con cep t o f  ‘life  ’ in B en jam in  a n d  that o f  the crea tion  o f  the w ork  o f  a r t in 
Yourcenar.
For Walter Benjamin, the life of a work of art is the period of its ‘realization’. 
Andrew Benjamin links it with the temporality of the instant and with that of the 
information. As such, ‘life’ is characterized by closure of meaning and finitude of 
interpretation. It refers to a primordial moment of ex n ih ilo  creation, which affirms 
the self-identity of life. Time emanates as a linear phenomenon from the moment of 
creation, always asserting the latter’s primacy. But in reality ‘life’ can only postulate 
that primordial moment, thus undermining the legitimacy of the authority that it 
draws from it.
On the other hand, for Yourcenar, the creation of the work of art follows the 
logic and the temporality of the symbol, as I pointed out in the previous chapter. 
Always necessarily a hostage to meaning, to artistic intention and interpretation, the 
work of art aspires to impose order over chaos and stabilize time. The temporality of 
the symbol is that of the linguistic sign: the eternal repetition of the same origin of 
signification.
Benjamin’s concept of ‘life’ as well as Yourcenar’s concept of the creation of the 
work of art are equally characterized by inauthentic temporality, in de M an’s sense of 
the term. In these concepts, time exists only as simultaneity (the eternal repetition of 
the same) or spatiality (a line, excluding all other dimensions). Moreover, from an 
ontological perspective, both Yourcenar’s and Benjamin’s concepts bear the mark of 
essentialism. For Benjamin, meaning is supposed to be essentially present in the 
‘original’ literary work for as long as the latter is ‘alive’, that is, not susceptible to 
genuine translation. Similarly, in Yourcenar’s scheme, at the moment of the creation
1 5 5
Chapter 3 -  Cultural Modernity
and Narrative Authenticity
of the work of art, an essential relationship is arbitrarily assumed to exist between the 
work and that which it intends to represent.
b) The con cep t o f  ‘afterlife  ’ in B enjam in  a n d  that o f  the life o f  the w ork  o f  a rt in 
Yourcenar.
For Walter Benjamin, the afterlife of a literary work is the open-ended period when 
the work is less charged with semantic associations and is delivered to history as a 
linguistic fragment among others. It is then that a literary work becomes really 
translatable. Benjamin stressed that the translatability of a literary work at the age of 
its ‘afterlife’ is a manifestation of the essence of language. In his commentary, 
Andrew Benjamin added that essence should not be understood as identity, but as the 
belonging together of differences. This is not a metaphysical state that precedes the 
literary work, but the actual state in which it is always already thrown. If this is so, 
then every piece of literature, including translations, draws its authority and 
authenticity solely from other pieces of literature. This, we may recall, is the 
function of allegory, in de M an’s essay ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’. Every 
fragment of language exists in an authentically temporal relationship with other 
fragments, and meaning is constantly (re-)produced and denied within a state of 
differential plurality.77
Walter Benjamin’s concept of afterlife thus proves to be similar to Yourcenar’s 
concept of the life of the work of art. Indeed, in the previous chapter we saw that,
76 This is the meaning o f Walter Benjamin’s statement that translations o f works which have reached 
the age o f their fame ‘do not so much serve the [original] work as owe their existence to it’. Benjamin, 
‘The Task o f the Translator’, p. 72.
77 Benjamin’s perception o f the temporality o f the symbol and the allegory is therefore not 
fundamentally different from de Man’s. According to Menninghaus, ‘for [...]  Benjamin the sym bol’s 
temporal form is “momentary totality”; the temporal form of allegory is “progression in a series of 
moments” or, to use another term, “history”’. Winfried Menninghaus, ‘Walter Benjamin’s Theory of 
Myth’, in Gary Smith (ed.), On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections (Cambridge, MA: 
M.I.T. Press, 1988), p. 292-325, (p. 313). Menninghaus quotes from Benjamin’s Trauerspiel (1928), 
published in English as Walter Benjamin, The Origin o f  the German Tragic D ram a , trans. by John 
Osborne (London: Verso 2003).
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once delivered to time and history, the work of art lives an authentically temporal 
existence. Only then does it begin to be free from its symbolic content and, thanks to 
its successive transformations in time, it lends itself to an unstable, open-ended 
process of interpretations. Through these transformations, the work of art 
progressively loses its original semantic charge and comes to represent the 
differential and temporal state in which it exists. Left to time, it expresses a 
primordial state of non-identity in the same way that the linguistic fragment 
expresses the ‘greater language’.
It is no surprise that Yourcenar looks no further than the word ‘life’ to name that 
stage in the existence of the work of art which Benjamin calls afterlife. We know that 
she used the term le vecu to describe the fleeting and sinuous aspects of existence 
that escape systematization and ideology.78 Because le vecu cannot be categorized in 
terms of identity, it is devoid of essence. Therefore it cannot be accepted as a valid 
term by essentialist philosophy for which only entities that are identical to themselves 
actually live.79 Walter Benjamin, who is certainly not an essentialist, has nevertheless 
followed this traditional definition when he used ‘life’ to describe only the early, 
more rigid stages of the existence of the literary work. Yourcenar does not make the 
same concession. Following a process of inversion of values, she assigns life to 
entities that were previously thought to be ontologically dead, such as the decaying 
sculpture with its constant leakage of meaning. By the same token, she discerns the
78 For instance, in Chapter 1 o f my thesis, I quoted Yourcenar’s critique against ‘ce durcissement, ce 
dessechement du vecu au profit d ’ideologies regnantes’, in her interviews with de Rosbo (see Chapter 
1, n. 4 o f the present thesis).
79 The priority o f life over essence, and o f becoming over being is, of course, a typically Nietzschean 
theme. While this is not the place to examine Yourcenar’s Nietzschean roots, her concept o f vie and le 
vecu can still be linked with N ietzsche’s philosophy. If indeed, as I am arguing here, Yourcenar’s 
concept o f ‘life’ corresponds in many respects to Benjamin’s ‘afterlife’, then it can be understood as 
‘an ontology not o f stasis but o f becom ing’, as Andrew Benjamin writes. Andrew Benjamin explicitly 
discusses this non-essentialist ontology in terms o f the Nietzschean project o f overcoming Platonism  
(Andrew Benjamin, pp. 105, 107).
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lack of life there where previously it was thought that life was encapsulated, that is, 
in the freshly created work of art, with its excess of symbolic value.
This re-definition of ‘life’ certainly mirrors Yourcenar’s heroic attempt to save 
the possibility of authenticity in literature, in art as well as in the terms of actual 
existence. However, if ‘life’ and ‘authenticity’ mark a departure from essentialist 
philosophy, they do not indicate that an end should be put to the quest for the 
essential. On the contrary, thinking in terms of life and authenticity enables 
Yourcenar to search for the essential not as perennial truth, but as something that is 
transformed, constantly translated over time. At a more abstract level, the inversion 
of the semantic content of life and authenticity in the context of irony allows us to 
redefine the essential as the possibility of translation. As Andrew Benjamin pointed 
out -  and this is equally valid for Yourcenar as it is for Walter Benjamin -  the 
introduction of the parameter of time through the practice of translation ‘works to 
redefine the essential nature of the object of interpretation [...] The essential is re­
expressed in terms o f translatability' .80 This means that artistic or literary 
representation does not, in itself, contain any degree of truth, and exists always in 
reference to other artefacts that precede it or follow it. But it also means that truth 
inheres in successive ephemeral representations, just as language inheres in 
individual literary works and their translations. It is this last point that makes 
authentic representation possible for both Walter Benjamin and Yourcenar, despite 
the inaccessibility of truth.
80 Andrew Benjamin, p. 90, my emphasis.
158
Chapter 3 -  Cultural Modernity
and Narrative Authenticity
Translation, authentication
This positive moment in the quest for authenticity accounts for Yourcenar’s 
confidence when she attempts to identify Hadrien’s voice among the many ‘voices’ 
or fragments that she collects from the past and the present. To achieve this, she 
begins by rejecting the injunction of approximating the historical character as he 
‘really’ was, and of offering the resulting work as a true representation. This means 
that she does not set herself the impossible task of the historian, which is to depict 
accurately a historical era; neither does she take up the role of the historical 
biographer, which is to ‘bring back to life’ a personality. By occupying the vantage 
point of a translator, her aim is to bring together past representations - including 
those by historians, biographers, visual artists and so on - and to create a new portrait 
which is authenticated by the very recognizability of its heterogeneous constitutive 
parts. To these parts, Yourcenar adds distinct elements of her own time and mentality 
and creates an image that is less the true reflection of a historical person than a 
version of his portrait, consciously situated in the present among other similar past 
and future projects. The validity of this portrait depends equally on factual accuracy 
and the ability to refer to the ‘essential’, variously defined according to modem 
sensitivity as le vecu, time, ‘greater language’, anoriginal difference or that which lies 
beyond representation.
Yourcenar’s aphoristic description of her method: ‘Un pied dans l’erudition, 
l’autre dans la magie’ may be understood along these lines.81 Magie implies the 
imagined absence of mediation between author and fictional character. This 
immediacy is only explicable with reference to that other ‘essential’ reality, which 
cannot be captured in isolated literary texts, but has to be searched intertextually. The
81 ✓In the ‘Carnets de notes de M emoires d ’HadrierC, OR, p. 526.
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Yourcenarian intertext does not only consist of the corpus of original sources and 
historical, biographical, literary, etc. texts which are relevant thematically and 
linguistically to her historical fiction; it also includes the large amount of paratextual 
material that accompanies her work -  prefaces, postfaces, carefully edited interviews, 
notes, commentaries as well as the annotations written by Yourcenar for the Pleiade 
edition. It is in these segments, such as the passage on erudition and magie quoted 
above, that we find her most direct analyses of her discursive techniques and
rhetorical strategies, and they consciously work to disrupt the compactness of her
82realist fiction.
It has been argued that Yourcenar’s empathetic identification with her fictional 
or historical characters stems from her quasi-mystical ability to transcend and 
reconcile differences between the self and the Other on an ethical basis. By way of 
example, Edith Marcq, in her essay ‘L’Empathie ou une maniere d’ecriture 
yourcenarienne’, claimed that Yourcenar approached her fictional characters through 
a psychomental process of identification. Marcq’s well-researched study is structured 
along the ethical opposition between le Moi and VAutre. Her ethical viewpoint 
accounts, in my opinion, for her paper’s failure to explain how the gap between the 
two is actually bridged, except by evoking Yourcenar’s compassion and an ill- 
defined concept of mystique supposedly at work in the act of narrating.83 I am 
suggesting instead that this process of identification is neither ethical, nor of course 
mystical, but existential in character. Identification is rather the result of a knowing
82 It is therefore more useful to read Yourcenar’s paratext as part o f her work rather than against it. 
The latter approach has unfortunately been adopted in Beatrice N ess’s 1991 essay ‘Le succes 
Yourcenar: verite et mystification’. Compelled to answer the implied dilemma of her essay’s title, 
Ness interprets paratextual information in the traditional Genettian sense o f a -  dishonest (?) - attempt 
to manipulate readerly reception and ensure the fulfilment o f authorial intention. I suggest that the 
answer lies rather in the narrative interplay between ‘truth’ and ‘mystification’ as legitimate devices 
for conveying the complexity o f both the represented situations and the act o f writing itself. Beatrice 
Ness, ‘Le succes Yourcenar: verite et mystification’, in The French Review, Vol. 64, No 5. (Apr. 
1991), pp. 794-803.
83 Edith Marcq, ‘L’empathie ou une maniere d ’ecriture yourcenarienne’, in Jean Philippe Beaulieu et 
al. (eds), M arguerite Yourcenar, Ecritures de Vautre (Quebec: XYZ, 1997), pp. 265-277.
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acceptation of what already exists - in this case, the sources cited by Yourcenar, from 
the Historia Augusta, to Hadrian’s statue at the British Museum, to Piranesi’s 
drawings of the Villa Adriana to more recent iconography and bibliography available 
to her. Acceptation, in the sense that Yourcenar gives to the term, implies identifying 
and embracing the existent ‘source texts’ despite their incompleteness and failures, 
and manipulating them in such a way as to produce a historically updated ‘target text’ 
where differences continue to survive. By that token, acceptation is a form of 
translation and translation is a form of acceptation. They both describe a writerly 
technique of appropriating and re-working the past with the aim of identifying what 
exists authentically in time. We have seen how Yourcenar has recognized this 
technique in various artists and writers, from Piranesi to Thomas Mann. I have also 
discussed how she imagined Hadrien implementing this technique at the level of 
politics but also at that of subjectivity and existence. By comparing her own method 
of writing to translation, Yourcenar intimates that she considers herself as a member 
of that pantheon of artists, writers, poets and fictional characters, united in their 
ability to locate authenticity in the acceptance of difference.
The example which I mentioned above of the ‘back translation’ of an excerpt 
from Memoires d ’Hadrien is most illuminating as to how Yourcenar would decide on 
the authenticity of a character’s voice. We saw that she realized that some of her text 
could not have been ‘spoken’ by Hadrien, especially not in Greek. In this particular 
example, the untranslatable text is an emotionally charged phrase consisting of seven 
words: ‘d ’un mouvement sauvage, insense et doux\ Properly speaking, the inclusion 
of these words should undermine the authenticity of the novel, insofar as the latter 
purports to be spoken by the emperor himself. Thus, Yourcenar writes,
Le lecteur demandera alors pourquoi je ne les fais pas enlever. Parce que 
1’impression, sinon l’expression, me semble authentique, et parce que je pense de 
1’inexactitude a peu pres ce que l’empereur, d’apres moi, pensait du risque, c ’est-a- 
dire que, toutes precautions prises, il convient de lui faire sa part.84
84 EM, p. 297, emphasis by the author.
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The authenticity of Memoires is therefore affirmed, rather than challenged, by the 
inclusion of that small inaccuracy. Aware that her account can never be fully 
legitimate, Yourcenar reclaims part of the lost authenticity by being explicit about her 
text’s foreignness. She does not do so within the realist text, which, like film at 
Benjamin’s time, must be seamless in order to operate as complete distortion of 
reality, in the sense that I discussed above. But in her essays and paratext, Yourcenar 
is keen to scratch the surface and let the artificiality of her ‘realist’ constructions 
appear. In the case in question, she wants us to be aware that the seven-word phrase 
constitutes an addition to the original message of the novel, and that other criteria 
than exactitude and imitation have been employed. The foreignness of these seven 
words challenges the putative nativeness of the narrator’s voice. This modem 
‘supplement’ to the ‘translation’ of the voice of Hadrien disrupts the spatiotemporal 
unity of the narrative and affirms its fragmentary character. Thus, Yourcenar engages, 
rather than constructs, the reader’s complicity by presenting the literary text as a 
translation of an imagined monologue which comprises a number of foreign textual 
elements. If the novel can no longer purport to be authentic as original representation, 
it can nevertheless claim to be authentic as translation. As such, it has no unique 
origin, it is open to interpretation and itself constitutes one possible interpretation 
among many. Because foreignness is an integral part of it, the novel as translation 
inhabits more than one place; moreover, it exists properly in time, being by its nature 
finite and posterior to its source text. Thus, through a process of controlled 
distortions that can best be paralleled with the process of translation, Yourcenar 
manages to create an authentic space and time for Memoires d ’Hadrien.
Before concluding, it must be mentioned that in the autobiographical trilogy Le 
Labyrinthe du monde, where the conventions of realism are more loosely 
implemented, Yourcenar occasionally interrupts the narrative and exposes her 
method of reconstructing the past, thus knowingly undermining the ‘authenticity’ of 
her narrative from inside the text. An example is at the beginning of the chapter ‘Rue
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Marais’, in Archives du Nord, where Yourcenar admits that she does not know what 
kind of people the villagers around her family chateau in Flandre were. She 
nevertheless proceeds to visualize one of them, Frangoise Leroux, ‘a force de 
sympathie imaginative’.85 As in the case of Hadrien, the universal referent that 
enables this identification is a reality that lies beyond representation, in which all 
people participate: ‘Elle [i.e. Frant^oise Leroux] est comme nous tous dans 
1’inextricable et 1’ineluctable’.86
Yourcenar questions her method more profoundly in Quoi? V e tem ite , the last 
part of the trilogy, when she discusses the authenticity of the portrait that she creates 
of Jeanne, a family friend and the central female character of the book. She accepts 
that the biographical material about Jeanne that she managed to collect from third 
parties is incomplete.
Mais les propos plus ou moins incomplets ou desultoires de tiers, les recits faits 
distraitement au cours d’une promenade, ou les coudes sur une table desservie, nous 
laissent toujours a court : il faut boucher les trous de la tapisserie, ou rejointoyer les 
fragments de verre brise.87
It is worth noticing how often the analogy with the broken or worn artefact surfaces 
when Yourcenar examines the issue of the validity of representation. In this case, the 
similarity extends to the verb ‘rejointoyer’ which she also uses in the example of 
‘back-translation’ from ‘Ton et langage dans le roman historique’, quoted above. 
This analogy is always reminiscent of Benjamin’s ‘broken vessel’. Exactly like the 
act of translation, the reconstruction of the past consists in collecting fragments and
85 EM, p. 1050. Archives du N ord  is the second part o f Yourcenar’s autobiographical trilogy Le 
Labyrinthe du monde. Marguerite Yourcenar, Archives du Nord  (Paris: Gallimard, 1977).
86 This passage appears to be inaccurately printed in the Pleiade edition (Essais et Memoires, 
Gallimard, 1991), as follows: ‘Elle est comme nous tous dans Vextricable et l’ineluctable’ (p. 1051, 
my emphasis: ‘extricable’ instead o f ‘inextricable’). For this reason I chose to quote from the original 
Gallimard edition o f Archives du Nord  which seems to be more accurate at this point. (See previous 
note, p. 168).
87 EM, p. 1238.
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treating them in such a way as to produce a visibly segmented totality. The tapestry is 
forever worn out and the glass will always look broken.
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Sp a c e , T im e  a n d  t h e  E x is t e n t ia l  S u b je c t : 
Y o u r c e n a r  a n d  H e id e g g e r
Studying Marguerite Yourcenar’s work from the perspective of the contemporary 
critique of representation shows how thoroughly her fiction and criticism are 
infiltrated by a variety of specifically modem themes and preoccupations. This is by 
no means a surprising fact, but, as I pointed out in my introduction, it is one which 
has not been sufficiently stressed by critics so far. This is possibly due to Yourcenar’s 
insistence that her narrative idiom and strongly philosophical concerns do not relate 
directly to any trend either in literature or in philosophy. What is more, her fiction 
and persona have been shrouded in an aura of universality which tends to eclipse 
subtler and, to my mind, more significant aspects of her work, including its topicality 
and historical relevance. Paradoxically, the one element that contributed more 
drastically to this situation is Yourcenar’s resistance to the dominant perception of 
the self as a subject situated opposite the world. It can be argued that her existential 
consideration of the self as an irreducible entity firmly placed in the world should 
have made her wary of the temptation of universality. In this chapter I shall claim that 
Yourcenar’s approach to subjectivity - which accounts for her refusal to commit to 
any particular political or ideological cause - is inextricably linked, theoretically and 
historically, with the existentialist tradition and more specifically with the quest for 
authentic selfhood in the twentieth century.
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Arguably, one thing that philosophers of existence, from Kierkegaard to 
Heidegger, Sartre and Camus, have in common is their unwillingness to use the 
subject-object bipolar opposition in order to make epistemological, historiographical 
and ontological claims. Their rejection of the bodiless and timeless Cartesian ego -  
and, to a qualified extent, of its Platonic origins and Kantian and Hegelian 
transformations -  is indirectly reflected in some major themes in Yourcenar’s work. 
These include the non-ideality of the self, the inability of thought adequately to 
represent the world and the differential effect of time on any attempt to define human 
essence. Other themes, such as the identification with nature especially expressed in 
the writings about animals, the finality of physical death and the adjacent theme of 
bodily desire also show how Yourcenar challenged the putative autonomy of the 
subject to the extent that the very notion of subjectivity becomes difficult to define. 
The reversal of the semantics of authenticity in her work is authorized by the 
privileging of spatio-temporality over ideality and of the existential over the essential 
aspects of selfhood. This is, of course, a typically existentialist move with very 
different meanings for different thinkers.
My purpose in stressing the existentialist implications in Yourcenar’s 
renegotiation of the question of subjectivity is not to categorize her under the 
existentialist tag. Rather, I believe that the historical and intellectual developments of 
the 1920’s, 30’s and 40’s led to the prioritization of the problematic of existence in 
Yourcenar’s fiction and criticism, as they did in the work of many other literary 
figures and, of course, philosophers. In the previous chapter, I suggested that the 
paradoxical concept of narrative and existential authenticity in Yourcenar is closely 
associated with her critique of cultural fragmentation in modernity - a critique which 
dates as early as 1929, the year of ‘Diagnostic de l’Europe’. I would like now to 
focus on a more specific issue. Like the existentialists, Yourcenar went beyond the 
essentialist definition of the subject and attempted to re-think existence in terms of its 
spatial and temporal specificity and unrepeatability. However, this new determination
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of existence is always at risk of being objectified as a new version of a hypothetical 
essential structure of being. The question is therefore whether such existential 
characteristics as temporality, locality, contingency and irreducibility, which are 
present in Yourcenar’s work, contribute to a new definition of the supposedly eternal 
essence of man. In terms of the specific discussion which I am undertaking here, the 
question is whether the paradoxical definition of authenticity as an inescapable state 
of impurity and worldliness truly deconstructs the nostalgia for the authentic as it is 
conventionally understood, or is itself based on it. Despite Yourcenar’s refined use of 
literature as a privileged area for the presentation of non-categorical attributes of 
existence, her contemplative and philosophical stance often invites this question. But 
above all, it is the presumption of universality in her fiction and criticism which 
authorizes not simply this question, but the suspicion that existence remains too 
coherent, too conceptual and too generic a figure in her work. By proposing to 
investigate this possibility, my principal aim is not to show that the problematic of 
subjectivity is only external to Yourcenar’s oeuvre and that deep down this 
problematic remains captive to some metaphysical impulse or pattern. I do not doubt 
her sincerity and insight when she writes that ‘le « moi » est une commodite 
grammaticale, philosophique, psychologique’, and that it is not ‘la personne’ in its 
integrity, but the individual in its inconsistency that she is interested in.1 On the 
contrary, my intention is to examine the ways in which she negotiated with the 
persistence of the metaphysical determination of selfhood in language and in thought, 
and thus to capture a moment in the history of thought as well as in the history of 
French and European literature.
In his 1989 book Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Richard Rorty is concerned 
with the contemporary moral and political dimensions of the clash between
1 See her interview with Claude Servan-Schreiber for Lire, July 1976, reprinted in Maurice Delcroix 
(ed.), M arguerite Yourcenar, Portrait d ’une voix (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), especially pp. 181-82 
where the above quotations are to be found.
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universality and contingency. He uses that opposition to bring about a sharp 
distinction between the public and the private spheres which is, I believe, difficult to 
sustain to the extent that he does. However, on the basis of that opposition, he 
discerns correctly a ‘tension between an effort to achieve self-creation by the 
recognition of contingency and an effort to achieve universality by the transcendence 
of contingency.’2 Throughout the twentieth century, this tension has been operative in 
the area of philosophy, in the sense that philosophers abandoned the quest for 
timeless truths and turned their attention to ‘the sheer contingency of individual 
existence.’3 According to Rorty, this tension has dominated philosophy since Plato, 
in whose writings it takes the form of ‘the quarrel between philosophy and poetry’:
Post-Nietzschean philosophers like Wittgenstein and Heidegger write philosophy in 
order to exhibit the universality and necessity o f the individual and the contingent. 
Both philosophers became caught up in the quarrel between philosophy and poetry 
which Plato began, and both ended by trying to work out honorable terms on which 
philosophy might surrender to poetry.
Here Rorty sums up the still ongoing shift from philosophy to literature, and points 
out the paradox of an ‘un-philosophical’ philosophy that seeks to establish the 
universality of the contingent.
Rorty elaborates this paradox further in a separate chapter of his book where he 
compares Heidegger’s effort to inaugurate a non-conceptual way of philosophizing to 
Proust’s use of narrative to explore concepts and terms which do not lay claim to 
universal validity. He concludes that ‘Heidegger failed where Proust succeeded’, 
because Proust was under no illusion that the terms which he used -  that is, names 
such as ‘Guermantes’, ‘Combray’, ‘Gilberte’ - had any autonomous, universal value.5 
Heidegger, on the other hand, was ‘quite wrong in thinking that there could be a 
universal poem -  something which combined the best features of philosophy and
2 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
p. 25.
3 Rorty, p. 25.
4 Rorty, p. 26.
5 Rorty, p. 118.
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poetry, something which lay beyond both metaphysics and ironism’.6 This criticism 
conveys in broad terms the aporetic aspects of the relationship between literature and 
philosophy and takes into account the continuous temptation to sublimate contingent 
experiences and meanings. In this chapter I shall refine this criticism with especial 
reference to Heidegger and his elaboration of a form of subjectivity with universal 
pretensions, the Dasein. It is in the wider context of this discussion that a comparison 
between Yourcenar and Heidegger becomes possible. In their different capacities, 
they approached literature and philosophy from opposite ends, they were both 
determined to let their work be infiltrated by disciplines which were not homologous 
with their own -  speculative thought, for Yourcenar; poetry, for Heidegger - ,  and yet 
they reached some surprisingly compatible conclusions, as I shall attempt to show.
Space and the existential subject
In Being and Time, the most comprehensive account of Heidegger’s early 
philosophy, the element of contingency is discussed through the existential analytic 
of Dasein. Thoroughly subverting the traditional Cartesian notion of subjectivity, 
Dasein is principally distinguished from that notion by the fact that it is not an 
objectively present entity. Heidegger’s criticism of the Cartesian subject is articulated 
in terms of his distinction between the ontological and the various ontic enquiries 
into existence. He writes that Descartes ‘investigates the “cogitare” of the “ego”, at 
least within certain limits. On the other hand, he leaves the “sum” completely 
undiscussed, even though it is regarded as no less primordial than the cogito\ 
Against the failure on the part of Descartes to investigate existence as such, 
Heidegger then formulates his task as follows:
6 Rorty, p. 119.
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One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an ‘I’ or subject as such that is 
proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein. 
Ontologically, every idea o f a ‘subject’ [...] still posits the subjectum {vnoKeipevov) 
along with it, no matter how vigorous one’s ontical protestations against the ‘soul 
substance’ or the ‘reification o f consciousness’.7
Heidegger is keen to distinguish between the ontological approach to existence and 
the various ontic approaches to ‘subjectivity’, such as the Cartesian ego or ‘soul 
substance’, and the critique of the ‘reification of consciousness’ in sociology. This 
distinction is central to Being and Time and it is based on what Heidegger called the 
ontological difference, that is, the difference between Being and beings. The 
importance of the prioritization by Heidegger of Being over beings is that it opens up 
a space for the study of existence not as a timeless type, but as absolute individuality. 
Heidegger thus wishes to equip philosophy with a new tool on the basis of which 
universally valid statements can be made on contingent states and situations in which 
man can be found.
Being, as the basic theme o f philosophy, is no class or genus o f entities; yet it pertains 
to every entity. Its ‘universality’ is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of 
Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may 
possess. Being is the transcendens pure and simple. And the transcendence of 
Dasein’s being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity o f the 
most radical individuation.9
By the doubly emphasized term transcendens Heidegger implies that Being 
transcends rationalist, empiricist and materialist categorizations. Being is 
transcendental in that it is the condition for the possibility of any classification of 
beings and the condition for the existence of these beings.10 In this way, Heidegger
7 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1988), pp. 71 and 72, emphasis by the author.
8 Lucien Goldmann has proposed that Heidegger’s use o f the phrase ‘reification o f consciousness’ is 
borrowed directly from Lukacs, to whose socio-philosophy, according to Goldmann, Being and Time 
responds. See Lucien Goldmann, Lukacs et H eidegger (Paris: Denoel, 1973), especially pp. 72-73: 
‘Sans nommer Lukacs, [Heidegger] critique son analyse de la reification en nous disant qu’elle a un 
statut socio-historique qui a besoin d ’etre fonde ontologiquement’ (p. 73).
9 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 62, emphasis by the author.
10 Cf. O. C. Thomas, ‘Transcendens is Heidegger’s term for the scholastic transcendia  or universally 
applicable characters’, ‘Being and Some Theologians’, The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 70, No. 
1/2. (Jan. - Apr., 1977), pp. 137-160, (p. 149).
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stresses the paradox of the particular Being of Dasein whose universal attribute is 
spatio-temporal uniqueness. In the first sections of Part I of Being and Time, 
Heidegger is mostly concerned with the spatial parameters of Dasein’s structure, that 
is, with Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, before tackling the issue of Dasein’s 
temporality. I shall first focus on selected aspects of this analysis, with a view to 
drawing specific parallels between it and Yourcenar’s critique of subjectivity and 
conceptual thinking.
Being-in-the-world is, according to Heidegger, one of the most basic states of 
Being and it signifies simply the fact that no entity is encountered on its own, but it 
always exists in a context. Beings, including human beings, do not possess an 
essence that exists autonomously before coming into contact with other entities. 
Heidegger’s discussion of the way in which Dasein exists alongside, and gets to 
know, other beings is of particular importance here, as it reflects to a certain extent 
Yourcenar’s critique of conceptuality. Heidegger is wary of classical epistemology 
which is based on the idea of truth as equation. He regrets the ‘procedure [...] of 
setting up knowing as a “relation between subject and Object” -  a procedure in which 
there is as much “truth” as vacuity’.11 It is tempting already to compare this statement 
with the following passage from Memoires d ’Hadrien:
Sur bien des points, d’ailleurs, la pensee de nos philosophes me semblait elle aussi 
bomee, confuse, ou sterile. Les trois quarts de nos exercices intellectuels ne sont plus 
que broderies sur le vide ; je  me demandais si cette vacuite croissante etait due a un 
abaissement de 1’intelligence ou a un declin du caractere.12
In both Yourcenar’s and Heidegger’s statements, there is awareness that the quest for 
truth is predicated upon abstract terms ( ‘subject’, ‘Object’, ‘broderies sur le vide’) 
with no foundation in the world, thus leaving the questioning being, Dasein, in an 
emotional and intellectual state of vacuity. This basic critique of the spatio-temporal
11 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 87.
12 OR, p. 458.
171
Chapter 4 - Space, Time
and the Existential Subject
vacuum in which philosophical research is generally conducted is further elaborated 
not only by Heidegger but also by Yourcenar, as we shall see further on.
In Being and Time, Heidegger develops a deconstruction of the subject and the 
object of philosophy before establishing the relationship between Dasein and the 
world on his own terms. Firstly, he is determined to avoid the reductive 
representation of the enquiring self as a pure, contemplative, disembodied being. His 
way of doing so is to consider Dasein as it is usually to be found, namely, Heidegger 
thinks, in the state of ‘average everydayness’. Dasein is thus not abstracted as a 
scientific, psychological, moral, etc., subject, nor is it extracted from life and isolated 
as a phenomenological subject a la Husserl. It is when Dasein is examined in this 
casual state that any ontological interpretation may claim any validity, as Heidegger 
makes clear:
We must [...] choose such a way o f access and such kind o f interpretation that this 
entity can show itself in itself and from itself [. ..].  And this means that [Dasein] has 
to be shown as it is proxim ally and fo r  the most part -  in its average everydayness,13
Secondly, with regard to Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, Heidegger explains that it 
is characterised by concern for all beings including itself. ‘Concern’ designates an a 
priori interest in the world, a fundamental fascination with it, which goes beyond the 
subject-object antithesis.14 In its usual mode of ‘average everydayness’, Dasein is not 
concerned with other entities by reaching out of itself towards ‘objects’ that exist 
autonomously. Neither does getting to know something involve ‘a process of 
returning with one’s booty to the “cabinet” of consciousness after one has gone out 
and grasped it’.15 Heidegger suggests that the world is first disclosed to us through a 
non-aggressive and non-possessive kind of concern, which is activated every time we 
use something for practical purposes. Such practical relationship with entities in the
13 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 37-38, emphasis by the author.
14 ‘Being-in-the-world, as concern, is fascinated  by the world with which it is concerned.’ Heidegger, 
Being and Time, p. 88, emphasis by the author.
15 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 89.
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world -  entities that are used as ‘tools’ or, as the term Zeug was translated, as 
‘equipment’ - is emphatically non-theoretical. Theory, with its etymological root in 
the Greek horan, to see, posits a distance between the spectator and the item which is 
looked at, by dint of which this item is thematized and objectified. On the contrary, 
equipment used in Dasein’s ‘average everyday’ dealings is not seen, in the strong 
sense of it being observed by Dasein. The type of sight most usually employed by 
Dasein is called by Heidegger ‘circumspection’ and the type of Being which is 
immediately available to Dasein in this way is called readiness-to-hand. Heidegger 
draws a sharp line between, on the one hand, centuries of philosophical reductionism 
and abstract speculation, and on the other, his own phenomenology which is 
contaminated, as it were, by authentic existence in the world: ‘If we look at Things 
just “theoretically”, we can get along without understanding readiness-to-hand.’16 
Then, Heidegger explains further:
The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort o f thing 
that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of 
what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, 
withdraw [zurtickzuziehen] in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically.17
Entities which are ready-to-hand withdraw from Dasein’s interpretative gaze. They 
are not thematically present while Dasein is using, manipulating or producing them. 
It is only when immediate familiarity with equipment ready-to-hand is interrupted - 
because of an accident, loss and so on -  that a subsequent intentional act of 
inspection transforms it into something which is present-at-hand, that is, of pure 
theoretical interest {Being and Time, §16.) While Heidegger is keen to emphasize 
that presence-at-hand is not a less authentic state of Being, he is adamant that 
readiness-to-hand is the primary mode in which Dasein finds itself in its dealing with 
entities in the world. He stresses that ‘readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities
16 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 98.
17 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 99.
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as they are “in themselves” are defined ontologico-categorially’.18 Thus, Dasein is 
practically engaged in a non-explicit, non-representational relationship with other 
entities. In examining and getting to understand these entities ‘in themselves’, Dasein 
does not conceptualize them by stripping them from the relational context in which 
they are ordinarily encountered.
This is clearly not just a methodological point to be taken on board in 
epistemological research. Heidegger’s idea of the embeddedness of beings in real 
environments problematized the relationship between existence and space in 
European philosophy. It marked a shift of focus away from objectified three- 
dimensional space, but also from Husserl’s phenomenal space - perceived by an ego 
that suspends other sensory data -, and towards a perception of dynamic existential 
space.19 While it is beyond the present context to pursue this analysis any further, it 
must be mentioned that Heidegger’s re-working of the relationship between subject 
and space anticipated his later turn from philosophy to poetry and contributed to his 
questioning of the space that is traditionally allocated to philosophy in relation to 
literature.
In her work, Yourcenar investigated the relationship between subjectivity and 
space less systematically but along very similar lines. As early as in 1932, the 
difference between immediate contact with things and the theoretical gaze towards 
them is illustrated perfectly in a passage of her monograph on Pindar, which 
describes the trip that the Greek poet made as a young man from his native Boeotia to 
Athens to further his education. Yourcenar writes about the sober Attican landscape 
as it is revealed to Pindar, and takes the opportunity to remind us of the archaic
18 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 101.
19 The notion of existential space is further developed in Being and Time and in Heidegger’s later 
writings. See especially Being and Time §24, and Heidegger’s essays ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ 
and ‘The Thing’, in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 1975).
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understanding of beauty as a sufficient and necessary relationship between man and 
physical environment.
Ce n’etait plus la grasse plaine beotienne ni les massifs du Citheron ou toumait la 
ronde echevelee des menades ; une terre plus maigre, aux montagnes seches, qui 
n’accorde aux hommes que le necessaire, et leur donne par sa sobriete la le^on du 
parfait. Les contemporains de Pindare ne cherchaient pas comme nous a comprendre 
ces paysages ; ils y v iva ien t; ils en vivaient.20
This passage refers to a non-cognitive and non-aesthetic understanding of beauty, in 
decidedly positive terms. The accent here is on the signification of ‘le parfait.’ 
According to Yourcenar, Greeks did not define perfection through a conscious 
process of perception and appreciation. ‘Le parfait’ qualifies their economy, ecology, 
and practical dealing with the world. This economy pertains to a more archaic state of 
being for which the world was man’s functional extension. To put Yourcenar’s 
argument in specifically Heideggerian terms, Greeks at the time of Pindar had a 
relationship of readiness-to-hand with their environment; we, on the other hand, have 
lost this relationship of vital necessity and try to compensate for this loss through our 
efforts to comprehend the world as something present-at-hand. The archaic simplicity 
is underlined by Yourcenar further down in the same paragraph, when she draws 
attention to ‘cette extreme simplicity d ’impression, qu’il ne faut jamais oublier quand 
il s’agit des anciens Hellenes’.21 Yourcenar refers here to the original admiration 
which she believes that the Greeks felt for basic things, such as Pentelic marble and 
olive trees, a feeling that is reminiscent of Dasein’s fundamental fascination with the 
world. This admiration having been replaced in our times by comprehension, we tend 
now to dwell not in a world of equipment, but in a world of concepts.
20 EM, p. 1452. Marguerite Yourcenar, Pindare (Paris: Gallimard, 1932).
21 EM, p. 1452.
22 Yourcenar’s point about pre-classical innocence is certainly worth taking seriously, although there is 
a risk of falling into cliche when one argues, as she appears to do in Pindare, that archaic cultures 
were somehow simpler than ours. There is a more serious risk o f falling into metaphysical speculation 
in the assumption that man’s identification with the world was, or could be, a possibility actualized 
historically by entire civilizations. Yourcenar soon became aware o f the precariousness o f her 
statements in Pindare, a book which she later described as ‘ce tres mediocre ouvrage de jeunesse’, 
where ‘la peinture de la Grece y reste exterieure et superficielle’ (Letter to Simon Sautier, 8 October
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Yourcenar’s criticism of the tendency to conceptualize our relationship with the 
world parallels to some extent Heidegger’s idea of readiness-to-hand as the primary 
mode in which Being is revealed to Dasein. In chapter 2 especially, I showed how the 
critique of conceptuality becomes in Yourcenar a critique of spatiality, in the sense 
that the suppression of time, for instance in art, is precisely what authorizes the 
projection of reality onto an immobilized mental space. Clearly, no account of man’s 
understanding relationship with the world in the work of Yourcenar is valid without 
reference to this relationship’s temporal dimension. I shall return to this discussion 
shortly. Before that, further instances should be mentioned of the way that 
Heidegger’s distinction between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand appears in 
Yourcenar’s work.
A prime example comes in the lecture ‘Andre Gide Revisited’ which Yourcenar 
delivered in 1970 at Smith College in Massachusetts for the 100th anniversary of 
Gide’s birth. Discussing Gide’s Les Nourritures terrestres, a novel which ‘changeait 
le sens et le gout de la vie’, Yourcenar develops the antithesis between abstraction 
and life:
Le Nourritures terrestres nous montrent un personnage jouissant des formes du 
monde, des couleurs du monde, des aventures, des differents aspects, des differentes 
possibilites variees de la vie.
Et il y a la, il y avait la dans une litterature qui [. ..] tend parfois un peu, a chaque 
generation, a s ’eloigner de la vie pour s’enfermer dans des concepts, dans une sorte 
d’abstraction presque ideologique, et dans des problemes de pure forme, il y avait la 
le desir passionne de contact avec la vie qui etait, de nouveau, pour d’innombrables 
jeunes gens en train de faire sagement leurs universites, bouleversant.23
The difference between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand is here expressed in 
terms of the opposition between jouissance des formes du monde and problemes de 
pure forme. The issue of authentic spatiality is addressed negatively, through a
1970, in Lettres a ses amis et quelques autres, pp. 461-478, pp. 464-65). Nonetheless, her biographer 
Josyane Savigneau points out that Pindare contains ‘beaucoup [ ...]  de traces de ce qui sera l’univers 
de Marguerite Yourcenar, sa pensee, et meme son style’. In Josyane Savigneau, M arguerite 
Yourcenar: L ’Invention d ’une vie (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), p. 100.
23 Marguerite Yourcenar, ‘Andre Gide Revisited’, in Cahiers Andre Gide 3, Le Centenaire (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1972), pp. 21-44, p. 30.
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critique of distance, abstraction and ideology. Every generation, writes Yourcenar, 
tends to distance itself from life. This distance is what allows for conceptual 
representation of forms, colours, aspects of life, and so on. Les Nourritures 
terrestres, her argument goes, is a book about the possibility of ecstatic union with 
the world -  a book which deeply moved young readers as it revealed precisely the 
distance that separated them from a more inclusive state of being. Yourcenar implies 
that an authentic relationship with the world can indeed be reclaimed within the 
context of representation and conceptualization. To that extend, her argument 
parallels Heidegger’s theory that readiness-to-hand is an authentic possibility for 
Dasein within the dominant metaphysics of presence-at-hand.
I have already discussed other aspects of Yourcenar’s critique of conceptuality, 
particularly during my examination of ‘Animula vagula blandula’ in Chapter 1. As in 
her essay on Andre Gide, Yourcenar’s approach is centred, negatively, on the lure 
and the limits of ideology and systematic thought, without offering a strong positive 
paradigm of the way our non-cognitive, non-representational relationship with Being 
may be revealed to us. This is certainly not surprising, for Yourcenar is as 
overwhelmed by the impasse of representation as any modernist writer. The mental 
and psychological space of her novels is overdetermined by presence-at-hand. To use 
her own words from the last quotation above, Yourcenar is also inescapably 
‘enfermee dans des concepts’. However, she came closer to a positive definition of 
that non-theoretical immediacy implied by readiness-to-hand in her later novels, 
UCEuvre au noir and, especially, Un homme obscur. Both Zenon, on the way to his 
prison cell, and Nathanael, sailing to his final insular abode, carry out an experiment 
which could boldly be described as the fictional equivalent of phenomenological 
reduction: progressively, they exclude chronological and even historical time in order 
to sink into space and become one with it. Indeed, time is excluded already in the 
first lines of the final section of Un homme obscur, where Nathanael’s figure slowly 
pales away into the darkness of the island before he dies:
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Alors, le temps cessa d’exister. C’etait comme si on avait efface les chiffres d’un 
cadran, et le cadran lui-meme palissait comme la lune au ciel en plein jour. Sans 
horloge (celle de la maisonnette ne fonctionnait plus), sans montre (il n’en avait 
jamais possede), sans calendrier des bergers pendu au mur, le temps passait comme 
l ’eclair ou durait toujours.24
What is eliminated here is not time as such, but the objectivity of time. Time as a 
calculable quantity gives its place to existential time. With the cessation of calendar 
time, Nathanael is able to free himself from the tyranny of the concept and, in an 
ecstatic union with the world, to transcend all ‘ontic’ categories, including age, 
gender and even the quality of being human. As Nadia Harris writes in her essay 
‘Representations de 1’Autre dans 1’oeuvre de Marguerite Yourcenar’, ‘L’espace 
insulaire devient le lieu privilegie ou cet emigre de la culture [i.e. Nathanael] fait
25l’experience du lien profond qui l ’unit au monde’. She goes on to quote this 
passage from Un homme obscur:
Meme les ages, les sexes, et jusqu’aux especes, lui paraissaient plus proches qu’on ne 
croit les uns des autres : enfant ou vieillard, homme ou femme, animal ou bipede qui 
parle et travaille de ses mains, tous communiaient dans 1’ infortune et la douceur 
d’exister.26
In her essay, Harris has explicitly in mind Levinas’s idea of radical exteriority. This 
makes her sensitive to the way Yourcenar avoids the process of conceptual 
appropriation of otherness in Un homme obscur. Harris draws our attention to 
Nathanael’s final act of liberation, the burning of the Bible - the last book which he 
has with him in the island. The destruction of the Bible has nothing symbolic for 
Nathanael, in whose hands the book becomes a piece of equipment, in the 
Heideggerian sense of the word: ‘une Bible qu’il brula par poignees un jour ou le 
poele prenait mal.’27 Nathanael is then free to dedicate himself fully to the study of 
the world around him: ‘il pensait en tout cas qu’il eut ete mal de ne pas s’absorber
24 OR, p. 1032.
25 Nadia Harris, ‘Representations de 1’Autre dans l ’ceuvre de Marguerite Yourcenar’, in Jean-Philippe 
Beaulieu, et al. (eds), M arguerite Yourcenar, Ecritures de I’autre (Quebec: XYZ, 1997), pp. 45-52, p. 
51.
26 OR, p. 1036.
27 OR, p. 1034.
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98exclusivement dans la lecture du monde.’ But the meaning of the destruction of the 
Bible is underlined still further by Yourcenar. In so far as the concept of ‘books’ is 
used at this part of the novel to signify abstraction and reductive representation, it is 
at the antipodes of life. She writes: ‘Lire les livres, comme lamper de 1’eau-de-vie,
29eut ete une maniere de s’etourdir pour ne pas etre la .’ This is an extraordinary 
statement to which the expression ‘pour ne pas etre la’ adds a specific ontological 
dimension. In the context of the narrative, ‘etre la’ refers to the island where 
Nathanael has come to be united with nature and finish his life. Therefore, from an 
ontological perspective, ‘etre la’ signifies being there where one belongs, immersed 
in one’s facticity, ‘absorbed exclusively’ (as Yourcenar writes) by the world. This is 
what Da-sein is. The verbal noun etre-la is of course an established translation of 
Dasein, emphasizing the worldliness of being-there. We may interpret the above 
phrase from Un homme obscur as follows: ‘conceptual appropriation of the world is 
but a way of intoxicating oneself as a substitute for not being where one belongs 
authentically.’ Here, Yourcenar reaches exactly the same point as Heidegger, when 
he discusses conceptual representation ( ‘“understanding” everything’, ‘all 
possibilities of explanation’, ‘characterologies’, ‘typologies’) as an attempt by Dasein 
to ‘tranquillize’ itself -  an attempt that ends in inauthenticity and alienation:
When Dasein, tranquillized, and ‘understanding’ everything, thus compares itself with 
everything, it drifts along towards an alienation [Entfremdung] in which its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it. Falling Being-in-the-world is not only 
tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time alienating .30
The passage of Un homme obscur which I discussed above is followed by a 
comment on Nathanael’s disintegrating body and on the anticipation of death. ‘Plus 
ses sensations corporelles devenaient penibles, plus il lui semblait necessaire, a force 
d’attention, d’essayer plutot de suivre, sinon de comprendre, ce qui se faisait ou se
28 OR, p. 1034-35
29 OR, p. 1035, my emphasis
30 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 222.
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defaisait en lui.’31 Again, it is worth noticing how Yourcenar arrives from a different 
direction at the Heideggerian idea that ontological awareness is not a question of 
cognition but one of attention and heeding. The difference between comprendre and 
suivre is the same as that between conceptualization of the world and concentration 
on the world - in this case, one’s body - in such a way as to let the world reveal itself 
to the questioning self. In contrast to the theoretical attitude implicit in comprendre, 
there is purely a technique involved in the process of suivre, which, in the case of 
Nathanael, consists in paying close attention to physical pain.
For Hadrien, on the other hand, this technique entails a necessary political 
dimension. It provides for two forms of active collaboration, avec la terre and avec le 
temps, which are translated into the dual enterprise of ‘construire’ and ‘re-construire’ 
(OR, pp. 384 ff.). As it is explained through the examples of collaboration provided 
in Memoires d ’Hadrien, and as I stressed in Chapter 2, this way of understanding 
political activity originates in Hadrien’s conviction that people belong to concrete 
spatiotemporal (and therefore historical) contexts. Yourcenar suggests that Hadrien’s 
political planning is inspired by a strong sense of worldliness centred on humanity. 
For that reason, it is interesting to study Hadrien’s politics in relation to Heidegger’s 
existential analysis. This will be one of my goals in the next chapter. Prior to that, I 
shall try to establish a relationship between Yourcenar’s and Heidegger’s perceptions 
of time.
Time and the existential subject
The centrality of the agency of time in both Heidegger and Yourcenar hardly needs 
emphasizing. Time is the element on which both thinkers’ meditation on existence,
31 OR, p. 1035.
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their respective theories of representation and their philosophies of history are 
anchored. More fundamentally, time is for both the inherently differential 
phenomenon which makes it possible to think existence at all, to introduce the 
question of authenticity and to explain the bearing of history on the present.
There are certainly deep-seated differences in the way Yourcenar and Heidegger 
think time. For instance, Heidegger does not deal systematically with cosmic or 
astronomical time, which plays an important role in Yourcenar’s idea of the 
fundamental order of things, their objective duree. Nonetheless there are striking 
similarities between them as regards the way they consider existential and historical 
time and the way these two relate to each other. Further, by thematizing time in their 
work, they both exemplify the shift of focus in European thought from essence to 
existence. With equal urgency, they move from the quest for static truth to the 
possibility of dynamic authenticity, by temporalizing the site of the self with a view 
to placing the latter firmly within the world. We just saw how pressingly the 
temporal question emerged at every turn in the above discussion of Yourcenar’s 
critique of spatiality. Time is the element which constantly disturbs the possibility of 
spatial order, but which also, through destruction and irony, discloses the constitutive 
worldliness of the self. By complicating the act of representation, while being 
unrepresentable itself, time defines the ‘thereness’ of Being.
These arguments are valid for both Heidegger and Yourcenar, but it is in Being 
and Time that they aspire to universal meaning as part of the analysis of the ecstatic 
structure of Dasein. Heidegger’s main point is that time is not an entity or a context 
in which things occur, but a process fuelled by Dasein itself in the course of which 
Dasein projects itself onto its unique possibilities. This means that the human being, 
whether ‘authentic’ or ‘inauthentic’, is never equal to itself. It does not arise from 
itself but from its Being towards which it tends. Dasein is always ahead of itself 
striving to become explicitly the Being-in-the-world which it originally is. Existence 
is therefore differential, and this difference - in effect the difference between Being
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and beings - manifests itself dynamically as a tension, a projection towards 
‘something’. This tension is time. Levinas summarizes this point neatly: ‘On pourrait 
dire que le temps c ’est l ’elan par lequel l’homme s’inscrit dans l’etre, par lequel il 
1’assume.’32 As this dynamic absence, time makes it possible for man to assume his 
Being, that is, to understand non-conceptually himself as a finite being in the world. 
Dasein’s return to itself is actualized through the phenomena of the future, the 
present and the past, which Heidegger calls ‘ecstases’. While the traditional triadic 
structure of temporality is retained, the ecstases do not designate ordinary perceptions 
of objective or psychological time. Heidegger insists on the differential and thereby 
non-essential character of temporality:
Temporality is the primordial ‘ outside-of-itself in and for itself. We therefore call the 
phenomena of the future, the character o f having been, and the Present, the ‘ecstases’ 
of temporality. Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which first emerges from 
itself, its essence is a process o f temporalizing in the unity o f the ecstases.33
There are two aspects of this definition that are directly relevant to my argument on 
Yourcenar. Firstly, the unity of the three ecstases of time relates to Yourcenar’s 
discovery of a unifying order which emerges through the disorder of man’s 
existential predicament. Secondly, and following from the previous point, the 
Heideggerian theme of the unity of primordial time can be linked to the prevalence, 
in Yourcenar, of acceptation over revolte. I shall summarize Heidegger’s thesis on 
the unity of the ecstases, before I attempt to associate it with Yourcenar’s arguments 
on order and acceptance.
If time has always been felt as a continuum of difference, Heidegger transferred 
the site of the difference from the objective world to Being, or rather, to Being-in- 
the-world. The unity of ecstatic time is possible because Dasein is not a stable 
essence in a changing world but is itself temporal. In this way, in its unity, ecstatic
32 Emmanuel Levinas, En decouvrant I’existence avec Husserl et H eidegger (Paris: J. Vrin, 1994), p.
8 8 .
33 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 377, emphasis by the author.
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time remains plural. The three dimensions of Dasein’s time, futurity, pastness and 
presence, assume their meaning only in relation to each other and they all point to 
Dasein’s instability and dislocation.
- Futurity is not a quality assigned to events towards which Dasein is supposed to 
lead, but the coming of Dasein towards its own possibilities. The future is produced 
by the self in resolute anticipation of its own death. Heidegger writes: ‘We have in 
view the coming in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes 
toward itself. Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural.’34 Dasein is always 
already outside itself. It is not, but it ex-sists.35 Existence is this perpetual tension 
between Dasein and its ‘ownmost potentiality’ which is nothingness, literally death.36
- Similarly, the past is defined non-objectively as an attribute of the self, rather than 
as something anterior to the present. In seeking to retrieve itself from the past, Dasein 
looks in itself. As Dasein oscillates between its ‘thrownness’ in the world and its 
future fulfilment, its past is defined as this thrownness, which involves inauthenticity 
as well we the desire for authenticity. Heidegger writes that ‘Dasein never ‘finds 
itself’ except as a thrown Fact’.
- Finally, for Heidegger, the present is not the now-moment of ordinary time. The 
present is also ‘ecstatic’, because Dasein steps beyond itself and defines itself in 
relation to other entities. Heidegger calls this motion ‘Falling’ into the everydayness, 
and considers that it entails an original moment of inauthenticity. From there, Dasein 
must spring forward into authentic futurity.
Undoubtedly, Heidegger’s most enduring insight into time is the determination 
of temporality as part of man’s constitution, prior to any segmentation between
34 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 373, emphasis by the author.
35 Michael Inwood points out that ‘Heidegger often writes Ex-sistenz or Ek-sistenz to stress “stepping 
forth.”’ In Michael Inwood, A H eidegger Dictionary (London: Blackwell, 1999), p. 60.
36 It is tempting to add that this perception o f death and futurity, resolution and anticipation, is 
perfectly illustrated in one o f Yourcenar’s plays, Qui n ’a pas son Minotaure ?. Just before Thesee 
enters the labyrinth to face the Minotaur, he says: ‘Je marcherai vers la mort doucement engage dans 
l’avenir’. Marguerite Yourcenar, Theatre, 2 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), II, p. 205.
37 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 376.
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subjective and objective time. The human being emerges from this discussion as a 
solitary figure, free to assume the contingency of his or her existence. The unity of 
time reflects the unity of Heidegger’s analysis of temporality which is made possible 
by the horizon of individual death. The prospect of nothingness frustrates in advance 
any ambition to understand oneself as eternal essence living in the present. This is 
why Heidegger insists that man is not settled in the hypothetical identity of eternal 
present but lives differentially, ecstatically, in a future which is his own. As Paul 
Ricceur has pointed out, ‘Cette differentiation est intrinsequement impliquee par la 
temporalisation, en tant que celle-ci est un proces qui rassemble en dispersant. Le 
passage du futur au passe et au present est a la fois unification et diversification’.38
This unity that comprises difference defines man’s factical situation, thus 
rounding up and universalizing contingency. This does not mean that there is a 
pattern underlying contingent phenomena -  the only ‘pattern’ being finiteness -, but 
that contingency is a structural part of existence. It means that we are thrown in a 
world where scientific principles, ethical values and so on change constantly and 
where different manifestations of nature and history are ultimately unpredictable. 
What persists is thrownness, a difference which affects all beings but to which only 
the human being is privy. Whether or not Heidegger’s account of temporality 
manages to overturn metaphysics, it certainly overturns the terms of the question of 
Being. Heidegger redefines the task of philosophy as the effort to record the tensions 
which keep Being away from itself in a world determined by finiteness.
Let me now return to the work of Yourcenar to see how aspects of the 
problematic of time as discussed above can be related to her thinking of contingency 
and the worldliness of existence. Certainly, Yourcenar’s work is no illustration of any 
given version of existentialism. Rather, it is concerned in an original way with the
38 Paul Ricceur, Temps et recit, tome III, Le temps raconte (Paris: Seuil, 1985), p. 130.
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stakes involved in the modem determination of selfhood, and represents at the level 
of narrative man’s struggle to come to terms with the implications of difference.
In ‘Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur’, Yourcenar shows how time acquires various 
meanings depending on its relationship with the act of (aesthetic) representation. She 
argues that time is neither the context in which representation takes place nor simply 
the force against which representation is set. Time is rather the ‘sculpteur’, the agent 
of representation which ultimately fulfils artistic intention in the sense that the final 
product, the ruin, is as fragmented as its ‘creator’. In the ontic world, the artist’s 
intention expresses itself as the drive for identity, but from the existential perspective 
which Yourcenar adopts, the intention is to repeat difference and fragmentation. 
Following a Heideggerian logic, we may therefore suggest that the artist’s intention is 
indeed a tension between identity and difference. Artistic intention is a movement of 
stepping ahead of oneself toward authentic futurity, which is the definition of ecstatic 
time.
In the previous chapter I also referred to the question of temporality in terms of 
the life (or ‘afterlife’) of the aesthetic/literary artefact. With reference to Walter 
Benjamin, time was understood metaphorically as a relation between linguistic 
fragments, especially literary works and their translations. It was recognized that this 
temporality depended on a tension of a more fundamental order, that between 
languages of the world and ‘pure language’ as a unified site of differential plurality. 
Although in that discussion there was no immediate reference to existentiality, 
literary works were discussed in terms of their life, as they pass from a state of 
originality to one of translatability. They, too, were considered to be ‘thrown’ into 
factical world and to exist in a tension between two types of temporality, the 
temporality of the ‘instant’ and that of the ‘primordial’. Under the light of the present 
discussion, these temporalities correspond, to a certain extent, to ordinary and 
ecstatic temporality respectively. Just as Dasein exists in a state of permanent tension 
in relation to Being, so literary fragments exist in a state of tension in relationship to
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‘pure language’.39 As I showed, Yourcenar took this difference implicitly into 
account. She situated Memoires d ’Hadrien within the tension between essentialism 
and translatability by defining her novel as a translation. She embraced and 
demonstrated the difference between, on the one hand, essentialism and the 
temporality of the instant, and on the other, translatability and the temporality of the 
primordial. By considering her novel as a fragment in a series of fragments (in 
Benjamin’s and de Man’s sense), she temporalized and thus authenticated it in the 
same sense that Dasein claims an authentic relationship with Being by temporalizing 
itself.
In addition to the metaphor of translation, Yourcenar uses other analogies in her 
fiction to highlight the tension between the ordinary time of presence and the 
primordial time of existence. In chapter 1 I showed how this tension is expressed in 
Memoires as Hadrien’s nostalgia for order and desire for representation (chapter 
‘Animula vagula blandula’). Hadrien is frustrated by the fact that no system of ideas 
has eternal value, a state of affairs which is evident to him from his privileged 
standpoint as a manipulator of symbols. I would like to focus on a point of the novel 
where this key problem seems to Hadrien to be resolved, if only for a moment.
Structurally, this point corresponds exactly to the centre of the novel and 
represents the moment of Hadrien’s absolute personal and political fulfilment.40 Two 
themes are used simultaneously to bring together the issues of contingency, 
phenomenal time and death. The first is that of the Eleusinian Mysteries, to which 
Hadrien was initiated, and about which he says: ‘Ces grands rites ne font que 
symboliser les evenements de la vie humaine’.41 The second theme is the study of the
39 I am aware o f the differences between Heidegger’s and Benjamin’s accounts o f temporality. 
Notably, as Caygill writes: ‘It is the distinction between fulfilment in historical time and the fulfilment 
o/historical time which marks the difference between Heidegger and Benjamin (Caygill, p. 10). At this 
point, I am interested in Yourcenar’s perception o f time not as presence, but as difference and tension 
-  a perception that, I believe, Benjamin and Heidegger share.
40 Cf. Les Yeux ouverts, p. 101, where Yourcenar discusses the structure o f M emoires d ’Hadrien  as 
‘une espece de construction pyramidale’.
41 OR, p. 400.
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sky, in the forms of astrology, ‘cette etrange refraction de l’humain sur la voute 
stellaire’, and astronomy.42 In the following passage, Hadrien considers astronomy as 
an equally legitimate method of representation of humanity as the rituals of Eleusis:
l ’esprit humain revelait ici sa participation a l’univers par l ’etablissement d’exactes 
theoremes comme a Eleusis par des cris rituels et des danses. L ’homme qui contemple 
et les astres contemples roulaient inevitablement vers leur fin, marquee quelque part 
au ciel. Mais chaque moment de cette chute etait un temps d’arret, un repere, un 
segment d’une courbe aussi solide qu’une chame d’or. Chaque glissement nous 
ramenait a ce point qui, parce que par hasard nous nous y sommes trouves, nous parait 
un centre.43
The relationship between man and the world transcends such oppositions as subject 
and object, inferiority and exteriority. It is significant that Yourcenar uses the verb 
contempler instead of the more appropriate - when it comes to astronomy - observer. 
It allows us to think that the stars are not seen here as objects which are present-at- 
hand, but belong together with the onlooker to a greater spatiotemporal whole, 
Vunivers. This passage tells us that the structural unity of space-time is not of a 
spiritual and metaphysical order and does not have a central stable point of reference, 
although it may appear to do so. The last sentence of the quotation above explains 
how phenomenal space-time, though contingent in itself, creates the illusion of a 
centre -  and, one might add, the desire or the nostalgia for one. However, the unity of 
the universe is existential in that it is only understood through the occurrence of 
falling and death. Yourcenar is explicit about i a  chute’ [de 1’homme et des astres] 
‘vers leur fin.’ The overall message is reminiscent of the adventure of Dasein in 
Being and Time. Man can only make sense of himself and the world by recognizing 
the possibility of his own end. What is then revealed is man’s participation in the 
spatiotemporal unity of Being {Vunivers) -  a unity which precedes any statement 
about the disorder of existence and the order of the world. Indeed, this revelation is 
encapsulated in Hadrien’s statement ‘Le desordre s’integrait a l’ordre’.44
42 OR, p. 401.
43 OR, p. 402.
44 OR, p. 401.
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In the paragraph that follows the above quotation, Yourcenar gives a vivid image 
of man’s active participation in the universe. Hadrien recalls a night when he was 
younger which he had spent lying on the Syrian desert, contemplating the stars: 
‘couche sur le dos, les yeux bien ouverts’.45 His posture, touching the earth and 
looking above to the sky is symbolic of both thrownness and futurity. His experience 
of union with what is imagined as the divine element is described as an extase lucide 
-  an ecstatic unity of time which, in Heideggerian parlance, could be termed as being 
‘ahead of oneself’ while ‘being already in the world’.46
The theme of a unity that precedes and includes difference is further illuminated 
in Un homme obscur, in the discussion between the philosopher Leo Belmonte and 
Nathanael, which I also examined in Chapter 1. Belmonte refers to the same process 
which Heidegger’s existential phenomenology describes as the ontic reduction of 
existence and temporality into their inauthentic counterparts, namely, non­
corporeality and eternity: ‘Ces volitions, ces puissances, ces nivaux d’existence de 
moins en moins corporalises, ces temps de plus en plus etemels [...] qu’est-ce, sinon 
ce que ceux qui ne savent pas ce dont ils parlent appellent grossierement des 
Anges?’47 Thirty years after Memoires, the impasse of conceptual representation in 
philosophy and in science is here dramatized with even more poignancy. Yourcenar 
gives us the dark image of a thinker who, having always been sceptical of the abstract 
beauty of his findings, only comes to discern the possibility of truth in the ugly 
corporeality of his own imminent death. In my earlier analysis I discussed the 
opposition between ‘les choses et les idees’, as well as Belmonte’s despair in man’s 
endless intellectual effort ‘pour donner au chaos au moins l’apparence d’un
48ordre.. . ’ While these issues reproduce Yourcenar’s problematic of the impossibility
45 OR, p. 402.
46 Hadrien says, ‘[J]’ai connu plus d ’une extase [ ...]  Celle de la nuit syrienne fut etrangement lucide’. 
OR, p. 402.
47 OR, p. 1009-10.
48 OR, p. 1009.
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of existential order in Memoires d ’Hadrien, they are here tackled from the point of 
view of negative theology. Belmonte is looking for a divine point of reference from 
which the opposition between order and chaos can be transcended. God emerges 
from his discussion as the missing centre of things. It is what remains unaccounted 
for after representation has exhausted itself. Belmonte argues that God’s nothingness 
is to be found everywhere, like water is found wherever one digs in the sand on a 
seashore. Then he concludes, ‘Car le secret, c ’est que je creuse en moi, puisqu’en ce 
moment je suis au centre : ma toux, cette boule d ’eau et de boue qui monte et 
descend dans ma poitrine, mon devoiement d ’entrailles, nous sommes au centre...’49 
As in the case of Hadrien contemplating the stars, the contingency of what we feel as 
the ‘present’ of phenomenal time is here re-affirmed. Belmonte’s meditations deal 
with such fundamental notions of existential phenomenology as the necessity of 
‘falling’ into phenomenal time, the physicality of existence, the privacy of death and 
the search inside the self for a unified Being that escapes representation.
Acceptance and guardianship
The key statement ‘le desordre s’integrait a l’ordre’ reflects another discovery which 
Yourcenar formulated as succinctly at about the same time, namely, that i a  re volte se 
place a l’interieur de 1’acquiescement’.50 In the previous chapters I studied the 
political and aesthetic implications of this assertion. In Yourcenar, revolte signifies a 
rebellion against a system of principles, ideas, religious or literary traditions, which 
eventually leads to the establishment of new a system of principles, ideas and so on. 
This situation gives rise to un understanding of modem history as a process of
49 OR, p. 1012.
50 This phrase (EM, p. 156) from ‘Presentation critique de Constantin Cavafy’, an essay finished in 
1953, was one o f the focal ideas o f Chapter 1 o f my thesis.
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conceptual overdetermination of le vecu, a thesis which encompasses Yourcenar’s 
entire work.51
At a more fundamental level, revolte is addressed against this progressively 
rhetorical elaboration of experience and is therefore based on the assumption that 
such transcendence is possible. It is not simply because Yourcenar rejects this 
assumption that she always tends to side with acceptation or acquiescement. 
Accepting is for her a more comprehensive and more humble, as it were, attitude 
towards the past. Accepting contains revolt in the sense that the illusion of ‘creation’ 
always precedes the explicitness of frustration and irony. Revolt is thus a necessary 
dialectical moment before the illusory and fragmented character of reality is revealed. 
However, this moment does not lead to synthesis, for irony is not transcended. 
Instead, irony forces us to completely revise our attitude towards the idea of 
creativity. The issue is no longer how to create something original, but how to re- 
assume what has been handed down to us from the past, including fragmentation and 
conceptual overdetermination. The meaning of accepting is to be found in 
reconstruire, defined by Yourcenar in the phrase: ‘collaborer avec le temps sous son 
aspect de passe [...] vers un plus long avenir’. As this statement suggests, accepting 
is a temporal act which is directed towards the future.
Thus, in Memoires, when Hadrien completes the construction of the temple of 
the Olympeion -  a project begun seven centuries earlier -  he is able to say ie  passe 
retrouvait un visage d’avenir’. This fusion of the dimensions of historical time is 
possible thanks to an accepting attitude towards temporality that goes beyond the 
dilemma between revolt or acceptance.
In the following passage, which summarizes Hadrien’s existential politics and 
sense of history, it is made clear that that which he accepts is time itself.
51 As we saw, this idea was already central to Yourcenar’s 1929 essay ‘Diagnostic de l’Europe’ and 
still present in Leo Belmonte’s philosophy in Un homme obscur, published in 1982.
52 OR, p. 422.
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Cet esprit des temps, j ’aurais peut-etre ete le premier a y subordonner consciemment 
tous mes actes, a en faire autre chose que le reve fumeux d’un philosophe ou 
1’aspiration un peu vague d’un bon prince. Et je remerciais les dieux, puisqu’ils 
m’avaient accorde de vivre a une epoque ou la tache qui m ’etait echue consistait a 
reorganiser prudemment un monde, et non a extraire du chaos une matiere encore 
informe. [...] Je me felicitais que notre passe fut assez long pour nous foumir 
d’exemples, et pas assez lourd pour nous en ecraser.53
It is worth noticing again the perception of history as the accumulation of legacies 
that would potentially overwhelm culture -  which takes us back to the analogy of the 
branch of a tree that snaps under its own weight, in ‘Diagnostic de l ’Europe’ 
(Chapter 3). Yourcenar suggests that Hadrien lived at a time when accepting the 
legacy of the past was not so heavy a task as it is today. But beyond its concrete 
political meaning (‘reorganiser le monde’) and in both the ancient and the modem 
historical contexts, order has an original existential significance. To accept time is 
above all to be able to envisage a totality, an order, which incorporates and even 
necessitates disorder, multiplicity, conflict and revolt. While in Memoires the divine 
element as such plays only a secondary role, it is often evoked when Yourcenar 
wishes to direct our attention to that order that dispenses the multiformity of factical 
life. In the passage that follows, in which Hadrien explains his relationship with the 
divine element, this quasi-mystical order is described remarkably as ‘cette force 
unique engagee dans la multiplicity des choses’.
Je m’imaginais secondant [le divin] dans son effort d’informer et d’ordonner un 
monde, d’en developper et d’en multiplier les circonvolutions, les ramifications, les 
detours. J’etais l’un des segments de la roue, l’un des aspects de cette force unique 
engagee dans la multiplicity des choses.54
My suggestion now is that Yourcenar’s constitutive notion of accepting the past, and 
with it the possibility of a futural order that integrates disorder, shares many 
characteristics with Heidegger’s idea of accepting and responding to the unity of 
Being.
53 OR, p. 372.
54 OR, p. 398-99.
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I have already mentioned the original fascination which, according to Heidegger, 
Dasein experiences towards Being. This pre-ontological attitude, already a form of 
primitive acceptance of Being, becomes explicit in Dasein’s authentic solicitude 
towards Being, which Heidegger calls Care. Care is a form of acceptance, in the 
fundamental sense that authentic selfhood involves accepting Dasein’s thrownness 
into the world and embracing Dasein’s finiteness. As in the case of Yourcenar, 
accepting in Heidegger is not an ethical or rational choice, but a recognition of the 
existential state in which entities already are. This is why, in both authors, the 
meaning of authenticity is not originally ethical, but existential. Indeed, to be thrown 
is not a state to which Dasein has to give its consent, but one that it has to accept 
authentically as a fact. Heidegger is unambiguous about it: ‘As Being, Dasein is 
something that has been thrown; it has been brought into its “there”, but not of its 
own accord.’55
At the same time, accepting is also an attitude that encompasses inauthenticity, 
in a sense which is very close to Yourcenar’s idea of acquiescement as the 
transcendence of revolte. There is room in Being and Time to hypothesize that 
inauthenticity as fear and alienation is a necessary step towards the realization of the 
homelessness of the self. Heidegger has called ‘Falling’ that state in which Dasein 
interprets itself in terms of ontic categories - a state which may involve the choice 
between revolt and accepting in the common sense of these words. Falling is thus 
associated with inauthenticity and the present. Dasein must have ‘fallen’ so as to be 
able to reclaim itself resolutely. Heidegger writes that falling is ‘existentially 
determinative’ and adds that ‘In falling, nothing other than our potentiality-for- 
Being-in-the-world is the issue, even if in the mode of inauthenticity’.56 George 
Steiner makes the following comment on this topic:
55 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 329, emphasis by the author.
56 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 223-24.
192
Chapter 4 - Space, Time
and the Existential Subject
But ‘fallenness’ is positive in [a] deeper sense. There must be inauthenticity and 
‘theyness’, ‘talk’ and Neugier, so that Dasein, thus made aware o f its loss o f self, can 
strive to return to authentic being. At no point in his work is Heidegger more 
dialectical, more intent on the dynamics o f an argument which springs from internal 
contradiction. Verfall becomes the absolutely necessary precondition for that struggle 
toward true Dasein, toward possession or, rather, repossession o f self, which defines 
man’s exposure to the challenge o f the ontological.57
Falling is thus an integral part of Dasein’s acceptance of Being in the same way that 
revolte, in Yourcenar, belongs to acceptation and is not opposed to it.
I am not suggesting here that Falling and revolte define exactly the same attitude 
or mode of being, although both terms connote a degree of misinterpretation of man’s 
possibilities and both lead to the necessary moment of irony. The point I rather wish 
to emphasize is that the notion of accepting marks an equally profound existential 
disposition for Heidegger and Yourcenar, beyond any immediate political, ethical or 
anthropological evaluations and beyond any negative or positive judgements. Writing 
about the ‘call of Being’, Jacques Derrida pointed out that there is in Heidegger ‘un 
oui avant toute opposition du oui et du non \ In a relevant footnote he makes this 
comment: ‘Je ne traduirai pas le mot Zusage parce qu’il rassemble des significations 
que nous dissocions en general, celles de la promesse et de 1’acquiescement ou du
c o
consentement, de 1’abandon originaire a ce qui se donne dans la promesse meme.’
In context, Derrida’s remark means (among other things) that, to formulate the 
ontological question, one has to be open to Being and therefore to have accepted it 
already in a relationship of co-belonging. Because Dasein and Being belong together, 
Dasein cannot be a creator, in the proper sense that it cannot by itself create Being, it 
cannot give meaning to Being. Dasein’s role is precisely to accept Being, to let Being 
be through Dasein.
57 George Steiner, H eidegger (London: Fontana Press, 1992), pp. 98-99, italics by the author.
58 Jacques Derrida, H eidegger et la question (Paris: Galilee, 1987), pp. 114-15, emphasis by Derrida.
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Heidegger has famously asserted man’s role with regard to Being in the 
apophthegm ‘Man is the shepherd of Being’.59 J. Glenn Grey, who co-translated the 
‘Letter on Humanism’, from where I quote the above phrase, annotates as follows:
Like that o f the shepherd, man’s true dignity consists in his function o f taking care of, 
of being a protector and a guardian. His being is care (Sorge) in the comprehensive 
sense of the term. Man does not create Being, but he is responsible for it since, 
without his thinking and remembering, Being has no illumination, no voice, no 
word.60
Gray is not necessarily moralizing when he writes about ‘man’s true dignity’. This 
expression occurs in ‘Letter on Humanism’ (p. 233), when Heidegger wants to make 
the point that Western humanism is still an evaluative criterion that does not do 
justice to the humanity of man. Humanism (especially in its Sartrean version which 
Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’ set out to deconstruct) is pregnant with the idea of 
absolute self-creation, whereas, from an ontological perspective, being human 
involves only the distinction in relation to other entities of being able to respond to 
Being.
After Being and Time, the idea that ‘creating’ is fundamentally an exercise in 
custodianship and preservation of Being became stronger in Heidegger’s thought. In 
his essay ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, first published in German in 1954 as ‘Bauen 
Wohnen Denken’, Heidegger takes recourse to etymology to interpret bauen not as 
‘to build’, but as ‘to dwell’, to which he then gives the sense of ‘to preserve’. He 
writes: ‘as long as we do not bear in mind that all building is in itself a dwelling, we 
cannot even adequately ask, let alone properly decide, what the building of buildings 
might be in its nature.’ He then concludes with a new aphorism: ‘The fundamental 
character o f dwelling is [...] sparing and preserving.’61 Thus the humanist
59 ‘Letter on Humanism’, in David Farrell Krell (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings (London: 
Routledge, 1973), p. 234.
60 J. Glenn Gray , ‘Heidegger's “Being”’, The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 49, No. 12 (Jun., 1952), pp. 
415-422, (p. 416).
61 ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, in Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 148-49, 
emphasis in the original.
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representations of man as a master of his own being, and of creation as the ability to 
confer meaning to entities are shown to be inadequate. The meaning of accepting is 
in the custodianship and preservation of that which has been handed over to man, 
namely access to his own Being.
The relationship between creating and preserving in Heidegger mirrors the 
relationship between construire and reconstruire in Yourcenar. Heidegger’s and 
Yourcenar’s comparable attitudes with regard to accepting also extend to the idea of 
custodianship. The idea that man is the shepherd of Being finds its equivalent in 
Yourcenar’s remark that Adam ‘aurait [...] pu se sentir promu au rang de protecteur, 
d ’arbitre, de moderateur de la creation’, because he was meant to be ‘non le tyran, 
mais l’intendant [du monde]’.62 While Yourcenar and Heidegger use theological 
terms, they both try to make a point that goes beyond theology: namely, that man is 
not a ‘subject’ who gets to know the ‘objective truth’ of existence but the only being 
who participates knowingly in the truth of Being. It is therefore man’s prerogative to 
remember and safeguard this knowledge.
I have already discussed this passage from Yourcenar’s essay ‘Qui sait si l'ame 
des betes va en bas’ in Chapter 1, in the context of my analysis of her idea of freedom 
as a form of acceptance. There I mentioned the ecological implications of 
Yourcenar’s argument. Similarly, it comes as no surprise that Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the quality of ‘being human’ as a form of preserving has given rise 
to ecological interpretations of his thought. On this topic, Leslie Paul Thiele writes:
Celebrating the unique capacities o f human being to disclose in a way that preserves 
best ensures humanity’s caretaking of the earth and the world. The fostering o f human
62 From Yourcenar’s essay ‘Qui sait si l'ame des betes va en bas’ (1981), EM, p. 374. It is not 
accidental that in the same essay Yourcenar rejects the conventional concept o f humanism for 
promoting the idea o f the superiority o f man over other beings: ‘un mouvement suppose rationaliste et 
lai'que, l’humanisme, au sens recent et abusif du mot, qui pretend n’accorder d ’interet qu’aux 
realisations humaines, herite directement de ce christianisme appauvri, auquel la connaissance et 
l’amour du reste des etres ont ete retires’, (EM, p. 374). As in Heidegger, Yourcenar’s critique o f the 
autonomy o f the rationalist subject and her perception o f man as the custodian o f existence makes her 
sceptical towards the idea o f humanism. Moreover, ‘la connaissance et l ’amour des etres’ is an idea 
that carries the same Christian undertones as Heidegger’s notion o f Care.
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freedom, understood as a disclosive letting-be rather than a sovereign control, is 
precisely the measure that will best safeguard the earth’s ecological diversity and 
health.6
This comes as further proof that Yourcenar’s and Heidegger’s independent 
trajectories of thought indeed meet in some unexpected if consistent ways.
Yourcenar has revisited the idea of guardianship several times in her work. 
Already in ‘Diagnostic de l’Europe’, she wrote of ie s  poetes, gardiens des 
disciplines hereditaires de la pensee’.64 According to this essay, 20th-Century poets 
attempt to emancipate themselves from the role of guardians, as a result of which 
‘leur liberation a les aspects d ’une decheance’. True freedom, Yourcenar implies as 
early as in 1929, is in guardianship and acceptance of the past.
In Memoires, Yourcenar conflated the role of ‘gardien’ with that of ‘maitre’ in 
the following statement by Hadrien: ‘La Grece comptait sur nous pour etre ses 
gardiens, puisqu’enfin nous nous pretendons ses maitres’.65 The point here is not 
simply that Rome would protect Greece from external military threat, but that it 
would maintain the conditions for Greeks to continue and perfect their cultural work 
(‘pour laissez aux Grecs le temps de continuer, et de parfaire, leur oeuvre’).66 There is 
much to be said about ‘the work of the Greeks’ as the limit of representation for both 
Yourcenar and Heidegger. As I will discuss in the next chapter, to be guardian of 
Greece would mean to preserve and safeguard the possibility for man to assign name 
and meaning to things and therefore to have exclusive access to their truth. However, 
within the context of my present argument, I suggest approaching this phrase as an
63 Thiele, 186. Another Heideggerian, Michael Zimmerman, takes Heidegger’s ecological injunction 
even more literally: ‘Already in the 1930s, Heidegger was speaking in a way very congenial to 
contemporary ecological thinkers: both believe that human beings become healthy and whole only 
when they learn how to dwell within the natural world, not when they attempt to subjugate it.’ Michael 
Zimmerman, Eclipse o f  the Self: The Developm ent o f  H eidegger’s Concept o f  Authenticity (Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 1981), p. 168.
64 EM, p. 1654.
65 OR, p. 344.
66 OR, p. 344.
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additional piece of evidence for Yourcenar’s thesis that authentic mastery and 
freedom lies in accepting the legacy of the past.
This point can be further supported by the references to ‘gardiens’ and ‘garde’ in 
the ‘Carnets de notes de Memoires d f Hadrien'. For example, thinking of some 
historians and artists whose work was related to the life and reign of Hadrian, 
Yourcenar notes: ‘Sentiment d ’appartenir a une espece de Gens /.Elia, de faire partie 
de la foule des secretaires du grand homme, de participer a cette releve de la garde 
imperiale que montent les humanistes et les poetes se relayant autour d ’un grand 
souvenir.’67 Behind Yourcenar’s grandiloquence lies a holistic perception of 
temporality which attempts to go beyond simple scholarly respect for history. 
Yourcenar pinpoints the feeling of belonging to a past which has become almost 
personal: it has become a ‘souvenir’ which defies the objectivity of temporal 
distance. It is even implied that the literary work is the actualization of a writer’s 
acceptance of the past. Memoires d'Hadrien would then be not an interpretation of 
emperor Hadrian’s life, but a letting-be of that souvenir, as it recites itself through its 
recipient, the author. This of course brings us back to the idea of Memoires being not 
an original novel but the translation of Hadrien’s dictation to Yourcenar, a central 
metaphor examined in the previous chapter.
The lofty attitude of this passage is counterbalanced by a more subtle comment, 
a few notes down in the same ‘Carnets de notes’. After a visit to the Villa Adriana, 
the emperor Hadrian’s residence in Tivoli, Yourcenar thinks of the thousands of 
‘silent lives’ of beggars, idlers even looters who have lived or passed by the Villa 
since Hadrian’s time. Interestingly, she writes that she happened to see the personal 
items of a shepherd, left at a spot which he had apparently appropriated for himself 
among the ruins. The shepherd is an emblematic reference, and is mentioned again in 
the next note of the ‘Carnets’. Yourcenar’s response to the discovery of the
67 OR, p. 538.
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shepherd’s spot is exactly the same as in the last quotation above: ‘Sensation 
d’humble intimite a peu pres pareille a celle qu’on eprouve au Louvre, apres la 
fermeture, a l’heure ou les lits de sangle des gardiens surgissent au milieu des 
statues.’68 Here, ‘gardiens’ has a metaphorical as well as a literal meaning. The 
shepherd living and working amidst the ruins of the Villa Adriana is compared to the 
museum guards whose job is to protect similar vestiges. Both have a factual, un- 
theoretical relationship with the past and Yourcenar participates in this feeling. It is 
not a question of being reconciled with nature and history: accepting the past is 
described as a humble way of being, whereby what has already happened is part of 
what is happening. Similarly, to be a guardian and a shepherd is not about protecting 
tradition from change and contamination but about understanding oneself as part of 
the past and the past as part of one’s life.
Existence and history
For both Yourcenar and Heidegger, the fusion of ‘inner’ life with ‘external’ history is 
possible thanks to the perception of the self as a dynamic entity which extends 
temporally. In the same way that the self never lives simply in an objective ‘now’ but 
in its own future and past, it also lives in a collective future and past, as Memoires 
d ’Hadrien, perhaps more than any other book by Yourcenar, tries to establish. 
Historically, Hadrien understands himself as a receiver and a deliverer of a heritage. 
On the narrative level, the most obvious way in which this is actualized is the 
epistolary form of the novel. That Memoires is a letter attenuates the solipsism to 
which the notion of authentic selfhood is vulnerable. This is not so much because as 
a letter it is addressed to someone else, but because it communicates a sense of
68 OR, p. 539.
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‘handing down’ on a historical level. The novel reaches considerable depth and 
sophistication because the stress is equally placed on what is handed down -  the 
historical heritage of Greece and Rome -  and on the existential attitude per se of 
accepting this heritage.
Nonetheless, the passage from the existential to the historical and from the 
individual to the collective is not without complications, for both Heidegger and 
Yourcenar. In the rest of this chapter, I shall pursue the dialogue between these two 
thinkers in a more critical spirit. I shall first discuss the relationship between personal 
and collective history in Heidegger and then I shall begin to question Yourcenar’s 
perception of the historico-political subject as it is embodied principally in the figure 
of Hadrien.
The unity of life and history is a central theme of Being and Time, where it is 
interpreted in terms of the derivation of historical time from the temporality of 
Dasein (Division II, Chapter V.) In a manner characteristic of his analytical method, 
Heidegger takes a step beyond the opposition between the inner time of the self and 
the external time of history. The question is not for him to reconcile the two, but to 
re-define historicity in terms of what affects Dasein, anything else being beyond the 
scope of the phenomenological premise. He claims that it is Dasein which affects 
itself, as it exists ecstatically. Dasein extends beyond itself, dwelling in its own future 
and past, and coming back to itself to assume different possible historical meanings. 
In this way, Heidegger attempts to transcend the categories of interiority and 
exteriority. There is nothing external or internal to Dasein, because it always already 
exists in a world. Heidegger can then assert that ‘what is primarily historical is 
Dasein’.69 Dasein does not live within history as it does not live within time. It rather 
exists historically, simply by virtue of existing temporally. In a sense, if existing 
generally means being open to possibilities, each human being as a unique and
69 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 433, emphasis in the original.
199
Chapter 4 - Space, Time
and the Existential Subject
concrete existence chooses to assume a number of concrete possibilities, thus 
expressing himself or herself historically.
Dasein assigns historical meaning to its own Being by assuming such 
possibilities of existence as come down to it in terms of a heritage that it accepts. 
Acceptance of tradition and the past -  the notion in which I am chiefly interested here 
-  is an act and an attitude substantiated in and by the self. The possibilities offered to 
the self through what Heidegger calls heritage -  Erbe -  belong to the self and not to a 
putative past which is over and done with. By accepting tradition and the past, Dasein 
essentially accepts itself. This is the first movement in the process of self- 
historicizing of Dasein, which determines Dasein’s ‘fate’. Fate (Schicksal) defines 
paradoxically man’s freedom to negotiate with those aspects of tradition which 
maintain their relevance and urgency with regard to the finiteness of existence. 
Heidegger defines fate as ‘Dasein’s primordial historizing, which lies in authentic 
resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a 
possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen’.70
Heidegger’s discussion of the historicity of individual Dasein in Being and Time 
is followed by an analysis of the historicity of communities and peoples. This is the 
second movement in Dasein’s effort to understand history as part of its own structure. 
Communities and peoples are considered as collective entities which exist 
historically and project their own history in the same way that Dasein historicizes 
itself. However, the projection of individual to collective history and of existential to 
historical time is not entirely convincing. In what follows, I shall discuss briefly the 
problems involved in Heidegger’s attempt to understand history on the basis, 
ultimately, of individual Dasein. Subsequently, I shall establish a parallel between 
Dasein as the fundamental agent of history and the figure of Hadrien, the authentic 
hero and leader of Memoires d'Hadrien. I shall thus begin to challenge the subtle
70 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 435, emphasis in the original.
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coordination of the existential and the political in Yourcenar’s text. In the present 
context, this interrogation will take the form of a number of questions, which will be 
further addressed and answered in the following chapter.
If fate designates the ‘primordial historizing’ of Dasein, and does so in a manner 
which is directly and explicitly linked to Dasein’s self-temporalization, things are not 
equally clear in Heidegger’s account of ‘co-historizing’ as the ‘historizing of the 
community, of a people’.71 He calls this process ‘destiny’ (Geschick, a word which is 
etymologically linked with both Schicksal and Geschichte, history). He specifies that 
the destiny of a people does not consist of the sum of individual fates, but is a form 
of historizing of Dasein as Being-with-Others. Paul Ricceur summarized and 
criticized this point as follows:
Tout indique que Heidegger s’est borne ici a suggerer l’idee d’une homologie entre 
destinee communautaire et destin individuel, et a esquisser le transfert des memes 
notations d’un plan a l ’autre : heritage d’un fonds de potentialites, resolutions, etc., -  
quitte a marquer la place en creux de categories plus specifiquement appropriees a 
l’etre-en-commun : lutte, obeissance combattante, loyaute.72
There is certainly not much in Being and Time that refutes Ricceur’s suggestion. The 
transition from fate to destiny is not adequately described, while the notion of co- 
historizing indeed seems to designate the historical self-affection of a community, 
understood as collective Dasein.
In a footnote to the passage quoted above, Ricceur suggests that Heidegger’s 
failure to account for history on a collective level can be linked to his one-time pro- 
Nazi affiliation. More specifically, Ricceur identifies the problem in the transfer to 
the sphere of the community of the existential theme of Being-for-death. As a result 
of this transfer, Heidegger thinks of the community, and specifically of the German 
Volk, as an entity envisaging its own dissolution in the same way that individual 
Dasein envisages its death. The community is thus understood in terms of its desire
71 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 436.
72 Paul Ricceur, p. 138. Ricceur uses the established translations in French o f Schicksal as destin  
(individuel) and o f Geschick as destinee (communautaire).
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for heroic and fateful self-becoming, which, Ricceur implies, brings Heidegger closer 
to the National Socialists.
The case of Heidegger’s engagement with the Nazi party is of particular interest 
for my study because it reveals the aporias and risks involved in attempting to 
understand history in terms of individual existence. Paradoxically, when Dasein is 
taken out of in its ‘proper’ existential context and transferred to the level of politics 
and history, it transforms from a dynamic absence to a violent and appropriative 
presence. Commenting on one of Heidegger’s strongest pronouncements in favour of 
the Nazis, his 1933 Rectoral Address, Jiirgen Habermas made a similar point to that 
of Ricceur:
If [Heidegger] had hitherto used ‘Dasein’ in an unmistakable way for the existentially 
isolated individual on his course toward Death, now he substitutes for this “in-each- 
case-mine” Dasein the collective Dasein o f a fatefully existing and “in-each-case-our” 
people [Volk]. All the existential categories stay the same and yet with one stroke they 
change their very meaning -  and not just the horizon o f their expressive 
significance.73
Thus, Heidegger’s claim that collective history can be understood on the basis of 
individual existence is a bold but not entirely consistent interpretation. As a result of 
this interpretation, individual Dasein assumes the character of the Fiihrer, or 
transforms into the German Volk.
As I shall discuss in the following chapter, there are elements in Memoires 
suggesting that Yourcenar also attempted to translate the existential into the historical 
in a way that parallels the historicization of Dasein in Being and Time. It is possible 
to establish an analogy between the historico-political subject in Heidegger and that 
in Yourcenar. There is an existential kinship between, on the one hand, Heidegger’s 
Fiihrer and Volk, and on the other, the leader (Hadrien) and the community (the 
Roman Empire) which define the historical and political context of Memoires.
73 Jiirgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse o f  Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. by Frederick 
G. Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 157.
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The overall consequences of this situation for the existential-historical fiction of 
Marguerite Yourcenar are crucial. The intersection between existence and history 
proves to be the point of origin of the authentic hero of the narrative. Could it be that 
this hero is blind to the way history is not only determined by the self but also 
determinative of it, in a way that transcends the distinction between authentic and 
inauthentic selfhood? Does Hadrien, the most historical, heroic and ‘fateful’ figure in 
Yourcenar’s fiction, fail to suspect the otherness of history, namely, the fact that it 
cannot be entirely grasped by the self -  whether or not the self is understood as 
Dasein? Consequently, does Yourcenar’s powerful perception of authenticity, much 
as it does justice to the impurity and disorder of factical existence, apply after all only 
to a universalized humanist subject? This perception of subjectivity would risk the 
exclusion of other non-anthropocentric, non-Westem cultures, other approaches to 
life, such as animality and irrationality, that the subject cannot adequately represent 
in and for itself. To that extent, there may be totalitarian aspects to the Yourcenarian 
political subject which warrant further investigation. While I am not implying that 
this subject should be interpreted in exclusively Heideggerian terms as the Fiihrer 
and heroic leader of the community, the character of Hadrien could represent aspects 
of selfhood that are less ‘authentic’ than the Yourcenarian text initially suggests.
In the same critical spirit, it may be asked whether the notions of ‘accepting’ and 
‘guarding’ one’s ‘heritage’ intimate one’s exclusive commitment to one’s culture and 
history in such a way that elements that are not part of one’s heritage remain foreign 
and forgotten. By accepting what is ‘handed down’ to one, for example, the art, 
literature and philosophy that belong to one’s language and culture, one is bound to 
repeat only those ‘possibilities of existence’ that are already available to one and can 
therefore be measured against the criterion of existential authenticity. These 
questions concern equally Heidegger and Yourcenar, for they both insisted on the 
possibility of authenticity as the commitment to accepting, repeating and re­
constructing the past.
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The discussion on the historicity of Dasein in Being and Time concludes with the 
concept of repetition, which defines how Dasein becomes engaged in a discussion 
with the historical past. Repetition establishes the continuity of history through the 
succession of interpretations and re-evaluations of structures of meaning that have 
reached each thinking subject from the past. Every Dasein has to come to terms with 
these structures, and ‘repeat’ them in such a way as to test their solidity in relation to 
the bare facticity of its own ‘there’. Repetition thus contains a moment of reclaiming, 
explicitly appropriating, the past for the purpose of asking every time more 
concretely the question of existence. Therefore, repetition is the Heideggerian 
concept that comes closest of all to Yourcenar’s idea of acceptation / acquiescement. 
Authentic repetition is the process by which Dasein accepts and questions the past as 
representation. Through repetition the self understands the past as something new, 
something to be actively reclaimed from the future.
Heidegger’s intricate logic leads Ricceur to write that the concept of repetition 
‘rouvre le passe en direction de l’a-venir’.74 This remark mirrors accurately Hadrien’s 
thought after the consecration of the Olympeion, as quoted above: ‘le passe retrouvait 
un visage d ’avenir.’ In its simplicity and metaphoricity, this phrase can be interpreted 
more generally than we attempted earlier. It is possible to formulate Yourcenar’s 
implication as follows: Rome led by Hadrien initiates a renegotiation with classical 
Greece through the consecration of the Olympeion and other works of cultural re­
construction by Hadrien. Rome appropriates for itself the Greek past which is not 
historically its own, but which belongs to it now, insofar as only it, Rome, can see 
through the layers of representations because of which Greece appears to recede to 
distant history. By doing so, Rome enters into a conversation with a unique culture 
which is based on things themselves, rather than on representations of things. Rome
74 Ricceur, p. 139.
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is ready to re-enact Greece, and its future is announced by Hadrien in terms of its 
commitment to do so.
With this hypothesis, which I shall elaborate and support further in the next 
chapter, I do not seek to articulate a historical argument on Roman history. I am 
rather attempting to reproduce an assumption, perhaps also a conviction, held by 
Yourcenar at the time of the writing of Memoires d ’Hadrien. This assumption is not 
limited to the way Yourcenar may have understood Rome and Greece, but is relevant 
to her philosophical and cultural analysis of contemporary Europe. As I have already 
suggested, Yourcenar wishes to initiate an un-mediated debate with Rome and 
Greece, beyond any sentiment of nostalgia for the past or vague passion for antiquity. 
This is conveyed by the metaphor of Memoires being a ‘dictation’ which was then 
‘translated’ by Yourcenar. Working on the basis of an analogy between contemporary 
Europe and ancient Rome, Yourcenar invites the (Western) reader to retrieve the 
Greek past and make it her own ‘again’, in the same way that Hadrien reclaims 
Greece for Rome. Yet the question remains as to whether the existential framework 
of this operation does in fact allow for the retrieval of the past and ensure access to 
things themselves, as Yourcenar hoped.
In one of her very few references to Heidegger, Yourcenar points accurately to the 
element which links her thought with that of the German philosopher: the 
construction and deconstruction of representation in time. In a short letter to Jean 
Beaufret, who had sent her a copy of Questions IV, a collection of essays and 
seminars by Heidegger translated into French by Beaufret and others, she praises the 
‘noyau brulant de la philosophic de Heidegger’, which she contrasts to popular 
versions of existentialism, then still dominant in French intellectual life. The letter is 
dated 17 October 1976, that is, a few months after Heidegger’s death. Yourcenar 
continues as follows:
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J’ai ete tres sensible, chez le philosophe, a la recherche d’une sorte de perception 
originelle a travers l ’etymologie [. ..].  Ay ant un peu -  tres peu -  approche du Sanscrit, 
je me rends mieux compte de cette fascination du mot ‘originel’, tel que Heidegger le 
rencontre chez les pre-socratiques, oil le mot est encore tout pres d’une part de l ’acte, 
et de 1’autre des choses. Un peu traductrice moi-meme, je puis me rendre compte de la 
reussite qu’il y a a faire passer ces notions de base dans une langue aussi 
intellectualisee que la notre.75
This paragraph brings together some of the major themes driving the thought of both 
Yourcenar and Heidegger: the need to return to the things themselves; the abstractive 
character of linguistic representation; the inquiry into the poietic function of words; 
the identification of Greece as the topos of linguistic and cultural originality; the 
perception of contemporary culture as a palimpsest of conceptual interpretations; and 
finally the mediatory role of translation in the recovery of original meanings.76
These themes lie behind Yourcenar’s next comment, or rather, her expression of 
surprise in finding how relevant to her thought the Heideggerian notion of destruction 
is. Yourcenar writes: ‘J ’ai ete frappee, p. 271, par une remarque de Heidegger qui 
recoupe L ’CEuvre au noir alchimique, prise par moi comme metaphore centrale d’un 
de mes livres.’ The editors of Yourcenar’s Lettres quote the relevant remark from 
Questions IV, in which Heidegger explains that destruction has to be understood in 
the sense of de-faire and not of devaster. The French text that impressed Yourcenar 
reads as follows: ‘Mais qu’est-ce qui se defait ? Reponse : ce qui recouvre le sens de 
l’etre, les structures accumulees les unes sur les autres et qui masquent le sens de 
l’etre. La Destruction vise alors la decouverte du sens initial de l’etre.’77 Destruction 
is a moment in the dialogue with the past which involves the de-construction of 
ontological concepts which have reached us historically, in the express effort to 
uncover the truth of Being.78 Destruction is thus related with Heidegger’s
75 Letter to Jean Beaufret, 17 October, 1976, pp. 661-662, in Lettres a ses amis et quelques autres, p. 
660.
76 On the function o f translation in Heidegger, see Andrew Benjamin, Translation and the Nature o f  
Philosophy, Chapter 1, T h e Literal and the Figural Translated’, pp. 9-38.
77 Lettres a ses amis et quelques autres, p. 660-61 and 6 6 In. The quotation is from Beaufret’s 
recapitulation o f Heidegger’s ‘Seminaire du Thor’ o f 1969, now in Martin Heidegger, Questions III et 
IV, trans. by Jean Beaufret et al. (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), p. 426.
78 The concept o f Destruktion is discussed in Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 44f.
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understanding of truth as unconcealment (a-letheia), an idea which evidently 
presupposes that there is a truth waiting to be unconcealed. On the other hand, 
destruction is connected with repetition in the sense that it brings again to the 
attention of Dasein hidden meanings and manifestations of Being in older 
philosophical traditions which may have passed unnoticed by their authors. Thus 
destruction does not in fact ‘destroy’ anything else than the perception of Being in the 
present. It is this positive dimension of destruction that Yourcenar appreciates in 
Heidegger, because it agrees with her concept of acceptation.
One must embrace not only the idea of the hiddenness of Being -  the existential- 
phenomenological assumption -, but also the accumulated structures of signification 
behind which the meaning of Being lies hidden. The metaphorical meaning of 
destruction as it dissolves into acceptance is emphasized by Yourcenar more than it is 
by Heidegger. Indeed, L ’CEuvre au noir, to which Yourcenar refers in her letter to 
Beaufret, is based on the metaphor of alchemy, a practice involving different stages 
of negative and positive work, in search of the philosopher’s stone. In the novel, this
79process is summed up by the expression ‘Solve et coagula’. Alchemy stands for the 
process of removing superimposed layers of interpretation, until a primordial truth -  
‘le sens de l’etre’ -  is finally exposed. It becomes evident that Yourcenar understood 
Questions IV  in a way which touches basic questions of being, meaning and 
representation. Her letter to Beaufret suggests an unexpectedly profound and 
conscious kinship of thought between her and Heidegger.
It must be emphasized that Yourcenar’s recovery of ‘truth’ in her fiction can 
never be reduced to a simple essentialist thesis on sexuality, ethnicity, race and so on. 
Significantly, no philosopher’s stone is ever found in L ’CEuvre au noir. This most 
enigmatic of Yourcenar’s novels finishes with Zenon’s suicide, an act of self- 
knowledge, for sure, but not one of definite (dis)closure of meaning. The alchemical
79 OR, p. 702.
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80process never goes further than its first stage, Voeuvre au noir. This serves as a 
further reminder that when we suspect the presence of a universalized subject in 
Yourcenar, we should not look for any essence neatly enveloped within layers of 
cultural meaning. The self-authentication of the hero does not add meaning to his 
existence, but resides in his reconciliation with his impurity, his facticity, which is 
devoid of ethical, psychological or other content. At the end of Memoires d ’Hadrien, 
of L ’CEuvre au noir and of Un homme obscur, the principal character dies alone 
having recovered no sense of identity, cultural, political, sexual, and so on, but an 
elementary sense of belonging to a factical world. The dying hero has the paradoxical 
beauty that Yourcenar noticed in ruins, in that he represents allegorically man’s 
belonging to the world, but symbolizes nothing.
There is no surplus meaning to be derived from the image of the dying hero other 
than the self-evidence -  on which Heidegger above all insisted -  that one dies one’s 
own death. Yet Yourcenar clearly admires her heroes and invites her readers to 
participate in her admiration. This much is clear from her interviews, the ‘Carnets de 
notes’ which supplement Memoires d ’Hadrien, and the ‘Carnets de notes’ at the end 
of L ’CEuvre au noir*1 This admiration that culminates in the death of the hero has 
inspired the following remark from ‘Carnets de notes de L ’CEuvre au noir :
Rien de plus secret ni de plus difficile a atteindre que la notion authentique d’un Dieu 
personnel (ou personnalise) qui s’etale un peu partout sous ses formes stereotypees. 
(L'Isvara des yogis hindous.) Zenon y arrive (ou en tout cas arrive a l’entrevoir en 
tant qu’hypothese) deux ou trois heures avant sa mort.82
In spite of the parentheses, used to denote Yourcenar’s reservations and protect her 
thesis from too literal an interpretation, the positive goal of self-authentication in the
80 The alchemical process involves two further stages, I’oeuvre au blanc and Voeuvre au rouge. See 
OR, p. 702-703.
81 Yourcenar has spoken and written with admiration especially about Hadrien and Zenon on numerous 
occasions. By way o f example, see her interview with Bernard Pivot, when she talks about ‘La 
grandeur d ’Hadrien’ (p. 239), and says about Zenon, ‘On a l’impression d ’un temperament presque 
indestructible’, (p. 245). Maurice Delcroix (ed.), M arguerite Yourcenar: Portrait d ’une voix.
82 OR, p. 863. The ‘Carnets de notes de L ’CEuvre au noir was first published posthumously in La 
Nouvelle Revue Franqaise, in two parts: No 452 (sept. 90), p. 38-53; and No 453 (oct. 90), p. 54-67.
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face of death is at the heart of Yourcenar’s existentialism. The same theme is 
fundamental to Heidegger’s existential anthropology. Critical and more specifically 
deconstructive evaluations of Heidegger’s concepts of truth and authenticity can thus 
contribute to our appreciation of the same concepts in Yourcenar.
This final part of my thesis can take different forms. For example, it would now 
be possible to focus more intensely on the question of temporality and see how the 
problem of reconciling existential and historical time, a weak point of Being and 
Time, affects Yourcenar’s historiography, her method of re-capturing the past as a 
writer and her strategy for ensuring narrative authenticity in the historical novel. 
Alternatively, it is possible to trace and record in more detail than we have done so 
far certain typical Heideggerian themes in the development of Yourcenar’s main 
fictional characters, namely, their sense of the inauthenticity of philosophical, ethical, 
psychological and religious interpretations of life, their dealing with the past and 
their coming to terms with the idea of death, on the way to authentic selfhood. Within 
the contours of my thesis, I propose instead to evaluate the aesthetic and political 
ramifications of existential authenticity in Yourcenar, having in mind the cultural 
context of modernity in which she and Heidegger are placed, and choosing as 
principal work of reference Memoires d ’Hadrien. I shall approach more critically 
Heidegger’s and Yourcenar’s direct or indirect claims that authentic selfhood 
transcends representation while always remaining a hostage to it. Based on 
deconstructive criticism of Heidegger by Lacoue-Labarthe and Lyotard, I shall 
attempt to show that the definition of existential and political authenticity 
necessitates the arbitrary marginalization and exclusion of elements which refuse, or 
are not able, to conform to the vision of authentic subjectivity in Memoires 
d ’Hadrien.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Y o u r c e n a r ’s P o l it ic a l  A e st h e t ic ism  
a n d  A m b iv a l e n t  D is c o u r s e  o f  Id e n t it y
In Memoires d ’Hadrien, the narrative of the search for authenticity has a double 
focus. On the one hand it concentrates on the human subject, Hadrien, and his 
struggle for self-formation. One of the major challenges to Hadrien’s sense of 
identity comes from personal biography, in the form of his doomed love for 
Antinoiis. An even more demanding arena is that of statesmanship. In Hadrien’s 
effort to re-structure the state through legislation, in his cultural policy, centred on 
the revival of the Greek spirit, and even in his defensive military action, which aims 
at pacifying the world, we may discern the signs of a strategy of existential self­
containment and authentication. Within the internal logic of the novel, the Roman 
Empire and the city of Rome in particular can be considered as projections of the self 
which define the phenomenal limits of consciousness. Moreover, if Antinoiis 
constitutes a challenge, it is because he presents Hadrien with an opportunity -  
entirely missed, as we shall see -  to perceive the human subject in its absolute and 
irreducible otherness, beyond the project of authentication.
On the other hand, the narrative of Memoires d ’Hadrien focuses on the political 
subject which, in the framework of the novel, takes the form of Rome. In addition to 
their function as metaphors for the psyche and the self in general, the empire and its 
capital are represented as historical and geopolitical formations which also tend
2 1 0
Chapter 5 -  Political Aestheticism
towards self-authentication. The meaning of authenticity at the level of the state is 
less well defined by Yourcenar and more difficult to establish, but its importance in 
the novel cannot be overstated. In the opening chapter of Memoires, it is made clear 
that Rome is in a state of crisis which affects above all the possibility of making valid 
statements. In the absence of any standard metaphysical referent and with the gods of 
antiquity unable to guarantee the veracity of any judgement, Rome has to look in 
itself and strive to realize its inherent potential. Indeed, the triptych proposed by 
Hadrien, Humanitas, Felicitas, Libertas, defines the political objective in an 
immanent way.1 As I mentioned already (e.g. in Chapter 2, with reference to the 
temple of the Olympeion in Athens), the model which Hadrien’s Rome is invited to 
follow in its path to authenticity is Greece. Memoires describes Rome’s re­
negotiation with its Hellenic heritage under Hadrien, as well as its effort to retrieve 
its political identity without having recourse to imaginary or symbolic 
representations. This is also a wager that Hadrien ultimately loses. However, as 
Yourcenar has suggested in her interviews and as the immediate success of the novel 
arguably confirms, this challenge was still very relevant to Europe as a newly 
ambitious geopolitical formation in the years after the Second World War.
The human subject and the political subject are brought together in the character 
of Hadrien in a way which implies that they are in any case inseparable. Still, the 
pursuit of authenticity at the level of the state is modelled on the pursuit of 
authenticity at the level of individual existence. I came to this view in Chapter 1, 
while examining the perception of freedom that infiltrates Memoires. My conclusion 
there was that freedom for Hadrien means above all freedom to accept that we only 
have access to the world through a process of conceptual representation. Moreover, I 
suggested that the best way to understand the paradoxical form of freedom proposed
1 ‘Humanitas, Felicitas, Libertas : ces beaux mots qui figurent sur les monnaies de mon regne, je ne 
les ai pas inventes. N ’importe quel philosophe grec, presque tout Romain cultive se propose du monde 
la meme image que m oi’ (OR, p. 372).
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by Yourcenar is through the aesthetic theory that infiltrates her fiction and criticism. 
Yourcenar recognizes that politics (just as philosophy, historiography and poetry) has 
generally been based on the erroneous assumption that artistic creation is possible, 
despite the evidence to the contrary offered by the spectacle of ruins. Because politics 
uses the paradigm of artistic creation and because art as creativity is necessarily 
doomed to fail its stated purpose, Hadrien envisages a new kind of politics which 
does not oppose this (dis)order of things. This politics does not aspire to the 
construction and mastery of a new world but to reconstruction and collaboration with 
the past.
However, this chapter will argue that there is a marked disparity between the 
philosophy of politics announced in Memoires d ’Hadrien and Hadrien’s political 
programme and actions as they are narrated in this novel. The politics of acceptance 
and recognition of difference appears to be theoretically consistent, and indeed 
operates well in certain privileged contexts, including that of the relationship 
between Rome and Greece. Yet this politics is strenuously tested and ultimately fails 
when Hadrien attempts to implement it on cultures and peoples located at or beyond 
the margins of the empire, such as the ‘barbarian’ populations and especially the 
Jews. This failure has a metaphorical sense. It suggests that the idea of ‘difference’ 
on which political authenticity rests is still defined in an essentialist way, and 
excludes incompatible, wholly irreconcilable versions of subjectivity. The Jews 
introduce an element of absolute alterity with which, I shall submit, the novel does 
not fully come to terms. The narrative of Hadrien’s Jewish wars distances itself from 
the cause of the Jews and highlights instead the drama of Hadrien as he reluctantly 
inflicts violence on them. Despite this violence, the novel insists that Hadrien’s 
politics celebrates difference and helps ensure personal and political authenticity.
In the present chapter, I shall stress the ambivalence of Yourcenar’s discourse of 
difference and political identity. I shall locate and discuss instances of alterity that the 
narrative of Memoires d ’Hadrien refuses to recognize as such. The political
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aestheticism that infiltrates this novel will be interrogated in the context of the 
aesthetic perception of politics in the West, a perception inspired by a 
characteristically modem understanding of Greek art and philosophy. I shall begin by 
examining the idea of the universality of Greece in Yourcenar.
The universality of Greece
In the following passage from Memoires, Hadrien refers to the Greek origin of his 
political ambition.
II me semblait parfois que l’esprit grec n’avait pas pousse jusqu’a leurs extremes 
conclusions les premisses de son propre genie : les moissons restaient a faire ; les epis 
murs au soleil et deja coupes etaient peu de chose a cote de la promesse eleusinienne 
du grain cache dans cette belle terre. Meme chez mes sauvages ennemis sarmates, 
j ’avais trouve des vases au pur profil, un miroir ome d’une image d’Apollon, des 
lueurs grecques comme un pale soleil sur la neige. J’entrevoyais la possibility 
d’helleniser les barbares, d’atticiser Rome, d’imposer doucement au monde la seule 
culture qui se soit un jour separee du monstrueux, de 1’informe, de 1’immobile, qui ait 
invente une definition de la methode, une theorie de la politique et de la beaute.2
While this passage speaks for itself in terms of Hadrien’s aspiration to spread the 
Greek culture to the world, two specific points have to be stressed. Firstly, further 
evidence is offered here to support the claim that Yourcenar understands politics 
through aesthetics. This idea is implied by the references to works of art ( ‘des vases 
au pur profil, un miroir’) in the context of politics and war; by the suggested 
identification of the ‘barbarians’ with disorder and the lack of art {le monstrueux, 
I ’ informe, V immobile)', and finally by the bringing together of politique and beaute in 
the last phrase of the quotation. Secondly and more to the point, Rome is not simply 
inspired by the paradigm of Greece, it also understands itself as Greece’s organic heir 
and the political enforcer of its spirit. If Greece defined the theory and the method,
2 OR, p. 344.
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Rome has the historical mission to universalize the subject of Greek aesthetics and to 
implement it, even impose it, on the known world. To use Yourcenar’s metaphor of 
light ( ‘le soleil’, ie s  lueurs’), we may put forward that Hadrien’s dream is to shed the 
Greek light to all dark comers of the world, so that everything comes into form and 
consciousness.
The aesthetico-political role of Rome is also attested in other parts of the novel. 
At a subsequent point, Yourcenar specifies how Rome understands itself as the 
institutional force that transforms the Greek aesthetic spirit into political praxis:
[. . .] il m’arrivait de me dire que le serieux un peu lourd de Rome, son sens de la 
continuite, son gout du concret, avaient ete necessaires pour transformer en realite ce 
qui restait en Grece une admirable vue de 1’esprit, un bel elan de Fame. Platon avait 
ecrit La Republique et glorifie l ’idee du juste, mais c ’est nous qui, instruits par nos 
propres erreurs, nous efforcions peniblement de faire de l ’Etat une machine apte a 
servir les hommes, et risquant le moins possible de les broyer.3
Hadrien continues with several further examples of the way in which Rome 
decidedly transformed the Greek intention into action. It is always worth noticing the 
presence of the aesthetic parameter in Yourcenar’s discourse about the State: here, 
she describes Greek thought as ‘une admirable vue de l’esprit, un bel elan de Fame’.
This eminently aesthetic view lies behind Hadrien’s next remark in the same 
paragraph. Deliberating on the importance of the different cultures that were under 
Roman sovereignty (Spain, Africa, ‘[les] gouttes de sang celte, ibere, punique’), he 
points out: ‘La Grece m ’avait aide a evaluer ces elements, qui n ’etaient pas grecs. II 
en allait de meme d’Antinoiis ; j ’avais fait de lui l’image meme de ce pays passionne 
de beaute ; e ’en serait peut-etre le dernier dieu.’4 This statement expresses clearly 
what has hitherto been a suspicion in the novel, namely that Greece does not simply 
define the values and assessment standards of the Roman political project, but it does 
so in an exclusive manner. Foreign peoples and cultures are appreciated by Hadrien 
and accepted in the universal Roman family to the extent that they are compatible
3 OR, p. 459.
4 OR, p. 459-60.
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with, and comprehensible by, the Greek spirit. To be sure, the Greek paradigm is here 
chosen because of its supposed receptivity and inclusiveness of barbarian elements. 
However, one cannot help but discern in Hadrien’s principles a colonial attitude of 
appropriation and therefore of forgetfulness or indifference towards what remains 
alien.
These remarks do not necessarily suggest that Yourcenar’s own perception of 
Greece coincides with the one expressed in Memoires d ’Hadrien. Emperor Hadrian’s 
philhellenism and his dedication to the revival and spreading of Greek culture are 
historical facts which had to be emphasized and interpreted in the novel. Moreover, 
we know that Yourcenar studied and valued other cultures, notably the Japanese and 
the Chinese, which are not originally related with the Greek vision of the world. This 
certainly indicates that Yourcenar was able to distance herself from what I am 
discussing here as Greek aesthetics, however formative her classical European 
background was. What is more, she was a persistent critic of the (still problematic) 
reduction of the manifold faces of ancient Greece into one idealized version of ‘the 
Greek miracle’. In her introduction to La Couronne et la lyre, her book of 
translations of Greek lyric poetry, she discusses the reasons for this phenomenon, 
particularly in France:
Les querelles entre partisans des Anciens (categorie ou Ton fourrait pele-mele 
Hesiode et Menandre, sans parler d’Horace et de Lucain) et sectateurs des Modemes, 
suivies du long debat Classiques-Romantiques, vain partout et interminable en France, 
puis d’affrontements ideologiques et scolaires ou l ’hellenisme etait mis en cause, ont 
contribue a creer une serie de stereotypes de la Grece [...].
Yourcenar enumerates some of these stereotypes and concludes as follows:
En faite, l ’etonnante richesse de la Grece, et de la poesie que la Grece nous a laissee, 
est que les experiences les plus diverses y ont ete tentees, et que ses poetes en on 
enregistre une bonne part.5
5 Marguerite Yourcenar, La Couronne et la lyre: Anthologie de la poesie grecque ancienne (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1979), pp. 14-15. In the same introduction, Yourcenar also rejects the thesis o f the 
superiority o f Greek culture in relation to other literary traditions, including that o f modern Europe. 
See especially pp. 38-40. ‘Vue dans ces perspectives, la poesie grecque a cesse de pouvoir etre 
consideree comme Pun des aspects d ’un unique et inexplicable « miracle grec »’, p. 40.
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Emphasis is placed on the diversity of the ways that Greeks experienced life and 
represented it artistically and poetically. It is because of this diversity and richness 
that Yourcenar can write in Memoires that Hadrien could understand and appreciate 
other cultures on the basis of Greek values. Nevertheless, it is also true that because 
of its admirable inclusiveness, Greek thought assumes for Yourcenar the specific 
character of universality. The result is that this thought does not simply relegate those 
‘incomprehensible’ cultures, experiences or forms of aesthetics to the category of 
‘barbarian’, but it also suppresses them and renders them invisible.
This point will become more evident in my discussion of Memoires o f  Hadrien 
in the present chapter. But it is interesting to see how in other parts of her work as 
well Yourcenar stresses both the diversity and the exclusive universality of Greece. 
For example, in her short 1936 essay ‘A quelqu’un qui me demandait si la pensee 
grecque vaut encore pour nous’, which was re-published, and therefore re-endorsed, 
in 1970, she compares Greece with China, a parallel system of universal values.
[De] meme que la Grece, [la Chine] a su formuler au cours des siecles toutes les vues 
possibles sur la metaphysique et la vie, le social et le sacre, et offrir aux problemes de 
la condition humaine des solutions variees, convergeantes ou paralleles, ou souvent 
diametralement opposees, entre lesquelles 1’esprit peut choisir. Grecques comme 
chinoises, leur valeur, comme celle d ’une equation algebrique, demeure inchangee, 
quelles que soient les realites particulieres auxquelles chaque generation 1’applique.6
Here the paradoxical meaning of diversity is revealed in all its philosophical breadth 
and historical narrowness. As it becomes clear from the italicized parts, Yourcenar 
thinks that each of the Greek and the Chinese perspectives covers sufficiently all 
possible areas of experience and offers interpretations which can be applied in all 
historical situations with invariable effectiveness. As always, Yourcenar’s point 
should not be misconstrued as the expression of a simple nostalgia for the antiquity 
or even as an underestimation of the complexity and the mystery of ‘the human 
condition’. If anything, it is the outcome of her extensive study and knowledge of
6 EM, p. 431, my emphasis. This essay appears as part o f a larger essay which Yourcenar entitled 
‘Grece et S icile’, and which is included in her collection En pelerin et en etranger { 1989).
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Greek poetry and art. Nevertheless, even allowing for the broadest interpretation, this 
approach betrays her reluctance or inability to consider situations that remain at the 
margin of these ‘universal’ frames of reference, or wholly outside them.
Once more, I would like to discuss the aesthetic references in the above passage, 
as I believe that it is the aesthetic factor which gives such breadth to Yourcenar’s 
perspective, while at the same time enclosing and limiting it. In her effort to 
emphasize the diversity of the Greek and Chinese solutions available to modem man, 
Yourcenar uses the example of different geometrical figures - parallel and convergent 
lines and the circle, conveying the ideas of sequence, identity and opposition. These 
aesthetic analogies suggest and determine an imaginary area within which ideas may 
only be part of comprehensible structures, even if things themselves are not. This 
eminently Greek representation leaves one wondering as to whether all possible 
‘problems’ or situations accept such interpretations, as Yourcenar seems to suggest.
If we now return to Memoires d ’Hadrien, we shall see that the discourse of the 
universality and vast inclusiveness of Greek thinking is here reiterated in terms of 
Greek art. In the chapter entitled ‘Tellus stabilita’, where the discussion of construire 
and reconstruire is also to be found, we read Hadrien’s meditation on the visual arts 
of his time. It is specified that by the word art Hadrien means Greek art: ‘notre art 
(j’entends celui des Grecs).’8 In the following passage, the domain of the arts is 
represented as a sphere, another geometrical shape, which draws attention to its 
perfection and inclusiveness, while at the same time excluding all that lies outside of 
it:
7 Yourcenar makes a similar point in Souvenirs pieux (EM, p. 875): ‘J’ai cru vers ma vingtieme annee 
[...]  que la reponse grecque aux questions humaines etait la meilleure, sinon la seule. J’ai compris plus 
tard qu’il n’y avait pas de reponse grecque, mais une serie de reponses venues des Grecs entre 
lesquelles il fau t choisir.' Notice how Yourcenar radicalizes here, as in the passage quoted above, an 
otherwise perfectly acceptable argument, by adding the last phrase which I have emphasized. 
Souvenirs Pieux is the first part o f Yourcenar’s autobiographical trilogy, Le Labyrinthe du monde. 
Marguerite Yourcenar, Souvenirs Pieux (Paris: Gallimard, 1974).
8 OR, p. 388.
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Notre art est parfait, c ’est-a-dire accompli, mais sa perfection est susceptible de 
modulations aussi variees que celles d’une voix pure : a nous de jouer ce jeu habile 
qui consiste a se rapprocher ou a s ’eloigner perpetuellement de cette solution trouvee 
une fois pour toutes, d’aller jusqu’au bout de la rigueur ou de l ’exces, d’enfermer 
d’innombrables constructions nouvelles a l ’interieur de cette belle sphere.9
This is a problematic assertion regardless of whether emperor Hadrian, the historical 
subject of the book, had a similar view of art and the future of art. What needs to be 
interrogated is rather a perception of Greek art which is also present in Yourcenar’s 
critical essays and which is here expressed through Hadrien’s reduction of all 
possible artistic diversity into an original Greek archetype. The ideas of artistic 
rigueur and exces may be construed as specific references, respectively, to 17th/ l8 th- 
Century European art, and to aspects of modem art, especially surrealism. Whether 
this is so or not, Greek art and thought appears to be for Yourcenar the archetype of 
universality and the measure of all originality, at least as far as Western culture is 
concerned.
This situation has major implications for the principle of reconstruire, which 
sums up Yourcenar’s innovative determination of representation. While she spends a 
large part of her criticism and fictional work arguing that true art can only be 
reconstruction and acceptance of the past, her argument seems to be anchored in a 
more fundamental concept of artistic originality that escapes philosophical and 
aesthetic revisionism. Even if we accept that Greek art and thought bear the mark of 
authenticity, in that they offer us a comprehensive report of the human condition in 
all its facticity and finiteness, does it follow that this art and thought represent the 
human subject in an exclusive and inevitable way? Would this not amount to saying 
that total representation has been possible at least once in history and that it is only 
we, the descendants of this classicism (including Hadrien), who suffer the ironic 
effect of time? The philosophical inferences of these questions are indeed easy to 
draw. Greek thought and art are here represented not as the absolute answer to the
9 OR, p. 388.
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question of existence, but as the sum of all possible formulations of this question. 
The thought of Being is possible not through metaphysical reduction but through the 
different and exhaustive ways in which the Greek people opened themselves up to 
the question of existence. It certainly seems that the thought of Being which always 
escapes modem man has been identified by Yourcenar specifically with Greek 
thought and aesthetics.
Modernity and political aestheticism in Yourcenar
Keeping this conclusion in mind, let us now turn to Yourcenar’s political 
aestheticism in its relation to contemporary perceptions of politics and aesthetics in 
the West. This question has been tackled with some subtlety by Erin G. Carlston in 
Thinking Fascism: Sapphic Modernism and Fascist Modernity, to which I referred in 
Chapter 3. Carlston’s argument is that, while speaking as a political and cultural 
liberalist, Yourcenar used reactionary ideological categories in a way that aligns her 
with the antimodemist writings of Spengler, Barres and Maurras, and even with the 
flawed (in the writer’s opinion) analysis of fascism by Croce and Arendt.10 To 
support her claim, Carlston examines especially ‘Diagnostic de 1’Europe’ and Denier 
du reve, and exposes some conservative-elitist aspects of Yourcenar’s attitude 
towards gender, sexuality, ethnicity, politics and culture.
While I believe that Carlston is too quick to accuse Yourcenar of serious 
political and ethical failures, including sexism and racism, her general conclusion and 
some of her specific insights are not without interest. They show how the conflict 
between universality and irreducible individuality in Yourcenar, as it has been
10 Erin G. Carlston, Thinking Fascism: Sapphic Modernism and Fascist M odernity (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), p. 87.
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identified in the present thesis, can be perceived as deep-seated intellectual hesitation 
or, even worse, as a form of duplicity, symptomatic of the crisis of political 
liberalism. Carlston touches the heart of the matter when she identifies ‘Yourcenar’s 
commitment to the Hellenic and Enlightenment traditions’ as the root of what comes 
out as an ambivalent discourse of totality and humanism.11 Her overall conclusion 
refers to both Yourcenar and Arendt:
[T]heir uncritical commitment to the Enlightenment’s aesthetic, ethical, and political 
values in turn allies them bon gre mal gre with the ethnocentric and ultimately racist 
concept o f European culture that also subtends certain fascist ideologies.1"
As far as Yourcenar is concerned, this is a fascinating statement in need of more
detailed investigation. In line with my research here, I would highlight the
relationship which Carlston points out between Yourcenar’s aestheticism and the
aesthetic ideology of fascism.
Carlston quotes (in English) from Les Yeux ouverts Yourcenar’s response to
Mussolini’s fascism, which she had witnessed during her visits to Rome in 1932-33,
and which led to the first version of Denier du reve, in 1934. ‘Le fascisme me
paraissait grotesque ; j ’avais vu la marche sur Rome : des messieurs « de bonne
famille », suants sous leurs chemises noires, et des gens sur lesquels on tapait, parce
1 ^qu’ils n ’etaient pas d’accord. Cela ne m ’avait pas paru beau.’ Carlston is surprised 
that Yourcenar’s immediate reaction to the oppressive regime is summarized in an 
aesthetic judgement ( ‘grotesque’, ‘beau’). She writes that Yourcenar’s ‘resistance to 
fascism’s coercive, totalitarian aspect is an afterthought, something “de plus”’.14
11 Carlston, p. 125.
12 Carlston, p. 134.
13 Les Yeux ouverts, p. 87, quoted in English in Carlston, p. 111.
14 Carlston, p. 111. Strictly speaking, it is not fascism, but politics in general, that Yourcenar sees with 
primarily aesthetic criteria, as I have been arguing in the present thesis. Thus, in Le Coup de grace  
(1939), Yourcenar’s next novel after Denier du reve, communism is also depicted as an aesthetic 
choice. The reason why Sophie, the aristocrat main female character o f  the novel, is a communist 
sympathizer is specified primarily in aesthetic terms: ‘Sophie cachait a peine ses sympathies pour les 
rouges : pour un coeur comme le sien, I’elegance supreme etait evidemment de donner raison a 
l’ennemi.’ OR, p. 107, my emphasis.
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Further down, she quotes the following phrase from Yourcenar’s most openly anti­
fascist essay, ‘Forces du passe et forces de l’avenir’: ‘Et certes, nul ne conteste qu’il 
y ait de la beaute dans l’exaltation passionnee de tel jeune nazi et dans son sacrifice 
total a son chef bien-aime.’15 According to Carlston, the fact that Yourcenar has an 
eye for the beauty of the Nazi sentiment is a sign not so much of her susceptibility to 
Nazi ideology, but of her inability ‘entirely to divorce her criticism of fascism from 
the categories of fascist thought’.16 Carlston criticizes Yourcenar for failing to see not 
only that aesthetics is a basic category of fascist politics, but also that the Greek 
aesthetic ideal, which she embraces unconditionally as the source reference of all 
representation, is in fact at the origin of National-Socialist aestheticism.
The implication, in much o f [Yourcenar’s] work, that Greece is the centre and the 
source o f civilization reminds us o f Winckelmann’s argument that only the Greek or 
European type achieves beauty, and that countries distant from Greece, in their 
climate and soil as well as their culture, produce human and natural deviations from 
the aesthetic ideal. That idea helped [. . .] to support both homosexual aestheticism and 
Nazism’s racist aesthetic ideology.17
These conclusions, tentative as they remain in Carlston’s essay, help to lend 
concrete historical context to the problematic relationship between politics, aesthetics 
and the Greek paradigm in the work of Yourcenar, and especially in Memoires 
d ’Hadrien. Having suggested that Hadrien’s politics is an act of representation with 
Rome as its subject and Greece as its model, the question is how this political 
aestheticism relates to political modernity of which fascism is a symptom and 
possibility. It would of course be pointless to ask whether Hadrien is a fascist figure 
or, for that matter, whether Yourcenar espouses too many fascist ideologemes, pace 
Carlston’s aphorisms.18 Rather, I would ask in what ways the rebirth and political
15 EM , p. 463, quoted in English in Carlston, p. 114. Carlston does not quote the end o f this phrase: 
‘...m em e si cette exaltation et ce sacrifice portent en eux leur poison.’ ‘Forces du passe et forces de 
l’avenir’ was included in Yourcenar’s posthumous collection En pelerin et en etranger (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989).
16 Carlston, p. 111.
17 Carlston, p. 121.
18 Carlston does not shrink from calling Yourcenar a racist and an anti-Semite, which she certainly was 
not either as a writer or as a person (see especially Carlston, 114ff.) This certainly weakens the grip of
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fulfilment of Rome, which Yourcenar envisions in Memoires, follows a specifically 
Western aesthetic model of self-creation which represses, rather than respects, 
difference. Beyond the tags of racism, and sexism, I would also propose to identify 
those forms of humanity or subjectivity in this novel which remain foreign to this 
aesthetic model and are therefore perceived as less human.
National aestheticism: Lacoue-Labarthe
One of the most enlightening studies on the philosophical and historical implications 
of modem political aestheticism is Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s La Fiction du 
politique ,19 Lacoue-Labarthe begins by questioning Heidegger’s involvement with 
the Nazi regime and examines his political thought to see how it allowed for such an 
eventuality. In the process, he draws some interesting conclusions about the nature of 
fascism and Nazism, their historical origins and emblematic manifestation in 
Germany, and their relationship with Greek politics and art. Thus La Fiction du 
politique is relevant to my thesis in two interconnected ways. First, it will help 
illuminate the historical and philosophical context in which the dominant idea of 
politics as representation in Memoires d ’Hadrien has its roots. Second, it will show 
whether the affinity of existential thought between Yourcenar and Heidegger extends 
to their aesthetico-political theories as well.
Like Carlston, Lacoue-Labarthe traces the European ideal of the aesthetic 
formation of the community back to Winckelmann’s re-discovery of Greece.20 The
Carlston’s otherwise valid argument that the concepts o f race and Jewishness in Yourcenar’s work are 
problematic. I shall expand on this issue at a subsequent point o f this chapter.
19 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique : Heidegger, Vart et la politique  (Strasbourg: 
Association des Publications pres les Universites de Strasbourg, 1987). In my analysis I have also been 
using the English translation o f this book, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics: The 
Fiction o f  the Political, trans. by Chris Turner (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
20 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, pp. 58 and 59.
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Greek idea of beautiful corporeality is equated in Winckelmann with that of
spirituality. This equation is then taken over by Hegel who translates it into the unity
21of nature and spirit, of subject and object, in the total work of art which is the State. 
Lacoue-Labarthe argues that this idea was central to the quest for a unique national 
and spiritual identity by the German Romantics and Idealists alike and is still strongly 
present in Nietzsche. Despite the profound differences between Hegel’s and 
Nietzsche’s determinations of the political,
l’un comme l’autre, s’agissant des Grecs, ont identifie le politique a Festhetique et 
[. ..] une telle identification est au depart de I’agon mimetique ou Fun comme l’autre 
(mais beaucoup d’autres avec eux, et a vrai dire pratiquement tous jusqu’a Heidegger 
compris) ont vu l’unique chance pour FAllemagne de pouvoir s’identifier et de 
parvenir a F existence."
Some of the main themes of Lacoue-Labarthe’s thesis are present in this statement. 
They include the historical need felt by the German people for the formation of a 
national identity; the choice of Greece as not simply the historical source of the 
values that could inspire this process, but the model according to which the formation 
of national identity could be achieved; and, consequently, the adoption by Germany 
up to the Second World War of a mimetic logic which, as Lacoue-Labarthe explains, 
led to exhaustion and disaster. The other basic claims that inform his study are, 
firstly, that Heidegger’s philosophy was the only one capable of seeing through this 
dialectic of identity, while at the same time Heidegger himself enigmatically 
submitted his political thought to it and allied with the Nazi party; and secondly and 
most relevantly to my thesis, that aestheticism, transposed to the level of the political, 
led to the outbreak of violence and extermination. I will discuss very briefly Lacoue- 
Labarthe’s notion of national aestheticism, as it concerns my research on Yourcenar’s 
political aestheticism and highlights the difficulties involved in thinking the political 
subject (for Yourcenar: Europe; for Heidegger: the Volk) in terms of the work of art.
21 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, pp. 59-60.
22 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique , p. 59.
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For Lacoue-Labarthe, the Romantic and modem notion of politics as a form of 
plastic art derives from the German reception of Greece as the topos of art par 
excellence. Central to the Greek perception of art, of education and of the formation 
of the City is the concept of mimesis and its Platonic and Aristotelian determinations. 
According to Lacoue-Labarthe’s reading of Heidegger, mimesis in ancient Greece is 
defined as mimesis of physis, a process by which nature reveals itself to man. This 
process is techne, art and technique, understood not as autonomous creation, but as 
the organic development and extension of physis. In this sense, human artefacts, 
including the City itself, are not original creations, but manifestations of the natural 
and organic relationship between nature and man. In terms of the political, this means 
that nature reveals itself as knowledge to the community through art, including in the 
broadest sense of linguistic representation. According to Lacoue-Labarthe, this 
process is still fundamental to the definition of the modem political subject, the 
nation.
L ’organicite essentielle du politique est [. ..] l ’organicite du peuple, du V olkstum , que 
notre concept de « nation », si on le restitue a son sens premier, rend assez bien en ce 
qu’il fait signe vers une determination naturelle ou « physique » de la communaute 
que seule peut accomplir et reveler a elle-meme une techne, -  si ce n’est la techne  
elle-meme, Fart, a commencer par le langage (la langue). Si la tech n e  peut se definir 
comme le sur-croit de la p h u sis , par lequel la ph u sis  se « decrypte » et se presente -  si 
done on peut dire la te ch n e  comme a p o p h a n tiq u e , au sens aristotelico-heideggerien du 
terme -, V o rg a n ic ite  politique est le surcroit necessaire a la presentation et a la 
reconnaissance de soi d’une nation. Et telle est la fonction politique de Fart.23
Techne is ‘apophantic’ in that it shows forth ( ‘apo-phainein’) physis in itself, and 
defines the polis not as ‘une formation artificielle ou conventionnelle’, but as ‘la « 
belle formation » spontanement jaillie du « genie d ’un peuple » (le genie grec)’.24
However, the Greek perception of art as mimesis is complicated by the Platonic 
determination of Being as Idea. The Idea serves as the axiomatic paradeigma, that is, 
as the model of the mimetic process. In the Platonic scheme, mimesis is no longer
23 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, p. 60.
24 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, p. 58.
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mimesis of nature, but of a posited single origin devoid of any facticity. In art, the 
quest for truth - for what Heidegger called aletheia, unconcealment of physis - is 
supplanted by the quest for identity between the Idea and the thing, the work of art 
and what it represents. Techne is no longer thought as a supplement to nature. In 
seeking to efface its difference from physis, the work of art claims its autonomy and 
art becomes the domain of pure creativity. As a result, the subject, itself understood 
as a work of art, also loses its mimetic (and, consequently, differential) relation to 
physis and obeys to what Lacoue-Labarthe calls a typology of being. The subject 
becomes a type and belongs to a race, a nation and so on. Lacoue-Labarthe calls this 
process i e  fictionnement des etres et des communautes’. On the basis of this 
understanding of mimesis as original creativity and of the political subject as a 
fictionalized copy of an ideal Form, Romantic Germany entered into a mimetic agon, 
whose objective, Lacoue-Labarthe argues, was the formation of a unique and 
authentic national and political identity.
Importantly for my thesis, Lacoue-Labarthe clarifies that, while the aesthetic 
constitution of the political was revealed to us through the vicissitudes of German 
history, the historical process of the mimetic reproduction of the Greek paradigm is 
common to the rest of Western European nations.
La rivalite agonistique (et par consequent mimetique) avec l’Ancien n’est 
evidemment pas reservee a la seule Allemagne. Elle est en general fondatrice du 
politique modeme, etant tout simplement 1’invention du Modeme meme, c ’est-a-dire 
de ce qui surgit dans l’epoque de la « delegitimation » des theocraties chretiennes. 
Depuis la Rennaissance, l ’Europe tout entiere est la proie de l’Antique et c ’est 
Yimitatio qui regie la construction du Modeme.26
Entering an era of delegitimatation, Western Europe sought a model of self-grounded 
identity in Greek aesthetics and emphasized the political function of art. This 
situation made historically possible what Benjamin in the Artwork essay and Brecht
25 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, p. 71, emphasis in the original.
26 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, p. 68.
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97called the aestheticization of politics in fascism. Fascism is here explained as the 
radicalization of the Western misinterpretation of mimesis as the imitatio of a single 
origin. It is an attempt at reproducing not simply the Greek example of the political 
aesthetic, but the hypothetical Greek awakening of man into history. Lacoue- 
Labarthe argues convincingly that ‘ce que cherche Yimitatio allemande dans la Grece 
c’est le modele [...] d ’un pur surgissement, d ’une pure originalite : le modele d ’une 
auto-formation’.28 In this sense, Nazism aspired to establish a totally new mythical 
beginning for itself, and exhausted itself - together with the entire aesthetico-political 
project of classical imitatio - in the effort to mould the Nazi Volk into the total work 
of art. In effect, the aesthetic moulding of the people - a word which translates the 
Greek plassein (whence ‘plastic arts’) and relates semantically to the Latin fingere - 
gives Lacoue-Labarthe’s study its title and main thesis: ‘La fiction du politique’. 
Fascism, he argues, is the absolute fictionalizing of the political subject as the all-
29embracing work of art. And this total fiction, Lacoue-Labarthe points out, is film. 
Film as the total artefact is an idea that Benjamin understood very well, and which 
Yourcenar also sensed to a considerable extent, as we saw in Chapter 3.
In this context, to define fascism and Nazism as forms of national aestheticism is 
to suggest that they are the consummation and not the temporary abandonment or 
negation of modem European politics. Indeed, Lacoue-Labarthe specifies that the 
extermination of the Jews ‘est a l’egard de l’Occident la terrible revelation de son
30essence’. Even more controversially, he also claims that ie  nazisme est un 
humanisme’, in so far as man is at its centre as the self-created transcendental
31subject. These bold statements do not reduce modem politics to variations of
27 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, p. 53. See also Benjamin, ‘The Work o f Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction’, p. 235.
28 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, p. 69.
29 On the issue o f film as the total artwork, see especially Lacoue-Labarthe, pp. 54-58.
30 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, p. 38. I will return to the issue o f the extermination 
further down in the chapter.
31 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, p. 81.
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fascism, but they do mean that the political in the West is essentially metaphysical. 
Political aestheticism posits both the possibility of absolute beginning, supposedly 
initiated by the Greeks, and the possibility of (national) identity, which was pursued 
by the Modems.
From an ontological point of view, the metaphysical character of the political 
aesthetic, as Lacoue-Labarthe discusses, is asserted by the fact that a subject is 
always anterior to the modem mimetic process, rather than its result. The identity of 
the self, the political identity of Europe or that of the Volk are always represented in 
advance, rather than produced in the course of mimesis. In an anti-Hegelian 
statement, Lacoue-Labarthe writes that the dialectics of mimesis thus understood is 
‘une eschatologie de l’identique ; et tant que cette logique [...] sous-tendra 
1’interpretation de la mimesis, on ne pourra qu’indefiniment circuler du meme a 
F autre -  sous F autorite du meme’.32 If this self-posited identity pre-conceives Being 
as the unique subject of a violent and exclusive humanism, it also creates the 
stereotypes that lead to racism and extermination.
Lacoue-Labarthe proceeds to imagine a new ‘mimetologic’ which takes into 
account the ‘originary secondarity’ of the subject or, to recall the term that Derrida 
coined for Lacoue-Labarthe’s use, its desistance. This mimetologic avoids the 
classical interpretation of mimesis as imitatio, that is, the pursuit of identity on the
basis of a single model or origin. The interesting thing about this new mimetologic is
that it proposes a ‘subject’ which bears expressly the characteristics of Dasein, with 
the sole difference that its infirmity and impropriety are emphasized. Having 
described the ex-static, improper and open character of this subject, Lacoue-Labarthe 
concludes:
C ’est bien ce qu’ « est » le Da-sein  heideggerien. Mais cette (de)constitution
extatique est a penser elle-meme comme defaut ou comme insuffisance -  selon une
32 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, pp. 70-71.
33 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du po litique , pp. 72-73.
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pensee stride de la finitude. Le sujet est originairement l ’infirmite du sujet, et cette 
infirmite est son intimite meme, en dehiscence.34
Here, Lacoue-Labarthe pushes the economy of Heidegger’s argument to its limits, 
suggesting at the same time that Heidegger had not done so sufficiently - and in any 
case, not when it mostly mattered. Perhaps because he has the benefit of hindsight, by 
which I mean the knowledge of the extermination, Lacoue-Labarthe emphasizes the 
infirmity of the ‘subject’ in a way that Heidegger, with his idea of the authentically 
resolute Dasein, did not manage to do. At the same time, Lacoue-Labarthe stresses 
that the impropriety of the subject should not in turn be considered ‘comme un sujet 
ou un suppot’, an error which Yourcenar, due to her universalizing tendency, has not 
always managed to avoid.35
Lacoue-Labarthe’s mimetologic is thoroughly indebted to Heidegger, as is his 
entire analysis of the aestheticization of politics, even as Heidegger’s political 
thought is criticized forcefully for not being consistent with his philosophy. It is in 
Heidegger’s philosophy that Lacoue-Labarthe finds the beginning of an 
understanding of the subject that avoids the perilous reduction of subjectivity into 
imaginary types and identities: the German, the Greek, the Jew. This subject, claims 
Lacoue-Labarthe, was already richly delineated as Dasein in Being and Time. But 
when it came to situating this subject within the German historico-political context, 
as in Introduction to Metaphysics and his infamous 1933 Rectoral Address, then 
Heidegger decided to concretize and reduce this subject along the lines of the 
mythicized self-creation of the German Volk,36 Let us recall here Paul Ricoeur’s
34 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, pp. 71-72.
35 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, p. 71.
36 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to M etaphysics, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, (New  
Haven & London: Yale Nota Bene, 2000). Introduction to M etaphysics was first published as 
Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik in 1953, on the basis o f lectures o f 1935.
The historical specifics o f Heidegger’s political involvement need not interest us here. For a 
thoroughly researched biographical account, see Hugo Ott’s Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, trans. 
by Allan Blunden, (Fontana Press: London, 1994). Among the many reference books in English on the 
‘Heidegger affair’, Richard W olin (ed.), The H eidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 1993) contains key texts by Heidegger, including ‘The Self-Assertion o f the German 
University’, as well as testimonies and interpretations by Heidegger’s colleagues and pupils, including
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accurate diagnosis of the difficulties facing the attempt to project individual fate onto 
historical destiny, to which I referred in Chapter 4.
For his part, Lacoue-Labarthe locates the problem in Heidegger’s idea, during 
his Nazi years, that the work of art is not the differential representation of nature, but 
the means by which Being (physis or nature) manifests itself beyond difference and 
representation. Lacoue-Labarthe highlights Heidegger’s unexpected Platonic 
‘condemnation of mimesis’:37 by excluding mimesis, that is, difference in 
representation, as if physis could be fully present in man’s works, Heidegger 
hypothesized a state of original unity between man and nature, in much the same way 
as Plato did. Heidegger’s political thought thus authorized the search for a new 
political identity, which, he believed, found its historical actualization in Nazi 
Germany. As we shall see, this way of arriving at a concept of identity which 
transcends difference presents certain similarities with the idea that the acceptance of 
difference and contingency may lead to the formation of the universal subject of 
humanism. For this reason, it is worth pursuing Heidegger’s thinking on art and 
representation a little further.
In his idiosyncratic interpretation of the first choral ode from Sophocles’ 
Antigone ( ‘polla ta deina kouden anthrdpou deinoteron p e le i ...\  lines 332-275), 
Heidegger states that ‘Art is knowing and hence is techne' .38 This idea, which 
Lacoue-Labarthe considers as central to both German Idealism and Romanticism, 
assumes a specific meaning in Heidegger. If nature reveals itself as knowledge to 
man, it is not because the work of art reflects or simply resembles nature. It is rather 
because through the inexorable undoing of human constructions, nature reveals itself
Karl Lowith and Jurgen Habermas. For a comprehensive approach which takes into account the 
interaction between the poetic, the historical, the political and the philosophical elements in 
Heidegger, see Miguel de Beistegui, H eidegger and the Political (London: Routledge, 1998). Lacoue- 
Labarthe’s La Fiction du po litique , which I am discussing here, is also a good, if unsystematic, source 
of information on this issue.
37 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du po litique , p. 67-68.
38 Heidegger, Introduction to M etaphysics, p. 170.
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in its overwhelming power. In this schema of things, the artist exerts violence over 
nature in full awareness and expectation of the eventual destruction of his works. 
History is then defined as the confirmation of the ‘overwhelming’ - the catastrophic 
outcome of the conflict between man and nature. Concluding his commentary, 
Heidegger writes:
In [artistic success], the violence-doer as creator sees only a seeming fulfillment, 
which is to be despised. In willing the unprecedented, the violence-doer casts aside all 
help. For such a one, disaster is the deepest and broadest Yes to the overwhelming. In 
the shattering of the wrought work, in knowing that the work is un-fit and sarma 
(dungheap), the violence doer leaves the overwhelming to its fittingness. [...] The 
overwhelming, Being, confirms itself in works as history.39
In this passage, it is noteworthy that the ‘violence-doer as creator’ acknowledges and 
accepts disaster, thus cooperating with the ‘overwhelming’, even at the cost of the 
permanence of his creation. Leaving aside (if at all possible) the vehemence and 
masculine ardour of Heidegger’s expression, we notice that art contains ‘the deepest 
and broadest Yes’, an act of knowing cooperation with nature, of embracing and 
prolonging the conflict through which the truth of Being becomes manifest. 
However, what is still not acceptable in Heidegger’s thinking of art is the hybris of 
‘willing the unprecedented’, that is, the call to initiate and master this process. It is 
for his political belief in the possibility of a totally new and autonomous beginning 
which repeats the genius of Greek techne that Lacoue-Labarthe mostly criticizes 
Heidegger.
The extreme language of Introduction to Metaphysics and the concomitant desire 
for mastery are softened in another essay on techne, ‘The Question Concerning 
Technology’.40 In this essay, Heidegger is concerned with the modem shift from art
39 Heidegger, Introduction to M etaphysics, p. 174.
40 Introduction to M etaphysics is based on lectures given in 1935, that is, at the apex o f Heidegger’s 
Nazi years. ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ is based on a lecture o f 1953, that is, after the war 
and the dissolution o f the Nazi party (it was published in 1954, as ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’). The 
difference in tone between these two works reflects both the dramatic change o f scenery in German 
history in the space o f ten years, and Heidegger’s fall from grace in post-war German academic circles. 
Martin Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. 
by David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 311-341.
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to technology (a central theme in both Benjamin’s T he Work of Art’ essay and 
Yourcenar’s ‘Diagnostic de l’Europe’), and attempts to clarify the distinct ontological 
status of each of these terms. His aim is no longer to awaken Germany into a spiritual 
beginning, although he still draws from the Greek perception of art as a way of 
‘bringing forth’ the truth of Being (aletheuein). His overall point in this essay is that 
modem technology disturbs the original unity between man and nature, which was 
traditionally expressed through art, and prevents Being from manifesting itself in 
man’s artefacts.
Heidegger observes that in Greek the word techne covers both technology and 
art. Like art, ‘Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to presence in 
the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth, 
happens’.41 This means that, for the Greeks, technology (e.g. building construction) is 
not an effort to give form to nature, but an expression of cooperation between man 
and nature. Man gives form to his constructions, but that which endures, Heidegger 
writes, is ‘what is granted’ to man. Permanence is not in the form, but in the way 
constructions ‘hold sway, administer themselves, develop, and decay -  the way they 
essentially “unfold”’.42 The artist does not impose any conceptual description on 
nature; he rather opens the way for nature to disclose itself in the artwork or the 
construction.
The discourse in Introduction to Metaphysics of an originary and indefinite 
manifestation of nature beyond any representation is repeated here. Heidegger writes 
that ‘It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that techne is bringing-forth’.43 In 
other words, art is a way for Being unreservedly to manifest itself in the artefact, as 
the collaboration between nature and man; technology, in the modem sense of
41 Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 319.
42 Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, pp. 335, 336.
43 Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 319.
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manufacturing, attempts to disturb this relationship with the result that nothing is 
revealed, apart from man’s desire for mastery.
Modem technology, according to Heidegger, attempts to impose permanence on 
nature. If the essence of technology in the traditional sense is in revealing, its essence 
in the modem sense is in Ge-stell, that is, in ‘enframing’, ordering and quantifying 
nature. In modernity, creation is no longer co-operation, but manipulation and 
objectification of physis, which now recedes behind subjective representations. 
‘Enframing’, Heidegger writes, ‘blocks the shining forth and holding sway of 
truth’.44 This is why modem technology is ‘mysterious’ and what it reveals is 
‘danger’: the danger of Being’s definite concealment. With reference to this essay by 
Heidegger and in the context of her commentary on La Fiction du politique, Joan 
Brandt writes:
Modem technology and its mode of revealing, which is Enframing, thus become a 
debased form of techne, a decline into subjectness and representationality. [...] For 
Heidegger, then, technology in its original sense as a primordial belonging together of 
man and Being, or of techne and physis, has not yet been contaminated by the 
mimetic.45
Echoing Lacoue-Labarthe, Brandt questions Heidegger’s hypothesis of an original 
purity in the relationship between man and Being, prior to any representation. All the 
more so, as it was Heidegger who first pointed out that it is of the essence of Being 
not to be full presence but self-concealment. We may recall at this point that ecstatic 
Dasein was described by Heidegger as the Lichtung, the clearing, in which Being 
shows itself not as presence, but as dynamic absence.46 Being’s concealment is 
therefore not a consequence of modem technology, but the way Being confirms itself 
through all techne, ancient or modem. Modem technology does not deny Being, as 
Heidegger believes in his writing on techne', on the contrary, by foregrounding the
44 Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 333.
45 Joan Brandt, Geopoetics: The Politics o f  Mimesis in Poststructuralist French Poetry and Theory, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 193.
46 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 171.
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mimetic character of representation, technology makes us aware of the illusory 
character of ‘art’. Let us remember here that Benjamin had reached this conclusion 
already in T he Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, showing how 
film deprives the traditional artefact from its aura (Chapter 3 of the present thesis).
It is therefore untenable to suggest, as Heidegger does in his writing on techne, 
that Greece represented an original unity between Being and man, and that a new 
beginning towards that unity is possible, either for Nazi Germany or for post-war 
Western Europe. Lacoue-Labarthe claims that the effort to ground philosophically the 
possibility of a new beginning was not abandoned by Heidegger even after the war, 
when he concentrated on Holderlin’s poetry and on language in general. Heidegger’s 
‘exclusion brutale de la mimesis l’avait laisse a son insu prisonnier d’une 
mimetologie au font traditionnelle, c ’est-a-dire platonicienne’.47 By excluding 
difference in representation in the same way as Plato did, it became possible for 
Heidegger to subscribe to a form of political aestheticism embraced also by the 
Nazis, and to envision together with them a fictional future for Germany as the total 
work of art.
Between existential authenticity and political aestheticism
Let us now return to Memoires d ’Hadrien and attempt to re-think Yourcenar’s quest 
for authenticity in relation to her aesthetic perception of politics. Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
problematization of the relationship between the two helps understand Yourcenar’s 
political aestheticism in its characteristically modem dimensions. For it appears that, 
not unlike Heidegger, she also believed that the formation of a new authentic 
European identity was possible beyond mimesis and difference; this identity was also
47 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, p. 74.
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thoroughly inspired by the example of Greek aesthetics and philosophy; and finally, 
this identity was based on an imaginary configuration of the political subject, Rome, 
as something that could develop into the absolute work of art, as I will attempt to 
demonstrate. Thus Yourcenar would appear to use the same ambivalent political 
discourse as Heidegger. On the one hand she insists that it is not possible to escape 
representational structures, which is why she constantly suggests that the subject be 
thought authentically in its original difference and infirmity. On the other hand, she 
refers to Greece to support the idea that Europe can be moulded into a total work of 
art which transcends representation, thus reverting to the traditional concept of 
authenticity as original creativity.
To be sure, there is no underestimating the differences between Yourcenar’s and 
Heidegger’s approaches to political subjectivity and their respective perceptions of 
art (let alone the fact that these perceptions and approaches varied, at least for 
Yourcenar, through the years). To begin with, Yourcenar would never call for a 
violent political beginning, as Heidegger did in the Introduction to Metaphysics. 
Indeed the political objective of Hadrien in Memoires is the pacification of the 
empire. This may reflect the fact that the writing of Memoires began in earnest four 
years after the war, while the Introduction to Metaphysics was first presented as a 
lecture course four years before it. In pre-war Nazi Germany it was more possible for 
Heidegger to express in violent terms the idea of destruction as a manifestation of 
Being than it was in his later essays on language and poetry. Nonetheless, one cannot 
help noticing how well Yourcenar’s idea of the relationship between the artist, the 
authentic work of art and time -  an idea illustrated in Memoires and further explained 
in ‘Le Temps, ce grand sculpteur’ - is served by Heidegger’s statement: ‘disaster is 
the deepest and broadest Yes to the overwhelming’. Only the unsavoury register of 
Heidegger’s patriotic flair separates this statement from Yourcenar’s theory that the 
artist should accept the inevitable dismantling of his constructions and thus accept 
time itself ( ‘the overwhelming’). The ‘artist’ - 1 refer here to the type of artist, poet or
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writer whom Yourcenar has in mind in her essays on Piranesi, Cavafy and Thomas 
Mann48 -  is aware of the inadequacy and inauthenticity of representations and knows 
that time authenticates human constructions by ruining them. This is very close to 
what Heidegger intimates by writing that ‘in knowing that the work is un-fit and 
sarma (dungheap), the violence doer leaves the overwhelming to its fittingness’. 
Finally, when Yourcenar suggests that authenticity is not in the stability but in the 
impermanence of the ‘creation’, she mirrors Heidegger’s claim in ‘The Question 
Concerning Technology’ that the essence of human constructions is in the way they 
‘hold sway, administer themselves, develop, and decay -  the way they essentially 
“unfold”’. Especially in the realm of the political aesthetic, the proximity between 
Heidegger’s and Yourcenar’s ideas is a strong indication that she also tended to 
translate the notion of authenticity into essentialist terms. Even as it was clear to her 
that politics is a techne and a technique of accepting difference, I suggest that she 
saw in modernity an opportunity for Europe, clearly supported by the nihilistic 
conjecture at the end of the war, finally to reclaim its identity and fulfil its historical 
role.
In Memoires d ’Hadrien this would mean that Hadrien does not content himself 
with re-structuring the empire, as it is often repeated at those parts of the novel where 
his political methods and strategies are described. If we look at the paragraphs where 
his actual political vision for the State is presented, we shall see that the discourse of 
re-construction, acceptance and repetition develops alongside a parallel and 
contradictory discourse of permanence, stability and eternity. There is much evidence 
in the book supporting this claim. I will focus first on Yourcenar’s discussion of the 
political determinations pertaining to the city of Rome and the abstraction of its role 
under Hadrien.
48 ‘Le Cerveau noir de Piranese’, ‘Presentation critique de Constantin Cavafy’, and ‘Humanisme et 
hermetisme chez Thomas Mann’, are included in Yourcenar’s collection Sous benefice d ’inventaire 
(1962, also in EM). I referred to these essays in Chapters 1 and 2.
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Yourcenar observes that, at Hadrien’s time, Rome was no longer a city, but the 
expansion of a geopolitical representation over half the world: ‘Rome n ’est plus dans 
Rome : elle doit perir, ou s’egaler desormais a la moitie du monde.’49 The 
macropolitical relationship between Rome and Greece is then summarized in an 
interesting passage which I quote here at length:
Chaque fois que j ’ai regarde de loin, au detour de quelque route ensoleillee, une 
acropole grecque, et sa ville parfaite comme une fleur, reliee a sa colline comme le 
calice a sa tige, je sentais que cette plante incomparable etait limitee par sa perfection 
meme, accomplie sur un point de l’espace et dans un segment du temps. Sa seule 
chance d’expansion, comme celle des plantes, etait sa graine : la semence d’idees dont 
la Grece a feconde le monde. Mais Rome plus lourde, plus informe, plus vaguement 
etalee dans sa plaine au bord de son fleuve, s’organisait vers des developpements plus 
vastes : la cite est devenue l’Etat. J’aurais voulu que l’Etat s’elargit encore, devint 
ordre du monde, ordre des choses.50
In this passage, Yourcenar explains pithily the transition from City to State as the 
organic development of the political subject which produces its own identity -  an 
idea which, Lacoue-Labarthe claims, propelled Romantic Germany into political 
modernity, and then culminated in Nazism. It is true that, referring to Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s idea of la communaute desceuvree, Lacoue-Labarthe identifies the political 
subject with the basic (infra-)political unit of the community, rather than with that of 
the State, which allows him to approach better the category of Volkstum.51 However, 
in the example of Rome’s spatial and temporal enlargement, it is the very abstraction 
of the State that shows the aesthetic character of the political. In relation to nature, 
the State is further removed towards metaphoricity than the City, and constitutes 
nature’s absolute conceptual representation. It is ‘ordre du monde, ordre des choses’. 
In the same example, let us also notice that perfection by way of the political 
aesthetic was already reached, according to Yourcenar, in the Greek City. The City
49 OR, p. 370.
50 OR, pp. 370-31.
51 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, pp. 61-62. Lacoue-Labarthe refers to Jean-Luc Nancy, La 
Communaute desceuvree (Paris: Christian Bourgeois, 1986).
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was a miniature manifestation of the ‘belonging together’ of techne and physis in the 
sense that the perfection of physis was revealed through the Greek ‘flower’.
Now Hadrien is calling -  and I suggest hearing in this Yourcenar’s own call for a 
new beginning for Europe -  for a repetition of the same authentic happening. Only 
this time, the political subject will find its identity through the processes of 
abstraction, spatial enlargement and futural projection. Imagining Rome’s prospect as 
a political entity free from material concreteness, Yourcenar writes that Rome 
‘echapperait a son corps de pierre ; elle se composerait du mot d’Etat, du mot de
c y
citoyennete, du mot de republique, une plus sure immortalite’. Rome would 
become a political identity which transcends time and space and bears such 
ideological characteristics as would be still desirable in the years after the Second 
World War and to this day. Of course, immortality is a word that Yourcenar never 
used with such conviction with reference to individual existence. However, in the 
context of political subjectivity, immortality assumes its traditional metaphysical 
content of the possibility of absolute presence. The political subject is immortal not 
because it escapes the rule of representation, but because, as State, it becomes total 
representation. As with Heidegger’s violence doer, difference is eclipsed not because 
it is ignored but because it is transcended, provided for in advance.
The ways difference is provided for and, consequently, done away with are 
clearly mentioned in the text: First, spatial difference:
Des vertus qui suffisaient pour la petite ville des sept collines auraient a s’assouplir, a 
se diversifier, pour convenir a toute la terre.
Then, temporal difference:
Mais toute creation humaine qui pretend a l’etemite doit s’adapter au rythme 
changeant des grands objets naturels, s’accorder au temps des astres.53
52 OR, p. 371.
53 Both quotations in OR, p. 371.
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An unmistakeable movement from the self-sufficiency of the City (Rome, i a  petite 
ville des sept collines’) to the self-sufficiency of the State (Rome, ‘[une] creation 
humaine qui pretend a l’etem ite’) is described here. But if the identity of the City is 
local, factical and mortal, the identity of the State is universal, abstract and eternal. 
Hadrien can thus qualify Rome as ‘the eternal city’ ( ‘Rome, que j ’osai le premier 
qualifier d’etemelle’).54 His hope is that the political subject can expand temporally 
and spatially to cover the entire field of possible reference. In this way, the State 
becomes a proper name and a dream of absolute political presence. The political 
subject retains its uniqueness and at the same time aspires to universality.
This is the paradoxical situation which the text narrates with precision and 
which, I maintain, it does not sufficiently recognize as such. While Yourcenar 
considers Hadrien’s failure fully to represent his existence as a token of his 
authenticity, she also suggests that his post-ironic grasp of the possibility of total 
representation authenticates the political subject that he constructs.
The leader’s ability to account for the totality of space and pre-empt the agency 
of time is illustrated well in the references to Hadrien’s architectural work. For 
example, the Pantheon in Rome both represents the universe and incorporates the 
differential factor of time in its design:
J’avais voulu que ce sanctuaire de Tous les Dieux reproduisit la forme du globe 
terrestre et de la sphere stellaire, du globe ou se renferment les semences du feu 
etemel, de la sphere creuse qui contient tout. [...] Ce temple ouvert et secret etait 
con$u comme un cadran solaire. Les heures toumeraient en rond sur des caissons 
soigneusement polis par des artisans grecs.55
The Pantheon represents the synthesis of eternity and the moment, disaster and 
creation, nature and art. In the novel, this dialectics is further emphasized by 
Hadrien’s comments on the disastrous effects of time after the presentation of each of 
his successful architectural projects. Thus, a few paragraphs after the narrative of the
54 OR, p. 371.
55 OR, p. 416.
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inauguration of the Pantheon, Hadrien thinks of the future vicissitudes of Rome: ‘Je 
songeais aussi, avec une sorte de terreur sacree, aux embrasements de l ’avenir. Ces 
millions de vies passees, presentes et futures, ces edifices recents nes d’edifices 
anciens et suivis eux-memes d ’edifices a naitre, me semblaient se succeder dans le 
temps comme des vagues’.56 In the same vein, after the consecration of the 
Olympeion, he invokes the ‘Temps devorateur’, as I noted in Chapter 2.
Yourcenar does not suggest that Hadrien ‘wills the disaster’, therefore it is not 
right to say that he defies physis in exactly the same way as Heidegger’s violence- 
doer. If there is hybris in Hadrien’s politics, it has to be sought in the presumption 
that the knowledge of the anticipated disaster can be used to establish a permanent 
political order. Knowledge of the instability and the non-representability of the 
subject can lead to the acceptance of the past, to acts of repetition and re-construction 
and to the re-evaluation of selfhood and otherness beyond the logic of essentialism. 
However, this knowledge cannot be used to support the invention of any identity, 
existential or political, for this would constitute a relapse to the traditional, 
metaphysical definition of authenticity as pureness and originality. As we saw, in his 
essay ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’, Paul de Man warned against the dialectical 
formation of authenticity on the basis of the knowledge of irony. And yet, this is the
cn
lapse (faute) with which Lacoue-Labarthe charges Heidegger, as a political thinker.
In Chapter 2, I argued that, from an existential perspective, Yourcenar’s fictional 
characters avoid this lapse, inasmuch as they never reclaim a stable identity, despite 
their awareness of irony. This is also true for Hadrien, as an individual character. We 
must now recognize that, from a political perspective, Memoires d ’Hadrien is not 
immune to this charge. In this novel, awareness of irony is used as a tool for effacing 
difference and for consolidating a total and exclusive political identity for the empire.
56 OR, p. 418.
57 See chapter ‘Faute’ in Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, pp. 33-40.
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This ambivalence extends to the meaning of the word gardien, which, as I 
discussed in Chapter 4, is important to the novel. I suggested that, by calling Hadrien 
‘guardian of the Greeks’, Yourcenar wishes to emphasize his humility and accepting 
attitude towards the past. This phrase intimates the idea that his authenticity and 
existential freedom lie not in his mastery over tradition, but in his submission to it 
and the repetition of its paradigm. However, in so far as Greece does not constitute 
simply the ‘legacy of the past’ but the limit of all tradition and the site of all truth, to 
be guardian involves a unique privilege which undermines the interpretation of 
guardianship suggested by the novel. This privilege consists in having immediate 
access to the truth of Being, in being able to safeguard meanings and also in 
assigning names to entities. There is a hubristic element in the definition of this role 
and this is evident throughout the novel in the prevalence of the title of master, or 
similar names, over that of guardian. Hadrien is called ‘Maitre de Tout’, although it 
is clarified that he prefers the title of ‘Philellene’; 58 he accepts the title ‘Pere de la 
Patrie’, but only after years of refusing it;59 finally, he thinks of himself as God, but 
hastens to add that ‘J ’etais dieu, tout simplement, parce que j ’etais homme’.60 It is 
clear that Yourcenar takes pains to undermine the principal meaning of Hadrien’s 
titles, so as to render them compatible with the way existential authenticity is 
understood in the novel. However, such terms as maitre, pere , and dieu derive from a 
fundamentalist logic of unity and originality and cannot be reconciled with the 
elusive human subject of Memoires d ’Hadrien. As such, they serve as further 
evidence of the double discourse of guardianship and mastery, difference and 
identity, uniqueness and universality that characterizes this novel.
58 OR, p. 422.
59 OR, p. 414.
60 OR, p. 399.
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The sub-plot of Hadrien’s relationship with his lover Antinoiis contains the most 
evident case of hybris in the novel. This is because Hadrien thinks of himself as ‘the 
sad master of Antinoiis’ fate’, a mastery which he assumes to the extent that he 
creates a god out of the dead eromenos.61 This amorous relationship is certainly 
significant in terms of its fictional content, that is, as a story of love and loss. In 
addition to this, however, it acquires a specific meaning in the context of the present 
discussion on Yourcenar’s political aestheticism. This is because Antinoiis represents 
in the novel the type of subject which Hadrien aspires to ‘mould’ according to his 
aesthetico-political vision, and therefore constitutes the measure against which 
Hadrien’s political aestheticism will be tested. Politics is understood here in its 
relationship with the concept of paideia, which involves, as Lacoue-Labarthe also 
underlines, an aesthetic education and aims at the formation of an identity. 
Hadrien’s pederastic love for Antinoiis has a strong paternal dimension and 
symbolizes to a certain extent the almost obsessive interest that a leader nourishes in 
his subjects.63 But we should also understand this ‘moulding’ literally, in the context 
of Hadrien’s compulsive representation of the figure of Antinoiis, especially in 
sculpture. ‘Je reclamais un fini parfait, une perfection pure, ce dieu qu’est pour ceux 
qui l’ont aime tout etre mort a vingt ans, et aussi la ressemblance exacte, la presence 
familiere, chaque irregularite d ’un visage plus chere que la beaute’.64 The narrative of 
this love affair -  though the word love loses its ethical and emotional content in the 
present framework -  is in fact the narrative of the sustained and even paranoid effort 
on the part of the ‘master’ to achieve authenticity and eliminate difference through
61 ‘[J]’etais jusqu’au bout le triste maitre de son destin.’ OR, p. 420.
62 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, p. 70.
63 The mixture o f the pederastic and the paternal elements is felt in many parts o f the novel, when 
Yourcenar refers to Hadrien’s feelings for Antinoiis. It becomes more pronounced after the death of 
the latter. When Hadrien sees a father mourning the death o f his son, paternity and erotic friendship 
are amalgamated in the expression o f his feelings: ‘J’avais le sentiment de prendre sur moi cette 
douleur de pere comme j ’avais pris celle d ’Hercule, celle d ’Alexandre, celle de Platon, pleurant leurs 
amis morts.’ OR, p. 448.
64 OR, p. 389.
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aesthetic manipulation. This is certainly at the antipodes of the perception of 
authenticity as acceptance of difference. Yourcenar describes some of the statues of 
Antinoiis which Hadrien had ordered and links Hadrien’s political vision for the 
empire with one of them: ‘Et ces petites statuettes d’argile a un sou qui ont servi a la 
propagande imperiale : Tellus stabilita, le genie de la Terre pacifiee, sous 1’aspect 
d’un jeune homme couche qui tient des fruits et des fleurs’.65
Antinoiis is chosen because he is beautiful, submissive and silent, but also 
because he is Greek.66 However, his Greekness is attractively blemished by the fact 
that he comes from Asia Minor: ‘Mais l’Asie avait produit sur ce sang un peu acre 
l’effet de la goutte de miel qui trouble et parfume un vin pur.’67 Antinoiis’ animality 
and submissiveness, in short, the un-Greek parts of his personality, are attributed to 
this Asian connection. In fact, he is likened to a young dog, ‘un jeune chien’, ‘un 
beau levrier’.68 In the logic of the novel, Antinoiis’ figure contains both physis and 
techne, both the Orient and Greece, in raw form. For Hadrien, the oriental and animal 
part of Antinoiis represents a mystery to be brought into the ‘Greek’ light, 
rationalized, represented and cleansed. He treats the young lover as a work of art in 
the making. For instance, remembering how Antinoiis’ face changed with time, 
Hadrien remarks: ‘ce visage changeait comme si nuit et jour je l’avais sculpte’.69 
Antinoiis’ suicide remains an enigma for Hadrien till the end, but the answer implied 
by Yourcenar is that the young lover died because no aesthetic construction can resist 
the agency of time. His death perfects him in the same fashion that decay 
authenticates the work of art and affirms the artistic intention of its creator.
To be sure, Antinoiis is also seen as a human being by Yourcenar. Thinking of 
his lover’s death, Hadrien says: ‘il etait mort seul.’ 70 Nonetheless, this is a rare
65 OR, p. 390.
66 See Yourcenar’s portrait o f Antinoiis through the eyes o f Hadrien in OR, pp. 405-6.
67 OR, p. 405.
68 OR, p. 405.
69 OR, p. 406.
70 OR, p. 446.
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moment in the novel. Antinoiis is mainly treated as the aesthetico-political subject 
whose death, perfection and authentication were constantly desired by Hadrien. The 
death of the young lover is presented as an artistic masterpiece: i e  singulier chef- 
d’oeuvre que fut son depart.’71 His body suffers in the novel even as it lies dead. We 
learn that while it was being prepared for embalming, Hadrien could literally hold the 
lover’s heart in his hands. Even then, Yourcenar uses the aesthetic criterion and 
characterizes the dead body as ‘un atroce chef-d’oeuvre’.72
It was by no means the necessity to be historically precise that guided Yourcenar 
to the extreme aestheticization of the figure of Antinoiis. The opposite is rather the 
case: the story of emperor Hadrian’s relationship with Antinoiis lends itself 
excellently to the fictional representation of an idea that Yourcenar had already 
formed earlier in her work. In Feux, written in 1935, she referred in analogous terms 
to another legendary erotic friendship, that of Achilles and Patroclus, and to the
feelings of the former with regard to the death of the latter:
La haine inavouee qui dort au fond de 1’amour predisposait Achille a la tache de 
sculpteur : il enviait Hector d’avoir acheve ce chef-d’oeuvre ; lui seul aurait du
arracher les demiers voiles que la pensee, le geste, le fait meme d’etre en vie
interposaient entre eux, pour decouvrir Patrocle dans sa sublime nudite de mort.73
Like the relationship between Hadrien and Antinoiis, the myth of Achilles and 
Patroclus is interpreted by Yourcenar in terms of longing for authenticity through the 
effacement of difference. Like Hadrien, Achilles wishes for the death of his 
companion, as a means of achieving beauty and perfection. In Patroclus alive, 
Achilles ‘hates’ (‘la haine’) the difference between idea and reality, form and matter 
-  a difference which is explained in unambiguous terms as etre en vie. The same 
difference is conveyed in Memoires d ’Hadrien in terms of Antinoiis’ oriental 
animality. The deaths of Patroclus and Antinoiis are more authentic than their lives,
71 OR, p. 420.
72 OR, p. 441.
73 OR, p. 1102. Marguerite Yourcenar, Feux (Paris: Grasset, 1936), for the first edition.
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because both figures, as ‘works of art’, are completed at the moment of their demise. 
Hadrien’s political-aesthetic dream is realised in the absolute immediacy of that 
moment. This is made perfectly clear in the phrase that Yourcenar uses as Hadrien 
holds his friend’s heart in his hands: ‘Toutes les metaphores retrouvaient un sens.’74 
Language achieves referentiality at the moment when death ensures identity.
Although the death of Antinoiis forms an integral part of Hadrien’s aesthetic 
project, it also fills him with unbearable sorrow. This is the sorrow of the artist who 
sees his creation crumble under the impact of time, physis, or, as Heidegger put it in
nc
Introduction to Metaphysics, the ‘Overwhelming’. However, Hadrien is not a 
common artist whose works are pitted against time and impermanence (though he is 
also that - for instance, as a narrator of his ‘memoirs’). As a statesman and a leader, 
Hadrien is the arch-artist whose project of political authentication provides in 
advance for difference, death and impermanence, with an aim of transcending them. 
Thus Antinoiis death does not call a halt to Hadrien’s project of total representation, 
however deep his sorrow. On the contrary, it signals a new phase in Hadrien’s 
determination to aestheticize and immortalize the figure of his lover. Freed from his 
semi-barbarous, quasi-bestial alterity, Antinoiis’ image can now be totally purified 
and ‘hellenized’ through art.
Earlier in the present chapter, I quoted the phrase in Memoires d ’Hadrien where 
the interconnectedness between beauty, identity, death and Greece is acknowledged: 
‘j ’avais fait [d’Antinoiis] l’image meme de ce pays passionne de beaute; e ’en serait 
peut-etre le dernier dieu.’76 The hellenization of the political subject continues with 
renewed strength after its death. Yourcenar refers extensively to Hadrien’s obsessive 
reproduction of the effigy of Antinoiis after his death in statues, busts, medals and 
coins, to the erection of temples for his worship and to Antinoe, the city founded at
74 OR, p. 441.
75 See n. 39, this chapter.
76 OR, p. 460.
2 4 4
Chapter 5 -  Political Aestheticism
the site of his death. The deification and idealization of Antinoiis is an extravagant
77project which cannot be dismissed as a simple act of sadness or madness. This 
project contradicts the apparent claim of the novel that freedom is to be found in 
godlessness, facticity and the abandonment of the quest for identity. As Hadrien 
becomes creator of names and attributor of meanings, freedom resumes its 
conventional significance as mastery, which the novel programmatically tried to 
subvert. Longing for truth and authenticity, but dominated by the ideas of beauty and 
perfection within the Greek premise, Yourcenar’s political thought hovers between 
the acceptance of difference and the obsession with identity.
In the novel, Hadrien becomes more and more fixated on effacing the difference 
which accrues as time passes since Antinoiis’ death: ‘comme un ouvrier 
consciencieux s’epuise a copier un chef-d’oeuvre, je m ’achamais a exiger de ma 
memoire une exactitude insensee.’78 This passage implies that identity is to be 
reached through appropriation of difference, a process effected through an excess of 
art. Hadrien says: ‘j ’exigeais un modele plus exact des joues, la oii elles se creusent 
insensiblement sous la tempe, un penchement plus doux du coup sur l’epaule. [...] 
Les plus ressemblantes de ces images m ’ont accompagne partout ; il ne m ’importe 
meme plus qu’elles soient belles ou non.’79 Not only is the aesthetico-political 
subject beyond life, it is also beyond beauty: Hadrien’s objective is identity through 
total representation.
As a novel, Memoires d ’Hadrien both is and is not aware of its ambivalent 
discourse on identity and difference. Yourcenar certainly recognizes that the erotic 
relationship of Hadrien and Antinoiis is aesthetico-political in its character and is
77 Consistent with the device o f subverting the meaning of words carrying a metaphysical charge, such 
as maitre and dieu, Yourcenar attempts to belittle the importance of Antinoiis’ deification. Hadrien 
says: ‘Le culte d’Antinoiis semblait la plus folle de mes entreprises, le debordement d ’une douleur qui 
ne concernait que moi seul’ (OR, p. 508). However, this act cannot be dismissed as a simple folie , in 
so far as it involves the creation and attribution by Hadrien o f a new essence, the deity o f Antinoiis. 
Hadrien is no longer a manipulator o f symbols but a creator of eternal values.
78 OR, p. 446.
79 OR, p. 464.
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linked with Hadrien’s project to hellenize the Barbarians. Further, it is also 
acknowledged that Hadrien’s obsessive reproduction of the effigy of Antinoiis is a 
form of resistance to time, which is not consonant with the critique of conceptuality 
in other parts of the book. The contradiction that is inherent in Hadrien’s pursuit of 
beauty is made forcefully clear in his devastating sense of failure as difference 
persists, beauty loses its significance and identity is never reached. Would it then be 
the case that Yourcenar is not ambivalent in her thesis, as I claim here, but represents 
in fiction the uncertainty that always accompanies the quest for truth; the forward and 
backward movement of the self between authenticity and its opposite; the impulse to 
resist chaotic time, even as one knows that the subject exists temporally?
There is no doubt that the expression of ambivalence in existential, philosophical 
and historical terms is one of Yourcenar’s principal objectives. However, I would 
also maintain that while she succeeds in presenting Hadrien’s different states of mind 
and the different stages of authenticity and inauthenticity through which he passes, 
the discourse that she uses is itself ambivalent and often self-contradictory. Let us 
recapitulate some of the signs of this ambivalence. Much as Yourcenar tries to 
minimize or qualify the significance of Hadrien’s imperial titles of maitre and dieu, 
they retain their metaphysical character and convey an aura of self-aggrandizement 
that transcends universal disorder and historical nihilism. While the Pantheon as an 
edifice negotiates with, rather than negates, time and space, it still represents a 
concept of universality that sublimates both this building and its builder, beyond the 
notion of contingency. The eventual demise of the city of Rome is predicted, but only 
for the purpose of confirming its essential eternity as a concept. Finally, the death of 
Antinoiis does not lead to the re-evaluation of Hadrien’s project to re-model the 
empire according to the Greek archetype, but is used as a token of the greatness, 
authenticity and humanity of a man who is prey to passion.
Yourcenar stresses the tragic dimension of Hadrien’s situation and, by extension, 
the tragic nature of existence and art in modernity. But she does not seriously
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question the premise of her thought - the essentially Greek thought of the possibility 
of total representation. Contradiction, failure and decay are perceived in terms of 
distance from the Greek ideal. The alternative idea that European art and politics 
have not distanced themselves from Greece, but re-interpreted the Greek ‘project’ for 
their own purposes is absent from the novel. In the most pessimistic passage of 
Memoires, known as i a  nuit palestinienne’, Hadrien accounts for his failures by 
arguing that the genius of Greece has been lost and the masses cannot measure up to 
the nobility of his project:
Nos lettres s’epuisent ; nos arts s’endorment ; Pancrates n’est pas Homere ; Arrien 
n’est pas Xenophon ; quand j ’ai essaye d’immortaliser dans la pierre la forme 
d’Antinoiis, je n’ai pas trouve de Praxitele. Nos sciences pietinent depuis Aristote et 
Archimede [...j. L’adoucissement des mceurs, l’avancement des idees au cours du 
demier siecle sont l’oeuvre d’une infime minorite de bons esprits ; la masse demeure 
ignare, feroce quand elle le peut, en tous cas egoi'ste et bomee, et il y a fort a parier 
qu’elle restera toujours telle. 0
In this passage it is interesting to note how Yourcenar places the problem of decay in 
its appropriate context, that of Greece and Greek techne and episteme, but fails to 
resolve it in terms of the same context. Instead, she has recourse to general 
statements about the human nature and to an elitism which remains problematic in 
her work, since its first public expression in ‘Diagnostic de l’Europe’. In Memoires, 
Hadrien understands the reasons of his failure only to the extent that the novel’s 
equivocal discourse on existence, art and politics allows him to do so. There is 
another, more complex aspect of his failure which Hadrien is incapable of 
understanding and whose existential and political implications the novel refuses to 
acknowledge in full. This is the failure of Rome under Hadrien’s rule to hellenize the 
Jews.
It is not accidental that the so-called ‘nuit palestinienne’ - the moment in the 
novel where Yourcenar loses her faith in ‘humanity’ in a way seldom seen in her
80 OR, p. 4 7 5 .
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work - occurs immediately after the account of the failure of the war in Judea. It is
equally fitting that the beginning and the end of Hadrien’s career as army
administrator are marked by two Jewish uprisings, a signal of the peripheral but
determinative role of the Jews in the novel. The second of these uprisings (132-135
CE) led by two historical figures who are mentioned in the book, Bar Kochba and
Rabbi Akiba, constitutes a key moment in Jewish history, which ended in devastation
for both sides and the death of hundreds of thousands. In Memoires, the effects of
81this war are described gruesomely from the point of view of Hadrien. Here, as in 
other parts of the novel, there are repeated comments on the Jewish people and their 
relationship with Rome. Apart from the Greeks and the Romans, no other constituent 
people of the empire is discussed so persistently in the novel.
Judgements on the Jewish people as a whole are invariably stem, as are those 
referring to specific Jewish personalities, with the exception of those called by 
Yourcenar ‘Juifs eclaires’, that is, Romanized or hellenized Jews.82 The Jews 
represent an anomaly and the risk of contagious illness for Rome. With reference to 
Jewish fanaticism, Yourcenar writes the phrase i a  contagion zelote’ and adds: 
Tabces juif restait localise dans l’aride region qui s’etend entre le Jourdain et la mer
RT; on pouvait sans danger cauteriser ce doigt malade.’ Elsewhere, the Jews are 
described as ‘peuple meprise et persecute’ (p. 430), ‘desherites’ (p. 430), and 
‘aveugles’ (p. 479). The question arises whether these comments and
characterizations, written just after the Second World War and with public awareness 
of the Nazi extermination of the Jews rising, can be taken as safe signs of anti- 
Semitism in the author. There is no doubt that the rhetoric of the Jewish people’s 
misery and of the danger of spiritual and political sickness which they are supposed 
to embody reproduces an age-old prejudice in Europe. However, nothing in the text
81 OR, pp. 471-480 passim.
82 OR, p. 467.
83 OR, p. 472.
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amounts to specific evidence of the author’s personal antipathy towards the Jewish 
people. If there is antipathy in this rhetoric, it concerns, in my opinion, a deeper and 
equally ancient misconception which is of aesthetic-political, rather than cultural- 
anthropological order. This misconception does not concern primarily the Jews but 
the idea of representation. It bears upon the Jewish prohibition to represent God in 
art, and by extension upon the non-aesthetic attitude of the Jews -  an attitude which 
is referred to, but not sufficiently comprehended in Memoires d ’Hadrien.
By emphasizing the aesthetic dimension in Yourcenar’s appreciation of 
Jewishness, I am not referring to the strategy of physiological misrepresentation 
through which anti-Jewish feeling was expressed, for instance, by the Nazis. 
Negative physical depictions of Jewish people are absent in this novel, and in one 
occasion the Jewish defenders are described as beautiful: ‘je vis sortir un a un les 
demiers defenseurs de la forteresse, haves, dechames, hideux, beaux pourtant comme 
tout ce qui est indomptable.’84 Beyond the inconclusive criteria of physical and 
characteriological depiction, one must rather focus on the difference in mental 
attitude between Hadrien, who sees beauty even in the fighters’ emaciated bodies, 
and the Jewish people, for whom beauty and aesthetics are categories of no relevance 
to the Mosaic law. Hadrien is incapable of empathizing with such a radically 
different view of things:
La Dixieme Legion Expeditionnaire a pour embleme un sanglier ; on en plaga 
l’enseigne aux portes de la ville, comme c’est 1’usage ; la populace, peu habituee aux 
simulacres peints ou sculptes dont la prive depuis des siecles une superstition fort 
defavorable au progres des arts, prit cette image pour celle d’un pore, et vit dans ce 
petit fait une insulte aux moeurs d’lsrael.85
From his vantage point, Hadrien can only rationalize the prohibition of artistic 
representation as a superstition and, consequently, reduce those who respect it to the 
status of ‘populace’. If Hadrien has no way of understanding the Jewish mentality,
84 OR, p. 479.
85 OR, pp. 466-467.
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the novel implies that it is mostly the Jews who do not make an effort to understand 
him. In the paragraph referring to Akiba’s visit to Hadrien for negotiations in 
Alexandria, the old rabbi is described in terms of ‘pensee forcenee’, ‘esprit sec’. It is 
specifically mentioned that he did not speak Greek.
Assiste par des interpretes, j ’eus avec lui plusieurs entretiens, qui ne furent de sa part 
qu’un pretexte au monologue. En moins d’une heure, je me sentis capable de definir 
exactement sa pensee, sinon d’y souscrire ; il ne fit pas le meme effort en ce qui 
concemait la mienne. Ce fanatique ne se doutait meme pas qu’on put raisonner sur 
d’autres premisses que les siennes ; j ’offrais a ce peuple meprise une place parmi les 
autres dans la communaute romaine : Jerusalem, par la bouche d’Akiba, me signifiait 
sa volonte de rester jusqu’au bout la forteresse d’une race et d’un dieu isoles du genre 
humain. [...] L’ignorance d’Akiba, son refus d’accepter tout ce qui n’etait pas ses 
livres saints et son peuple, lui conferaient une sorte d’etroite innocence.86
Taking into account Hadrien’s affirmation, mentioned earlier in this chapter, that he 
learned to evaluate foreign elements on the basis of Greek values, it is not difficult to 
understand why he would be perplexed by the Jewish exception. The novel is 
touching upon the question of the incompatibility between Greeks and Jews, two 
peoples which organized their history around two different ideas, representation and
0 7
its impossibility. ‘Les Grecs et les Juifs, incompatibles etemels’, writes Yourcenar. 
But even as the novel recognizes that the Jewish and the Greek mentalities are 
irreconcilable, Jewishness is strictly approached from within the Greek perspective. 
In the process the novel contradicts itself and the limits of Greek thought when it 
comes to notions and cultures which lie beyond its scope and influence become 
evident.
Signs of this contradiction are present in the above quotation on Akiba’s visit. 
Hadrien uses reason and dialogue to appeal to Akiba’s humanity with a view to 
integrating the Jews into the Roman community. The possibility that Akiba’s apathy 
might be due to the fact that reason, dialogue, humanity and community constitute 
conceptual abstractions of no value for a people refusing representation as such is not
86 OR, p. 435.
87 OR, p. 360.
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considered in the novel. Instead, Hadrien attributes the failure of the negotiations to 
Akiba’s ignorance and, significantly, ‘son refus d’accepter’. Now, acceptation is for 
Hadrien a necessary moment in the effort to understand the world. He thinks of his 
project of dialogue, pacification and re-construction of the empire as an outcome of 
his accepting attitude. Consequently, Akiba’s refusal to accept makes him a fanatic, 
in the eyes of the emperor. Akiba is represented as a revolte, someone who is 
motivated by a stubborn belief in the superiority of his own representations. This 
conclusion clashes with the recognition in the novel that the Jews are a people 
without representations. Thus, in Memoires d ’Hadrien the Jews are depicted as both 
the disinherited and blind people who hate progress and resist conceptualization and 
aesthetic representation and, simultaneously, as the arrogant people with a profound 
sense of the superiority and purity of their own representations. The novel is at a loss 
to explain why the Jews are insensitive to the Greek light, and the result is violence 
brought upon them. There is physical brutality against the population, to which, it is 
stressed, Jews respond with more brutality. The Jews are banished from Jerusalem (p. 
480), circumcision is outlawed (p. 467) and the study of the Law is prohibited (p. 
479).
As in the case of Hadrien’s doomed love affair with Antinoiis, the novel 
orientates the reader towards an aesthetico-political interpretation of Hadrien’s 
failure to hellenize the Jews, but stops short of articulating and endorsing such an 
interpretation. By refusing to go beyond the Greek ideals of beauty and order, the 
novel misconceives the Jewish ‘problem’ and problematic. One of the key aporetic 
themes in the narrative of the war in Judea is that of the proposed re-building of 
Jerusalem as a new city with the name of Tdia Capitolina and the renaming of Judea 
as Palestine. As part of his programme of reconstruction, itself built on the 
existential-political imperative of acceptance and collaboration with time, Hadrien 
intends to extend his unified aesthetic vision to the land of the Jews.
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Je previs la capitale romaine habituelle : JElia Capitolina aurait ses temples, ses 
marches, ses bains publics, son sanctuaire de la Venus romaine. [...] Ces projets 
indignerent la populace juive : ces desherites preferaient leur mines a une grande ville 
ou s’offriraient toutes les aubaines du gain, du savoir et du plaisir.88
Hadrien’s almost provocative description of the city he imagines provides the answer 
to the question why the Jews would not accept the ‘habitual’ plan of a Roman capital. 
Their stubborn attachment to their ruins and their rejection of Greco-Roman politics 
of the City are related to the fact that they, as a people, are dedicated to a law of non- 
representability rather than to an idea of beauty. Hadrien is aware of that difference 
but not of the way it undercuts his argument. After Akiba interrupts his negotiation 
with Hadrien, the latter observes: ‘II parait qu’il mourut plus tard en heros pour la
O Q
cause de son peuple, ou plutot de sa loi.’ Therefore, it is a law, not the desire for 
freedom and for the people’s well-being, which motivates the Jewish rebellion. 
Despite his awareness, Hadrien collapses that difference by having recourse to the 
vague opposition between fanaticism and common sense: ‘Je n ’en tenais que 
davantage a faire de Jerusalem une ville comme les autres, ou plusieurs races et 
plusieurs cultes pourraient exister en paix ; j ’oubliais trop que dans tout combat entre 
le fanatisme et le sens commun, ce dernier a rarement le dessus’.90
Hadrien’s homogenizing plan for the empire incorporates a particular 
understanding of difference and variety based on the all-embracing Greek paradigm. 
However, there is no room in this plan for the ‘incompatible’ case of the Jews, whose 
difference has to be eclipsed. This is why Jerusalem must be i a  capitale romaine 
habituelle’, ‘une ville comme les autres’. This is also why the Jewish god, exclusive 
as he is, must be worshipped in peace together with the other deities, as the last 
quotation above asserts. Hadrien’s perception of the god of the Jews constitutes 
another aporetic theme in the novel. He realizes that this god’s radical difference ( ‘un 
dieu isole du genre humain’) lies in the fact that this god must not be represented in
88 OR, p. 430.
89 OR, p. 435.
90 OR, p. 468.
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aesthetic artefacts but studied as a text. To this he responds by prohibiting the study 
of the Law in Judea, thus acknowledging indirectly the political importance of the 
difference between representation and its lack. Yet the uniqueness of the Jewish god 
is peremptorily denied in the novel, in the name of the Greek perception of the 
universality of the divine:
En principe, le judai'sme a sa place parmi les religions de 1’ empire ; en fait, Israel se 
refuse depuis des siecles a n’etre qu’un peuple parmi les peuples, possedant un dieu 
parmi les dieux. [...] Aucun peuple, sauf Israel, n’a l’arrogance d’enfermer la verite 
tout entiere dans les limites etroites d’une seule conception divine, insultant ainsi a la 
multiplicity du Dieu qui contient to u t; aucun autre dieu n’a inspire a ses adorateurs le 
mepris et la haine de ceux qui prient a des differents autels.91
As soon as it is guessed at, the singularity of the Jewish god is dismissed for 
transgressing the limit of acceptable difference. It may be claimed that the novel 
boldly underscores, but coyly shrinks from affirming, the incommensurable otherness 
represented by Judaism. Faced with it, Hadrien invokes the Greek conception of 
difference in harmony, order in disorder, which allows no possibility of absolute 
incompatibility. Unable to interpret Jewish monotheism in other terms than his own, 
Hadrien blames the Jews for having the arrogance to think of god as a unique totality. 
Thus he misconceives the basic quality of non-representability of the Jewish God. 
Hadrien insists on the multiplicity of a god who contains everything, whereas the 
Jews remain devoted to the singularity of a god who contains nothing.
In La Fiction du politique, Lacoue-Labarthe considers the significance of the 
Jewish god for the West in terms which are similar to those investigated in my thesis. 
His principal concern is with the Nazi extermination of the Jews, which he sees as 
the West’s ultimate attempt to eliminate its elusive other, thus coming face-to-face 
with its own essence.
Dieu est effectivement mort a Auschwitz, en tout cas le Dieu de 1’Occident greco- 
chretien, et ce n’est par aucune sorte de hasard que ceux que l’on voulait aneantir 
etaient les temoins, dans cet Occident-la, d’une autre origine du Dieu qui y avait ete 
venere et pense -  si ce n’est meme, peut-etre, d’un autre Dieu, reste libre de sa
91 OR, pp. 4 6 7 -6 8 .
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captation hellenistique et romaine et entravant par la-meme le programme de 
1’accomplissement.9
The absolute alterity of the Jews is related to their thinking of a god who is 
irreducible to the Hellenistic and Roman traditions. The presence of this wholly 
different thought within the boundaries of a European conscience which tries to 
realize and re-invent itself prompts the persecutions of the Jews and leads, in 
modernity, to the plan of their extermination. It is in this sense that the Jews 
constitute, in Yourcenar’s terms, ‘un abces’, ‘un doigt malade’, in the metaphorical 
body of an empire -  and, by extension, in the aesthetico-political construction that is 
the ‘West’ - looking to Greece in search of an identity. As I discussed earlier, 
Lacoue-Labarthe understands ‘the programme of accomplishment’ as the terrible 
culmination of the W est’s metaphysical project which involved the self-production of 
a political identity on the basis of the Greek prototype. Even though the differences 
remain palpable, this project can be broadly paralleled to Hadrien’s attempt to 
hellenize the world, while the presence of the Jews symbolically compels both the 
West, in Lacoue-Labarthe’s account, and the Roman Empire, in Yourcenar’s one, to 
release their potential for violence. The sheer scale of violence is proportional to the 
absolute refusal by the Jews to participate in the Western aesthetic construction of the 
political. This refusal does not betray stubbornness, neither does it imply that the 
Jews adhere to a different representation. If anything, it signifies the modesty of a 
way of existing outside the intellectual confines of European humanism and without 
a dream of identity:
Les juifs n’appartiennent pas a Yhumanitas ainsi definie parce qu’ils n’ont ni reves ni 
mythes. Maurice Blanchot a raison d’ecrire que « les juifs incament (...) le rejet des 
mythes, le renoncement aux idoles, la reconnaissance d’un ordre ethique qui se 
manifeste par le respect de la loi. Dans le juif, dans le “mythe du j u i f c e  que veut 
aneantir Hitler c’est precisement l’homme libere des mythes ». [...] C’est un « peuple 
» informe, inesthetique, qui par definition ne peut entrer dans le proces de l’auto- 
fictionnement et ne peut pas faire un sujet. C’est-a-dire un etre propre. [...] En somme 
les juifs sont des etres indefiniment mimetiques, c’est-a-dire le lieu d’une mimesis
92 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du po litique , p. 38.
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sans fin, a la fois interminable et inorganique, ne produisant aucun art et n’aboutissant 
a aucune appropriation. La destabilisation meme.
Lacoue-Labarthe attempts to explain here why the Jewish prohibition on 
representation situates the Jews beyond the scope of the Greco-Roman determination 
of subjectivity. In so far as this determination of subjectivity presupposes the self- 
identity of the individual in the present, it also introduces the idea of the propemess 
of the subject. Propemess, the coincidence of sign and referent which makes each 
subject unique and autonomous, is at the root of European humanism. Extreme forms 
of political modernity, such as Nazism, radicalize the humanist myth of propemess 
with regard to such ideas as nation and race. However the Jews, Lacoue-Labarthe 
claims, can be no part of this myth. Their ‘im-propemess’ is fundamentally a 
question of their reluctance to recognize the category of the proper name. The 
prohibition on representing god marks the Jews’ distance from the aesthetico- 
political logic of the West and its idea of humanitas. It means that the Jews do not 
serve the longing for identity; rather, they abide to a Law. According to Lacoue- 
Labarthe, this distinction highlights the particularity of the Jews as people of ‘endless 
mimesis’, that is, people of perpetual difference, for whom a stable subjectivity is not 
only impossible but, strictly speaking, not even desirable.
This interpretation offers a way to understand how Memoires d ’Hadrien is 
embedded in its immediate post-war context as well as how it encapsulates, exposes 
and reproduces modernity’s ambivalent discourse on (political) identity. With regard 
to Heidegger, Lacoue-Labarthe goes further than the charge of ambivalence, and 
states that Heidegger’s appreciation of the political was incorrect and his silence after 
the extermination unpardonable. For Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger’s failure is all the 
more puzzling, as he was better placed than any thinker to perceive the West’s 
violent effort to efface difference through the technological suppression of mimesis,
93 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, pp. 81-82, emphasis by the author. The quotation from 
Blanchot is from Maurice Blanchot, ‘Les Intellectuels en question’, Le Debat, No 33 (29 May 1984).
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itself reflected on the technological annihilation of the Jews. Mutatis mutandis, and 
accepting in advance that there is no question of ethical lapse on the part of 
Yourcenar, one may make an analogous claim about her. It is inconsistent with 
Yourcenar’s profound and refined scepticism vis-a-vis any kind of conceptual 
abstraction that she did not discuss anywhere the implications of the political 
aesthetic. Especially Memoires d ’Hadrien, a political novel in many ways, which 
begins with a uniquely powerful statement on the impossibility of representation, 
could offer a privileged platform for exposing Europe’s nostalgia for the self- 
sufficient political subject. In the wake of the Second World War, Yourcenar could 
see how Europe’s loyalty to the struggle for a stable universal subject led to racism 
and brutality. Indeed Memoires can be read partly as a statement of Yourcenar’s 
awareness of the fundamentally aesthetic character of politics in the West and of its 
essentially Greek origins. The novel also shows how this politics is responsible for 
sublimating and petrifying the individual (the case of Antinotis) and suppressing all 
difference (the case of the Jews). And yet, these failures are not allowed to affect the 
predominant political thesis expressed in it. This thesis still supports the possibility 
of a new aesthetico-political beginning for Europe after the war, a new universal 
representation which would allow the self-authentication of the individual, just as 
Hadrien prepares to die as the archetype of humanitas at the end of the novel. The 
empire, with Hadrien as its spirit, thus risks becoming a signifier of universalized 
difference, of a totality which contains pluralism but only at the cost of silencing the 
incompatible ‘subjects’ of absolute alterity, Antinotis and the Jews. Yourcenar’s 
courageous effort to subvert the semantics of authenticity by introducing 
impropemess to the notion of propemess and impurity to the notion of purity, 
functions here as a simple device for rescuing the essentialist politics of identity 
which emerged traumatized after the war. Thus, while in her meditations on 
existence and in her literary and art criticism she re-discovers the lost subject in its 
infirmity and inadequacy, her political thought is ultimately tied to a conventionally
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Greek (Lacoue-Labarthe would say: Platonic) perception of authenticity. In all this, 
‘the Jews’ remain repressed, and the memory of their un-aestheticism is largely 
ignored.
It is worth pointing out that a number of scholars have questioned the central but 
ambivalent place of Jewish figures in Yourcenar’s fiction, without necessarily 
portraying her as an anti-Semite. One of these scholars, Michele Sarde, traces 
references to Jews in Yourcenar’s work, interviews and letters, and attempts to 
contextualise these references in relation to other writers whom Yourcenar read. 
Sarde concludes that ‘le Juif reste pour Yourcenar l’etranger par nature qu’il etait 
exemplairement pour elle et les romanciers de sa generation’.94 Further, Sarde claims 
that Yourcenar attempts to conflate the otherness that Jews represent for her by 
evoking a general idea of universality and humanism which is supposed to transcend 
that otherness:
[Cet] humanisme niveleur [...], dans sa visee a se mettre « a la place de l’etre evoque 
», « detour par lequel on atteint le mieux l’humain et l’universel », finirait par 
deboucher sur une tolerance de 1’ intolerance et sur un amalgame de tous les malheurs 
et persecutions universels, dont la generalite finirait par les frapper de nullite.95
It is this idea of humanism, whose Greek origins I have emphasized in my thesis, that 
Yourcenar evokes in Memoires, to ensure the reader’s ‘tolerance of Hadrien’s 
intolerance’ (to paraphrase Sarde). This universal humanism is accurately juxtaposed 
by Sarde to the otherness of the Jews who, at least in Memoires d ’Hadrien, remain 
‘etrangers par nature’.
Like Sarde, Alexandre Temeuil has had access to unpublished manuscripts and 
letters by Yourcenar, now in ‘Marguerite Yourcenar Papers’, Houghton Library, 
Harvard, and has written on i a  question juive’ in her work. Temeuil shows how 
Yourcenar’s writings ‘temoignent de son attention certaine et constante face a
94 Michele Sarde, ‘Representations des Juifs chez Marguerite Yourcenar’, in Camillo Faverzani (ed.), 
Marguerite Yourcenar et la M editerranee  (Clermont-Ferrand: Association des Publications de la 
Faculte des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Clermont-Ferrand, 1995), pp. 71-82, (p. 78).
95 Sarde, p. 79. The quotations within the quotation are from Les Yeux ouverts, p. 62.
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l’antisemitisme’, and stresses that Yourcenar re-wrote and edited her work so as to 
avoid charges of racism.96 Moreover, Temeuil mentions that in the first edition of 
Jean Blot’s monograph Marguerite Yourcenar in 1971, there was a reference to 
Hadrien’s anti-Semitism which was omitted in the 1980 edition of that book. This 
reference reads as follows.
Toumons les pages relatives aux guerres de Judee et faisons vite pour n’avoir pas a 
nous demander d’ou vient a l’empereur cet antisemitisme si modeme dans le bon ton 
digne du XVIe arrondissement de Paris ou de la banlieue correspondante de Bruxelles 
et qui se resume en ceci qu’on n’a rien contre ces gens impossibles si ce n’est 
l’entetement malseyant qu’ils mettent a vivre ou a refuser de disparaitre.
Reading Yourcenar’s unpublished letters, Temeuil gives evidence that this charge of 
anti-Semitism was taken personally by Yourcenar, a fact which confirms my
98argument that she identified with Hadrien’s politics to a large extent. It was after 
the 1971 publication of Jean Blot’s book that Yourcenar began adopting a defensive 
attitude in her interviews with regard to her supposed anti-Semitism.99
To return to Memoires d ’Hadrien, one must certainly acknowledge that this 
novel does not have to be read as an oblique reference to the then recent war, neither 
does Hadrien’s Rome stand exclusively for modem Europe, let alone Nazi Germany. 
Nonetheless, the historical relevance of this novel cannot be underestimated. 
Memoires treats historically and narratively such topical political themes as the
96 Alexandre Terneuil, ‘Reflections sur la question juive chez Marguerite Yourcenar’, in Francesca 
Counihan and Berangere Deprez (eds), Ecriture du pouvoir, pouvoir de Vecriture : La realite sociale 
et politique dans I’eeuvre de M arguerite Yourcenar (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2006), pp. 107-117, (p. 
113).
97 Terneuil, p. 112, quoting Blot, in Jean Blot, Marguerite Yourcenar, coll. « Ecrivains d’hier et 
d ’aujourd’hui », Seghers, No 38, 1971, p. 149.
98 Terneuil, p. 113. On this topic, see also Josyane Savigneau, Marguerite Yourcenar: L ’Invention 
d ’une vie (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), pp. 339-340.
99 See, for instance, Les Yeux ouverts, p. 280, where Yourcenar embraces again, in 1980, the idea of 
Tintrasigeance juive’.
Scholars who have written on the presence o f the Jews in Memoires include Thomas Gergely, ‘La 
Memoire suspecte d'Hadrien’, in Revue de I'Universite de Bruxelles 3-4 (1988), pp. 45-50; and Janet 
Whatley, ‘Memoires d ’Hadrien'. A Manual for Princes’, University o f  Toronto Quarterly, Volume 50, 
No 2, (Winter 1980/81), pp. 221-237, who writes: ‘[Hadrian] is the possessor o f a marvelous formula 
for the balanced life [ ...] . That there can be other formulas o f competitive completeness barely comes 
into Hadrian’s consciousness. What is there that does not welcome the Graeco-Roman? Well, there is 
Judaea.’ (p. 233.)
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creation of a vision for Europe, the consolidation of peace and the perceived need for 
charismatic leadership, over the background of the failure of philosophy, 
historiography and the arts to provide a functional field of reference for political 
action. It should not be forgotten that Yourcenar invited the allegorical reading of her 
novel in her interviews. For example, in her 1976 interview with Claude Servan- 
Schreiber, she observes:
Quand j ’ai ecrit M emoires d ’Hadrien, entre 1948 et 1951, la raison qui m’a ramenee a 
ce sujet, auquel je pensais depuis longtemps, etait la preoccupation du Prince. Dans 
un monde qui se defaisait, etait-il encore possible (avait-il jamais ete possible ?) 
qu’un homme soit assez fort ou assez subtil pour retenir entre ses mains ce qui 
risquait de crouler? 100
But Yourcenar is already clear about the contemporary political significance of 
Memoires in the ‘Carnets de notes de Memoires d ’Hadrien1 (written in 1952), at the 
point where she describes the chronicle of the genesis of the novel. She writes that, in 
1948, she received in the USA, where she lived, a trunk from Europe, containing her 
old copies of Dio Cassius’ Roman History, and the Historia Augusta, among other 
books and notes. Here are her comments:
Cette nuit-la, je rouvris deux volumes parmi ceux qui venaient aussi de m’etre rendus, 
debris d’une bibliotheque dispersee. C’etaient Dion Cassius dans la belle impression 
d’Henri Estienne, et un tome d’une edition quelconque de L ’H istoire Auguste, les 
deux principales sources de la vie d’Hadrien, achetes a l’epoque ou je me proposais 
d’ecrire ce livre. Tout ce que le monde et moi avions traverse a Vintervalle 
enrichissait ces chroniques d ’un temps revolu, projetait sur cette existence imperiale 
d’autres lumieres, d’autres ombres. Naguere, j ’avais surtout pense au lettre, au 
voyageur, au poete, a l’amant ; rien de tout cela ne s’effa^ait, mais je voyais pour la 
premiere fois se dessiner avec une nettete extreme, parmi toutes ces figures, la plus 
officielle a la fois et la plus secrete, celle de l’empereur. Avoir vecu dans un monde 
qui se defait m ’enseignait Timportance du prince}  1
100 M arguerite Yourcenar: Portrait d ’une voix, ed. by Maurice Delcroix (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), p. 
178.
101 OR, p. 525, my emphasis.
On the same topic, see also Yourcenar’s interview with Rosbo, in Patrick de Rosbo, Entretiens 
radiophoniques avec M arguerite Yourcenar (Paris: Mercure de France, 1972), especially pp. 64-66. 
Yourcenar’s readers have not failed to notice the historical relevance o f Memoires. For example, 
George Freris writes o f Yourcenar’s double reference to the past and to the present: ‘Sous le souci 
d’Hadrien, preoccupe de laisser ses traces dans l’histoire, il faut discerner la ‘ruse’ d ’ecriture de M. 
Yourcenar, soucieuse de nous livrer ses pensees sur le monde actuel. Si Hadrien pense a l ’avenir de la 
Pax Romana, M. Yourcenar, partant de l’etat actuel du monde, songe a son avenir.’ Georges Freris 
‘L’Esprit decadent du XIXe siecle et l ’angoisse du XXIe siecle dans Memoires d ’Hadrien , in Georges
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It becomes clear especially in the italicized phrases that Yourcenar wished her 
readers to relate closely Memoires d ’Hadrien to the historical context in which it was 
written. This relation is indeed vital to the understanding of the novel, even as 
individual interpretations, including the present thesis, deviate from those suggested 
by Yourcenar. Rome, as portrayed in the novel, constitutes an allegory of Europe in 
so far as it bears some of the characteristics of Western political modernity, 
prominent among which is the search for a stable political identity at an age deprived 
of religious and humanist references. Hadrien’s failure to secure such an identity, 
much as it is ascribed to the bad faith of the masses and the ‘natural’ tendency of 
things for disorder, allegorizes the persistence of difference in representation and the 
structural inadequacy of the political subject. Elevated to the state of master and god 
and being responsible for mental and physical violence on his subjects, Hadrien 
incarnates inevitably the absolute leader of the politics of essentialism and 
aestheticism.
In this context, and probably going against Yourcenar’s intentions more than at 
any other point, I suggest that the Jews, who are the principal victims of this politics, 
be seen as an allegory of those forms of subjectivity that resist Europe’s radically 
appropriative attitude. It would of course be inaccurate to contend that the Jews of 
Memoires d ’Hadrien represent the Jews as victims of Nazism and, even less, the 
actual Jewish people. On the other hand, it is not a coincidence that their presence 
destabilizes the novel more subtly and more substantially than any character, episode, 
movement or situation. At an allegorical level, the Jews stand for the West’s 
knowledge, whether conscious or not, of the metaphysical and therefore unreal 
foundations of the ‘empire’ -  a term now resonating with diverse significations, 
including Rome, Europe, the European ‘spirit’, the European’s ‘psyche’, the Western 
political subject and the subject tout court. The allegorization of the name ‘the Jews’
Freris and Remy Poignault, (eds), M arguerite Yourcenar, Ecrivain du XIXe siecle ? (Clermont- 
Ferrand: SIEY, 2004), pp. 183-191 (pp. 189-90).
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is the principal narrative device of Jean-Fransois Lyotard’s study Heidegger et « les 
juifs ».102 I shall now turn to this book to examine how the presence of ‘the Jews’ 
points to the limits of ontological thinking and also enframes Yourcenar’s 
apprehension of difference.
Beyond the political aesthetic: Lyotard and the ‘jew s’
Heidegger et « les juifs » is a less rigorous but more ambitious work than La Fiction 
du politique, to which it is indebted. Lyotard studies carefully Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
deconstructive demonstration of European totalitarianism as a consequence of 
modem political aestheticism. He agrees that Heidegger’s thought was as finely 
attuned as any thinker’s to detect the shortcomings of the politics with which he 
collaborated. Finally, he echoes Lacoue-Labarthe’s question as to why Heidegger was 
so inexcusably reticent in acknowledging the victims of Nazism. Lyotard’s answer is 
broadly that Heidegger’s silence cannot be reduced to a fault within his thought, but 
to deconstruction’s inability fully to examine its dependence on the context in which 
it operates.103 For Lyotard, there is something in the thought of ‘the Jews’ that will 
escape even the most rigorous deconstructive operation. To designate it, he begins his 
essay by divesting the word Jews from its propemess as a noun:
J’ecris ainsi « les juifs », ce n’est pas prudence ni faute de mieux. Minuscule pour dire 
que ce n’est pas a une nation que je pense. Pluriel pour signifier que ce n’est pas une 
figure ou un sujet politique (le sionisme), religieux (le judaisme), ni philosophique (la 
pensee hebraique) que j ’allegue sous ce nom. Guillemets pour eviter la confusion de 
ces « juifs » avec les juifs reels.104
102 Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard, H eidegger et les « ju ifs » (Paris: Galilee, 1988).
103 ‘Le silence sur l’extermination n’est pas un lapsus deconstructioniste. Ou s ’il Test, c ’est la 
deconstruction elle-meme qui est au moins le lapsus.’ Lyotard, H eidegger, p. 122.
104 Lyotard, Heidegger, p. 13.
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By allegorizing ‘the jew s’, Lyotard releases a signifier which cannot coincide with a 
specific referent, thus introducing the idea of the heterogeneity of a non-appropriable 
subject.105 ‘The jew s’ signify the people and peoples who have resisted the West’s 
spirit of creativity and the impulse to establish identity-forming institutions, because 
they lead a life of intellectual and geographical homelessness. Lyotard includes in 
this account Jewish and non-Jewish modernists alike, such as Celan, Kafka, Joyce, 
Proust, Beckett, Freud, Adorno and even Celine, among others. What these artists, 
thinkers and writers have in common is that they lent their voice to those excluded 
from modem political and philosophical discourse, those whom Lyotard and Lacoue- 
Labarthe call le dechet, the industrial waste of modem geo-politics and geo­
philosophy.106 The following passage from Lyotard’s book carries echoes from the 
phraseology of La Fiction du politique. Through the references to the Western 
‘empire’ which tries to found itself to the detriment of ‘the jew s’, it also supports my 
reading of Memoires d ’Hadrien.
II me semble que [...] « les juifs » sont dans l’« esprit » de l’Occident, occupe a se 
fonder, ce qui resiste a cet esprit ; dans sa volonte, la volonte de vouloir, ce qui 
entrave la volonte ; dans son accomplissement, projet et progres, ce qui ne cesse de 
rouvrir la plaie de l’inaccompli. Qu’ils sont l’irremissible dans son mouvement de 
remission et de remise. Qu’ils sont le non-domesticable dans l’obsession de dominer, 
dans la compulsion a l’emprise domaniale, dans la passion de l’empire recurrente 
depuis la Grece hellenistique et la Rome chretienne, « les juifs » jamais chez eux la ou 
ils se trouvent, inintegrables, inconvertibles, inexpulsables.107
105 In his book A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics o f  Identity (Berkeley: University o f California 
Press, 1997), Daniel Boyarin questions Lyotard’s freedom to allegorize ‘real, upper-case Jews’. He 
writes:
The critical text which has gone furthest in employing ‘the jew ’ as an allegorical trope for otherness is 
Lyotard’s recent H eidegger and ‘the je w s ’. [ ...]  But why does Lyotard feel free to appropriate the 
name ‘the jew s’? [ ...]  I want to insist in response to Lyotard that there is a loss and a danger either in 
allegorizing away real, upper-case Jews or in regarding them primarily as a problem for Europe, (p. 
220.)
While I cannot go here into the details o f Boyarin’s argument, I would point out that I see nothing 
wrong with the freedom o f any writer to use allegory (of any name, proper or otherwise) as he or she 
wishes. Besides, as I discussed in Chapter 2, allegory is a way o f dislocating the sign rather than 
repressing its polysemy. It is only to a preconception of properness and a desire for constancy of 
meaning that allegory can do any harm.
106 Lyotard, Heidegger, p. 151, Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, p. 38.
107 Lyotard, Heidegger, p. 45.
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Obliquely present in this passage is a critique of Heidegger’s voluntarism, ( ‘la 
volonte de vouloir’), expressed politically through Heidegger’s collaboration with the 
Nazi regime, and philosophically through Dasein’s resolution to found itself 
authentically. Moreover, the phrase T «  esprit » de l’Occident’ hints to De Vesprit, 
Derrida’s deconstruction of the term ‘spirit’ and its demarcations in Heidegger’s 
writings.108 Further in his book, Lyotard applauds Derrida’s conclusion that 
Heidegger’s thought needed a metaphysical supplement, the projection of Europe’s 
‘spirit’, so as to be politically functional and have an impact on his audience. 
However, Derrida’s deconstruction, as that of Lacoue-Labarthe, are still deemed too 
nihilistic or too much attracted by the ‘demon of philosophizing’ to capture the 
incommensurability of the thought of ‘the jew s’.109 What is, then, that Heidegger 
could not think about ‘the jew s’ and in what principal ways did he fail to transcend 
the Western philosophical tradition, according to Lyotard? It is worth giving a brief 
account of the principal argument of Heidegger and the “jew s”, as it opens a way to 
understand how Yourcenar failed to respond to the alterity of the Jews in Memoires 
d'Hadrien, a novel written to celebrate difference and irreducibility.
Lyotard resumes here his controversial reading of the Kantian sublime, in order 
to establish a radical difference between the sense of beauty and the indeterminate 
feeling of the sublime. Rather than delve into Lyotard’s commentary on Kant, I will 
concentrate here on the way the difference between the beautiful and the sublime 
complicates the history of the W est.110
The sublime is a feeling of pleasure and pain, ‘une motion a la fois attractive et 
repulsive, comme une sorte de spasme’. This feeling exceeds by far the potential of 
the mind’s faculties, including the imagination, to apprehend, structure and represent
108 Jacques Derrida, H eidegger et la question (Paris: Galilee, 1987).
109 Lyotard, Heidegger, pp. 121 and 136.
110 On this subject, see especially Lyotard’s Legons sur Vanalytique du sublime (Paris: Galilee, 1991). 
Other essays on the Kantian sublime by Lyotard include ‘Reponse a la question : Qu'est-ce que le 
postmoderne ?’, Critique, No 419 (avril 1982), and ‘Le sublime et 1’avant-garde’, in Lyotard, 
L ’Inhumain: Causeries sur le temps (Paris: Galilee, 1988), 101-118.
2 6 3
Chapter 5 -  Political Aestheticism
sensory experience. It does not lend itself to structural or dialectical analysis and 
cannot be tamed by any aesthetics of beauty. ‘Ce sentiment temoigne que du « trop » 
a « touche » l’esprit, trop pour ce qu’il peut en faire. C’est pourquoi le sublime n ’a 
nulle consideration pour la forme, est « informe »’. Contrary to the beautiful, this 
‘feeling of the mind’ does not give rise to a linear temporalization of experience: 
‘sentiment incompatible au temps, comme l’est la mort’.111 The temporality of the 
sublime can best be approached, according to Lyotard, with reference to the Freudian 
idea of Nachtraglichkeit, deferred action. The sublime feeling is akin to the belated 
response of the psychic apparatus to a shock for which it was unprepared and which 
has left it in a state of permanent infancy. In psychoanalysis, this shock stems from 
the paradoxical timing of sexuality, which registers in the psyche both too soon and 
too late, thus stalling its development. Being at a loss to ‘figure out’, that is, to 
structure and represent, that which has affected it, the psyche fails to temporalize the 
sexual event.
It is this failure to temporalize that Lyotard compares with the W est’s failure to 
historicize itself. He considers Western thought as a psychic apparatus under a 
permanent shock which it can neither fully narrativize nor totally repress and forget. 
Since the event which occasioned this shock is non-representable, Lyotard does not 
have a specific name for it, although it certainly revolves around the metaphor of 
sexuality. In any case, the historical effect of this event is unmistakable. Lyotard 
thinks of the Western tradition as an effort to repress the memory of the ‘unthinkable’ 
event, through the various mises en scene proposed by speculative thought. This 
tradition begins with Greek aesthetics, philosophy and rhetoric, and it is constantly 
challenged by ‘the problematic of the unpresentable’ which ‘emerges with the 
question of the sublime’:
On essaie evidemment, les Romantiques notamment, la pensee speculative, de
refermer [la problematique de l’impresentable], de refouler secondairement la chose,
111 A ll the last quotations from Lyotard, Heidegger, p. 61.
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en en faisant une esthetique (dialectique, ironique, humoristique, dandy). Alors 
qu’avec cette etrange notion, qui par Longin et Boileau, nous vient non des Grecs 
mais des juifs et des chretiens, c’est la these, la position meme, de Vaisthesis qui est 
mise en jeu, la possibility et la pertinence du beau et par consequent la poetique 
classique, tragedie incluse, au sens d’Aristote.112
As far as Christianity is concerned, Lyotard specifies that although it partakes in the 
perpetual promise of a closure that would allow the naming of the event, it has 
already confirmed the presentation of the Other, the Messiah, on earth, and it keeps
1 1 0
confirming it every day in church. It is only ‘the jew s’ who are hostages to a 
promise that is never fulfilled, and which must remain a promise: ‘On se rappelle 
tout le temps que ga arrivera, et ce qui arrive est seulement qu’on doit se le rappeler 
[...] Doit suffire a sauver l’interminable et la promesse.’114 The task of contemporary 
art and writing is defined along these lines as the effort to save this promise, to repeat 
the impossibility of an end and a closure.
Ce que l’art peut faire, c’est se porter temoin non du sublime, mais de cette aporie de 
l’art et de sa douleur. II ne dit pas l’indicible, il dit qu’il ne peut pas le dire. [...] Tout 
ce que je sais faire, c’est de raconter que je ne sais plus raconter cette histoire. Et cela 
devrait suffire.115
Following Adorno, Lyotard writes that, especially after Auschwitz, art can no longer 
be concerned with beauty and taste. Art cannot be mimesis, because absolute 
otherness has no form and does not lend itself to aesthesis, to sense perception. 
Writing and art must be anaesthetic so as to resist the effacement of the difference 
between rerpesentability and the sublime -  an effacement attempted by the Nazis, but 
continued in the contemporary managerial or late capitalist world. ‘C ’est de cette 
resistance extreme que l’ecriture et l’art contemporains peuvent nourrir leur 
resistance au « tout est possible », et d ’elle seulement. L’anesthesie pour lutter contre 
l’amnesie.’116
112 Lyotard, Heidegger, p. 65.
113 Lyotard, Heidegger, p. 68-69.
114 Lyotard, Heidegger, p. 68.
115 Lyotard, Heidegger, p. 81.
116 Lyotard, Heidegger, p. 84.
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According to Lyotard, the extermination camps were the site of the W est’s - and 
not only Nazi Germany’s - most concerted effort to obliterate the memory of the 
‘unsayable’. The Jews were not seen by the Nazis as an enemy in any immediately 
political or military way. But they constituted a threat in that they were the bearers of 
a Law which provides that the promise of total representation, the W est’s Greek 
dream, shall remain unfulfilled. Consequently, exterminating the Jews was a 
prerequisite for the accomplishment of the West’s aesthetic project.
It is at this point that Lyotard begins to diverge from Lacoue-Labarthe’s account. 
Lyotard cites Lacoue-Labarthe’s claim, which I quoted earlier, that the Jews were the 
principal victims of the extermination because they remained the witnesses in the 
West of another origin of God, of another God.117 In this perception of ‘another 
God’, Lyotard discerns the persistence of onto-theology, of the thought of Being, 
which deconstruction cannot articulate. ‘Si ce Dieu est autre, ce n ’est pas comme un 
autre Dieu, mais comme autre que ce que l’Occident greco-chretien nomme Dieu. 
Autrement que Dieu, parce qu’« autrement qu’etre » (Levinas)’.118 In a similar vein, 
Lyotard discusses the claim that God died in Auschwitz, which is repeated in La 
Fiction du politique. He writes: ‘Dieu ne peut pas « etre mort » puisqu’il n ’est pas 
une vie (esthetique). II est un nom de rien, le sans-nom, une loi seulement 
inapprochable qui ne se signifie pas dans la nature en chiffres, mais se raconte dans 
un livre.’119 This notion of the singularity of the Jewish god, foreign to Christian 
monotheism and, generally, to the Western perception of the divine, is one that is not 
adequately accounted for in Memoires d ’Hadrien, as I showed above. I will return to 
this point shortly.
Heidegger et les « juifs » defines a differend between on the one hand beauty and 
representability, descending from the tragic and archaic Greek tradition, and on the
117 See n. 92, this chapter.
118 Lyotard, Heidegger, p. 131.
119 Lyotard, H eidegger, p. 129.
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other, the art and writing of the sublime and the thought of the ‘anaesthetic’, as they 
have been monotonously re-iterated by the allegorized ‘jew s’. The result of this 
incompatibility is the silencing and the misery which ‘the jew s’ suffer. In terms of 
this differend, Lyotard attempts to demarcate the limits of deconstruction, as 
practiced by Heidegger as well as by his post-structuralist followers, which certainly 
does not authorize this silencing, but has nevertheless nothing to say about it.
[Demeurant] etablie dans la pensee de l’etre, dans le prejuge « occidental » que 
l’Autre est l’etre, [la deconstruction] n’a rien a dire d’une pensee de qui l’Autre est la 
Loi. Elle n’en predit rien, assurement: elle n’en dit rien. Son silence trahit la me^rise 
par laquelle tout « savoir » s’en prend a 1’Autre sous le nom de la verite de l’etre. 0
This passage also explains why, unlike Lacoue-Labarthe, Lyotard does not find 
Heidegger’s silence after the Holocaust enigmatic. From his point of view, the 
thought of ‘the jew s’ is as incommensurable with Heidegger’s ontology as it is with 
recent deconstruction. For Lyotard, neither Heidegger nor Lacoue-Labarthe or other 
deconstructionists can approach the thought of radical otherness, in so far as 
otherness is still determined by them in terms of Being, or its negation or 
modification. Since Being is always related to aesthetic representation (and more 
specifically to techne, the authentic representation of physis by man), ontology 
cannot come to terms with the otherness of the anaesthetic of which the ‘jew s’ are a 
fitting allegory.
In the same vein, Lyotard challenges Lacoue-Labarthe’s judgement that 
TExtermination est, a l’egard de l’Occident la terrible revelation de son essence’.121 
For Lyotard, nothing is revealed by the extermination, in so far as the thought of the 
Other, the thought of ‘the jew s’ was both known and repressed before, during and 
after the War. That which the extermination made plain, according to Lyotard, was 
not ‘the essence of the W est’, but that there is no essence, no Being. Consequently, 
the art and writing of the sublime aim not at revealing or revolutionizing Europe’s
120 Lyotard, Heidegger, p. 145.
121 Lyotard, Heidegger, pp. 136 and 144. S ee  n. 30  in this chapter.
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essence, but at using representation in order to signify the impossibility of 
representing.
To be sure the above brief foray into what is arguably a set of meditations by 
Lyotard, rather than a philosophical thesis, touches only tangentially on the issue of 
the margins of philosophy and the beginning of the thought of the Other. Still, I 
suggest that it shows a direction for evaluating further Yourcenar’s attempt to 
reconcile difference and authenticity in representation.
In the light of Lyotard’s book, Memoires d ’Hadrien appears to be very close and 
yet very far from the thought of the Other. Very close, because the persistence of 
difference is the main theoretical theme of the novel, and the consistency with which 
this theme is treated is its main characteristic. The endless deferral of the referent in 
art, philosophy and poetry haunts Hadrien at the opening chapter of the novel and 
qualifies from the start its two central questions, that of existence and that of politics. 
The love affair with Antinoiis introduces the problematic of the heteronomy of the 
subject while his death underlines the distance between the self and other human 
beings. The theme of the Jews, underexplored and stifled as it may be, is still strongly 
present in the novel, as if Yourcenar were toying with an idea which could challenge 
radically her proposal for a new beginning for Europe. Questions of difference are 
also shaping narrative choices concerning the genre of the historical novel, from 
history to fiction and vice versa, and more generally the way to re-capture the ‘past’ 
in the ‘present’-  a topic which remains sufficiently relevant to the present thesis.
At the same time, Memoires d ’Hadrien stands very far from the thought of the 
Other, due to Yourcenar’s persistent suggestion that authenticity - existential, artistic, 
literary and political -  is still possible after the War and perhaps then more than ever 
before. This belief led her to re-negotiate the notions of authenticity, purity and 
originality in such a way as to reconcile them with the fact of difference. 
Inauthenticity becomes for her a new form of authenticity, repetition a new form of 
originality; disorder is integrated in order, and finally difference ends in identity. As I
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have tried to show, this reworking of conventional metaphysical themes leads to a 
fascinating, if peculiar, existentialism. However, it fails to support a theoretically 
solid understanding of the political. When transposed to the level of politics, 
authenticity and identity prove to be entirely dependent on a traditional perception of 
aesthetics. Politics, however expanded as a notion to include impurity, temporality 
and polyphony, proves immediately to be a form of shaping and projecting: shaping 
the people into a cohesive community and projecting a sense of identity onto this 
community.
Thus Yourcenar proposes a spatio-temporal project which remains within the 
logic of aestheticism, while insisting that this project is based on difference and the 
overcoming of aestheticism. Lacoue-Labarthe’s and Lyotard’s commentaries show 
that Heidegger’s spatio-temporal project is similarly aesthetico-political in its 
constitution, as Heidegger’s writings of his more openly political period manifestly 
show. Especially Lyotard’s Heidegger et « les juifs » points to a way of thinking 
difference that cuts across the Greek determinations of the natural and the beautiful, 
and attempts to go beyond the thought of Being. In Memoires, the episode of 
Antinotis and, principally, the narrative of Hadrien’s Jewish wars touch the limit of 
the ontological, before the novel recoils back to the safer discourse of authenticity. 
To paraphrase Lyotard, in Memoires d ’Hadrien, the nostalgia for the authentic 
suppresses ‘the promise of nothing’.122
The persistence of the Other
Marguerite Yourcenar remained constant in her belief that authentic subjectivity is 
possible within a universal aesthetic premise which is never seriously put under
122 Lyotard, Heidegger, p. 129.
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question in her work. To this universalism, I have opposed Lyotard’s and Lacoue- 
Labarthe’s searches for the subject of a radical difference which has never been 
seduced by the aesthetico-political humanism invented in Europe. This subject is also 
undoubtedly sought by Heidegger (in Being and Time, in ‘Letter on Humanism’ and 
elsewhere), as both the above thinkers concede, despite what they see as his failures, 
which they recognize as the failures of philosophy as such. It is now the moment to 
add that this ‘other’ subject is also sought by Yourcenar, despite her obsession with 
the idea of universality, Greco-Roman or oriental.
The thought of the Other, of the improper and the unoriginally different, survives 
almost in spite of itself and almost inconspicuously, in various parts of her criticism. 
Some of the best examples, I suggest, come from ‘Humanisme et hermetisme chez 
Thomas Mann’, an essay which is never very far from the thought of the ‘unsayable’ 
and the ‘inexplicable’. It contains a phrase which would sound strange coming from 
any conventional humanist: ‘La verite demiere est une verite d’epouvantement.’123 
Starting from her own humanist viewpoint, Yourcenar has to accept Mann’s ‘dark’ 
humanism whose referent is not ‘man’ or ‘nature’, but something more enigmatic 
which cannot be represented. Yourcenar refers to the famous quote from Hamlet, 
‘What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties 
[ ...] ’,124 and then she remarks:
Mais deja la phrase de Shakespeare sur les infinies facultes humaines ouvre la porte a 
une autre forme d’humanisme aux aguets de tout ce qui, en nous, depasse les 
ressources et les aptitudes ordinaires ; elle debouche quoi qu’on fasse sur 1’immense 
arriere-plan peuple de forces plus etranges que ne le veut une philosophic pour qui la 
nature aussi est une entite simple. Cet humanisme toume vers l’inexplique, le 
tenebreux, voire l’occulte, semble de prime abord s’opposer a Fhumanisme 
traditionnel: il en est bien plutot l’extreme pointe et l’aile gauche.125
Although Yourcenar is characteristically keen to rescue the idea of humanism, and 
even to reduce Mann’s ‘hermeticism’ to a form of traditional humanism, she
123 EM, p. 173.
124 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene II.
125 EM, p. 193.
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certainly looks here to a direction beyond the aesthetic. She stands ‘sur le bord de 
l’informule et de 1’ineffable [ou] les mots et les concepts se taisent’, as she writes in 
another essay.126 All that a writer can do at this point is state that she can go no 
further by means of representation.
However, the voice of the ‘Other’, of the ‘inhuman’ subject which remains 
forgotten, without ambition and without authenticity, can also be heard occasionally 
in Yourcenar’s fiction. It is not so much specific fictional characters that convey this 
state of dissolution, as individual moments in the text. An example comes from the 
concluding paragraphs of the novella Anna, soror.... Anna, the incestuous sister, 
lives in a kind of tortured apathy, where even i a  consolation des larmes lui etait
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refusee’. She is beyond pain and even beyond mourning for the dead brother-lover: 
‘Comme d’autres se fouettent pour renflammer leurs sens, Anna se flagellait de ses 
pensees pour raviver son deuil, mais sa douleur epuisee n ’etait plus qu’une lassitude. 
Ce coeur mortifie se refusait a saigner.’128 Anna lives in excess of her own humanity 
and her mourning is without content. In the convent where she withdraws towards the 
end of her life, she resumes the reading of the Catholic mystics, but not for the 
meaning their texts contain.
Le livre restait ouvert sur le regard de la croisee ; Anna, assise sous le pale soleil de 
l’automne, posait de temps en temps sur une ligne ses yeux fatigues. Elle ne cherchait 
pas a suivre le sens, mais ces grandes phrases ardentes faisaient partie de la musique 
amoureuse et funebre qui avait accompagne sa vie.129
Structurally, the function of this passage is to prefigure Anna’s imminent death as a 
resolution to the drama of her life. Nonetheless, it also points to an interpretation 
which does not involve reconciliation and closure. As Anna reads, looking not for the 
meaning of the text, but for the musicality of the phrases, we are invited to think of 
her as an old woman who is free from the narrative of her life. Free, not because she
126 In ‘Ton et langage dans le roman historique’, EM, p. 305.
127 OR, p. 927. Marguerite Yourcenar, Anna Soror...(Paris: Gallimard, 1981), for the first edition.
128 OR, p. 928.
129 OR, p. 929.
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has found redemption, but because she can now be silent, outside all discourse. To be 
sure, Yourcenar quickly discounts this interpretation and implies that Anna was 
‘reunited’ with her brother cum lover cum Messiah at her deathbed. Still, Anna in her 
final years and days remains a powerful image of a woman who knows that no 
mythicization or representation can alleviate her pain.
The final quotation where the thought of the Other appears comes from Denier 
du reve, Yourcenar’s most openly political novel, although not also her most 
resourceful, in my opinion. It contains a passage which comes very close to an 
understanding of those whom Lyotard allegorically called ‘the jew s’. Indeed, it is a 
young Jewish character, Massimo Iakovleff, who talks to Marcella Sarte, an Italian 
communist, determined to shoot Mussolini that same evening.
Sais-tu, reprit-il a voix basse, il m’arrive de penser que c’est nous, nous qui ne 
sommes pas purs, nous qui avons ete humilies, depouilles, salis, nous qui sans jamais 
rien avoir avons tout perdu, nous qui n’avons ni pays, ni parti (non! non! ne proteste 
pas), qui pourrions etre ceux par lesquels le regne arrive... Nous, qu’on ne corrompra 
plus, qu’on ne peut pas tromper... Commencer tout de suite... a nous seuls...130
The voice of the ‘Other’ is here unmistakable. Yourcenar draws from a traditional 
discourse of exile and deprivation, which is neither necessarily nor exclusively that 
of the Jews, and transforms it into a state of the mind and the soul that is totally 
incommensurable with political aestheticism. This discourse cannot be ‘cheated’ or 
‘corrupted’ because it is not susceptible to the seduction of purity -  it is already 
impure. Moreover, it cannot be appropriated by any geopolitics or geo-philosophy 
because it belongs nowhere, it has no home. It is not the discourse of a people, but 
that of the alienated and the dispossessed who never possessed anything: ‘nous qui 
sans jamais rien avoir avons tout perdu.’ Massimo’s call to Marcella to ‘start 
immediately’ aims at dissuading her from her plan to kill the dictator. From her 
answer, it is clear that she is not listening:
130 OR, p. 233.
2 7 2
Chapter 5 -  Political Aestheticism
« Tu es comme un enfant », dit-elle doucement sans pretendre 1’avoir ecoute ou 
entendu. « Si je te fais confiance, c’est parce que tu as l’air d’un enfant. »
Marcella’s answer typifies Yourcenar’s attitude towards the discourse of otherness. 
Massimo’s voice is lost, neither audible nor comprehensible, in the midst of the fight 
between conflicting systems of representation. By calling him ‘un enfant’, Marcella 
excludes him from her system of concepts and ideas, which opposes fascism, but is 
not its ‘other’.
Yet Marcella understands perfectly well. By calling Massimo ‘un enfant’, she 
recognizes in him that state of the psyche which Lyotard, drawing from Freud, calls 
its permanent infancy. She sees that even though Massimo lives the same existential 
anxiety and historical terror as herself, he does not have the means to represent it and 
wishes no dramatic catharsis for it. Marcella’s simultaneous deafness and profound 
attention to Massimo’s voice marks an extraordinary moment of awareness of 
Yourcenar’s ambivalence towards existence and the political-aesthetic.
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This thesis was motivated by a desire to understand the notion of authentic selfhood 
in Marguerite Yourcenar’s fiction and criticism. Her implicit but persistent 
suggestion that an authentic relationship with the world was still possible in late 
modernity seemed to me difficult to accept and yet well supported in her work. From 
Alexis (1929) to Quoi? L ’etemite (1988), Yourcenar made clear that such a 
relationship must be achieved ‘les yeux ouverts’, that is, in the hie et nunc of 
individual, political and historical existence.1 This uncompromising attitude meant 
that she had to negotiate with the main obstacle on the way to authenticity, namely, 
the lack of immediacy in the self’s dealings with the world. It also meant that she had 
to take into account the knowledge of this lack as a key feature of modernity.
My research was focused primarily on Memoires d ’Hadrien, as this novel 
allowed me to approach the authentic hero of Yourcenar’s narrative from a dual 
perspective, that of existence and that of politics. In the character of Hadrien, the 
existential and the political subject are articulated as a function of each other and are 
examined by Yourcenar in the context of history, considered as a progressive 
aestheticization of experience. I have tried to show that Yourcenar’s attempt to define 
the existential and the political subject in a uniform manner was based on the idea 
that conceptual representation complicates both of these aspects of subjectivity in the
1 ‘Les yeux ouverts’ is the last phrase o f M emoires d ’Hadrien (1951), and the title o f Yourcenar’s 
published interviews with Matthieu Galey. See also n. 45, Chapter 4.
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same manner. Beyond Memoires, I relied on other novels, essays on culture, literature 
and art, as well as paratextual material by Yourcenar, to further support my claim that 
the subject is perceived by her in terms of its fleetingness and differentiality.
It is this understanding of the differentiality of the subject which situates 
Yourcenar’s thought at the heart of the modem problematic of subjectivity. In my 
analysis, I highlighted the specifically modem parameters of Yourcenar’s perception 
of the self, but also of language, culture, spatio-temporality and narrative. Given her 
reluctance to contextualize these themes with reference to cultural and philosophical 
modernity, as well as the relative dearth of relevant studies, it seemed to me 
important to compare her views with those of some of her contemporary thinkers 
who were preoccupied with similar concerns. I tried to show that there are consistent 
analogies between Yourcenar and Paul de Man’s idea of the rhetoricity of selfhood, 
Walter Benjamin’s critique of aesthetic and cultural modernity, and Martin 
Heidegger’s analysis of spatio-temporality. Beyond thematic kinship, these analogies 
extend to the interpretative paths followed and, in certain cases, to the solutions 
found.
With reference to Paul de M an’s thinking on rhetoric, time and history, I 
attempted to show how deeply Yourcenar’s thought is marked by the ironic 
knowledge of inauthenticity. Her idea of the gradual re-authentication of the work of 
art as it slowly disintegrates in the course of its ‘life’ provides a vital clue for 
understanding the mechanism by which she attempts to rescue the possibility of 
authenticity in the modem context. Through a semantic inversion of concepts, she 
locates authenticity within the repetitive and the inauthentic, purity within the factical 
and the impure, and subjectivity within the impossibility of the subject.
The semantic inversion of authenticity was further paralleled with Benjamin’s 
idea that modem art opens up the possibility of interpreting reality as illusion and 
vice versa. In modernity, what was previously considered as ‘real’ loses its aura and 
is revealed as a representation. On the other hand, modem representations, especially
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film, are shown to contain the real in distorted form. One such representation is 
translation, which reveals the source text’s true fragmentary character. Yourcenar 
understands Memoires d ’Hadrien as a literary and aesthetic fragment, deprives it 
from its aura, and re-authenticates it by designating this novel as a translation.
But it is with Heidegger’s existential phenomenology that Yourcenar’s 
perception of selfhood and art presents the most extensive analogies. There is a 
sustained commonality of thought between these two thinkers concerning their 
understanding of facticity, their critique of conceptuality, and their perception of 
tradition and history. In Chapter 4, I claimed that Yourcenar follows Heidegger in 
underlining the role of the self in producing its own space and time. For both 
thinkers, man exists always in a state of spatio-temporal difference in relation to the 
world, but this permanent difference defines the paradoxical authenticity of the 
existential subject. This subject becomes authentic by accepting difference. I tried to 
show how the idea of acceptance led both thinkers to develop a similar understanding 
of man’s role as guardian of the world / shepherd of Being, a position which 
originates in a non-anthropocentric humanism whose basic principles are also 
common to both.
The analogies between Yourcenar and Heidegger extend further, to what their 
theories of existence and history knowingly exclude or do not manage to think 
adequately. In exploring these negative analogies, the thesis moved on from 
investigating the notion of authenticity in Yourcenar and identifying its modem 
features to criticizing the desire for authenticity and demonstrating its philosophical 
limits. In Chapter 5 ,1 tried to show that Yourcenar’s inverted concept of authenticity 
is in fact anchored on a model of universality which she associates with ancient 
Greece. Furthermore, I tried to trace the marks of an incompatible difference between 
this Greek aesthetico-political model and the ‘anaesthetic’ people of ‘the jew s’ -  a 
term coined by Lyotard to refer to all the people, whether Jews or not, who suffer the 
violent repercussions of the W est’s quest for identity. Re-reading Memoires under the
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light of these definitions, I found evidence that the vision of European identity 
promoted in the novel was in fact not free from the metaphysics of modem political 
aestheticism. As the figure of Hadrien suggests, it is not possible to imagine a non- 
totalitarian political subject as long as subjectivity is evaluated in terms of identity 
and authenticity, whether inverted or not.
Two sets of issues arise from this discussion. The first has to do with a possible 
re-evaluation of Yourcenar’s work after the discrediting of the idea of authentic 
subjectivity. The second set of issues concerns the possibility of the subject, its 
political and existential ‘identity’ and its continuing significance in the broader 
historico-political context of postmodemity.
As regards the first set of issues, I would like to raise four points which may also 
be read as suggestions for further research.
a. This thesis suggests that the modernity as such of Yourcenar should no longer 
be a topic of debate. Rather, the question now is to study further the ways in which 
Yourcenar perceives and processes specifically modem themes and sensibilities. In 
my thesis, I highlighted some of these themes, including fragmentariness, the 
awareness of irony and the facticity of the self. I also suggested that Yourcenar’s 
relationship with modernity is so formative in her work that it extends to what the 
modem, in some of its manifestations, excludes and forgets -  most markedly, the 
thought of the Other, beyond ontology, aestheticism and humanism. Comparative 
studies of Yourcenar’s work in relation to other approaches to existence and 
subjectivity, such as those by Nietzsche, Sartre and Camus, could further support 
these arguments. Moreover, Yourcenar’s theatre and autobiography constitute 
particularly interesting sources for investigating the presence of modernity and even 
postmodemity in her work.2
2 There have already been studies examining the specifically modern features o f Yourcenar’s theatre 
and autobiography. For example, see Andre Blanc’s essay ‘Marguerite Yourcenar et la tentation
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b. Further, in my thesis I found evidence that the notion of authentic subjectivity 
in Yourcenar is based on an exclusive concept of totality and universality and can 
only be pursued at the expense of what the West rejects as a non-subject (the 
voiceless figure of Antinoiis, ‘the jew s’). Consequently, the question arises as to 
whether we now must understand the Yourcenarian subject as an ideological and 
potentially violent formation, a projected or imagined identity between man and 
world, and therefore the very thing against which it is supposed to stand. I certainly 
do not think so. In the first four chapters of my thesis I tried to show that Yourcenar 
makes no concessions in her attempt to think the subject in terms of the rupture 
which separates it from itself and precludes the possibility of identity. This is the 
point of re-interpreting identity as the constancy of difference, and authenticity as 
repetition and re-construction. This subject cannot be reduced to the autonomous, 
self-sufficient subject of metaphysics, even if its metaphysical or even totalitarian 
aspects are revealed, once it is projected onto the level of history and politics. It may 
well be, as I claimed, that Hadrien is not the liberated and post-ironic political subject 
that Memoires suggests -  as does Yourcenar herself in her interviews and ‘Carnets de 
notes’. Still, he represents, in my opinion, a consciously modem moment in the 
ongoing quest for a subject which tries to comes to terms with its infirmity and 
heteronomy.
Like any interpretation which claims to be critically ‘solid’ and ‘objective’, my 
argument that the figure of Hadrien gives in to the impulse of the metaphysical and to 
the illusion of representability necessarily contains an element of generalization. It 
must be stressed that Yourcenar’s work articulates more than one form of
theatrale : raisons d’un echec’, in Maria Capusan et al. (eds), M arguerite Yourcenar: Citoyenne du 
monde (Clermont-Ferrand: SIEY, 2006), pp. 63-73. Blanc compares Yourcenar’s efforts as a 
playwright to the theatre o f Giraudoux, Sartre, Anouilh and Cocteau. With regard to Yourcenar’s 
autobiography, I already mentioned May Chehab’s ‘Cerner l ’etre, une figure de la modernite ?’, at the 
beginning o f Chapter 3. Anna Elizabeth Snyman’s L ’Autorepresentation dans le Labyrinthe du monde 
de Marguerite Yourcenar (2003), constitutes a more extensive investigation o f Yourcenar’s dialogue 
with the modern and the postmodern in her autobiography. Unpublished thesis, 
<http://etd.rau.ac.za/theses/available/etd-03292004-100448/> [accessed on 27/08/07].
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subjectivity, and in fact culminates in the quasi-total absence of the subject (the 
writer herself) in her autobiography. For that reason, I finished Chapter 5 by giving 
some examples of how the presence of a different subject, which is not thoroughly 
thought in Memoires, persists in the Yourcenarian text. Future research would be 
able to trace more instances of that irreducible otherness in Yourcenar’s work.
c. One question that needs to be addressed further is that of realism as a 
technique of authentication of the text, and as a ‘distortion of distortion’ of reality. In 
chapters 1 and 2 of my thesis, I examined the idea that realism in Yourcenar is not 
the arbitrary identification of a linguistic sign with a referent but a narrative strategy 
for leaving in obscurity what cannot or must not be represented. Realism was proven 
to be intimately linked with Yourcenar’s thought on existence and art, and it was 
understood in the context of accepting difference in representation. Should this 
definition of realism be re-evaluated in the light of my later conclusions? If it is true 
that Yourcenar’s narrative is partly motivated by a desire for identity, then is it also 
arguable that realism is used in her work to intimate that identity is indeed possible, 
after all? For instance, if, as I argued in Chapter 5, Memoires d ’Hadrien suggests that 
a new identity based on the Greek archetype is possible for Europe in the wake of the 
Second World War, is the realism of the novel one way of supporting this 
suggestion? These questions relate to the broader issue of whether realism 
necessarily serves the desire for narrative unity, for the effacement of difference, and 
for the self-sufficiency of fictional representation.
However, realism means different things at different times for different writers 
and readers. As Buck-Morss argued with reference to ‘The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction’, even film, the most ‘faithful’ representation of reality, 
can be used for the purpose of critical enlightenment or its opposite.3 A further 
discussion of realism remains beyond the purview of my thesis. At the same time, I
3 See Chapter 3, n. 24.
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believe that realism as such does not relate to the controversial discourse of 
authenticity and political identity in a necessary way. Let us remember that Proust 
used realism for his extensive deconstitution of the subject in A la recherche du 
temps perdu, while on the other hand Heidegger’s re-constitution of Dasein in Being 
and Time is far from realist. I think that Yourcenar’s effort to reclaim realism for the 
20th-Century novel remains valid. It enabled her to read Thomas Mann’s fiction and 
Cavafy’s poetry in an original way, as I discussed in Chapter 1. Even more 
importantly, it allowed her to approach narratively what she called i ’informule et 
[...] l’ineffable’, and to access negatively what she thought that lied beyond the 
limits of language.4
d. Finally, Yourcenar’s theory of history and especially of the writing of history 
could be researched further along the lines of the present thesis. While I did not focus 
especially on historiography and the relationship between history and fiction, I have 
been discussing a number of themes that would be central to such a study. These 
include: Yourcenar’s perception of history as an accumulation of traditions and 
representations; the perception of the past as being essentially of the same substance 
as the present; the ensuing possibility of empathetic identification with the past 
through the projection of the self in time; and the representability of history in 
writing, in so far as all existence, including the past, can be depicted in terms of its 
simultaneous presence and absence. While there has been much scholarly interest in 
Yourcenar’s understanding of history and in her technique as a writer of historical 
novels, the study I am envisioning would seek to investigate these topics in relation 
to modernity and the way it figures in Yourcenar’s perception and philosophy of 
history.5
4 EM, p. 305, from ‘Ton et langage dans le roman historique’.
5 Prominent among other publications on Yourcenar’s relationship on history is Maurice Delcroix 
(ed.), Roman, histoire et mythe dans Vceuvre de M arguerite Yourcenar (Tours: SIEY, 1995).
2 8 0
Conclusion
With regard to the second set of issues, those that bear upon the concept of 
subjectivity and its vicissitudes, my thesis has referred to some key moments in the 
deconstruction of authenticity in modernity and beyond. Heidegger’s critique of the 
autonomy of the Cartesian ego, Benjamin’s account of the loss of aura, and de Man’s 
rejection of the possibility of authenticity are complemented by Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
suggestion that the subject can be approached in terms of its ‘inherent infirmity’. 
This, as I explained, is a subject which ‘desists’, which is ‘nothing in and of itself, 
and which, under different guises, we have always invested with the desire for a 
‘stable essence’ and a self.6 Although this thesis does not seek to offer conclusive 
assertions about the state of the contemporary discussion on subjectivity, it endorses 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s assessment. Heidegger’s effort to preserve the possibility of 
existential and historical fulfilment ended in failure and demonstrated the limits of 
philosophy and the perils of the discourse of authenticity. Lacoue-Labarthe’s ‘infirm’ 
subject (or rather, infirm ‘subject’) constitutes an effort to re-think subjectivity 
beyond the measure of authenticity / creativity / identity and their opposites. As 
Lyotard explains further, this subject cannot be evaluated in terms of the authenticity 
or otherwise of its relationship with the world. This subject, Lyotard insists, should 
be the Other, not simply the structural opposite, of the authentic subject of onto- 
theology.
Thus understood, the thought of absolute alterity is only contingently present in 
Yourcenar. Still, we must remember that she brought together Hadrien, the 
philhellenist emperor-poet, and Rabbi Akiba to the negotiation table. At a crucial 
moment in Memoires she juxtaposed allegorically the Greek thinking of subjectivity 
and representability with the Jewish experience of infinite otherness which resists 
representation. My point remains that ‘the negotiation table’ as the scene of this 
meeting favours Hadrien’s voice and his skills in dialogue and reasoning, to which
6 Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique, pp. 71-72.
2 8 1
Conclusion
the Rabbi can only respond with a monotonous and monologous repetition of his 
alterity. The more the Rabbi’s voice is stifled, the more we realize that the dialogue 
and the peace of which Yourcenar is dreaming are not possible. This impossibility is 
stressed by Derrida, who, in his essay ‘Violence et metaphysique’, asks himself:
Sommes-nous des Grecs? Sommes-nous des Juifs? Mais qui, nous? Sommes-nous 
(question non-chronologique, question pre-logique) d ’abord des Juifs ou d ’abord des 
Grecs? Et l’etrange dialogue entre le Juif et le Grec, la paix elle-meme, [...ont-ils] la 
forme de la separation infinie et de la transcendance impensable, indicible, de 
1’ autre?7
This thesis has explored this ‘transcendance impensable, indicible’ in relation to 
Yourcenar’s thinking of i ’informule et [...] 1’ineffable’. It has attempted to show 
that Yourcenar developed a characteristically modem understanding of difference 
and alterity. In many ways, the concepts of representation, identity, subjectivity, and 
authenticity in Yourcenar’s writing touch, and press on, the limits of philosophy in 
European modernity, as they appear to us today. Thus, her fiction and criticism stand 
at a critical juncture in the history of modem European thought where literature and 
philosophy negotiate their limits, and the narrative subject comes face to face with its 
Other.
7 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence et metaphysique’, L ’Ecriture et la difference (Seuil: Paris, 1967), pp. 
117-228, (pp. 227-28), emphasis by the author.
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